

*James Edmundson*


PALLAS ARMATA.

Military Effayes  
Of the ANCIENT  
GRECIAN,  
ROMAN,  
AND  
MODERN  
ART of WAR.

Written in the Years 1670 and 1671.

By Sir JAMES TURNER, Knight.  
*Scotts draught & del. fully*

LONDON,  
Printed by M. W. for Richard Chiswell at the Rose and Crown in  
S. Paul's Church-yard, MDCCLXXXIII.



*Vera Effigies  
Jacobi Turneri Equitis Aurati.*

*Printed for R. Chiswell at the Rose and Crown in S. Pauls Church Yard.*

*Povera Soldatesca, cui nel Pericolo si canta l'Osanna,  
e papato ch'egli è, s'infortunato crucifigge?*



TO HIS  
Royal Highness  
**JAMES**

Duke of ALBANY and YORK,  
His MAJESTIES only Brother.

*May it please your Royal Highness,*

**T**HE Dedication of Books hath  
been so old, and still is so uni-  
versal a custome, that to dis-  
allow it, would be perhaps  
look'd upon as affecting Sin-  
gularity a little too much; yet I could  
never learn any convincing reason for  
that Practice. The greatest Monarchs  
that



that ever liv'd could not protect Books from Censure : and, I think, it were against reason they should, for except in matters of Faith and State, (and not in them neither, where the Almighty and his Vicegerents have set no limits,) no restraint should be laid on Men, to hinder their embracing and enjoying their own Opinions, and arguing against those of others. Wherefore I shall not be guilty of so high a presumption, as to beg from your Royal Highness the Patrociny of this Work of mine ; in which, I have not the Vanity to doubt but that there may be many more Errors than I can well help. Nor shall I carry my Presumption to so extravagant a pitch, as to desire your Royal Highness to cast your Princely Eye on any thing contain'd in this Treatise ; You have given the World too publick demonstrations, how great a Master you are in the Art of War, to go to those Schools again, especially to learn from such as I am : And now in this happy calm under his Majesties most merciful Government, You are giving signal proofs of your great desire of Peace, notwithstanding your abilities and skill in War. I could enlarge my self much on this Head, without coming within the suspicion of Flattery, a sordid Vice in all Men, more especially in those who profess Arms. But my only design in  
this

this Humble Address is, with most submissive thankfulness, to acknowledge the Princely favours, you have so Nobly, but I am afraid undeservedly, bestowed upon me ; and to declare how ready I am to venture what remains of a Life, now almost worn out, in making all those dutiful returns that become,

May it please your Royal Highness,


Your most Humble, most Faithful,

and most Obedient Servant,

JAMES TURNER.

---

T O



TO THE  
Generous Reader.

**I**F the Subjects of Great Britain and Ireland live in so profound a repose, that they scarce hear the woful crys of their Neighbors, harass'd and oppress'd by that dreadful Monster War, that great Boar of the Forest, which makes desolate Cities and Provinces, so that their Sleep is not broke by the unseasonable sound of Trumpets, and the rattling of Drums, nor are they frighted out of their Houses ( I had almost said, out of their Wits ) by the sudden Infalls and Attacks of a fierce Enemy; they have good reason to bless and praise the God of Peace for so great a happiness, and with a thankful acknowledgement, pray for his Vicegerent, the King, under whose auspicious reign they enjoy these *Halcyon* days, and under whose Government, if they cannot sit under their own Fig-trees and Vines, at least they may eat the fruit of the one, and drink the Juice of the other in Peace and Quiet. Yet let them remember, that War follows Peace, as naturally as Night does follow Day; and that after a sweet calm, a dreadful storm is to be looked for, against which the wary Pilot carefully provides. If you think I do hereby invite all Gallant Spirits in time of Peace, to provide themselves for War, you are not at all deceiv'd. I do indeed desire, that when War comes unexpectedly (as often it does) it may not find brave men surpriz'd, and to need instruction in those necessary Military

Military things, which they might have learn'd before at full leisure.

If you be one of those, who either already knows, or imagines you do know all the rules of the Ancient and Modern Art of War; Or if you be one of those who desire to know neither of them, I shall advise you, to save your self the Money to buy, and the trouble to read this trifle of mine. It is with none of you that it seeks acquaintance, it walks in another Stage. It is to you, Young Lords and Gentlemen, it makes its humble address; It is to you, Generous Souls, that it offers its service: And it is from you (whose birth entitles you to Martial Exercises) that it expects a fair welcome and entertainment. Most, or many of you will not learn these Peaceable Arts and Sciences, without which no Principality or Republic can well or long subsist; and all of you cannot be admitted to the Stern of Government, or permitted to sit at the Kings Council-board: It will be therefore for you to consider, how you can serve your Prince and Country but by Arms. The ancientest of you all derive your Pedegree from those who bore Arms, it is by Arms you had your Honour, and it is by Arms you are bound now to maintain it. I shall not bid you look to those of your own rank and quality in France, who glory to learn the Military Art from them, and yet their example deserves imitation; but I shall entreat you to follow the footsteps of your Martial Ancestors, and account it more honour for you by Warlike Exploits to shew you are their Worthy Successors, than to pretend to it only by a vain muster of their old Charters, Patents, and Commissions. If this prevail not with you, then set before your eyes, but at a very great distance, the Most Illustrious Prince James, Duke of Albany and York; no mortal can boast of a higher Birth and Extraction, yet that did not hinder him in his younger years to learn the true Art to fight Battels both at Sea and Land, which hath made him now so famous all the World over. Nor do I desire you to rest satisfied when you know indifferently well to exercise Companies, Troops or Regiments of Horse and Foot, though that be both good and necessary; let there be a *plus ultra* with you, and endeavour to know all that belongs to a compleat Souldier; for you are indeed the stock out of which our

our Sovereign should chuse his Military Commanders, and then there will be the less need of such persons as I am, whom the World nick-names *Souldiers of Fortune*. Remember it is not your Native Courage and Valour (though that be an essential part) though every one of you were as stout as ever *Hector* was said to be, that will serve your turn; it is knowledge in Martial affairs that you are to learn; and though the Art of War be a Practical one, yet the Theory is so needful, that without it you may be Common Souldiers good enough, but not good Commanders; you are to know more than you daily see; for it is a sign of a very mean Officer, when he tells you he likes not such a thing, because he never saw it before. I wish with all my heart, that this following Treatise may afford you some help to so noble a Study: In it I give you few, or rather no rules of my own, I am not so vain; but I go very far back to search for them in all the remains of Antiquity: And let it not offend you, that I illustrate Rules and Customes of War by several Instances; I do it purposely because the Nature of Man is rather led by Example, than driven by Precept: This seems to impose, that only to invite to a Noble Emulation: Besides, the right or wrong doing of an action, with all its circumstances, is better clear'd by the first, than by the last. And if I seem to clash with the old Masters, or new Tactics of the Ancient or Modern Art of War, I give my Reasons for it, which you may either approve or disapprove as you please, without doing me the least injury. When I tell my own opinion of Military Customes, looking back as far as I could find any glimmering light of History to direct me; I give also my Reasons, which you may likewise reject if you please, for by so doing I shall neither be condemn'd for Heresie nor Schism.

If any Gentlemans curiosity leads him to enquire, Why I Print this Book? I shall Answer him first, I can sincerely assure him, Vanity to make my self known in the World push'd me not to it, else I had not let it lye unprinted by me ten whole Years after first I wrote it. Next, very few could importune me to publish it, since very few did know I had writ it. Nor did I, indeed, make it publick to disabuse some gay men, by letting them see they knew no

more than their Neighbours ; and yet the doing so had been Charity, if my offer had been receiv'd as kindly as I intended it. The consideration that induc'd me to it was in short this, When I had ended all I had resolv'd to say of the *Grecian* and *Roman* Art of War, and durst not hazard on the vast Ocean of the Modern Art, I was encourag'd to proceed to that, and to bring all I intended, to as great perfection as I could, by a great Master, and good Judge in those affairs : And when I had done so, that Noble Person, after my concealment of it some years, desir'd to peruse it ; and as he had perswaded me to finish, so he prevail'd with me to publish these Essays : But be pleas'd to know, he was such a one as his Majesty had made choice of in the year 1666. to command his *Scottish* Army, towards the end whereof he routed the Rebels at *Pentland* : The very same Person was again entrusted by his Majesty, with the conduct of his Forces, in the year 1679. and continues still in that Command, and is well enough known by the Name of General *Dalyell*. But I am afraid you may ask me, What mov'd me to begin to write these Discourses ? But for that, if I were put to the Rack till I give you my Reason, I could give no other than this, That being out of employment, and not accusom'd to an idle life, I knew not how to pass away my solitary and retired hours with a more harmless divertisement.

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PALLAS

## CHAP. I.



PALLAS ARMATA.

# Military Essays ON THE ANCIENT AND GRECIAN ART of WAR.

## CHAP. I.

*Of the Ancient Militia in General.*



PEACE is the choicest of all Earthly Blessings: One Peace is better than innumerable Triumphs: It is that Blessing which carries all other external ones in its Bosom; without it no man can say he either enjoys himself, or any thing he might call his own. The terrible Wars which our Passions raise within our Breasts against our Reason, make us cry to Heaven for that inward Peace, whereof neither Man nor Devil can bereave us. Even so, those people, among whom the seat of War is, send up their frequent Petitions to the God of Peace, to remove that dreadful Scourge from them; but the pity is, when their Prayers are heard, and that they have obtain'd the so much desir'd and long'd for Peace, few or none of them study to preserve so inestimable a Jewel.

Peace a choice Blessing.

Many Nations have, and do this day enjoy a quiet Peace, but seldom or never had the whole habitable World a general Cessation of Arms, but when *Augustus* shut the Temple of *Jannu*: And it was fit that it should be so then, when the Prince of Peace was to descend from the Mansions of Peace, to enter the Womb of the Immaculate Virgin. But it is not my Work to decant of Peace, the Elogies whereof have been loudly enough proclaimed many Ages ago.

If Peace be so great a Blessing, it will follow, that War must be a very heavy Curse, and so, no doubt, it is. It carries all evils, and all plagues in the Belly of it; it extirpates Families, destroys Nations, and drains Provinces of both Men and Money; it breaks up and dissolves Humane Societies, and it tramples on all Laws, both Divine and Humane, except that of the longest Sword; or it makes them run all after it like Lacqueys. I believe, if the Prophet *Gad* had spoke nothing of Pestilence, but given *David* his choice of War or Famine, the *Psalmist* had undoubtedly chosen the last, as the less Plague. For, though all the three be from God; (for there is no evil in the City which is not from the Lord) yet War is but mediately from God, and immediately from Man: And the King of *Israel* chose rather to fall into Gods hands, than Mans. Besides, both Pestilence and Famine have been, and undoubtedly will be, in the World without War; but it is almost impossible, that War can be of any continuance in a Land, but it will draw after it both Pestilence and Famine, as its inseparable concomitants. Yet this dreadful and devouring Plague of War is not only permitted, but commanded by the Almighty, to dwell among the Sons of Men. Gods own chosen people were by his own appointment afflicted by it, and did also by that same authority afflict others with it.

Enmity and feud had its beginning in the World soon after its Creation, not only between the seed of the Woman and the Serpent, but between Man and Man, yea, Brother and Brother, *Cain* and *Abel*; neither doth it matter much, with what Weapon the one kill'd the other, since experience teacheth us, that man can be sent to his Grave a thousand ways without the help of a Sword. This was a Private War, which still continues, and will last till time be no more, between Man and Man, and sometimes, Family and Family. A Publick War is twofold, a Foreign and a Civil War. The Foreign is of one or more Nations against one or more Nations; if undertaken to encrease Dominion, conquer or enslave others, or yet to hinder the growth of a neighbour Potentate, it is unjust. Of the justifying causes of a Foreign War, Authors are to be consulted, that write purposely on that subject, particularly *Hugo Grotius*, *De jure Belli & Pacis*: let it be enough to say in this place with *Augustin*, that there can be no cause of a just War, but an injury done, whether it be to Princes, Subjects or Embassadors, and that no satisfaction, after it is required, can be got. And indeed this War should be formally denounc'd, otherwise it derogates from the Justice of the cause. This to me seems clear from the definition the Civilians give of an Enemy, *Hostes* (say they) *sunt qui nobis, aut quibus nos bellum decernimus; ceteri latrones, aut predones sunt*: Those are enemies, who either have denounc'd the War against us, or we against them; others are Thieves or Robbers. And *Cicero* in his Offices, *Nullum Bellum est justum, nisi quod aut rebus repetitis geratur, aut denunciatio ante sit, & indictum; No War is just, but what is made for restitution, or denounced or indicted before*. Neither will the War that *Joshua* made against the seven Nations of the *Canaanites*, impugn what I have said of the just cause of a War; for though these Nations had, perhaps, done no wrong to the *Israelites*, yet *Joshua* had a particular Warrant from God for what he did, which few or none but he can pretend to. It is true, neither he nor *Moses* were commanded to fight with the *Amalekites*, yet the Lord approved of it afterward.

The *Grecians* denounc'd their War by a *Caduceus*: The *Romans* by their *Feciales*, whose custom was to stand on the *Roman* Territory, and throw a Spear or Javelin against the Land of those whom they declared Enemies. In these later times, besides the denunciation of the War, a Declaration (ordinarily, called a *Manifesto*) is emitted by the Aggressor, whereby he either doth make the Justice of his War appear to the world, or at least endeavors

vours it. And though the persons of Embassadors were wronged and violated against the Law of Nations, yet the War should be denounc'd by a Letter, or some such way, saith *Grotius*; yet we read that *David* used any such previous civility to *Hannu* King of *Ammon*, after he had affronted his Embassadors.

A Civil War may be likewise two-fold, the one sort is of the great men of a Free State, one against another, as that of *Sylla* against *Marius*, Father and Son, and *Cesar* against *Pompey*, Father and Son among the *Romans*; or in a Monarchy of those who are competitors for the Crown, as the War was between the Houses of *Tork* and *Lancaster*. The other is of Subjects against their Sovereigns, which can never be lawful, let the pretext be never so specious, I mean on the Subjects part; for I make no doubt, but a Sovereign, whether Prince or State, not only may, but ought by the power of the Sword to reduce their rebellious Subjects to their Duty, when by no other means they can prevail with them. Both these kinds of Intestine Wars are called *Civil*, because they are *inter Civis unus Republica*; Among the Citizens of one Commonwealth. It is the worst of all Wars, and that wherein there is not so much as the least shadow of Civility. This War arms Brother against Brother, for which we need not search History for Examples: In this War the Son thinks he doth a meritorious work if he betrays his own Father; and the Father conceives he super-erogates, if he sheaths his Sword in his Sons Bowels, because, saith he, he did not rise to fight the *Lords* Battels, even against the *Lords* armed; for this War extinguisheth all natural affection among the nearest in Blood. This sort of War feeds Coblers and other Mechanicks to the Pulpits; to torture their Audience with Non-sence. This converts Souldiers into Preachers, who by virtue of their double callings, belch out Blasphemies against the great God of Heaven, and rebellious and opprobrious Speeches against his Vice-gerents on Earth. And on the other hand, this War metamorphoseth Preachers into Souldiers, and tells them, that a Corslet becomes them better than a Canonical Coat, and a broad Sword better than a long Gown: It whippers them in the ear, that Christ would not have bid those of his Disciples who had two Coats, sell one of them, and buy a Sword, if he had not intended to leave War as a Legacy to his followers, as well as Peace. It tells them, they ought in their Sermons to summon Subjects under the pain of eternal damnation, to rise in Arms against the Sovereign Power, because they are hidden Curses *Merot*; who would not come out to help the Lord against the Mighty: Yet very few of them can tell you, whether *Merot* was a Prince, a City, or a Country. But I dwell too long here.

Not long after the Flood we find numerous Armies raised by *Nimrod* and his ambitious Successors, to subject others of *Noah's* race to their lawless dominion: And indeed, if the Stories of these very ancient times be true (as they are very much to be doubted) we read not of so great Armies (except some in Holy Writ) as those, which *Ninus*, and the famous *Semiramis*, and the Kings of *India*, whom she invaded, brought together. It is pity we should not know how they were armed, and in what order they fought: I suppose there were Wars in the World, before there was any to record them. The *Egyptians* wrote in Hieroglyphicks, and therefore, I believe, next to *Moses*, we are obliged to the *Grecians*, for giving us a glimpse of Antiquity. And truly; even they wrote the occasions, the causes, the beginnings, the progress, and issues of Wars so confusedly, and fabulously, that we can but little on their relations, till themselves became renown'd by the stout resistance they made against the *Persian* Monarchy; and yet even then, they give us but little light, how other Nations, besides themselves, managed the War, what Art or Order they used in their Battels, or how their Combatants were Armed.

The Sacred Story mentions no Battel fought after the Flood, or before it, till that of *Chadivlaomer*, and other three Kings, against the five Kings of the Plain. But we may presume, there were many bloody bickerings before that, when *Nimrod*, *Belus*, *Ninus* and *Semiramis* (if *Ninus* was not *Amraphel* one of the four Kings, whereof I much doubt) impos'd the yoke of Slavery on so many Nations. In this Battel fought in the plain of *Sadam* and *Gomorraha*,

War a horrible Curse.

Companions of War.

Private War.

Publick War.

Foreign War.

When just.

Indictio Belli.

Joshua his Wars.

It is the worst of Wars.

Antient Histories fabulous.

The Battel of  
Sodom.

the five Kings were beaten, but how either they or their Adversaries fought, with what Arms, or in what Order, the History tells us nothing. The Conquerors carry away a great booty, and many Prisoners, and among them *Lar*, and the endeavouring his rescue, made the War just on his Uncle *Abraham*'s side: He follows, and overthrows the four Kings, and brings back all the Goods and Prisoners. *Abraham* had no particular Warrant for this War, but it was approved, for thereafter *Melchizedec*, the Priest of the most High God, blessed him; nor was it needful for the Father of the Faithful to denounce the War, because he look'd upon himself there, as an Ally, if not a Subject of some of the five Kings, particularly him of *Sodom*. The Text makes this action of *Abraham* a surprisal; for it is said, he smote them in the night. We find he Armed three hundred and eighteen of his own Servants, but with what kind of Arms, either for Offence or Defence, we know not; and yet it would seem, his Servants had learned to handle their Arms, for some of our Translations have it, He armed his train'd Servants. By this place of Scripture, it appears that these Kings had fought together before, because it is said, the five Kings rebell'd against *Chadlosamer*, whom they had serv'd twelve years; now it is more than probable, they had fought at least once with him, before they offer'd to do homage to him, but *Moses* mentions not that, as not being to his purpose, his design there being only to give us the Story of *Abraham*.

Egyptians  
good Warri-  
ours.

*Pharaoh* follow'd the *Israelites* with six hundred chosen Chariots, saith *Moses*; and with two hundred thousand Foot, and fifty thousand Horse, saith *Josephus*: but how these Chariots, these Horse, and these Foot were arm'd, what order they kept in their pursuit, or what discipline they had, neither the one nor the other tells us. But we may suppose well enough that the *Egyptians* were well armed, and knew the Art of War; and that *Joshua* and other Captains of the people of *Israel*, might have learned from them the contemplative part of their Military skill, which afterward they practis'd on those Nations they were ordain'd to root out. And if the Kings of *Egypt* had War with the *Ethiopian*s while the *Israelites* were under them, I make no doubt, but many of them serv'd in these Wars. *Xenophon* commends very much both the valour and the skill of those *Egyptians* who were with *Cyrus*, at that Battel which he fought with *Cyrus*: And it is very like that the *Grecians* themselves got the rudiments of their Art of War in *Egypt*, as well as of other liberal Sciences; and it is like, *Lycurgus* taught the Rules of the Military Art to his *Spartans*, which he had learned from the *Egyptians*, as well as he did other civil constitutions. From the *Lacedemonians* did the *Thebans* learn their discipline of War. The *Theban* *Epaminondas* and *Pelopidas* taught it to *Philip* of *Macedon*, and he to his Son, the Great *Alexander*, whose glorious acts obscured all the famous exploits of the rest of the *Grecians*. We need not doubt each of these added something of their own to what they had learned, for by such means all Arts come to perfection.

So were the  
Spartans.

Facile est in-  
venire addere.

## CHAP. II.

### Of the Arms, and Order of War of the Ancients.

Sword.

TO find out the Arms, or Art of War of these Ancient Nations, whether *Jews* or *Gentiles*, till the *Grecians* wrote their own actions, we have very little light. To begin with the *Israelites*. In the foregoing Chapter I observed, that their great Patriarch *Abraham*, fought with four Kings and routed them; he was, no doubt, the first, but not the last of the race of *Eber*, who fought a Battel. I told you also, it is not known how he armed his servants and followers. That all or some of them had Swords, is no more but a probable conjecture, for we do not read of that Weapon in Scripture or any other Book, till *Simson* and *Levi* (who were *Abraham*'s great Grand-children) co-

vering

vering their cruel revenge with the cloak of Religion, (of so old a date is that mischievous practice) destroy'd the *Sechemites* with Swords; for it is said, Each man took his Sword.

That the *Israelites* had Arms, wherewith they fought against *Sihon* and *Og*, and other people, is not at all to be doubted: In the Wilderness they could not get them; and therefore, I think, that they brought them out of *Egypt* with them, should be no question; but how they came by them, to me is a very great question. For I think it not at all probable, that those Kings or those *Pharaohs*, who so grievously oppress'd them, would suffer so many hundred thousands of them to be arm'd, no more, than afterwards the *Philistines*, when they had the upper hand, would suffer a Smith to dwell in *Israel*. For my part, I believe, at their coming out of *Egypt*, they borrow'd all manner of Arms from the *Egyptians*, as well as they did better movables, for they had alike right to all.

But what kind of Arms they us'd, when they fought with those Nations whom they extirpated, what Art or Order they us'd in their Marches and Battels, both before and after they came to the Land of Promise, we are yet to learn: yet we find mention'd, for the Offensive, Swords, Javelins, and Spears; and for the Defensive, Targets and Shields (I suppose Head pieces could not be wanting) are recorded to have been in the Magazines of their several Kings; nor did they want their great Artillery of Balists, and Catapults, as shall be declared in its proper place. Yet, if all the *Philistines*, according to their several Statutes, were proportionably arm'd as their Champion *Goliath* was, and all the *Israelites* as well arm'd as their Neighbours the *Philistines*, we may safely conclude, they were as well arm'd every jot, as the *Grecians* or *Macedonians* were afterwards. We find likewise they had Chariots; but how many, or how arm'd or order'd, we know not. We may also probably conjecture, their Files were ten deep, when they march'd their Battalions, for I find they had Companies and Regiments much about the number of those of those our latest modern Wars: for we read of Captains of thousands, who were such as our Colonels; Captains of hundreds, who were Centurions, and like our private Captains; Captains of fifties, such as our Lieutenants. It is pity, *Josephus* (who was a great Captain himself) did not transmit the Military Art of his Countrey-men to posterity, it had been worth his labour.

As little, or indeed less light doth any Author afford us to know the Arms, Order, and Discipline of the *Assyrians*, to whom the first Monarchy is given, by the universal consent of History. But we find, that not only they, but the *Persians*, *Indians*, and other Nations us'd Elephants and Chariots.

The Elephant of *India* is said to be a far more courageous Beast than that of *Africk*: They are yet made use of in the Wars of that Countrey. Of old they carried wooden Towers on their backs, wherein were lodged armed men, who threw Darts and Javelins among the bands of the enemies, through which these dreadful Creatures were furiously driven, who of themselves were sufficiently able to break the strongest and best compos'd Squadrons of armed men: But when they were gall'd and wounded, and turned head, then they did that mischief to their Masters, that was intended for the Enemy. The *Romans*, before their Wars in *Greece*, made no use of them; and though at first *Pyrrius* terrified them with the sight of these, indeed, terrible Beasts; yet thereafter they found means to wound them, or by making lanes and treets for them, to render their fury so useless, that they got but little hurt by them. But for all this, I cannot have faith enough to believe what *Livy* reports, that an armed Souldier enter'd into combat with an Elephant, and that the Beast grappled him with his Trunk about the middle, and cast him up in the air, but that the Souldier falling with little or no hurt, wounded the Beast with his Sword. I should be of opinion, that such a hug as that might have crush'd both the Souldiers Corlet and his Bones, till the Marrow came out; for in his Trunk (which the *Latin*s call *Proboscis*) there is such strength, that therewith, as some write, he is able to fell Trees; or I think, the Elephant might have toss'd his Duellist so high in the air, that the very fall should have dash'd him in pieces. But *Livy* did no more see this Romantick combat, than he saw showers of Blood

Arms of the  
Israelites.

Their Order.

Assyrians.

The Ele-  
phants.

and Stones, which he writes rain'd frequently among the Territories of the Romans and their Allies.

Chariots in ancient times had sometimes Scythes on both sides of them, sometimes none. *Xenophon* writes that before *Cyrus* time, the *Trojans* and *Assyrians*, and thereafter the *Cyrenians* used Chariots drawn with four Horses, in every one whereof was only one Combatant, and a Driver or Coachman. This fashion seem'd to *Cyrus*, of no greater advantage than to skirmish a little, but did not at all help to beat an Enemy rang'd in Battel: Therefore he abolish'd it, and order'd his Chariots to be made with strong and broad Axle-trees, to both sides of which were fasten'd Brags or Iron Scythes; next he put armed men within the Chariots, who in the charge discharg'd lustily their missile Weapons, wherewith he took care that they should be well stored: and with these he did not only sometimes skirmish, but for most part charg'd furiously the Enemies strongest and closest Bodies and Battalions.

The *Egyptians* Arms for the Offensive, were great and massy Spears, faith *Xenophon*, but how long they were, he doth not tell; and for the Defensive, they had Shields of Brags, of such a largeness, that therewith they cover'd both their Bodies and their Legs. They marshall'd their men one hundred in File, and when this was told to *Cyrus*, he made himself merry with it, and said, he wish'd all his Enemies would draw up a thousand deep, for so they should be the more easily surrounded, their flanks sooner attack'd, and consequently, said he, I should have the cheaper market of them. By what that same Author faith, it would seem, the *Egyptians* drew up constantly an hundred deep; for when *Craesus* desir'd them to change, they answered, They would not alter their Countrey fashion. Yet I conjecture, the *Egyptian* custome hath been to marshal their Battalions by the square root, for here I find their Body consisted of ten thousand men, and they perhaps being desirous to make a square of men, (which is to have as many in File as Rank) have embattel'd them, a hundred in each; for a hundred times a hundred produceth ten thousand. Of the Square Root I shall speak hereafter.

The *Persians* that serv'd on Foot in *Cyrus*'s time carried for the Defensive, a Head-piece, Corset, and a little Target; and for the Offensive, a Sword and a Curtle-axe, besides their Darts and Stones. His Cuirassiers and Light-horse were arm'd as the *Grecians* were, whereof I shall speak in the next Chapter. In his time, the *Sacans* and *Cardusians*, a people dwelling near *Persia*, were excellent Bow-men on Horse-back, whose off-spring, in all probability, were those *Parthians*, who by their valour and skill in that manner of fight, roused the Army of the *Roman* Consul *Craesus*, and kill'd himself; and put *Mark Anthony* to so shameful a retreat, and so near a danger of evident ruine, that oftner than once he offer'd to rid himself of that impending disgrace by Self-Murther, as *Plutarch* in his Life relates. *Cyrus*, who was the first *Persian* Monarch, did not adhere to one constant number of Ranks; for sometimes he drew up his Battalions ten in File; and it is like, he observ'd that most, for he had Myriarchs, who had the command of ten thousand; Chiliarchs, who were Colonels of thousands; and Centeniers, who were Captains of hundreds; all which may infer ten deep. Yet in *Xenophon*'s second Book, we find *Cyrus* his *Persians* to be twelve in File; and his Battalions, when he fought with *Craesus*, were four and twenty deep; and indeed that was deep enough: Perhaps in the marshalling his several Bodies, he hath sometimes made use of the Square Root: But the King of *Lydia*, in that same Battel which he fought with *Cyrus*, made both his Horse and Foot thirty deep, except the *Egyptians* I spoke of, who were an hundred in File, as I told you formerly. What more I have to say of any point of War used by any other ancient Nation, either before, or in the time of either the *Grecian* or the *Roman* greatness, shall be interwoven in the discourses of the Militia of these two famous Nations.

CHAP.

## CHAP. III.

Of the Election, Levy, and Arms Offensive and Defensive, of the Grecians.

Since we have found out but little of the true Militia of other Ancient Nations, let us take a survey of the *Grecian* Art of War, which hath been in many ages, and still is so much spoken of. And herein we must borrow all our help from *Alian*, who, you will find, hath given it us very sparingly. For though we have the works of *Homer*, and that he is accounted the first Heathen Author, who wrote any thing of formed Battels; yet we are not to expect much light from so blind a Lantern. *Polybius*, though a *Grecian*, and a Captain, contributes nothing to our assistance, but what we are glad to glean from the scattered drops of his Pen. The rest of the *Grecian* Tactics nam'd by *Alian* in his Treatise, are lost, except some pieces of *Antas*, translated into *Latine* seventy years ago by *Cajanbon*, which Sir *Thomas Kellie* thought were likewise perisht. But truly we need not much regret that loss, if that which *Alian* (who perus'd them all) tells us, be true, that they wrote not, as if they intended to instruct those who were ignorant and desirous to learn; but as to those who were already Proficients, who understood the words and terms of Art, and who knew the practice of the *Grecian* War, as well as the Authors themselves.

All Armies and Forces were rais'd by a Levy called ordinarily in ancient times, and still very properly, an Election. And truly, I am sorry I should so soon have occasion to expostulate with *Alian*, who hath forgot to tell us that, of which he should have given us a particular information, and in the first place too; that is, how the levies of the *Grecian* Souldiers, either of Horse or Foot, were made, at what age they were enroll'd in the Militia, and how long they were obliged to serve. Of these particulars I shall tell my Reader, that *Lipsius* out of *Demosthenes*, faith, that none were elected till they were eighteen years old (this was a year later than the *Romans* chose theirs) and that they were bound to serve till the five and fortieth year of their age. But *Ulpian* faith, that the *Athenians* did indeed elect and enrol their Souldiers when they were eighteen years old, but made them only do Military duties within their own territories (which was, upon the matter, to train them) till they were twenty. After that, they were bound to serve in foreign expeditions till they were forty, and then they were dismiss'd. I think it strange, they would dismiss men in the very strength of their age; I should rather think, they then only left it to the Souldiers choice, to serve longer or not, as they pleas'd, but did not by any publick act or ordinance disable or incapacitate them to serve longer in the War. I find also in Authors, that the *Greeks* had an especial care (as all Nations should) to chuse persons, who as members apt for several functions, were fit to compose the great Body of their *Phalans*: For many can serve on Foot, who would make but bad Horse-men; and many are able enough to carry a piece of light Armour, and Offensive Weapons, who cannot bear the burthen of Head-piece, Corset, Greaves, Tablets, and Targets. And this is shortly all I can say of the *Grecians* Election of their Souldiers.

The Ancient *Greeks* compos'd their Armies of Horse-men, Foot-men, Chariots, and Elephants. Of the two last I have spoken. We are now to see how the other two were armed.

The Foot-men were divided into those who carried heavy Arms, and those who were light arm'd; and so were the Horse; and both the heavy arm'd Foot and Horse were called *Cataphracts*, and the light arm'd Foot had the denomination of *Pelites*. The heavy arm'd Foot had for the Defensive, a Head-piece, a Corset, Greaves, and a Target; this last was round and hollow in the middle, more than two Foot and a half in diameter; this the Souldier carried on his Back all the time of his march; but when he was to fight,

*Grecian* Tactics lost.

And no matter.

*Alians* omission.

*Grecian* levy.

Defensive Arms for the heavy armed Foot.

fight, by a wry of his Body he made it fall on his left shoulder, and presenting his Pike with his left foot foremost, his whole Body, till below the knee, was covered with his Target: All these Arms were of Brass, and so were their Boats, which defended their Legs; for *Homer* tells us often of his *bene creata Archivi*. I cannot tell whether both their Legs were Boated, it may be only the left, because most subject to danger: Instead of Brass Targets, the Great *Alexander* gave Silver ones to those *Petran Phalangites*, who had helped him well to obtain so many glorious Victories; and those who carried them were called *Argyralpides*, or Silver Shields. Every man who carried a Shield had some Device on it, according to his own fancy; and I have read that one cawed to be painted on his Shield a Fly, of as little a proportion as a living Fly is, and so scarce distinguishable on so great a Shield, for which his fellows and companions mock'd him, and said, He had done so, that his Device not being discernable, he might not be pursued by an Enemy: but he answer'd, That his intention was to advance so near an Enemy, that any of them might see and perceive it was the picture of a Fly. The Offensive Weapon for the heavy arm'd Foot, was a strong Pike, ordinarily eighteen foot long, but the *Macedonians* was of one and twenty, and was called *Sarissa*; these three foot of greater length gave a great advantage to those who carried them, for assuredly, the longer the Pike is, it is the better, so it be manageable, as shall be said hereafter: and therefore a Pike of four and twenty foot long, would have had the advantage of that of one and twenty. A good shearing Sword was also a Weapon for the *Catapraiti*, both Foot and Horse, though *Alian*, in all the accounts he gives us of the *Grecian* Armies or Arms, speaks not one word of a Sword. Perhaps he thought we were obliged to conceive, that all Souldiers were Sword-men.

Offensive.

Omission of *Alian*.*Velites* how armed.*Peltati*.

The *Grecian Velites*, or light arm'd Foot, for most part had no Defensive Arms. Their Offensive Weapons were Swords, Javelins, Darts, Arrows, and Stones, which they threw, both out of their Hands, and out of Slings: Some of them had also a short Spear; and for Defence, a little Target, which the *Macedonians* called *Pelta*: But those who carried them needed not make a third species of the Infantry, as *Alian* seems to insinuate; these *Peltati* being nothing but light armed Foot; for the best arm'd of them, were not so well arm'd Defensively, as the worst arm'd of the *Roman Velites*, who notwithstanding were but reckon'd among the light arm'd Infantry. And indeed I wonder, why any of the *Grecians*, at least of the *Macedonians*, should have wanted these *Pelta*, or little Targets, with which they ought likewise to have had Head-pieces or Morrions, as most of the *Roman Velites* had.

The *Grecian* Cavalry was likewise divided into two sorts; the heavy arm'd, and light arm'd. The heavy arm'd were called *Catapraiti*, a word which both the *Romans*, and all other Nations, have borrowed from the *Greeks*; and though it be common to both Horse and Foot, yet they have appropriated it only to the heavy arm'd Horse-men. And here my Reader may observe, that these words *Catapraiti*, *Gens d'Arms*, Men of Arms, heavy arm'd Horse-men, and Cuirassiers, signifie all one thing. The *Grecian Catapraiti* for Defence, had Head-pieces, Backs and Breasts, Greeves, Tallets, and Boots of Iron or Brass; and if I understand right, Targets; Their Horses were likewise arm'd. If these Riders so armed, were mounted on strong and courageous Horses, assuredly they were able, either to give or receive a very forcible and strong charge and impression. But being so heavy, were neither able to pursue an Enemy far, or run very speedily from him. In this place *Alian* is much to blame (as in many other places) and is here inexcusable, for not telling us what Offensive Arms his *Catapraiti* carried, for he keeps up this as a secret; but till he or some Body for him, inform me better, I shall believe their Weapons were Launces, Swords, and Maces, which I suppose, I could make appear out of History. The light armed Horse-men were of two kinds, *Hastati*, which I render *Lancers*; some of these had no Defensive Arms, and some had a Target. The second kind of light armed Horse-men *Alian* calls *Ferentarii*, other Authors call them *Acroboliti*, and these were sub-divided into two sorts; some used Darts, and were called *Tarentines*; and some had Bows and Arrows, and were called *Scythae*, because the *Scythians* delighted much in the Bow,

if

*Catapraiti* how armed.*Alian* inexcusable.

Light Horse how armed.

If you will compare the Antient *Grecian*, and the Modern Armies used not half an age ago, in the point of Arms, you will not find any considerable difference. To the heavy arm'd *Grecian* Foot, answer our Pike-men, when they were, and still should be armed with Head-piece, Back and Breast; Greeves and Tallets, except in this, that ours want Targets, and walk not in Brazen Boots. To the light armed or *Velites* of the *Greeks*, do answer our Bow-men or Harquebushers, when we had them, and now our Musketiers. To the *Grecian Catapraiti* on Horse-back, correspond our *Gens d'Arms*, or Cuirassiers, armed with Lances, when they were in fashion, and now with Pistols and Carabines. To the light armed Horse-men called *Sagittarii* or *Scythae*, you may compare those whom the *French* call still Archers, armed formerly (even since Gun-powder was found out) with Bows and Arrows, and half Lances, and now with Pistols or Carabines. To the *Tarentines* answer generally our Light Horse-men, armed Offensively now with Hand-guns and Swords, and some of them Defensively, with Back, Breast and Head-piece, but most without any of them.

*Grecian* and *Modern Arms* compared.

## CHAP. IV.

Of their great Engines, and Machines, of their Training, and Exercising.

THE Ancients had their Artillery as well as we have. These were their Rams, Balists, and Catapults. They had also their *Vinea*, *Plutei*, *Moletois*, and other Engines, whereby they made their approaches to the Walls of besieged Towns. I think it strange, that some attribute the invention of the moving or ambulatory Tower so much admired by Antiquity, to *Demetrius* the Son of *Antigonus*; for to me it is clear enough, that his Fathers Master the Great *Alexander* had one of them at the Siege of *Gaza*, which was rendered ineffectual by the deep Sand, through which it could not be brought so near the Walls, as was needful; for the Wheels, on which it was to move, sunk down. Neither do I think that *Alexander* himself was the inventor of it: Whether the *Trojan* Horse, whose Belly was stuffed with armed men, might be such a Machine as this, or whether it had only its existency in the Poets brain, is no great matter. But because the *Romans* used all these Warlike Engines at the expugnation and propugnation of Towns, I shall refer my Reader concerning them to the fourth Chapter of my Discourses of the *Roman* Militia, where I shall also show him the substance of what *Aeneas*, an Ancient *Grecian* Tacick, saith on that subject. Here I shall only observe, that as the *Grecians* were very apt to usurp to themselves the invention of many Arts and Sciences, which they stole from others: So it will be found that many of these Machines were used in the World, before the *Grecians* were so much known, as afterwards they came to be. We read in the seventeenth Chapter of the second Book of the *Chronicles*, That *Ozias King of Judah*, by the invention of skillful Masters, made and planted on the Towers and corners of the Wall of Jerusalem, Engines which shot Arrows, Darts, and great Stones. And these were no other than those Machines the *Greeks* called *Catapulti* and *Balists*: And this was long before, the overthrow and defeats of the *Persian* Monarchs made *Greece* famous in the habitable World. Some think, *Moses* invented them, and I think, they may as well sanse he invented the moving Tower (of all which hereafter) whereof I spoke but just now. But the place alluded for this, which is the last verse of the twentieth Chapter of *Deuteronomy*, will not justify that; for it is said there (as the *Italian* Translation hath it) Thou shalt cut down those Trees, which bear no Fruits, and make Bulwarks (*Hastati*) of them, against those Cities thou art to besiege. And though *Lysius* and *Ferdinandus* think, that here are only meant Stakes and Pallisades for Ramparts and Scones; yet I may without Heresie believe, that the *Vinea* and *Plutei*, of which we read in *Lavin* History,

The ambulatory Tower.

These Machines not invented by the *Grecians*.

C

ries,

ries, may be meant in the Text; and the Ram also, wherewith, I suppose, Joshua may have battered the Walls of those Cities, which he had no Authority from the Almighty, to beat down with the sound of Rams horns, as he did the strong Walls of Jericho.

The *Grecians* were very exact in Training and drilling both their Horse and Foot; and without question, they taught their Souldiers very perfectly to handle and manage all the Arms they were appointed to carry, whether those were Javelins, Darts, Stones, Slings, Swords, Pikes, Lances, Maces, or Bows and Arrows. And as careful they were to teach them those motions and evolutions, whereby their Bodies, whether small or great, changed their present posture into another, either by Facings, Doublings, Counter-marches, or Wheelings. And though the *European* Nations were forc'd to find out words of Command each in their own language, to teach the use and handling of the Pistol, Carabine, Harquebus, Mulet, or any other Fire-gun, in regard none of those were known to any of the Antients; yet the handling of the Pike is the same in all its postures, that the *Grecians* had: And all our *European* words of Command for the motions and evolutions of Bodies, are borrowed from the *Greeks*. By Example; That which they call'd *Declina in hastam*, we call To the Right hand. That which with them was *Declina in Scutum*, with us is To the Left hand: Because they carried their Pike on their right Shoulder, and their Target on the left. Their *Infestio in hastam aut Scutum*, was our Right or Left about. *Jugare* with them, is to my sense, (though I know others think not so) to Double Ranks. Their *Intercalatio*, was our Doubling of Files. *Reddere in arrectum*, is As you were. It is needless to give you more, since most of our Modern words are the same with theirs, and are obvious in most languages. Yet here I shall take liberty to speak a little of both their, and our Counter-marches, that hereafter I need not trouble either my self or my Reader with that point of exercise, for which I have so small an esteem.

Macedonian Counter-march.

They call'd a Counter-march *Etholusio per versum*, and they had three kinds of it, which are yet retained in our Modern Exercises; and these were the *Macedonian*, the *Lacedemonian*, and the *Persian*, which was also called the *Choræan*. The *Macedonian* is, when the Battalion is commanded to take up as much ground in the Van, as it possesse before, e're he who was Leader faced to the Rear. It is done thus: He who is in the Rear marcheth through or between two Files to the Van, and then without an ale so many foot beyond the File-leader, as the Body at their due distance possesse; all the rest that were in the File before him, following him in order as they stood, till he making ale, they all take up their several distances behind him, till he who is File-leader turn himself about on that same ground he stood on, and then all turn likewise, so that all the File faceth to the Rear in that same order, that before the Counter-march it fac'd to the Van; by this means the Body loseth ground in the Rear: and therefore our Modern Drillers, when they command the *Macedonian* counter-march, they say, By the Right or Left hand Counter-march, and lose ground in the Rear, or gain ground in the Van, which is all one thing.

Lacedemonian.

The *Lacedonian* is, when the Battalion is commanded to take up as much ground in the Rear as it possesse'd before, and is done thus: The File-leader turns just where he stands, and marcheth as many foot behind the Rear-man as the Body at its due distance should possesse, all who follow him turn not about, till their Leaders go by them, and so the Bringer up doth only turn himself without any further motion. The Modern word of Command for this is, Counter-march to the Right and Left hand, and gain ground in the Rear.

Persian.

The *Persian* is, when the Battalion keeps the same ground it had, but with this difference, that the Leader stands where the Bringer up was, and the Rear-man where the Leader stood. It is done thus: The Leader advanceth three steps, and then turns and marcheth to the Rear, and all who follow him turn not, till they come to that place to which he advanced, and then they face about, and take up the same ground they formerly possesse. The word of Command for this is, Counter-march to the Right or Left hand and keep your ground. It is also called the *Choræan* Counter-march, because,

cause, as the *Chorus* useth to sing and dance all together, so here all the Ranks move at once, and keeping that same measure and distance in turning, resembles a Dance: But indeed, all these Counter-marches, as most of all evolutions, are better, and sooner illustrated, nay, demonstrated by a Body of Souldiers in the Field, than they can be either by words, or figures on Paper.

Philip King of Macedon, Father of the Great Alexander, put down the first of these Counter-marches, which was his own Countrey one, and with good reason; for it hath a show of flying, at least of retiring, being a Body of sixteen deep (as the *Macedonian Phalanx* was) by that Counter-march lost in the Rear (where the Enemy is suppos'd to be) one hundred and twelve foot of ground, one foot being allowed for every Rank to stand on, and six foot of distance between the Ranks, at least it loseth one hundred and six foot. And truly, I think the hazard were small, if all the three several Counter-marches were ever banish'd out of all Armies, except those of our Enemies. It is true, I never saw any of them used in fight of an Enemy; for if they be practis'd then, I am confident, confusion would follow them, which is but too ready to appear in any Army, though never so well order'd, when it is unexpectedly attack'd by an Enemy in the Rear.

All three of small use.

If the *Grecians* had been acquainted with our great Guns, nay, even with our Muskets, which kill at a greater distance by far, than Darts or Arrows, and against which their Defensive Arms would not have been proof; they would have found that an Enemy a good way from their Rear would have render'd their best Counter-marches both unfeasible and dangerous. All the good, I suppose, that is intended by a Counter-march, is to place the very same men and Ranks with their faces to the Rear in that very same order they were, with their faces to the Front. And truly, if Captains be careful to place their best men in the Front, their next best in the Rear, and make middle men of the third, and rank every man according to his worth and dignity, as they should do, (but too many of them are negligent in this) it will be needless to hazard a Counter-march, but with much ease, and with one word of Command, (and that is, By the Right or Left hand about) an Enemy may be fac'd in the Rear, without danger of any confusion or disorder.

I have seen some very punctual Officers and Drill-masters, who have taken much pains to teach new beginners all these three sorts of Counter-marches, and have made them practise their lessons very exactly; yet for all that, I could never in my own Judgement, have a better opinion of Counter-marches, than, they say, some Physicians have of Cucumbers, which they first order to be well corrected and prepar'd with Vinegar, Oyl, Pepper, and I know not what else, and then advise, to throw them out of doors, or over the Windows.

In exercising Bodies, the first care is to make Ranks and Files keep that distance, that is allowed by the Prince or General who commands the Army, for he may do in that according to his pleasure. The *Grecian* Foot had a three-fold distance, the first was of six foot, and this *Alian* will have to be in exercising and marches between File and File, as well as Rank and Rank; but assuredly there was not so good reason for the one as there was for the other, in regard all the heavy arm'd Foot carrying long Pikes required six foot in their march between Rank and Rank for the convenience of their Pikes; but there was no need of so much between File and File, as any man at first view, may easily comprehend. The second distance was of three foot between Rank and Rank, as also between File and File, and this was when they were drawn up, and stood in Battel with their Pikes order'd; and their posture at this distance was call'd *Dysulatio*. The third was of one foot and a half between both Files and Ranks, and that was, when they were either to give or receive a charge; and it was call'd *Confusio*. In that posture having presented their Pikes with their left foot foremost, their Targets touch'd one another, and so their *Phalange* look'd like a Brazen Wall, as *Lucius Emilius*, the Roman Consul, spoke of that wherewith King *Persus* fac'd him at the Battel of *Ida*, where they fought for the Sovereignty of the Kingdom of Macedon.

The

The Grecian Horse were marshall'd in several figures, and of their distance I can say nothing, nor doth *Alian* help me in it at all. Of these several figures of Horse Troops, I shall speak in the next Chapter but one. And then my Reader will perhaps believe with me, that the Square Battels probably kept that distance that Troops have done since; and that both the Rhombus and the Wedge required a greater distance, when they were commanded by a motion either to the Right or Left hand, to change the posture or the place, wherein they stood; and I conceive, when either of them was to charge, the Horse men were obliged to ferr together, as close as ever they could, otherwise they could not pierce so home, as was expected by those who cast them into those moulds. But this will be better understood afterwards.

Omissions of  
*Alian*.

Whether all those *Grecians*, who were fit to bear Arms, were Train'd or Exercis'd, or some only of them elected for that purpose; or whether those who were pick'd out and Train'd, enter'd in pay before they were put in Companies or Troops, or what that pay was, or whether some were bred and Train'd in Military Schools and Seminaries, as *Alexander* did with those 30000 *Persians*, whom he caus'd to learn the *Macedonian Art of War*; and as the Grand Signior doth with his Janizaries, we know nothing. We should have been much bound to *Alian*, if he had touch'd to have given us any light in these particulars, but he is defective all along in many things, besides these.

Exercising a  
necessary du-  
ty.

The *Grecians*, and more especially the *Romans*, thought Training and Exercising so necessary a duty, that they never either neglected or omitted it, nay, nor in the times of the calmest Peace. A Train'd and well Exercis'd Army hath the advantage of that which is not Train'd, though the first be compos'd of Novices and *Tyrones*, and the last of *Veterans*, whereof *Polybius*, a famous Historian, and a good Captain, gives us an observable example in his Fifth Book. *Antiochus* King of *Syria*, presuming on the experience and approved valour of his Army, and despising the *Egyptians*, with their King *Ptolemy*, (an unactive Prince) whom he had beat before, neglected to exercise and keep his Shoulders in discipline; mean time *Siphium*, *Ptolemy's* great Minister of State, protracted time with feign'd Treaties with *Antiochus*, till he had levied great numbers both of Natives and Strangers; and had by *Grecian* Captains Train'd and Exercis'd them well in all Military duties; so that when the two Kings fought at *Raphia*, for the Kingdom of *Cassia*, with Armies of near equal numbers, *Ptolemy* got the Victory.

## CHAP. V.

### Of the Grecian Infantry.

Not sixteen  
deep.

WE are told by *Alian* that the *Grecian* Foot were sometimes marshall'd sixteen deep, sometimes twelve, and sometimes eight. Observe here, that what he or other Authors call a Longitude we call a Rank, which the *Latins* called *Front*, and *Yugum*; and what they call'd Altitude, we call a File, or the depth. The *Germans* after the *Latins*, call the deepness of a File the height of it. The *Macedonians*, as *Alian* saith, marshall'd all their heavy armed foot sixteen deep; and this height or depth of a File, our Author seems to be absolutely the best, because, saith he, it makes not too long a Front, but what if it make too short a one? But his reasons for sixteen deep, we shall hereafter examine.

Discipline.

Every one of those Files had a leader who commanded it, and was called *Decurio*. Observe here by the way, that *Decurio* is not always he who commands ten men, as many of my profession fanstie. The File had likewise its Tergiductor, who was our Bringer up. But in *Alian* account this Rear-man had

had no command, but was subject to the Middle-man, who under the Leader commanded the last half of the File. There were besides in every File, as *Alian* saith, four Enomotarchs, each whereof, saith he, had the command of three men. But here assuredly our Author mistakes himself, for four men, and each of them the command of three, make completely sixteen; and so both File-leader and Middle-man were excluded. But certainly the *Decurio* or Leader had the three men next him immediately under his command, and the fifth man was an Enomotarch, who had three under him, then the *Dimarite* or Middle-man, (who commanded the last half of the File) had the inspection of the three men immediately following; and lastly, the fifth man from the *Dimarite*, and thirteenth from the *Decurio*, had the three last men of the File recommended to his care. By this means, there are but four petty Commanders in every File, whereas *Alian* unadvisedly and unattentively made six. *Lochos* with the *Grecians* was our File, two of these made a *Dilochy*, which consisted of thirty two men; its Commander was called *Dilochita*; We have no Officer to represent him but a Lance Spelate. Two *Dilochies* or four Files made a *Tetrarchy*, whose number was sixty four; its Officer was a *Tetrarch*, whom a Caporal in a Company of two hundred or three hundred men may resemble. Two *Tetrarchies* made a *Taxiarchy*, its Commander was called *Taxiarcha*, which *Alian's* Translator renders *Centurio*; His command was of eight Files, which made one hundred twenty eight men. And here, I pray you observe, that *Centurio* was not always strictly taken for a Captain of one hundred. And we shall find hereafter in the *Roman* Militia, his ordinary command was of sixty, sometimes but of thirty, as it is here of one hundred twenty eight. A Sergeant in an old *French* or *German* Company represents this *Grecian* *Taxiarch*. Two *Taxiarchies*, which were sixteen Files, made a *Syntagmatarchy* of two hundred fifty six men; its Commander *Syntagmatarcha* was our private Captain. This Company was a square of men, sixteen in Rank and sixteen in File, and whatever way you turn'd it, still sixteen. And if with *Alian*, you allow six foot of difference between Files as well as Ranks, it will be a Body equilateral, and a square of ground, as well as a square of men. But of their manner of Battels I shall speak particularly hereafter.

Enumeration  
of the fe-  
veral Bodies  
of the Foot.

Two *Syntagmatarchies* compos'd a *Pentecostarchy* consisting of five hundred and twelve men; its Commander was called *Pentecostarcha*, or, in *Latine*, *Tribunus minor*, we call him our Lieutenant Colonel. Two *Pentecostarchies* made a *Chiliarchy* of one thousand twenty four men, its Commander was *Chiliarcha*, or *Tribunus major*, to whom answers directly our Modern Colonel of one thousand men. Of two *Chiliarchies* was made up a *Myriarchy* of two thousand forty eight, its Commander was *Myriarcha*. About eighty years ago no Colonel in *Germany* had so few in his Regiment, but now we shall say that he was as our Brigadier; Two *Myriarchies* made a *Phalangy* or simple *Phalange*, consisting of four thousand ninety six men; its Commander was called *Phalangiarcha*, in *Latine*, *Prætor*; for whom suppose a modern Major General. Two *Phalangarchies* made a *Diphalangy*, compos'd of eight thousand one hundred ninety two men; its Commander was called a *Diphalangarcha*, for whom we have none but a Lieutenant General. Two of these made a *Phalange*, over which commanded the General of the Infantry. By this account we find in every *Phalange* two *Diphalangarchies*, four *Phalangarchies*, eight *Myriarchies*, sixteen *Chiliarchies*, two and thirty *Pentecostarchies*, sixty four *Syntagmatarchies*: In all one thousand twenty four Files, which consisted of sixteen thousand three hundred eighty four men, at sixteen in every File.

Compos'd  
with our Mo-  
dern Bodies.

Here you are to observe, that every *Syntagmatarchy* or private Company, consisting of two hundred fifty six men, had beside the Captain and others already spoken of, five other Officers, whom *Alian* calls supernumerary or extraordinary. These were the Ensign-bearer (for every Company of *Syntagmatarchy* had a Colours) a Servant or Assistant, or if you please, you may call him an Adjutant; who carried the Captains Orders: The third was a *Prætor*, or a Crier, who proclaim'd the Captains directions, even in the time of Battel. Men of strong voices were chosen for that office. The *Romans* used them, as it appears by *Hannibal's* causing them to be counterfeited when

Extraordi-  
nary or super-  
numerary  
Officers.



he storm'd and enter'd the *Roman* Camp at *Capua*. They are out of fashion now, the loud noise of Gun-powder having render'd them useless. The fourth was a Trumpeter, whose office is known. And the last was a *Tergidux* or Lieutenant, whose office was to stay constantly in the Rear. These five were superordinary; the rest were *Ordinarii*; and this word the Church hath borrowed from the Militia (and reason for it, since on earth she is a Militant Body) in giving the name of Ordinaries to her reverend Bishops.

But in this place *Alian* is obscure, for I know not how he disposeth of the Sergeant, or of the Captain of the Company, nor how he disposeth of the Tribunes lesser or greater, Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels, Brigadiers and Major Generals, where he appoints them to march, or where to stand or officiate in time of action; or whether he reckons them in the number of the Phalange, which consisted of sixteen thousand three hundred eighty four men, or not. His Decurions, Dimarites, Enomotarchs, Dilochites, and Tetrarchs, are all of them, no doubt, of that number; neither can I allow them any other place to march or fight in, but Rank and File, for they were no other but File-leaders, Middle-men, Lance-spears, and Caporals, all of whom carry Arms. But that all who commanded above them were in Rank and File, is a thing I cannot fance. And if the Captain was constantly in the Van or Front of his Company, why was the Lieutenant, whose station was constantly in the Rear of it, call'd a superordinary Officer, more than the Captain? And being all these five were constantly Officers in the Syntagmarchy or Company, why should they not be call'd ordinary Officers as well as the Taxiarch or Sergeant, or as the Syntagmarch or Captain?

The light armed *Grecian* Foot, according to *Alian*, were half the number of the heavy armed, and by this account they were eight thousand one hundred ninety two. This he speaks of the *Macedonian* Foot, for the other *Grecian* Phalanges were not so strong. These light armed Foot were drawn up, saith *Alian*, eight deep. By this account they took up as much ground in Longitude, Rank, or Front, as the heavy armed Phalange did, and but half as much in File or depth.

A Question  
not answer'd.

*Grecian* Veterans.

## CHAP. VI.

### *Alian's marshalling the Grecian Infantry examined.*

TO hazard all at one cast hath ever been thought a piece of madness, except in very desperate cases, for in them necessity hath no Law. It is upon that ground that Leaders of Armies appoint Reserves, some one, some two, to sustain and second the first Battalions, in case they be worsted. But this great Body or Phalange of *Alian* admitted of no reserve at all, and therefore the men that compos'd it, had need to have fought well; because first, there were none to second them, and next their heavy Armour render'd them incapable to fly either fast or far.

That the Phalange might have had Reserves, is unquestionable, if those who compos'd it, had not made it so deep, as sixteen. But we shall the better know, whether it might not conveniently have been of a less altitude, when we examine the Reasons that are given for its great depth. For take it along with you, the more a Battalion is extended in length or Front, the more hands are brought to fight, and the less it is subject to be out-wing'd or surrounded; and therefore the deepness of this Phalange brings both those inconveniencies with it. Let us now hear the advantages it hath.

First, *Alian* saith, if it be needful that the Files be doubled, the Phalange may be made two and thirty deep; and if the Ranks must be doubled, then

Sixteen deep  
exam'd.

the Files are made eight deep. I wonder to hear such language from so great a Master; for all this may be done in any Body of men of what depth soever, provided it be not of an odd number. If *Alian* had made his Phalange but twelve deep, might he not, when he pleas'd, by doubling the Files, have made it twenty four deep; and by doubling the Ranks, have made it but six deep, and by the bargain he had made the Front of his Phalange a fourth part longer, that where at six foot distance between Files it took up in longitude but six thousand one hundred forty four foot, it would have taken up eight thousand one hundred ninety foot? But the mystery of the matter (if I understand *Alian* right) is shortly this, Such an altitude or deepness of the File is most exact, whereby the Commander in chief may with few words bring his whole numbers by equal proportions to one man: As sixteen to eight, eight to four, four to two, and two to one. But this you cannot do with twelve; for twelve divided makes two sixes, six divided makes two threes: three men you cannot divide, unless you cut one man in two pieces. Now by sixteen deep, you may bring your whole Battalion of sixteen thousand three hundred eighty four men into one File, or into one Rank, and here, I suppose, lyes the knack of the business. These sixteen thousand three hundred eighty four men, at sixteen in File, make one thousand twenty four Files, which you can bring to one File, thus: Command your half Ranks to double their Files, and then you have but five hundred and twelve Files; the same word of Command being obeyed, you have but two hundred fifty six; give it once more, you have but one hundred twenty eight; let it be done over again, you shall see but sixty four Files; continue the same word of Command, your Files come to thirty two, next to sixteen, after that to eight, from that to four, then to two, and lastly to one. And so you have your whole Phalange in one File. If you will have your Phalange all in one Rank, command the Middle-men or half Files to double their Ranks, and then sixteen become eight; command the same thing, they shall be but four, then two, and lastly one. But is it not very strange, that *Alian* would not know, that all this might have been done with a Body of men four deep, or eight deep, which last many of the *Grecians* did not exceed: And certainly, till we hear some more solid reason than this airy one, eight deep is for many considerations to be prefer'd to sixteen. Nor should this pretended reason hinder either Prince or State to appoint the depth of their Battalions to be twelve, ten, eight, or six deep, as they think fit, though by some of them, the Bodies cannot be subdivided till they come to one File, or one Rank; for it was never seen, nor do I fance it can be imagin'd, that ever such an emergency of War will fall out, that can move a General, (unless he be to File his Army along a very narrow Bridge, or a very narrow way) to marshal all his Foot either in one Rank, or one File. So I conceive the first reason is no reason at all.

A second Reason is, In time of Action an Enemy may charge the Rear, to rencounter whom, the *Dimarite* or Middle-men are commanded with the Half-Files that follow them, to face about (but without counter-march) and sustain the charge. By the way observe, that in such an occasion the Bringer up or Rear-man hath the command of the Half-File, and consequently of the *Dimarite* or Middle-man himself, to whom *Alian* gave it before. But to the reason it self I give two answers. First, a Reserve, which *Alian's* Phalange admits not, would prevent that danger. Secondly, I say, if they were but twelve in File, nay, but ten in File, they might withstand the charge of an Enemy in both Van and Rear, as well as being sixteen deep, which I make appear out of *Alian* himself, thus: The *Grecian* Pikes were all eighteen Foot long, except the *Macedonians* which were twenty one. We shall speak of the longest. Next, *Alian* allows one foot and a half of distance between Ranks, when they fought, which distance he or his Interpreter calls *Conspitatio*: Thirdly, the same Author allows three foot of the Pikes length for his hands who presents it. These grounds being laid, which are the Authors own; I say, that only four Ranks of the *Grecian* Pikes, and five of the *Macedonian* could do an Enemy any hurt; and but hardly so either, because between five Ranks, there are four distances, and for those you are to allow six foot, at *Alian's* account, of closest distance; next, you are by his rule likewise to allow fifteen foot of the Pikes of the fifth Rank

First reason  
for 16 deep.

Answered.

Second reason  
for 16 deep.

Answered.



to be abated from their length, which fifteen being added to fix, make one and twenty; for three foot of the Pikes length of the first Rank being allowed for their hands who hold them, you must of necessity grant the like proportion for the rest. And so the *second* Rank *Sarissa* did not much advance its point from the fifth Rank beyond the first Rank, and therefore the rest behind these five Ranks seem useless. But, an Enemy attacks the Rear, to oppose whom, let five Ranks face about, and prevent; for if five be sufficient to resist the shock in the Van, certainly five may do the same in the Rear. And if you will consider it well, you will think the points of the Pikes of five Ranks sufficient to give or receive a charge, if all the Files be serr'd together as the *Cavalry* do, and as all should be, that no interval be given an Enemy to enter between them. If then ten Ranks were enough to resist an Enemy in Front and Rear, I presume, the other six might have been dispos'd of two ways; first, they might have been bestow'd on the Front, and so have extended it to a far greater length, which would have brought more hands to fight, and not only sav'd the Phalange from being out-wing'd, but have put it in a capacity to out-wing the Enemy: Secondly, these six Ranks might very advantageously have compos'd a Body apart in the Rear, and that should have been a Reserve, and then no danger of an Enemy to have troubled the Battel behind.

But I am afraid you may think I am making up a *Grecian* Militia of my own, unknown to the famous Warriors of that renowned Nation. I shall tell you truly and ingenuously, my quarrel is only with *Alian*, because he hath not told us so much as he knew, and so much as he was oblig'd to tell us, which in this particular is that I am now to tell you, and it consists in two things, one that Phalanges were not always fifteen deep, and secondly, that they wanted not always Reserves : To prove both, be pleas'd to take the following Instances. At *Delys*, when the *Athenians* fought with the *Therabans* and other *Boeotians*, the Phalanges were all of them eight d-p, and all of them had Reserves. At *Leontis*, *Epaminondas* his Foot Battalions were all marshall'd in eight Ranks. At *Siracusa*, when the *Athenian* General *Nicias* was to fight, he plac'd his Auxiliaries in the two Wings, his *Athenians* he divided into two great Bodies, the half whereof he marshall'd in the Battel between the two Wings, the other half he plac'd behind at a distance, with command, to succour either the Wings or the Battel, as they saw them, or any of them stand in need of their help, and this was a perfect Reserve: And observe, that his Wings, Battel and Reserve, were all marshall'd eight deep. Take *Thucydides*, a noble Historian, and a good Captain for my Author.

But you will say, these were not *Macedonian* Phalanges, true; but they were *Grecian* ones though, and the Commanders of them without all peradventure, did well enough foresee, in what danger their Phalanges of eight-deep might be by a sudden charge of an Enemy in the Rear, which, no question, they would have oppos'd, by making the last four Ranks face about; if their Rerefiles serv'd not their turn, neither could the fourth Rank extend its Pikes (being three foot shorter than the *Macedonian* ones) much beyond the first Rank. But to take the Objection more fully, let us come nearer, and view the Great *Alexander's* Army at *Arbela*, and we shall see, he was not at all limited by *Aelian's* rules of a *Macedonian* Phalanx, though by it, they say, he conquer'd the *Perſian* Monarchy. Sir *Walter Raleigh* faith right, that in this place *Alexander* drew up his Forces, so that they fac'd to Van, Rear, and both Flanks; but this is not to be understood so, that he made his heavy armed Phalanx front four several ways: for then it should have been Immoveable, and only apt to resist, but not to advance, which had been both against the intentions of that brave Prince, and his actions of that day; for he charg'd the *Perſian* Battalions both with his Horse and Foot. But the meaning must be, that he order'd some Horse and Foot at a distance from his main Battel to face to the Rear, for preventing any misfortune there, and the like he did on both his Flanks; but all theſe, when his main Battel mov'd, fac'd to the Van, and advanced with it, and when it stood, they took up their former distances, and fac'd as they were appointed: And all this was done, left his Army (small in comparison of that with *Darius*) should be surrounded. If the

## CHAP. VI.

he was afraid to be out-wing'd, as assuredly he was, it will easily be granted Alexander at  
that the more ground he took up in Front, the less subject he was to that dan- Arvola but  
ger. And this Curtius confirms, when he tells us, that the Battalions of eight deep ;  
the several Bodies had orders given them, to extend their Wailes, as far  
in length, as without eminent danger they might, left, faith the same Au-  
thor, they should be environ'd. I conceive then, it cannot be doubted,  
that Alexander studying how to make as large a Front as feasily he might; against  
so numerous an Enemy, he made his heavy arm'd Foot Phalang, but eight  
deep, as that which suited best with his present affairs, and he made himself  
other Grecian Captains do before him, for by that means he marshall'd sixteen in  
master of twice as much ground, as he had when it was from Curtius and others, for  
File. That he had Referves, is most clear both from Curtius, or Silver Shields,  
and Nicomar follow'd the Phalange with the Argyraspides, or Band of men, which,  
these were heavy armed, (observe it) and Ceno with a Band of men, which,  
faith Curtius, was appointed (note this) to be a Reliefe. Then Horefti, Lin-  
certa, Polycarpon, and Phlagus, all with several Bodies follow'd the Phalanx:  
And that all these were Referves, Alban himself, nor any for him, will not be so  
impudent as to deny. But I shall speak more of the marshalling this Army  
in the Chapter following the next.

impudent as to deny. But man speak  
in the Chapter following the next.

I come now to the third Reason, which is pretended for sixteen deep of Third reason  
the heavy armed Phalange. And it is this. Though the Pikes of all those for 16 deep.  
Ranks, that stand behind the fifth, or if you will, the sixth, be useless; in  
regard they can reach but little or nothing beyond the File leader ( and you  
will remember these Ranks are not fewer than ten, if not eleven ) yet being  
and force of their Bodies those five or six Ranks that are before them, and so  
make the Impression the greater and stronger, they take all occasion of flight  
from them, and impose a necessity on them to overcome or dye. I answer  
first, that this pretended advantage, if it was any at all, was very oft dear answered.  
Secondly, I say, five Ranks having their Pikes presented to the Ene-  
my, three Ranks behind them might have serv'd sufficiently to bear forward  
the five before them ; or if *Alban* thought fix Ranks might present all their  
Pikes with advantage, then let four Ranks be allowed behind them to bear  
them forward to the charge and hinder them to fly, and this will make in  
all but ten Ranks, and so still fix Ranks might have been disposed of either to  
enlarge the Front, or make a Body in the Rear for a Reserve. And third-  
ly, I say, when *Alban's* six foremost Ranks were busy in fight, the ten be-  
hind them, who were to bear those fix forward, were at their closest distance  
( which he calls contiguation ) and so not able to open very suddenly, and face  
about in fo good order, and so soon as was requisite to receive, or beat back  
the charge of an unexpected Enemy : For certainly they must first have  
open'd backward, and then fac'd about ; both which must have been done by  
the command of some of their Officers, probably the Lieutenant, and it is  
well enough known; how confusion and disorder ( which seldom fails to at-  
tend such occasions ) stops the ears, and dulls the judgement of Soldiers,  
that they can neither hear nor understand the words of Command aright.  
I will fetch two instances from History, and those, I believe, will prove all  
I have said, and clear this whole matter pretty well.

1. The first I take from the famous Battle fought by *Philip* the last King of France, against the English, at the Battle of Marston, 1471. The English

I have said, and clear this whole matter pretty well. At the Battle of *Cynephale*, or Dogs heads, fought by *Philip* the last King of *Macedon*, except one, against *Titus Flaminius*, a Roman Consul, the Half of *Philip's* heavy armed Phalange on the right hand, bore down all before it, and *Philip's* heavy armed Legions, gaining ground so far, that the *Macedonian* thought trod over the Legions, having observ'd that the left Wing of the Phalange could not draw up in any close order, because of the unevenness and knottiness of the Mountain ( whose little hillocks represented the heads of Dogs ) sent a Tribune with a Legion and some Elephants up the Hill, to charge that Left Wing, which he smartly doing, easily routed it, and immediately fell on the Rear of the victorious Right wing, and without opposition, cut it in pieces. Now, if the Left Wing of the Phalange, which had no convenient ground whereon to draw up, had plac'd it self on the top of the Hill

Alexander at  
Arbela but  
eight deep

**Phalanges**  
**eight deep.**

**And had Re-  
serves.**

answered.

**Battel of Cinocephala.**

1

Hills

Hill at a distance behind the Right Wing, as a Reserve, the Romans durst never have hazarded to have come between them; or if the last ten Ranks of the Right Wing who serv'd for nothing but to bear forward the other six Ranks, had fac'd about (according to *Alian's* rule) they could not so easily have been broken. But the close posture or constipation of these last ten Ranks to bear forward the foremost six Ranks, made them incapable to do that quickly, which the present necessity required, or else the sudden charge of an unlook'd for Enemy did to appal them, that they knew not what they were doing, nor who commanded, or who obeyed, which, as I have said, frequently falls out in such cases. So this Phalanx cast in *Alian's Macedonian* mould, cost King *Philip* very dear, but another modell'd after the same fashion, cost his Son *Perseus* much dearer.

Battel of *Pidna*.

At *Pidna*, a Town of *Macedon*, King *Perseus* fought with *Lucius Amilius*, a Roman Consul, and the ground for his Phalange being as good as his own heart could wish, the Roman Legions were not able to resist its furious charge, but gave ground in several places, insumach that the Consul seeing Fortune look with so grim a countenance upon him, began to despair of the Victory, and to tear his Coat of Arms, but being of a ready judgement, he quickly espied his advantage, for he saw the Phalange open its constipation, some small Bodies of it pursuing those who gave ground, and others fighting loosely with those of his Romans who made stouter opposition, and therefore order'd some of his Legionaries to fall into those void and empty places of the several Phalangarchies, and these getting entrance at those intervals, came upon the sides of the *Macedonian* Pike-men, and so without much trouble made most of them dye on the place. If but a third, nay, a fourth or fifth part of this Phalange had been standing at a convenient distance in Reserve, ready to have charg'd the weary and disorder'd Legions, will any man doubt, but that in all humane probability, *Perseus* had been Master of the Field? But the want of that lost him, in the twinkling of an eye, his Wife and Children, his Kingdom, his Riches (which he lov'd too well) his Honour, and at last his Life.

Defects of *Alian's* Phalange.

The Defect then of the *Macedonian* Phalange, as *Alian* describes it, was two-fold; First, by the exorbitant deepness of its File, it took not up ground enough in the Front, and next it admitted not of a Reserve. Both which inconveniences other *Grecians* shunn'd, and so did *Alexander* himself, the greatest *Macedonian* that ever was. But I am of opinion, that *Alian* in his days, never saw any thing (except in figures) so like the other *Grecian* Phalangarchies, as we may see very frequently in our Modern Wars, for he wrote his Tactics to the Emperour *Adrian*, who liv'd some Centuries after the *Grecian* Phalange was forc'd to do homage to the Roman Legion.

Velites.

Our Author tells us, that the *Velites*, or light armed foot were half the number of the heavy armed, but we shall see hereafter that this held but seldom. He will also have them to be eight deep, because the heavy arm'd were sixteen in File. By this rule, the other *Grecians*, who march'd their heavy arm'd eight in File, should have drawn up their *Velites* but four deep. *Alian* doth also appoint them to be drawn up behind the Phalange, and indeed he might make them stand, perhaps march, where he pleas'd; but the manner of their Fight being a *la disbandad*, we may believe, they kept but little good order in fighting with an Enemy, less in pursuing him, and least of all in flying from him.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. VII.

### Of the Grecian Cavalry, with some Observations upon it.

IT seems the *Greeks* did not tie themselves to any precise or certain number of Horse in their Armies, as *Alian* hath tyed them to a determinate number of Foot, some of them using more, some fewer, as they conceiv'd needful for managing the present War they had in hand, augmenting, and diminishing the numbers of their Horse Troops, as also the number of the men of each Troop, as they found their occasions required. *Alian* tells us, that every Troop of Horse had a Captain, whose place was in the Van; a Lieutenant, whose station was in the Rear; and a Cornet, who, he saith, stood with his Standard in the second Rank next him who was on the Right hand of the Troop. All these we have. He saith, it had likewise two Flank Commanders, who, if they rode in Rank, are represented by our Corporals. He tells us nothing of a Quarter-master; perhaps one of these Flank-Officers was he, or officiated for him. But that wherein he is very forgetful, is, that he makes no mention of a Trumpeter; but assuredly, since every Foot Company, called a Syntagma, had that had Colours, was allow'd a Trumpeter, every Troop of Horse having a Standard had likewise one, if not more. Nor speaks he of Horn-winders, though these were used by the *Grecians*, as other Authors tell us. Other Nations used them also; The *Persians* had them; for *Xenophon* in his first Book saith, that *Cyrus* had his *Corvins*, or Horn-blowers, as well as *Tubicers*, Trumpeters. The *Romans* had them also, whereof we shall speak hereafter.

Officers of a Horse Troop.

*Alian* in that Treatise of his *De instruendis Aciebus*, gives us many figures of Troops of Horse, most of which do but represent the several postures of a Body of Horse in doubling Files and Ranks, and Countermarching. Some of these figures it will be found difficult to imitate, and perhaps our Author (as ingenious as he was) would himself have found it hard to have march'd them so in the Field, as he hath done in Paper, and they are indeed but those *Schematicks*, whereof *Lipsius* on another occasion speaks. Particularly *Alian* presents us with an Oval Figure of a Troop, another of a Lunar, or Crescent, and a third which he calls *Phalanx Inermis*, not unlike that form of Battel, after which the famous *Hannibal* is said to have drawn up his Mercenaries at *Cannae*, which Body could no sooner move, but presently it lost its form, and therefore, I think it is probable, that he march'd his Auxiliaries in that fashion, to stand before his choice *Carthaginians*, to weary the *Romans*, that so his best Souldiers might have a cheaper Market of them, as the Great Turk is said to blunt the Swords of his Enemies, with the Interposition of his Aspisi, between them and his Janizaries. If any of the *Grecian* Troops of Horse were drawn up after any of these three forms that I have mention'd, I shall very boldly say, that they needed to have kept their ground very tenaciously, and to have receiv'd the Enemies charge very steadfastly and courageously; for to my sense, it was impossible for them either to march, or give the charge, without falling immediately into an irrecoverable disorder; and this may be obvious to any man that will have the curiosity to look upon them, and consider themselves.

I find the *Grecians* used three kinds of Battels of Horse ordinarily, not to speak of extravagant ones. These were the Rhombus, the Wedge, and the Square. The *Thissulians*, who were thought to be the first and perfectest Horse-men in *Europe*, used the Rhombus: The invention of the Wedge is given to *Philip of Macedon*, Father of *Alexander*; and the Square was used by them both, as also by all the other *Grecians*; who sometimes made use likewise of the other two forms.

Three forms of Horse Battalions.

The first is  
the Rhombus.

Simple  
Rhombus.

The greater  
Rhombus.

The second is  
the Wedge.

A twofold  
mistake.

A Rhombus is a Geometrical Figure consisting of four acute Angles, and four sides equilateral, or if you imagine two equilateral Triangles join'd back to back, and their Angles equidistant (for when two Triangles are join'd, both of them have but four corners) you conceive the figure of a Rhombus right enough. To explain the Rhombus Horse Battel, let us imagine a Troop to consist of sixty four Riders, which number *Alian* gives to a Macedonian Troop. These sixty-four were thus marshall'd. Next the Captain stood one Horse-man, behind him two, next them three, behind them four, then five, then six, then seven, then eight: That Rank of eight made two Angles, where the two Flank Commanders stood; for behind that Rank the number decreas'd, as thus: Behind the eight stood seven, then six, then five, then four, then three, then two, and lastly one. Add all these together, you will find the aggregate to be sixty four. Behind the last one, to my sense, stood the Lieutenant, though *Alian* in some of his Figures, seems to make the Captain and Lieutenant to be two of the number; and if the two Flank Commanders were so too, then the Troop consisted only of sixty, besides Officers, and not of sixty four.

There is another kind of Rhombus, which in some sense may be called a double one, and it is marshall'd by increasing the number of every Rank after the first by two, till you come to the eighth Rank, and after that, your number is to decrease by two in every Rank till you come to one, and then your Rhombus shall consist of one hundred and thirteen Riders, as thus: First one, behind him three, behind them five, behind them seven, then nine, then eleven, then thirteen, and in the eighth Rank place fifteen; from that Rank your number decreaseth, for next to fifteen you are to place thirteen, behind them eleven, then nine, then seven, then five, then three, and lastly one. This is also a *Thessalian* Rhombus of Horse, a Figure whereof *Alian* bestows upon us. This Troop, I conceive, being at open order (for it was very requisite it should be so) could upon an occasion front any way without wheeling, to the Right or Left hand, by a half turn of their Horses, and to the Rear by two half turns, and immediately thereafter set together, either to give or receive the charge. This Figure of the Rhombus is call'd by some the Diamond; but if so, the Diamond which it resembles, must be a four-corner'd one. Observe here, that *Alian's* number of Horse represented in his Figure of the Simple Rhombus amounts but to forty nine; and this I attribute to his neglect, for he told us it should consist of sixty four.

The Wedge Battel, which the *Latines* called *Cuneus* or *Rostrum*, was a Body of men, either on Foot or Horse-back, drawn up with a sharp point, and increasing in its bigness, till it came to that greatness, which the maker of it design'd for it, and so represented a Wedge, from which it hath its denomination; or it is like a Dagger, sharp at the point, growing broader till it come to the haft. I told you, that *Philip of Macedon* invented it, choosing a Wedge to be the fittest pattern whereby to model his Macedonian Troops, by placing his choicest Men and Horses, both for strength of body and courage of mind in the foremost Ranks, the rest behind them serving to bear them forcibly forward. Take the description of it thus: First one, then three, then five, then seven, then nine, then eleven, then thirteen, and lastly fifteen: These added together make up *Alian's* Macedonian Troop of sixty four Horse-men. But in his description of it he oversees himself twice; first, in his words, for he saith the Wedge is just the half of the number of the great Rhombus, but that consists, as I just now told you, of one hundred and thirteen, and the Wedge is of sixty four, much more than the half of one hundred and thirteen. Next in his Figure, which presents us only with thirty six Horse-men, twenty eight fewer than King *Philip's* Troop. But if you would take a Wedge out of the Rhombus, you may do it easily, by causing that Rank wherein are fifteen Horse-men, with all the Ranks that are before it, to stand, and all that are behind it, to remove, and then you have a perfect Macedonian Wedge Troop, consisting of sixty four Riders.

But

But the manner of embattelling in form of a Wedge was not appropriated only to the Cavalry; The Infantry both of *Grecians* and *Romans*, and several other Nations used it in many occasions: *Epaninonda*, that famous *Theban*, at the Battel of *Manintia*, seeing the *Lacedaemonians* stand stoutly to it, (after he had routed their Confederates the *Athenians*) chose out a parcel of his gallantest Foot, cast them in a Wedge, and broke so forcibly in upon their Battalion, that he pierc'd it, and after brave resistance, forc'd them to quit the Field; but this prov'd his last action, for in it he receiv'd so many mortal wounds, that he dyed of them before the next day. I shall speak more of this Wedge Battel in my discourses of the *Roman* Militia. Neither it nor the Rhombus have been heard of in the World in many ages since those ancient times. It is probable, the Great *Alexander* permitted his *Thessalians* to make use of the Rhombus at *Arbela*, because almost half of their Great Rhombus might face to the Rear, and so prevent surrounding by *Darius* his numerous forces. It is also like, that his *Macedonian* Horse might have kept the form of a Wedge both at *Ijuss* and *Arbela*. And I find, that his great Captains (who after his death shar'd his vast Conquests among themselves) used it frequently. But I believe likewise, that both he and they, and other *Grecians* and *Asians* too, made use of the Square Battel.

The Square form of embattelling was most commonly used by the *Grecians* in marshalling their Infantry, and most of them us'd it in ordering their Cavalry. I speak not of an equilateral Square, but an oblong one, such as we use in our modern Wars. Yet I do not deny, but the Antients several times used equilateral Square forms of their Battalions, as when they made their Ranks and Files consist of equal numbers of men, and this we call a Battel Square of men, or sometimes Square of ground, when the Front was of no greater extent of ground than the Flank, but of these I shall speak hereafter, when I come to discourse of the Square Root. Not only many of the *Grecians*, but the *Persians* and *Sicilians* used the Square Horse Battel, and many great Captains prefer'd it to both the Rhombus and the Wedge; first, because by it the Troops could march with more celerity and convenience, and next, they could bring more hands to fight at one time. As for Example, in a Wedge Troop of sixty four, the first Rank consists but of one, the second of three, the third of five, and the fourth of seven: In these four Ranks there are but sixteen Riders. Oppose a Square Battel'd Troop of sixty, and marshal it in an oblong, fifteen in Rank and four in File, you may see that the sixteen Riders in the four first Ranks of the Wedge must fight with all the sixty of the Square Troop; this is a very great odds, and as much may be said of the Rhombus. But *Alian* doth not at all tell us, how deep the *Grecian* Square Battels of Horse were.

This was a great neglect, for thereby we might have known how many of the Ranks could have reach'd an Enemy with their Lances, and whether the rest behind serv'd only to bear forward those before, as the ten last Ranks of Pikes did to the six foremost. Yet as far as I can conjecture by some of his Figures, he seems to intimate, that his Country-men order'd their Horse to be half as many in File, as they were in Rank. His Figure of that Phalanx, which he calls *Quadrata*, of fifty Horse, hath ten in Rank and five in File. This manner of Battel (whether it be of Horse or Foot) is called by the Square Root men a Doubled Battalion, of the fashion of which, and how it is done, I shall shew you in its proper place. But I dare not believe that all *Grecian* Troops were marshall'd so, neither indeed doth *Alian* aver it. I know not then, why I may not imagine a *Grecian* Troop of Horse, consisting of sixty four, to be marshall'd three deep, as most of our Modern Troops now are, and so there should have been in it twenty one Files, for 21 multiplied by three produceth sixty three, and he who shall make the sixty fourth, shall be the Trumpeter, with whom we could not meet before in *Alian's* enumeration of the Officers of a Troop.

Wedge Battels of Foot:

The third is the Square.

Prefer'd to the other two.

*Alian* speaks nothing of the depth of Horse Files.

What

Nor of Distances.

What distances were kept between Ranks or Files, between several Troops, or yet between greater Bodies of the Horse, *Ælian* tells us not: Yet writing of the right ordering of Battalions, I think, he was obliged to speak of Distances, for who can marshal an Army, unless those be considered on? I conceive, that assuredly the Rhombus was oblig'd to keep a great Distance both between its Ranks and its Files, otherwise it could not turn to either Right or Left hand, or to the Rear, without Wheeling; and this, if I mistake not, was one of the advantages the *Thebani* propos'd to themselves, by that form of Horse Battel. But when either it or the Wedge was to charge, they were oblig'd to serr together as close as they could, otherwise they could not pierce so home, as was expected by those who cast them in those moulds. It is probable, that the Square Bodies of the *Grecian* Horse were exercis'd, did march and fight at those distances us'd now in our Modern Militia.

Denominations of the several Bodies of the Horse.

Our Author makes the number of the Cavalry in a *Macedonian* Army, to be half the number of their Velites, or lightarmed Foot. I told you, those were eight thousand one hundred ninety two, therefore the Horse must be four thousand ninety six. The smaller Bodies, of which he composeth this Cavalry, are shortly these: Sixty four Horse-men made a Troop, and were called an Elarchy, its Commander *Elarchas*, our Rite-master. Two Troops made an Epilarchy of one hundred twenty eight Horse-men, its Commander *Epilarchas*, for whom we have no Officer, unless a Major; and I find no such man among the *Macedonians*. Four Troops made a Talentarchy of two hundred fifty six Horse, its Commander *Talentarchas* is represented by our Lieutenant Colonel. Two Talentarchies made one Hipparchy, of five hundred and twelve Horse, he was called *Hipparchas*, our Colonel. Two Hipparchies made an Ephipparchy, its Commander *Ephipparchas* had under him one thousand twenty four Riders, our Brigadier may resemble him. Two Ephipparchies made a Telos, which consisted of two thousand forty eight Horse, its Commander was called *Telarchas*, whom, if you please, our Major General of Horse shall represent. Two Telarchies made up an Epitagma, and this consisted of four thousand one hundred ninety six Horse-men, which compos'd the whole Phalange of the *Macedonian* Cavalry, its Commander was called *Epitagmarchas*, for him our Modern Militia furnisheth us with a Lieutenant General, or if you will, a General of the Horse. Now, though our Author hath given us the exact number of both the smaller and greater Bodies of the *Macedonian* Cavalry, yet he hath not at all told us, how many of them were heavy armed, and how many light armed, for which he is inexcusably to blame.

Inexcusable omission.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. VIII.

*Of the Great Macedonian Phalanx, of its number, and how marshall'd; with some Observations on both.*

A Phalanx signifieth a number of men, great or small, Train'd and Instructed in Military Duties, and order'd in Ranks and Files. By this Definition any Foot Company, or Horse Troop is a Phalanx, as well as an Army; and a whole Army is a Phalanx, as well as a particular Company or Troop. It is true, in Authors, the word Phalanx is ordinarily taken for the great Body of sixteen thousand three hundred eighty four heavy armed Foot, which formerly I have out of *Ælian* describ'd to you, of which I shall tell you thus much more, that he saith it had two Horns (for so the Translator renders the word *Kerai*) and those were the Right and Left hand Horn, which we either simply call the Right or Left hand, or the Right and Left Wing. But indeed I wonder why *Ælian* divides the whole Phalange of Foot into two Horns, Right and Left; and why so many of our Commanders in the Modern Wars imitate him, in dividing a whole Body into the Right or Left Wing; never considering, that naturally and really there is a Body between two Wings: and the same error is committed, in dividing a whole Battalion of armed men into two Flanks, very ordinarily done by some Drill-masters. And here, no doubt, *Ælian* forgot himself, for the Phalange of the heavy armed Foot was divided, as I told you before, into four lesser Phalanges or Phalangarchies, two whereof made the two Wings, which he calls Horns; and the other two compos'd the Body. These four Phalangarchies made three Intervals, how great we know not, out of which, before the fight, issu'd the light armed; and if they prevail'd, they pursued their Victory, being followed by the Phalange; but if they were beaten, as for most part they were, they retired to the Rear the same way they came, and then the four Phalangarchies clos'd together, to give or receive the charge, according as they were ordered by their Superiors.

The significance of Phalanx.

Phalangarchies.

But now I am to speak of the whole *Macedonian* Army, which was call'd the Great Phalanx, consisting of heavy and light armed Foot and Horse, not reckoning their Chariots and Elephants. Their heavy armed Foot were sixteen thousand three hundred eighty four, the Velites were eight thousand one hundred ninety two, the Horse four thousand ninety six: Add all these together, you will find the *Macedonian* great Phalanx to consist of twenty eight thousand six hundred seventy two Combatants.

The great Macedonian Phalanx of both Horse and Foot.

A Story goes, that either the Great *Alexander*, or *Julius Caesar*, or both, should have said, That they desired no more than thirty thousand men to conquer the whole World: Certainly, if either of them, or both said so, they meant, that that number should still be kept compleat and full, for though they should have been constantly Victorious, and never have lost one man in Battel or Skirmish; yet sickness and toyl would have made all that number to have moulder'd away, before they could have march'd over the tenth part of the then habitable World. But I do not at all believe that either of them said so, for true Histories (if there be any truth in Histories) assure us, that both of them had Armies which far exceeded that number. At *Arbela*, *Alexander* had more than double the number of a *Macedonian* Army; and yet at that same time, when he fear'd to be surrounded, I suppose, he wish'd his forces to be more numerous than they were. Neither do I believe, that his Father *Philip*, who was the framer of the Phalanx, did keep himself precisely within that number, for at *Cheronea*, where he routed the Confederated *Greeks*, he exceeded it far. His Son *Alexander*, when he cross'd the *Helle*.

*Ælian* numbers did not always hold

*Spent,*

In the Macedonian Armies;

spont, to invade the Persian Monarchy, had thirty two thousand Foot, and five thousand Horse; above eight thousand more men, than in *Alian's* Macedonian Phalange. At *Issus* he was stronger, and at *Arbela* he had forty thousand Foot, and seven thousand Horse, all *Grecians*, besides very many *Asians* whom he had subdued. So we see that *Alians* numbers of Horse or Foot, did not hold even in the Macedonian Armies.

Nor in the other Grecian Phalanges.

Much less will his rule hold in other *Grecian* Phalanges, who drew up their heavy armed Foot but eight deep, and so by our Authors method, their light armed but four deep; for if you allow their heavy armed Phalange to be one thousand twenty four Files, these multiplied by eight, which is the number of the File, that Battalion consisted of eight thousand one hundred ninety two men: Their Velites being half of that number, they were four thousand ninety six: Give the half of that number to their Cavalry, they must have been two thousand forty eight. And thus by *Alians* rule, their whole Phalange of both heavy and light armed Foot and Horse should have amounted to neither more nor less than fourteen thousand three hundred thirty six Combatants. But they neither observ'd that number, nor his rule in the division of that number. At *Delos*, the *Thebans* and *Boeotians* had an Army consisting of seven thousand heavy armed Foot, ten thousand light armed, and one thousand Horse. If they had been rul'd by *Alian*, they should have had more than ten thousand heavy armed, five thousand odd Velites, and all the rest should have been Horse in this Phalange of theirs. When the *Athenians*, sent *Alcibiades* and *Nicias* to *Sicily*, they did not dream of any such exact numbers. At *Mantineæ*, *Epaninondas* his Army consisted of thirty thousand Foot, and three thousand Horse; a number exceeding the great *Macedonian* Phalange by four thousand three hundred twenty eight men. The Armies of the *Lacedæmonians* and *Athenians* that fought against him in that last Battle of his, were twenty two thousand Foot and Horse, and these were more by seven thousand six hundred sixty four, than a *Grecian* Phalange should have been by *Alians* method, at four deep the light, and eight deep the heavy armed, and yet came short six thousand six hundred seventy two of the number of the great *Macedonian* Phalange. By this we see our Authors numbers of Phalanges did not always hold; and it is a very great question to me, if ever they did exactly hold at all.

I have already told you, how he marshals his Phalange of heavy armed Foot, without Reserve, I have shown you that was not always done, and I have demonstrated and instanc'd the inconveniences of it, when it was done; Let us now see where he placeth his Cavalry in time of action: To this he saith, it was marshall'd according to the Generals pleasure, sometimes on the Flanks of the heavy armed Foot, sometimes before them, and sometimes behind them. That they were drawn up according to the Generals pleasure, he needed not tell us, that was not the question, but it was where the Generals pleasure was to place them. For marshalling the Horse on the Flanks of the Foot, there is reason enough for it; it was, and still is a common practice. To marshal them when they are to fight before the Foot, is not, in my opinion, advisably done; some to skirmish doth well, but if all the Horse fight in the Van of the Foot, and be beaten, they may readily rout their own Infantry, without the Enemies help, for something like that I have seen practis'd. And though the *Macedonian* Foot Phalange had, as I said before, three Intervals, through which, the Horse might perhaps (if worsted) have retir'd in good order, and drawn up in the Rear of the Foot, yet their Flight or Retreat would have infinitely discourag'd the Infantry, which was presently to enter into action; nor do I think such a manner of fight hath been oft practis'd. To draw up the Horse behind the Foot would be, in my judgement, yet of less use; but *Alian* in his Figure of the whole Phalanx, marshals the heavy armed Foot foremost, next them the Velites, and the Cavalry behind both. If he did not intend the Horse should fight in that place, why did he marshal them there; and if he conceiv'd they might fight there, why did he not tell us, how they could do it. It is true, it may be imagin'd, the Velites might bestow their Arrows and Stones cast out of Slings upon an Enemy,

Enemy, over the heads of the heavy arm'd Phalange; but what hurt Horsemen, heavily armed, could do an Enemy over the heads of both heavy and light arm'd Foot, drawn up in two distinct Bodies one behind the other, is not so easie to fantasie. And with permission of *Alian*, I doubt, it can hardly be made appear, that any General before his time, whether *Macedonian*, *Grecian*, or *Barbarian*, ever drew up an Army in that fashion, if they had ground to do it otherwise. *Cyru* plac'd his Foot in the Battell, and his Horse in the Wings, when he fought with the *Assyrians*, saith *Xenophon*. The *Grecians* at *Delos*, *Leutira*, and *Syracusa*, put their Horse in the Wings mixed with light armed Foot, their heavy armed Phalange in the middle, and some of their Velites skirmishing before it, with Reserves behind. *Alexander* used that same custome in all his Battels, though at *Issus*, the Straights of the Mountains would not suffer him to put his Army in that order he had design'd, till he acquir'd a more spacious ground. At *Arbela*, where he totally overthrew *Darius*, he marshall'd his Army nothing after *Alians* pattern; but so, that you may almost say, that our Modern Generals draw up their Armies now in imitation of him, and according to the Copy he cast them there: For his Right Wing consisted of Horse mix'd with light armed Foot, the Right hand whereof was commanded by *Cleus*, and the Left by *Philotas*. His Left Wing was likewise Horse mix'd with Velites, on the Right hand whereof stood *Melenger*, and on the Left, *Philip* with his *Thessalian* Cavalry. Between these two Wings was ranged his Phalange of heavy arm'd Foot. Some Velites skirmishing before it, and behind all these, both Phalanx and Wings, were those Reserves, under *Horestes*, *Lincerta*, *Polytaron* and *Philegus*; whereof I formerly told you.

The altering a Phalange from one form, posture, or site to another, gave occasion to the *Grecians* to give it some new denomination, though it was still that same Phalange, it was before the motion or evolution made the alteration, which perhaps hath given a rise to *Alian* to present us with so many several Figures in his Treatise; nor would they be hard to be understood, if they were illustrated by either smaller or greater Bodies in the Field, as they are by him in Paper. When the Phalanx presented their Pikes by half Files to Front and Rear, the *Greeks* called it in that posture *Anipistomus*: When the General commanded the Wings of the Phalange to advance, and the Body to make a Bow or Crescent, and in that posture to receive the charge of a Wedge Battel, then it was called *Antistomus*: And when by facing either by the Right or Left hand about, the Rear was made the Front; then the Phalange was called *Peristomus*: And so of others needless to rehearse. It may be I mistake in the *Greek* names, as having indeed but very little knowledge in that Language.

Ordinarily Horse fought in the Wings.

Several forms of a Phalange gave it several denominations.

Where *Alian* marshall'd the Cavalry.

## CHAP. IX.

*Of the Grecian March, Baggage, Encamping, Guards, and of their Pæan.*

Most of them  
forgot by  
Alian.

ALL these belong to the Art of War of any Nation and none will doubt, but the *Grecians* had set rules and orders for them all, and every one of them, which they did not alter, but according to the circumstances of things and emergency of affairs, on which depend most of Military actions. *Alian* gives us little light, or indeed none at all, in any of these particulars, but leaves us to glean what we can out of History, and thereon to build our own conjectures.

March:

It had been convenient for us to have known the manner of their marching, where or how the Horse, the heavy and light armed, and how far every day all of them were obliged to march, as also whether the Chiliarchies (which were Regiments of Foot) and the Hipparchies (which were Regiments of Horse) changed day about, or if they march'd constantly in one place according to their Antiquity or Precedency. For there is no doubt but their Ephipparchies (which were Brigades of Horse) and their Myriarchies (which were Brigades of Foot) might have chang'd Van and Rear every day by turns, as easily as our Brigades do. But since we are left by our leader *Alian* in the dark, I shall be of the opinion, that being there were by *Alian* account four Ephipparchies in the Cavalry, and four Phalangarchies in the Phalange of the heavy armed Foot, they chang'd day about, and each of them had the Van every fourth day; as also, I think, it was most consistent to Reason, that there being four Chiliarchies in every Phalangarchy, and four Talentinarchies in every Ephipparchy, they likewise daily changed; so that every Talentinarchy had the Van in the Ephipparchy every fourth day, as every Chiliarchy had in the Phalangarchy. I shall likewise believe, that the Cavalry march'd either before, behind, or on the Flanks of the Foot Phalange, according to the Enemies motions, and so did the light armed Foot. By these conjectures I do not offer to impose on any mans belief, but leave him that liberty that I have taken, to guess as probably as he can. How far the heavy armed Phalange was bound to march in one day, as I can assert nothing, so I may only guess, that they could be bound to march but twenty or five and twenty miles, as the *Roman* Legions were, and therefore I can hardly believe *Poliannus*, who saith, *Philip* made his Phalange march in one day three hundred *Stadia* or Furlongs, which make thirty seven *Italian* miles and a half, you will think this the more incredible, when you hear immediately what Baggage they carried.

Baggage:

Concerning the Baggage of a *Grecian* Army, our Author gives us this account; first, that it was necessary to appoint a judicious and active person to have the conduct of it, he saith well: Next he tells us, that sometimes the Baggage march'd in the Van of the Army, and so I think it should if the Enemy were in the Rear. Sometimes, saith he, it march'd in the Rear, when the Army advanc'd towards an Enemy, and good reason it should be so. Sometimes, saith he, it march'd in the middle of the Army, and there may be strong enough Reasons for that too. But sometimes he saith, it was order'd to march in the Flanks of the Army, and so it might, provided it had good Guards on the Flanks of it. And lastly, he avers, the *Grecians* sent their Baggage sometimes before their Army, when they were to enter into a declared Enemies Country. And here, I profess, I do not at all understand the mystery of this Stratagem of War. But I wish *Alian* had clear'd us in this, whether the Souldiers or Companies of Horse or Foot, had

had Waggon, Carts, Beasts of Carriage, Drudges and Slaves allow'd them to carry their Meat and Drink, and Fardles, or if they were obliged to carry all themselves; for in my next Essay of the *Roman* Militia, I shall let you see a Legionary carry three Magazines on his Head, Back, and Shoulders, the first of Arms; Scares or Palliades; the second of Meat and Clothes; and the third of Utensils for a Kitchen. If of all these three, the *Greek* was only obliged to carry his Arms, he had a great advantage of the *Roman* in all marches and expeditions. Yet, I suppose, my Reader may hazard with me to believe, that before *Philip* of *Macedon*'s time, the *Grecian* Souldiers carried no other burthens than their Arms, but had either Carriage-Beasts or Drudges allow'd them, for carrying their Victuals and other necessities; and this conjecture I ground upon what I have read in *Thucydides*, who tells us, that at *Syracusa*, after the unfortunate *Albanians* had lost their Navy, in which were all or most of their provisions, and that they were to march away by Land from the Siege of that potent City to seek new fortunes, their Souldiers were necessitated to carry their meat themselves; because, saith the Historian, they had mostly lost their Slaves and Drudges who were accusom'd to carry it; and some few, whose Slaves had stay'd till with them, durst not trust them with so precious a thing as meat then was, left in that sad disaster they should run away with it, and so starve them. If then their Slaves ran away from them, then Slaves were allow'd them. And it seems King *Philip* abrogated this custom, for he caus'd all his Foot Souldiers to carry their Meat and Baggage themselves, allowing only one Soujat to carry a Hand-mill for the use of ten Souldiers, and a Drudge to every Horse-man; this caus'd the other *Grecians* to call the *Philippians*, *Jumenta Philippi*, *Philips* Beasts of Carriage. But for all that, I have not Faith enough to believe *Frontinus*, who saith, that the same *Philip* caus'd his Foot to carry at one time *Triginta diurnum farinam*, meal for thirty days. And if his Son *Alexander* kept up that custom, as it is like he did, then his Phalangites needed not to have yielded to the *Roman* Legionaries for heavy burthens in both long and wearisome marches, which you will easily grant to be true, if you will consider the indefatigable expeditions of that magnanimous King through *Persia* and *India*.

It seems *Alian* hath not thought of Castrametation a subject pertinent to his Treatise, for he speaks nothing of it, and yet it is a very considerable part of the Art of War. I find the *Grecians* did not put their Souldiers to so much fatigue, as to fortify their Camp every night, as the *Romans* did. They chose their Castrametation to be in places of advantage, on Heights, Hills, or Rising grounds, or where they might have a River or Water at their Back, or one of their Flanks, and if they had these, or any of these, they used to cast up but a slight Retrenchment, unless they were to encamp some long time. Sometimes the Figure of the *Grecian* Camp was Oval, sometimes equilateral Square, sometimes Oblong, and I have read that *Lycurgus* appointed his *Spartan* Camps to be round, if they could have none of those advantages I spoke of; the defect of that Figure is, that it wants Flanks, which should not be wanting in any Fortification; but it had the advantage of other Figures, that it could contain more than any of them, because, *Rotunda est omnium Figurarum capacissima*. If it be true, what some say, that the *Romans* learn'd their Art of Encamping from *Pyrrhus* King of *Epirus*, then we shall know what his or the *Grecian* manner was, when I come to speak of the Castrametation of the *Romans*, where we shall see, if he was their Master, he need not be ashamed of such Scholars. This *Pyrrhus* was Brother-in-law to *Demetrius*, Son to *Antigonus*, who was a great Captain under a far greater Captain, the famous *Alexander*; who, no question, understood the Art of Encamping very well. We read, that the very day he fought his last Battel with *Darius* at *Arbela*, upon fight of that numerous Army he had to deal with, he became doubtful how to carry himself in so great an exigent, and therefore withdrew his Army to an Hill, (which *Mazæus* the *Persian* had desert'd) plac'd his Camp on it, and order'd it to be fortified, which was immediately done; for we read in *Quintus*, that after he had caus'd to put up his Pavillion, review'd the Enemies Forces, and resolv'd

The *Grecian*  
Souldiers carry'd no Bag-  
gage.

The *Philip* of  
*Macedon*'s  
time.

Castrametation.

*Alexanders*  
Camp at *Arbela*.

solv'd to give Battel, he commanded the Retrenchment to be cast down, that his Battalions might march out in Breach. All this being done in a very short time, shows that his Army was well acquainted with both Castramentation and Fortification.

To know how the *Grecians* kept their Watches and Guards, we must expect no light from *Alian*, who speaks nothing at all of that affair. Perhaps he hath been of one opinion with that Anabaptist Minister, who preaching on that Text, *Watch and Pray*, told his Audience, He would not trouble them with the various Interpretations of the word *Watch*, for he would assure them, in few words, that *Watch*, was as much as to say *Watch*. But because I have not read of any essential differences between the *Roman* Guards and Watches, and those of the ancient *Grecians*, I shall refer my Reader to my discourse of both, in the twenty second Chapter of my *Essays of the Roman Art of War*, where I shall inform him of any observable thing concerning them, mention'd by *Antus*, in those fragments of his, which all-devouring time hath left us, and those are but few.

*Pass a Hymn to Apollo.* Before the *Grecians* began their Battels they sung their *Paan*, which was a Hymn to *Apollo*; after which they had their shout or cry, which the *Romans*, with a barbarous word, called *Barium*. If they gain'd the Victory they sung another *Paan* or Hymn to that same Deity: Then they loudly

*Alala a cry to Mars.* cried to the God *Mars*, *Alala*, *Alala*; doubling and re-doubling that word very often. Neither was this custom peculiar to the *Greeks*, for we read in the first Chapter of the seventh Book of *Xenophon*, that *Cyrus*, the *Persian*, used the very same thing when he fought that great Battel with *Croesus*, wherein he was Victorious; for we read not of any *Paan* any of them sung, if they were beaten; thinking belike they were not oblig'd to thank their Gods for any misfortune that befel them.

By what I have said, you may easily perceive how little, I think, we have learn'd of the most essential points of the Ancient *Grecian* Militia, from this great, and so much talk'd of Master of the Art of War, *Alian*. And if any say, he only undertook to acquaint the Emperor *Adrian* with the marshalling *Grecian* Battels, I shall say first, that he hath but very ill acquitted himself of that undertaking; and next, that he might have done that great Prince as great a favour to have inform'd him of all those points of War, which he hath neglected; as of the manner how to marshal a Phalanx, and all the several parts of it.

## CHAP. X.

One of our Modern Armies compared with the Macedonian Phalanx.

*Modern Infantry resembles the Grecian one.* OUR Battalions of Pikes in the Modern Wars would resemble the *Grecian* heavy armed Phalanx of Foot, if they were as well arm'd for the defensive as they should be, and as they were one hundred years ago. Our Muskets, Harquebusses, Fire-locks and Fuses, give us an uncontroverted advantage over their light armed, or yet the *Roman* Velites, whatever *Lissius* say to the contrary, as shall be shown in the last Chapter of my *Essays of the Modern Art of War*. A Swedish Company, as it was in the time of the Great Gustavus and since, being of one hundred twenty six men, resembled the *Grecian* Centuriate, which consisted of one hundred twenty eight men: And a Swedish Regiment wherein are one thousand and eight men, comes very near to the *Grecian* Chiliarchy, wherein, according to *Alian*, there were one thousand twenty four men.

Since

Since the time that the *Switzer* Cantons confederated so strongly, and fought with their Masters so fortunately, that they got themselves declar'd Free States, their great Battalions of ten, sometimes twelve, sometimes sixteen thousand (all arm'd for the Offensive, with long and strong Pikes) and having their Heads, Necks, Backs, Breasts, Bellies, and Arms and Thighs well defended with Iron and Steel, resembled perfectly a *Macedonian* Phalanx of heavy armed Foot. And what great Victories they gain'd with those Battalions shall be spoke of hereafter en passant. But one hundred years ago, and before that, they came short of the *Grecians* for their Velites; for we read not, that then they made use of any Musquet or Harquebuss, though other Nations did. But not long after that time they began to follow the custom of the *Germans*, who then, and long after, made up their Bodies of Foot of two thirds of Pikes, and one third of Fire-men. For to arm two parts of a Company of Foot with Muskets, and one part with Pikes, is a custom of a far later date. But of this more in another place. Upon the whole matter, I say, that our Infantry of Musketeers and Pike-men, (if they be well arm'd for the Defensive) resembles the *Grecian* heavy and light armed Foot, and so do our Cuirassiers and Light Horse represent their Cataphracts and light armed Horse. I wonder why the *Turks* pretend that their Janizaries represent the *Macedonian* Foot Phalanx of heavy armed; for carrying Guns, Half-Pikes, and Javelines, they come far short of the Phalanx, in the strength whereof the *Macedonians* (as they had reason) put their greatest trust. But if these Infidels be not guilty of greater crimes than of vain ostentation, I think, as good Christians, we are bound to forgive them.

But since the time that Gun-powder made a loud noise in the world, I do not read of any *European* Army that so nearly resembled the great *Macedonian* Phalanx consisting both of Horse and Foot, as that of *Henry* the Second, King of *France*, when he march'd into *Germany* to assist the two Protestant Electors of *Saxony* and *Brandenburg*, against the Emperor *Charles* the Fifth; and by the way took in *Metz*, *Thoul*, and *Verdun*, with which Towns, his Successors, the *French* Kings, have not yet parted. This Army of his is very particularly describ'd by a Noble Author, who, though he conceal his name, yet, as his writings speak him to be an excellent Historian, so they bewray him to have been a Commander in the Wars, both in that Kings time, and in the Reigns of all his three Sons. By the relation of it, we will see how both the *French* Infantry and Cavalry were mounted and armed, and how their Battalions were marshall'd about one hundred and twenty years ago.

His Foot was marshall'd by his Great Constable *Mamourancy*, in three Battalions: One consisted of *Germans*, whose number was seven thousand; and therefore I conclude them to have been two Regiments; each consisting of twelve Companies, and each Company of three hundred men or thereabout, according to the custom observed then, and long after, by that Nation. They were arm'd Defensively as the *French* were; but for Offence, two parts of them had Pikes, and the third part Harquebusses. They were commanded by the Rhinegrave, whom most of the *French* Historians call very victoriously, and almost ridiculously Count of *Rhingrave*, which is as much as Earl of *Rhin-earl*. These *Germans* were Mercenaries, or Auxiliaries at best, and therefore I shall not say they were properly of the *French* Army, which I am now to compare with the *Macedonian* great Phalanx, as *Alian* describes it.

His *French* Infantry was divided into two great Battalions: The first consisted of fifteen thousand fighting men, of these nine thousand were heavy armed, and six thousand were light armed. The nine thousand had for their Defensive Arms, Head-pieces, Backs and Breasts, Gantlets, Sleeves and Tassetts; for the Offensive, they had Swords, and long *Bou*, under which name you are to comprehend Pikes, Halberds, Partisans, and long Staves, banded and pointed with Iron, and most of them all had Pistols at their Girdles. The other six thousand of the first Battalion, who were light armed, had for Armour, rich Morions, and Jacks and Sleeves of Mail, and for Weapons, they had Swords and Harquebusses for the most part, and some Muskets, all bright, clear, and fixed. The second *French* Battalion of Foot was composed of those who were brought out of the Southern Provinces of *France*.



France, and it was ten thousand strong, whereof seven were heavy armed, and the other three thousand light armed, they were armed much as the first Battalion was.

His Cavalry. His Cavalry was sub-divided into *Gens d'Arms*, Archer, Light Horse-men, and Harquebussiers: His Cuirassiers or *Gens d'Arms*, consisting all of persons of noble Families, were about one thousand, admirably well mounted on French Couriers, Turkey Horses, or Spanish Gennets. They were strongly and heavily arm'd for the Defensive; for Offence, they had each a Lance, a Mace, and a Sword, no word here of a Pistol. Their Horses were arm'd with Bards and Plates of Brass, richly caparison'd; and many other Horses they had, on which (beside their led Horses) their Servants, Pages, and Grooms rode. The Captains and other Officers of these *Gens d'Arms* were in rich Armour gilded and curiously wrought, mounted they were on courageous Horses, who were arm'd and richly caparison'd, and their Harness cover'd with either Velvet or Cloath of Tissue, with Goldsmith work or Embroidery. Every one of these *Gens d'Arms* had an Archer, who followed him, by the French constitutions of War, who though then they used neither Bow nor Arrow (as formerly they did) yet did still retain the name of Archers. They rode on small, but very nimble Horses, who vaulted pleasantly; each of them carried a Lance, a Pistol, and a Sword, all of them well accoutred, striving who should appear finest. The Light Horse-men were mounted on good Nags, little, but very swift; for Armour, they had Light Helmets, Corsets, and Sleeves; for Offensive Arms, each of them had a Cutlase, and either a half Lance, or a Pistol, which of them he pleas'd, but not both. Of these Light Horse there were about eighteen hundred. The Harquebussiers were mounted on as good Geldings as they could make themselves masters of; they had Jacks, Morions, and Sleeves of Mail for Defence; their Weapons were Swords, and Harquebusses of three foot long, hanging at the courches of their Saddles. He had about fifteen hundred of them.

Besides all these, there were about four hundred English Gentlemen, all Volunteers, under the command of an English Lord; they were mounted on handsome and swift Geldings; they were provided with little Armour for Defence; their Weapons were Swords and Lances, like Half-Pikes, such our Author. These were King Henry's Forces.

Setting the English aside, we have of French Cavalry, one thousand *Gens d'Arms*, one thousand Archers, eighteen hundred Light Horse, and fifteen hundred Harquebussiers: Add these together, the aggregate is five thousand three hundred. This exceeds the number of the Macedonian Horse by one thousand one hundred and eight. In the next place, let the Rhingrave and his German Foot aside, the heavy arm'd French Foot were sixteen thousand, which wanted but three hundred eighty four of the Macedonian heavy armed Phalange. The French light armed Foot were about nine thousand, which was eight hundred and eight more than *Ælian* allows to the Macedonian Velites. The French Foot and Horse amounted to thirty thousand three hundred Combatants, those of *Ælian's* great Phalange to twenty eight thousand six hundred seventy two; the difference is sixteen hundred twenty eight. But if we reckon on the English and French Volunteers, the Kings own Guards of Scots, French, and Swissers, with the Rhingraves seven thousand Germans, this Army exceeded the number of forty five thousand men; with which marched the Great Master or General of the Artillery of France, who had the conduct of forty four pieces of Ordnance, great and small, with Powder and Bullets suitable to so many Guns.

The Author tells us, that King Henry view'd this mighty Army of his near the City of Metz, where he said it was drawn up in Battalia; but he forgot to inform us here of two very considerable points, the one, of what altitude or depth both the Foot and Horse were; the second, what distances were kept, or order'd to be kept, between the several Files and Ranks both of Horse and Foot, and how great the Intervals were between the several Battalions and Bodies, as well of the Cavalry as the Infantry; for thereby we should have been able not only to have made a probable conjecture, but determinately to have known, how much ground the whole Army took up in longi.

longitude, but there are others who are guilty of this neglect as well as this Author of ours, who hath fail'd in this.

With these, indeed formidable Forces, did the French King intend to defend, and fight within the Bowels of the German Empire. Charles the Fifth, a greater and braver Prince than whom (though he had not been elected Emperour of the Romans) either for propriety and large extent of Patrimonial Dominions, or for personal Courage and Prudence, the Western World had not seen since the time of Charles the Great. But whilst this Magnanimous King is viewing, and exceedingly pleasing himself with the sight of his gallant Army, a beggarly and contemptible crew, of some Souldiers, some Soujats and Grooms, and some Countrey Clowns, in fight of this great Prince, his Nobility in splendid equipage, and of his whole Battalions, charg'd those who were appointed to guard the Baggage, and in spite of the King, then in his greatest strength, carried a rich and considerable booty into *Themouille*, an Imperial Garrison not far from the place: Nor was this affront done so publicly to so powerful an Army at all reveng'd, only some Light Horse were sent before the Town, to vapour and brave the Imperialists, who fail'd not to fall out, and skirmish with the French, from which bickering neither party carried away any thing but blows. And at length Henry's great preparations came to nothing, for the two German Princes having (not without some stain to their Honour) made their Peace with the Emperour, without the French Kings privacy, he was glad to return, and defend his own Territories against Charles, who was horribly incens'd against him, for offering to assist his Rebels (for so he call'd those Electors) against his Lawful Authority.

As this French Army, which, I think, so much represented the Phalange, vanish'd; so the Macedonian Phalanx it self (on which *Ælian* bestows the Titles and Epithers of *Invincible*, *Inexpugnable*, and *Irresistible*) after it had in Philip, and his Son Alexander's time, given the Law to the Eastern World, and after their deaths, had been kept up by Alexander's Successors and Great Captains the space of one hundred and sixty years, yielded to fate, and was brought to nothing in *Perseus* his time; and Macedon it self reduced to a Province by the Romans, of whose Legions, Art, and Order of War, we are in the next place to take a view.






PALLAS ARMATA.

Military Essays  
ON THE  
ANCIENT  
ROMAN  
ART of WAR.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

*Of the Ancient Roman Government, and Militia in General.*



THE hand of Heaven, which cast the Empire of the best part of the known World into the lap of the *Romans*, was the more visible in that before they came to any great progress of Conquest, and after too, their State was obnoxious to those difficulties which might have rendered it not only incapable to overcome its Enemies, but subject to be a prey to any of its Neighbours. And of these, any who have perus'd their Histories, may, if they please, with me observe them which follow.

First, Their frequent change of Government, as, from Kings to Consuls, then to Consuls join'd with Tribunes of the People, from these to a *Decem-*  
F  
*virate*;

virate, from that to Military Tribunes, invested with Consular Authority, from them to Consuls again, from these to a *Triumvirate*, and from that to Emperors.

Second. The almost continual wars and debates between the Senate and the People not only concerning the *Lex* *de* *potestate* and division of Land, but even about the Supreme Power of the Government itself, in which the Commons ever gain'd ground, and at the long-run obtain'd the principal points and marks of the Sovereignty; these were the Division of Magistracies, yea, of the Consuls, making and repealing Laws, *Senatus* of Life and Death, and the last Appeal.

Third. The constantly Seditious Orations and Practices of the Tribunes of the People, whereby they publicly obstructed many times the Levies of Souldiers, and the pursuance of many Victories gain'd against their Neighbours: Whilst the State was yet in its Infancy, all those alterations and contentions proceeding from an inward disease of State, could not choose but exceedingly weaken it in the undertaking any great action abroad. But,

Fourth. Their Cruelty and Ingratitude to their own Citizens and Captains, who had done them the best and greatest services, some whereof I shall instance in in another place; few of them all escaping by the censure; enough to withdraw any generous Spirit from a desire to serve them.

Fifth. Their frequent making Dictators, almost upon every sudden apprehension of fear, or supposed danger; an Office so unlimited (having power to do and command what they pleas'd, without comptrol, appeal, or fear to be question'd after their time expired) that it is a wonder none of them prevented *Julius Caesar*, in usurping the Sovereignty.

Sixth. Their making two Consuls of equal authority, the very fuel of discord at home, and of most dangerous consequence abroad, when a powerful Enemy necessitated them to join their Forces. Take some Instances: In one of the Wars against the *Volscians*, *Lucius Furius* was join'd in equal Command with *Marcus Furius Camillus* (that famous Roman, who freed his Country from the Invasion of the *Gauls*) in this War young *Camillus* would needs fight first against old *Camillus* his advice; and well beaten he was, and had been utterly routed, if the old man had not waited his opportunity, and come to his rescue with the *Triarii*. *Fabius* the Dictator (nick-nam'd the Cunctator) had *Minucius* join'd in equal Command with him, who would needs with the half of the Army fight *Hannibal*, whether the Dictator would or not: The *Carthaginian* beats him, and had made an end of him, and perhaps of the War too, if old *Fabius* had not parted the fray. But the Romans escap'd not so easily at *Canna*; for there *Terenius Varro*, in spite of his Colleague *Paulus Aemilius*, fought with the same *Hannibal*, where both of them receiv'd such an overthrow, that if he who gave it them, had follow'd *Maharbal's* advice, and immediately march'd, he might, in all probability, have din'd the fifth day after in the Capitol, and for ever have extirpated the City and name of the Romans. Here *Rome* was sav'd not at all by the Senates prudence, but by her Enemies negligence.

Seventh. Their custom to recall their Consuls and Proconsuls at the end of every year (unless by mighty favour or invincible necessity they were continued) which made their Generals either desperately hazard Battle, or grant an advantageous and honourable Peace to their almost conquered Enemies, left their Successors should have the honour to finish the War. Take these instances: *Sempronius*, against all reason, would needs fight *Hannibal* at *Trebia*, before his Colleague *Publ. Scipio* was recover'd of his wound, for fear new Consuls should come and rob him of the glory of the Victory: The like fear made *Titus Flaminius* grant an advantageous Peace to *Nabis*, the Tyrant of *Lacedæmon*, when *Titus* was almost Master of all *Greece*. So did *Scipio* the African, to the vanquish'd *Carthaginians*, after he had beat *Hannibal* at *Zama*; publicly professing, that the ambitious desires of *Claudius* and *Cornelius* (who aspired to succeed him, and put an end to that long War) was the cause he did not finish it himself (wanting time) with the destruction of *Carthage*.

Eighty,

Eighty. Their extraordinary superstition beyond all other Nations: They must sacrifice great and small Beasts, make Processions, Lectisterniums, and Supplications to all their Gods and Goddesses, (who were not a few) not only some days, but sometimes some weeks, before their Generals were permitted to march from the City, whereby time and occasion (not to be recovered in the matter of War) were very frequently lost. All this must be done to please their angry Deities when any prodigies were seen or heard of, either within or without the City; for some whereof, natural reasons might have been given; some of them were palpable and ridiculous lyes, and not a few of them compos'd either by the State or the Priests to cheat the credulous vulgar, and yet with the relation of them *Titus Livius* even nauseates his Reader; inasmuch, that *Boccadani* tells us in one of his *Raguagli*, that when *Dion* was severely reprov'd in *Parnassus*, before *Apollo*, for writing such fabulous Miracles, *Livius* was observ'd to blush, as guilty of the same crime; yet *Boccadani's* own *Tacitus*, and *Suetonius* use us very little better. *Livy* tells us of several Oxen that spoke, particularly of one that said, *Cave Tibi Roma*. But I wonder why many more poor mens Oxen did not learn to speak, since this Oxe for his seasonable warning, (in bidding *Rome* beware of herself) was order'd to be fed on the publick charge. *Suetonius* tells us of a Crow, which towards the end of *Domitians* Reign, told the Romans from the Capitol, *That all should be well*: If he had not lov'd her liberty better than her meat, she had not flown away, but stay'd still and been fed at the publick expence of the City, and perhaps been worshipp'd as *Fatidick*, for things did indeed grow well after that Monsters death; yet methinks she was a very ill-natur'd Bird, that would not tell so good news in the vulgar language, which was *Latin* (for you are to know she spoke in *Greek*) that the poor people of *Rome* (who were oppress'd by that bloody Tyrant) might have understood the comfortable Prophecy as well as the fabulous Priests. I pray you take the Story in Verse:

*Tarpeio nuper sedit qua culmine cornix,  
Est bene, non potuit dicere, dixit, Erit.*

*Upon the Capitol, the Crow  
Did not say, All was well,  
But, That things shortly well should go,  
Distinctly she did tell.*

Nor must the Roman Generals go out of *Rome*, till they took their auspices right, nor must they fight, if the entrails of the Sacrificed Beasts did not fully please the juggling Priests, or yet if the Sacred Pullers did not eat their meat well; and it was well enough known, how the Chicken-masters couzen'd the Consuls oft enough, with the eating or not eating of the Chicken, it being almost constantly in their power to make the Consuls give Battle, or abstain from it, when they pleas'd. *Julius Caesar* would not be so cheated, for though the *Hosia* which he was to Sacrifice, run away from him, which was thought to presage bad fortune, yet went he on to *Africa*, and at his landing there his foot tripping he fell; this his Souldiers thought very ominous, but he gave it another interpretation, and said, He had taken possession of the Country, *Tenete Africa*. But contrary to what I have said appear two famous Authors, *Machiavelli* and *Polybius*. The first, in his first Book of his Discourses on *Titus Livius*, makes the Romans tenacious adhering to their superstition (which he calls Religion) to be one of the causes of their aggrandizing their Empire, and commends them much for suffering no Innovation to be introduced in their Holy Rites; yet all he doth upon the matter, is to shew that the Ancient Romans made a prudent use of their pretended Religion, and under the notion of it, govern'd their Common-wealth politically: But I say, first, that is but one of his own conjectures, and notwithstanding any thing he saith to the contrary, I suppose those Romans were as really superstitious as they pretended to be, even the Senators themselves; and himself in the eleventh Chapter of that Book avers, that there was never

*Machiavelli.*

greater fear of God for many ages, than in that ancient Republick; then by his own account, it was no pretended, but a real Religion. And is not this found Christian Doctrine, to avy, that the fear of God was, where Devils, under the notion of Deities were publicly ador'd and worshipp'd? Secondly, I say, if the Roman Senate was to be commended for not suffering any alteration to be made in that Religion which their second King *Numa Pompilius* had establish'd amongst them, then by *Machiavelli's* rule, we must approve of all the persecutions of the Heathen Emperours against the Christians, for thereby they did but endeavour to banish all new Religions out of their Dominions. Truly I think, that not any one part of that *Florentines* Writings smells ranker of Atheism than this doth. But *Polybius*, an universally approv'd Author, speaks very near the same language in the sixth Book of his History, where he saith, that that which with other Nations was accounted a Vice, was made useful by the Romans, for keeping their Subjects within the bounds of their duty, and that was, saith he, the superstitious veneration of their Gods in an extraordinary way; but withal he adds, that the Romans did well to restrain the fury and other passions of the Commons with unfeared terrors, with feign'd and fearful bug-bears, and that both they, and other Ancient Nations had done prudently to induce in credulous minds the opinion of Deities, and of the torments of Hell; and though these have no existence, yet the Doctrine of them, saith he, is not to be rashly condemn'd, since it over-awes the vulgar. Whether this Discourse will not prove *Polybius* (though he knew not the true God) to have been in that Idolatrous age, wherein he lived, as very an Atheist, as *Machiavelli* was, when he wrote his Discourses in *Livy*, and his Book *Di Principe*, I shall not determine, but leave those who accuse him of that crime, and his Translator *Cassaubon*, who defends him from that imputation, to debate the matter between them.

Ninthly, Their horrible and bloody Civil Wars, enough to have destroy'd ten other Nations, as that between *Sylla* and *Marius*, Father and Son; and that between *Cesar* and the *Pompeys*; and that of the *Triumvirate*: In all which, how much the Roman State was at a loss, may be conjectur'd by one review the Dictator *Cesar* made of the Roman Citizens, even before he had made an end of the War, wherein he found the number to be less by one hundred thousand men than when he began that one Civil War, which had continued not full four years.

But there were other difficulties wherewith the Roman State had to wrestle, and those made up likewise an inward disease, which came unexpected and unlook'd for, and not being foreseen, could not well be prevented; and those difficulties are most proper for this discourse, because of a Military Subject; and those were the frequent and terrible Mutinies of the Roman Legions or Armies. Indeed these laid them open to the Attempts and Invasions of all their Enemies and maligning Neighbours, and have left beside, especially when unpunish'd, an eternal blemish on their Discipline of War, so much cry'd up by all Nations, and in all Ages; the like of which Mutinies, either for number or danger, I do not read to have fallen out in any Army of the World, if you except those infamous ones made by the King of Spain's Forces in the *Netherlands*, about twenty or thirty years, or more, after the beginning of the intestine Wars of those Countreys, wherof *John Petit*, *Strada*, and *Bemvolgio*, with other Historians of those times, may give the curious Reader a full account. Of the Roman Mutinies, some wherof were punish'd, some never, I shall give you these following instances.

When *Cesar*, the greatest Captain that ever was, made War in Spain against *Pompey's* Legates, because he would not fight when his Legions would, they Mutin'd, and told him, they would not fight when he desir'd them. He pacified them with good words, as knowing it was not time to use force. At *Placentia* his ninth Legion Mutin'd, and refus'd to go to *Africa* with him, but desir'd to be dismiss'd, and he accordingly disbanded them. When *Lucullus* had gain'd a Victory against *Mithridates* and *Tigranes*, he could not get it pursued for the Mutiny of his Army, which would neither be entreated nor commanded to march, alledging they had serv'd out their time. The Legions which were left at *Corinnum* by the Senate and *Pompey*, to whom they

they had sworn Fidelity, Mutin'd against their Governour *Domitius*, and deliver'd both him and the Town to *Cesar*. *Annius Posthumus Albinus*, a Legat and an Admiral, upon a false suspicion of Treachery, was barbarously murder'd by his own Army. *Caius Fimbria*, with the help of his Mutinous Souldiers murder'd the Consul *Valerius Flaccus*; and thereafter justly fearing the same measure, entreated one of his own Slaves to do him the courtesy to kill him. The Consul *Cinna*, because he would have had his Legions to fight against *Sylla* (at that time a declar'd Enemy to the State) is murder'd by them. *Lucius Scipio* being to fight with the same *Sylla*, is deserted by his Mutinous Souldiers, who went all over to the Enemy, nor were ever any of those Mutinies or Murders punish'd or look'd after. But because it may be said, most of all these were acted in time of Civil Wars, when Authority was laid under foot, and every man did that which seem'd good in his own eyes; I will tell you of some Mutinies, and those of the deepest dye; that fell out, when the Ancient Roman Discipline was in its vigour, and was said to be executed with the greatest severity and strictness.

I shall not speak of the Commons leaving the City, and going to *Mont Sacer*, or the Holy Hill, when they were brought back by the witty Parable of *Memmius Agrippa*; that being a Sedition or Secession of the people, rather than a Mutiny of the Souldiers. But sure those Legions, who without liberty given, came out of the Fields to the *Appennine* Hill, and made their demands to the Senate in Arms, was a Mutiny; but so far from being punish'd, that the Mutiniers got what they demanded. Consul *Cato Fabius* beat the *Equians* out of the Field with his Cavalry, but could not persuade his Legions to advance, or mend their pace, or make so much as a shew of pursuit; but on the contrary, they march'd back to their Tents, and offer'd rather their Throats to be cut by the Enemy (if he had turn'd head) than obey their Consul; nor was ever this pernicious and dangerous Mutiny punish'd. When *Appius Claudius* had march'd his Legions against the *Volscians*, they Mutin'd, refus'd to fight, and fled back to their Camp; and though many of them were kill'd in the Rear, yet neither Honour, Duty, or which is more, Self-preservation, could move them to turn their faces to the Enemy; their wickedness and obstinacy continued next day, when the Consul marching homewards, the *Volscians* again attack'd him, and made a carnage of the Rear of his men without any opposition, for none would fight; but all ran and fled, inasmuch that the Enemy might have made the whole Roman Army his prey, if he could have made use of so favourable an opportunity. It is true, *Appius* found his time to punish the execrable Mutiniers; and did it to some purpose, by whipping first, and then beheading all the Centurions, as also all the Ensign-bearers that had lost their Colours, and the Souldiers that had cast away their Arms; all the rest he decimated, and beheaded every tenth man, saith *Livy*; bastinadoed, saith *Florus*: What manner of death this bastinadoing was, shall be told you in the twenty fourth Chapter of these Discourses. A Legion of four thousand Romans was sent to *Egypus* to keep it for the State, they Mutiny, kill the principal Citizens, and keep the Town for themselves full ten years, at last being forc'd to yield, all that were taken alive, were well whipp'd and beheaded in the great Market-place of *Rome*. *Posthumus* a Military Tribune, with Consular authority fought fortunately with the *Equians*, (observe in all these that the Roman Empire was but yet in its Cradle) is call'd back to the City, in his absence his Army Mutinies against his Treasurer, beats him and wounds him: The Tribune returns in haste (and indeed he made more haste than good speed) and endeavouring to punish the Mutiniers, is himself ston'd to death by them; nor was this highest infolence and baseness ever punish'd, as both in Justice and Honour it should have been. *Sulpicius*, a Dictator, thinking to use the *Fabian* way, and protract the War against the *Gauls*, is forc'd by his Mutinous Army to fight, nor did he ever punish any of the Mutiniers, perhaps because he was successful in beating the Enemy; yet did not this favour so much of that Roman severity, for which they desir'd to be so much cry'd up. At *Capua*, before *Flaminius* enter'd Italy, some Roman Legions hatched a dreadful and monstrous Mutiny, which portended no less than the ruine and dissolution of the

Against *Domitius*,  
Against *Albinus*.

Against *Flaccus*.

Against *Cinna*.

Against *Lucius Scipio*.

Against the Senate.

Against *Cato Fabius*.

Against *Appius Claudius*.

Against the State.

Against *Posthumus*.

Against *Sulpicius*.

*Polybius*.

Ninth.

Mutinies in the Roman Armies.

Against *Cesar*.

Against *Lucullus*.

Against the  
Common-  
wealth.

the State itself, they came to a head at *Lemula*, fortified their Camp, and took *Titus Quintus* (who had been a Military Tribune) out of his Countrey-Houle, and forced him to be their General: Neither was this most dangerous Motiny appeald by the Authority of either the Senate, or the Dictator *Valerius*, but to the advantage of the Mutiniers; in so far, that the Horic-mens pay was diminished at the instance of the Mutiniers, who were all of the Infantry; and all because the Horse had refused to joyn with the Foot in that detestable design of ruining the Common-wealth. So you see the custome of punishing honest men, and rewarding knaves, is not of a new date. Great

Against *Scipio*  
the African.

*Scipio* the African, a person of great authority (if ever *Rome* bred any) being in *Spain*, eight thousand of his Army lay at a place called *Sucro*, a great way from him, they Mutiny, chase away their Tribunes, and choole Captains of their own, before two of whom were carried Axes, and bundles of Rods, the badges of Sovereign power: *Scipio* by policy and good words making fair weather with them, brought them to the rest of the Army, and then suddenly laid hold upon thirty five of the Ring-leaders, these he whips and beheads, the rest he pardons. The same *Scipio* had a Legat, one *Pleminius*,

Against *Ple-*  
*minius*.

who lay at *Locri* in *Italy*, his Souldiers and those of some other Tribunes go together by the ears, *Pleminius* compseth the matter, but because the Tribunes had not done their duty in parting the fray, he will have them whipp'd with Rods; their Souldiers Mutiny, beat *Pleminius*, and cut off his Nose. *Scipio* hearing of the disorder, hastens thither, acquits his Legat, as having done his duty; and for satisfaction to his Noseless face, orders the Tribunes to be sent in Fetters to *Rome*, there to receive their punishment, and so goes away. But when *Pleminius* put his hand to his Face and missed his Nose, he could not be satisfied with the Consule arbitration, and therefore resolved to cut out his own Revenge, which he performed with a very bloody Knife, for he put all the Tribunes to death with most exquisite torments.

How to great  
disorders in  
the Modern  
Wars.

Let those Modern Writers who so much cry up the Ancient *Roman* Discipline of War (and which of them all doth it not?) and complain of the Slackness of the Modern one, tell me of greater Insolencies, Mutinies, or Contempt of Authority, in any age, since the decandcy of the *Roman* Empire, than these I have mentioned; all or most whereof fell out when the Military Laws of *Rome* were thought to be most strictly observed; nor can it be said, that the Ancient Discipline was worn out, for at the latest of these Mutinies at *Locri* the *Romans* were but young Lords, being Masters of little more than the half of *Italy*, in one of the best corners whereof, *Hannibal* their sworn Enemy, made yet his abode, and would have done so longer, if his unhappy Countrey-men had not first withdrawn their assistance from him, and at length called him home to *Africa*, to support their now decaying and tottering State.

*Roman* Ver-  
tues.

Notwithstanding all these inward Maladies, enough to have consumed the vitals of any State, the *Romans* in time prevailed over all those, with whom they made either a just or an unjust War: for as the all-powerful God had pre-ordained them to be a mighty people, so he had qualified them with parts, abilities, and endowments, to attain to that greatness: These were, True Fortitude, Prudence, Abstinence, Temperance, Equity (either real or pretended) Patience, with an admirable Toleration of all manner of wants and difficulties, insuring their Souldiers to all manner of toyl and fatigue; and above all, with Magnanimity, as never succumbing, or yielding to adversity, but in their greatest affliction, and lowest condition, shewing greatest Courage and Confidence; which those Senators well witness'd, who would needs dye in their Robes, with the Enigmas of Majesty, when the *Gauls* had taken and burnt their City. And after their total rout at *Cannæ*, when *Hannibal* sent Embassadors with overtures of Peace to them, they sent out and discharged his Messengers to approach the City: And after that, when that Great Captain came (a little too late indeed) and sac'd their City with his Victorious Army, they sold that piece of ground on which his Pavilion was erected, publicly by the Drum, at an over-rate; and to shew him that this was not a rant, one of their Consuls offer'd him Battel two several days, but that great hazzard was hinder'd by fearful Tempests from Heaven.

With

With these, and other abilities, were the famous *Romans* fitted for the performance of that which the Almighty had order'd for them, and that was, to over-master the most part of the then known World, and to govern and rule all other Nations with a Rod of Iron.

They who desire to know perfectly the Ancient *Roman* Ordinances and Constitutions of War, have reason to wish that those Authors mention'd by *Vegetius*, were yet extant; which were, the Treatises of the Emperours *Augustus*, *Adrian*, and *Trajan*; but most of all, that of *Marcus Porcius Cato*, who was not only a great Senator, and an eloquent States-man, but an excellent Captain, whereof bear witness his prudent Conduct of Armies, his Victories, and his Triumphs, all yet on Record. And yet he profess'd, that he thought he had done the *Roman* Republick the greatest service, in preserving their Military Art from Oblivion, and transmitting it to posterity by his Writings. There is no question, but that Treatise of his, if it had not been lost, had clear'd us of many of those doubts and difficulties, which none that are ex- rant do or ever will do. All that is left to give us a glimpse of light in the *Roman* Art of War, are some fragments of *Polybius*, and a Book of *Flavius Renatus Vegetius De Re Militari*: Both of them Noble Authors, and eminent persons in their several times. For the last, he is so much cry'd up by most, and thought to be understood by all, that I do confess, it must be my dulness that makes me not understand him in many places, wherein I think him to obscure, so wandering, and so little constant to himself, that I go away from him, and those who comment on him, as ignorant of some points of the *Roman* Militia, as when I met with either him or them. I am not guilty, nor shall be, of so great presumption, as to fix any blemish on a person whose name hath been held for so many ages in so much reputation, and therefore, I shall think, first, we have not all he wrote on that subject, though in his Treatise seem to be full; and next, that when Printing first appeared in the world, some Papers of his have been too carelessly pieced together, and that perhaps put in several Chapters which should have been in one, (hence may come his frequent Tautologies) and a close made to a Paragraph, to which the Author perhaps intended an addition or interpretation, and thereby in some places he is made to speak that sense, which perhaps he never intended. Nor dare I qualifie *Vegetius*, as *Lipsius* in the sixth Book of his *Poliorketikon*, very magisterially does, in these words, *Bonus Vegetius hic & alibi solutus & negligent, & parum ad Genium Antiquum; nec peccarem, si salem Testem rejicerem, & contemnerem*; Good *Vegetius*, saith he, here and elsewhere loose and negligent, who had little of the Genius of the Ancients; neither should I commit any sin, if I should reject or contemn such a Witness.

Though in the following Discourses I intend to speak of the *Roman* Military Art, in all its dimensions, yet it is not to be expected, that I either will or can explain all their Ordinances of War, which hath been done by none whose Writings are extant: I shall follow *Vegetius* in those points he speaks of, and wherein he is wanting (and he is that in many things) I shall take what help I can get from others, when I leave him, it shall be when I think him out of the way; nor shall I take upon me to tell my own opinion in any point, but where Reason, History, or other mens Authority, seems to empower me.

## CHAP. II.

## Of the Military Election or Levy of the Roman Souldiers.

Three Orders  
in the Roman  
State.

Roman Horfe-  
men all Gen-  
tlemen.

Foot Souldi-  
ers Plebeians.

Manner of the  
Roman levy.

How the Le-  
gions were  
elected.

THE great Bulk or Body of the Roman State was divided into three Principal Members; these were, the *Patritian*, the *Equeſtral*, and the *Plebeian*. Out of the first were chosen the Senators, Dictators, Consuls, Pro-Consuls, Prætors and Pro-Prætors; till the Commons, after long strife, wrung from the *Patritians* the privilege to have a *Plebeian* Consul, and other Magistrates. Out of the *Equeſtral* Order were all their Horſe-men levied, so that all of the Roman Cavalry were Gentlemen, which custom was followed by many Nations for many ages, but is now well near worn out. The Roman Horſe-men were chosen by the Censors. Of the *Plebeians* or Commons were the Foot Souldiers elected. *Vegetius* faith, that the Countrey-fellows were rather chosen, than those bred in Cities; and, in the persons who were to be elected, he doth not so much require bigness or tainess of Body, (as *Marius* did) as the largeness of their Breasts, the vivacity of their Eyes, the brawniness of their Arms and Legs. He makes choice rather of Artificers and Traders than Merchants, but of these he rejects Fishers, Fowlers, Clothiers, Confectioners, and all such whose Trades are sedentary; and hereby he excludes Taylors and Shoemakers, (but I have known good Souldiers of both) for all these he esteems womanly: But he admits Hunters, Hawkers, Smiths, Carpenters, and such as they. This upon the matter is all *Vegetius* tells us of the Roman Levy.

Other Authors shew us the manner of their Levy, which was this: Every year when the Consuls were elected, four Legions were levied, (unless some extraordinary occasion requir'd more) that was two for every Consul, which with as many from the Allies, made up two Consular Armies. At that time did all the Tribes appear, which in the flourishing condition of the Romans came to be thirty five. In the first place, twenty four Tribes or Colonels were chosen, whereof fourteen were of the *Equeſtral*, and ten of the popular Order: Suppose still, that four Legions were to be rais'd, for if either more or less, the number of the Tribes was augmented or diminish'd. *Vegetius* faith, that six Tribes were constantly ordain'd for every Legion, whatever strength it was of; but by his favour, *Livy* tells us in his Ninth Book, that there were but four Tribes in every Legion in the War against the *Samnites*: And at that time the Tribes were chosen by the Tribes, and from thence they have their denomination; and I find likewise they were chosen by the Tribes in the time of the Second Punic War, but in the *Macedonian* the Consuls had the election of them. Two years after that War was ended, *Livy* informs us, the Tribes resum'd their former liberty, and elected their Tribes.

The manner in which the Tribes or Colonels elected their Souldiers was this: Every Tribe divided its men that were fit for service, by fours: Of the first four, the eldest Tribune of the first Legion chose one, the eldest Tribune of the second Legion chose the second; the eldest Tribune of the third Legion chose the third, and the fourth man fell to the lot of the eldest Tribune of the fourth Legion. Of the second four, the first Tribune of the second Legion chose the first. Of the third four, the first Tribune of the third Legion chose the first. And of the fourth four, the first Tribune of the fourth Legion chose the first; and so again alternatively, till the Legions were all compleat; and the election for all the four Legions as equally made as possibly it could be. Those who were elected, were not always *Tirones* or *Novitiates*, for many of them had serv'd in the Wars before, but were still oblig'd to be enroll'd at new levies (if elected) till they had serv'd out that time that

was

was appointed, and what that was, shall be immediately told you. Those who were levied for the Foot service, were ordinarily divided into four Classes: In the first were the most experienced, and were call'd *Triarii*; in the second those of the strongest Bodies, and had the name of *Principes*; in the third were those who were in their youthful years, and had least experience, and were called *Hastati*; in the fourth Class were those who were ordain'd to be light armed, and had the name of *Velites*. Of all these, and every one of them, I shall speak particularly in the sixth Chapter.

The Tribunes had the power also to choose the Centurions, the Standard, Ensign, and Eagle-bearers, but not according to their own pleasure, but according to the time they had serv'd, the degrees they had attain'd to, the Donatives they had got, and the services they had done; and if any of them conceiv'd he got wrong, he had power to appeal from the Tribune to the Consul. Observe here, that no man could be chosen to be an Officer, but he who had serv'd out half his time, which was this: The Horſe-men were oblig'd to serve ten years, and the Foot twenty, (suppose still, that they were not mutilated, or made unſerviceable in the Wars) after that, they were *Emeriti Milites*, and were to get their Dimissions; and this sometimes occasion'd Mutinies, when the State could not conveniently spare them. The members elected for the War, were not to be under seventeen years old, nor above forty seven. But it is strange, how *Vegetius* in the fourteenth Chapter of his First Book, against the current of all Writers, affirms, that those of fourteen years old should be brought to the election, if the ancient custom, faith he, were observ'd. But these Dimissions were sometimes dispensed with, when Reason of State required it: And *Livy* faith, that in the *Macedonian* War there was no Cessation from Arms, nor Dimissions granted, but to those who were past the fiftieth year of their age.

If any absented themselves from the time and place ordain'd for election, they were punish'd; but how, neither *Polybius* nor *Vegetius* tell us. But *Livy* says, that great Investigator of Antiquity, out of History informs us, that sometimes they were fin'd in Money, or Beſtiall; sometimes they had all or most of their goods taken from them; some of them were corporally punish'd by bonds and imprisonment, some of them had whipping with Rods, and some had their Fingers and Thumbs cut off, and many of them were sold for Slaves. He faith also, that some persons were appointed (whom he calls *Cognitores*) to search out, and find such Delinquents. But in process of time, especially after the Roman State was converted into a Monarchy, this laudable and strict way of election wore out, and decay'd; and instead of free-born, and of the justest and ablest *Plebeians*, Souldiers, Slaves, Drudges, and the Servants of Vintners and Cooks were elected and enroll'd, to the disgrace of the Roman Militia, and subversion of the Empire; whereof *Vegetius* hath just reason to complain.

Two things my Reader must observe here; first, that besides this formal election, there was a sudden and tumultuary levy, which was made when the danger was great, the Enemy prevail'd, or other Emergencies, or Reasons of State required expedition. In these cases, no respect was had to Age or Dimissions, but all, young and old (provided they were fit for service) were enroll'd, and forc'd to take Arms in defence of the Commonwealth. The second thing to be observed, is, that though most Authors say, that so long as the Roman State kept up its Ancient and strict discipline, (this some will have to have been done till the time of the Emperours) all the Roman levies, whether formal or tumultuary, were all made of Free-men; notwithstanding, I say, this assertion, History tells us, that that noble Nation did not tie it self so strictly to that point of Honour; but both could, and did dispence with it, when the Senators thought fit. For after the defeat at *Cannæ*, they bought eight thousand Slaves from their Masters, and enroll'd and armed them, who thereafter for their good service done at *Beneventum*, were manumitted. Nor was this all, the Dictator *Junius Brutus*, by open Proclamation, invited all who were condemn'd for capital crimes, or who were banish'd and fled, and all who were imprison'd for debt, to come and take Arms; exempting the first from all punishment, and

How the Of-  
ficers were  
elected.

How long a  
Roman Souldi-  
er was bound  
to serve.

Absent from  
elections how  
punish'd.

Tumultuary  
levies.

A strange  
Proclamation  
on.

the last from all payment. An action which seems not to relish much of Justice, but *Dura mater Necessitas*: Necessity will be tyed by no Law. And the like was practis'd afterwards in the times of most of their Civil Wars.

## CHAP. III.

## Of their Arms, Offensive and Defensive, and their Military Oath.

Defensive  
Armour most  
necessary.

Nature teacheth us to defend our selves, before we offend our Enemies; and indeed if we consider it right, all the offence we should intend is our own preservation, or reparation for injuries done. For this cause all the Ancients had an especial care to provide themselves with such Armour as might defend their Bodies from the strokes, pulses, or thrusts of those with whom they were to fight; and there is no question, but the confidence and opinion a Souldier hath, that his Body is well guarded from danger, doth much animate and encourage him to attack his Enemy.

Roman Horse-  
mens Defen-  
sive Armour.

The Roman Horse-men (as *Vergilius* hath it) carried for the Defensive, a Corset (call'd a Cataphract,) and from this, both heavy armed Horse and Foot were called *Cataphracti*) a Head-piece, and a Target, which, he saith, was short and round. He speaks not of Greaves, Belly-pieces or Tassets, perhaps he is defective here, for other Authors allow them. Nor doth he mention Boots, though there be reason to think, that every Horse-man should have had two Boots, since, as we shall see presently, one Boot was allow'd to every Foot-man. For the Roman Horse-mens Weapons, or Offensive Arms, we must consult *Polybius*, who gives them a Sword and a Lance, the Sword longer than that a Foot Souldier carried: It is strange, that *Vergilius* speaks nothing of this. Some Authors say, the Horse-men carried likewise some Darts, which may be probable. *Josephus* informs us, that they carried Lances, Long Swords, and two or three Darts within their Shields, the points whereof, he saith, were as long as that of a Lance; and the Lances had two points, one at each end. It might be so in *Josephus's* time, but the Ancient *Romans* Horse-men made use of no Darts. How the light Horse-men were armed, I cannot tell you; many very probably say, that no light horse were made use of till the time of the Emperours, and but a few of them at first; and if this be true, *Vergilius* might have told us, how they were arm'd, since he liv'd under an Emperour.

Foot heavy  
armed.

The Roman heavy armed Foot wore Head-pieces, Back, and Belly-pieces, and Tassets, all these of Iron or Brass: They had likewise Iron Boots, but how many is a question. *Polybius* seems to allow them two, for he speaks of Boots in the plural number. *Vergilius* saith, they had each but one Boot, which he affirms, they wore on their Right Legs. His words are, *Dextris eribus*, because, as some imagine, their Targets defended their Left Legs, when they came to the shock. Yet for all this, *Livy* in the Fourth Book of his first Decad, saith, The *Samnites* wore their Iron Boots on their Left Legs, perhaps so did the Romans their Neighbours; but we shall meet with greater uncertainties. I shall now speak particularly of some of these Arms and Weapons.

Though *Vergilius* doth much commend the Ancient Roman Arms, and layeth the blame of the losses the Empire suffer'd by the *Gauls* and *Etruscs*, on the want of these Arms, yet is he not at the pains to give us so perfect a description of them, as other Authors have done. He tells us of Shields, and that all the heavy

heavy armed Foot had Shields, but speaks not of their form nor bigness. There be some, and among them *Achilles Terdenax*, who make a difference between a Shield, and a Target; and it is this, the first was of a round figure, and the second of a long, angular, or oval. If so, we must conclude those used by the Romans to have been Targets and no Shields, in regard they were ordinarily four foot long, and two foot and a half broad. But notwithstanding this nice distinction, I shall use the word promiscuously, and call the Roman Target a Shield. If we consider, that there was an allowance of three foot of ground between the Roman Files, and that the breadth of their Shields covered two foot and a half of that ground, we must conclude, there was but one half foot left for them, first to throw their Javelines or Darts, and then to present the points of their Swords against their Enemies; and their Shields being so near each other, and their Bodies so strongly defended by them and their other Armour, it is no wonder, they either gave or received a charge courageously. For *Vergilius* saith well in the twentieth Chapter of his First Book, that those who are exposed naked to receive Wounds, must think more of flying than fighting: And in the end of that same Chapter he saith, that he who hath his Head and Breast well arm'd, is not afraid of Wounds, and therefore needs not fear to fight.

A nice distinction.

At first the Roman Shields were made of Timber, Bulls-hides, or other Leather, artificially interwoven and wrought together, the Timber being ordinarily of the Fig or Willow-tree, cut in small pieces, and all well cover'd with the strongest Leather: But *Camillus* having to do with the *Gauls*, who carried heavy slashing Swords, caused them to put a Margin or Border of Iron on the upper part of the Shield, thereby to resist the force of their furious blows; and after *Camillus's* time, there was a strong-pointed piece of Iron put to the lower part of the Shield, upon which they fix'd it in the ground, either when they stood Centinel, or when they stood in Battel array, expecting an Enemy, as *Asinius* his Legions did, when they were to fight with *Perseus* and his Macedonian Phalanx; for at those times they lean'd and rested themselves on their Shields: They made also good use of those points, by pushing and thrusting with them at an Enemy, when they came to any close medley. Many, and almost all Nations, besides the *Grecians* and *Romans*, made use of Shields, especially the *Gauls* and *Germans*, who peradventure had the use of them before the Romans were a Nation.

The Roman  
Shield.

Of Shields, either in Battel, or at the taking of Towns and Forts, was compos'd that Figure, which the Romans called *Testudo*, or Tortoise, because it resembled that Animal, which covers it self within its shell, and there were two kinds of it. The first was framed thus: The first Ranks cover'd their faces with their Shields, and all the rest kept their Targets above their heads, thereby making such a Wall of Defence, that they were not only able, say Authors, to despise all Darts, Stones, and Arrows, but to resist a furious charge of either Horse or Foot. But I wonder why any Tactick will call this figure of Battel Invincible, even against missile Weapons, since the Romans themselves were often than once beaten by the *Parthian* Archers: And *Livy* tells us in his Tenth Book, that in the great Battel fought by the *Romans* against the *Samnites*, *Umbrians*, and *Gauls*, when both the *Hasdrabs* and *Hasdrabs* were well near routed, some Tribunes coming with the *Triarii* to the rescue, found the *Gauls* serv'd together in a *Testudo*, covering themselves with their great Shields, in such a manner, that the Roman *Triarii* (who were heavy arm'd) durst not hazard on them, till first with Darts, Javelines, and other Missiles, they put them in disorder, and then they routed them. *Livy* tells us of the second kind of the *Testudo*, made of Shields, at the assaulting of Towns, the manner this: So many Centuries, Maniples, or Cohorts, as the Consul or General pleas'd, stood near the Walls or Ports with their Shields over their heads, the first Rank stood straight, the second bowed a little, the third bowed a little more than the second, the fourth more than the little, the fifth declining, till the last Rank, (suppose the tenth) kneel'd. Up third, so still declining, till the last Rank, (suppose the tenth) kneel'd. At the first Backs as up stairs, did those who were ordain'd to storm, run to the assault, and so either enter'd, or broke down places for others to enter. This, I believe, was practis'd often in their Plays on the Amphitheatres, and indeed

A Tortoise of  
Shields.

First kind.

Not Invincible.

Second kind  
of a Tortoise.

it was more to be used in jest than in earnest, for great Stones thrown down by the Defendants, would easily have broken the Tortoise-shell, and then molten Lead, boyling Oyl, or scalding Water (all ordinarily practis'd on such occasions by the Ancients) would, to my sense, either soon have kill'd, or chae'd away the Tortoise itself.

It is my opinion, that, when the Romans march'd, and no Enemy in sight of them, they carried their Head-pieces at their girdles, and their Shields, within covers, on their Backs; my reason is, *Cæsar* in the Second Book of the *Gallick War*, saith, that the *Nervians* gave him so brisk and sudden a charge, that his Souldiers had not time enough to put on their Head-pieces, or pull their Shields out of their covers. And it was necessary they should have been covered, for the preservation of those Devices and Coats of Arms that were Painted on them, a custome used by several Nations before *Romulus* laid the foundation of *Rome*. But both before, and long after the Romans had over-master'd the habitable World, or most of it, men used to put on their Shields what fancies or devices they liked best; some Birds, some Beasts of several kinds, some the noble actions of their Ancestors, some the Sun, some the Moon, and some a lesser Star. This, I suppose, gave the rise to many of our Romance Writers, to give several denominations to all their Knights Errant, by the devices of their Shields, and to make them distinguishable thereby, when their faces were undiscernable with the Beavers of their Helmets. But in after ages, Princes thought fit to restrain men from the vanity of taking Coats of Arms as they pleas'd, till they were given them by authority. Hence have the Heraulds their rise, and if they were permitted to exercise their office strictly, it is to be thought, we should not see so many extravagant Coats in the World. I was acquainted long ago with a *German* (and there be many good Heraulds of that Nation) who had assum'd for his Coat the *French Kings Arms*; I ask'd him his reason for it, he told me, That his Christian name was *Dominic*, as well as that of the Most Christian King, and since they had both one name, he knew not why they might not both have one Coat of Arms.

The Roman Head-pieces, as many think, were of Leather, till the time that the *Gauls* invaded their Seignory, and then *Camillus* the Restorer of *Rome*, caus'd them to make them of Iron or Brass, and indeed they had need of such to resist the mighty froaks of those strong-bodied *Barbarians*. I find, their Helmets were tyed under their chins with clasps of Leather, Iron or Brass; nor can I learn, that any other part of their face was either armed or covered, which, no doubt, mov'd *Cæsar* at *Pharsalia* to bid his Souldiers strike at the faces of the *Pompeians*, after they had cast their Javelines. *Miles, feri faciem*, were said to be his words. Upon their Helmets the Roman Souldiers had three Feathers, either Red or Black, standing straight up, one foot and a half high, saith *Polybius*; and those seem'd to add, saith he, so much to their stature, and made a fine shew. These Feathers were the common Souldiers Crests, but Commanders chose for their Crests such things as best pleas'd their fancy; and by these they were known, as by the Devices of their Shields. As *Pyrrhus* King of *Epirus*, was known by his Crest of Goats Horns.

Their Corset, Cataphract, Cuiras, or Back and Breast, (for all these are one thing) was of Iron or Brass, such, say some Writers, that no Sword could pierce, much less a Dart or an Arrow: But this I will believe at full leisure, for the Great *Alexander* at the Siege of *Gaza* had his Body wounded with an Arrow, through his Corset, which I may rationally suppose to have been as good as ever any Roman Legionary wore; but we shall have more of this stuff anon. Some instead of a Corset had a Jack, made in that same fashion as Fronts, with Plates of Iron, and so artificially, that many wore them next their Shirts, with as much ease, say some, as we wear our Doublets. If I should inform my Reader of a Corset made by a *Cyprian*, and presented to *Domitius*, which a Javeline shot out of a Catapult could not pierce; perhaps he would believe it as little as I do my self. It is writ of some who made Jacks so well and so strong of Linnen and Silk, that they could defend mens Bodies from Darts and Arrows, whereof some have been undertaken to be made

in

in our time Pistol proof. But here, let it be enough to know, that the Roman Corsets ordinarily were of Iron and Brass.

There is no question, but the Sword was the Weapon of Offence, in which the Valorous Romans put their greatest trust, as that whereby they gain'd their most glorious Victories. *Plutarch* affirms, that the Roman Sword was of so well temper'd metal, that no Head, Back or Breast-piece was able to withstand its force, and their Helmets and Corsets so strong (as I told you before) that no Sword could pierce them. What shall I say then of all this, but that the Roman Souldier might be stout enough, since his Sword was irresistible, and his Armour impenetrable. When I read all this fine Story, I fancy them all to be Enchanted Knights, till I remember how the *Gauls* and *Carthaginians* in many bloody bickerings open'd their Vains through the strongest Fortification of their Harais. Or if this should be deny'd me; yet, I hope, it will be granted, that Roman Swords could pierce Roman Corsets, in their Civil Wars, where so many thousands of them dyed by the edge of the Sword. *Livy* tells us, that after a scuffle between the *Romans* and *Macedonians*, *Perseus* King of *Macedon*, chose rather to leave his men unburied, than discourage his Souldiers by looking on those horrible, ghastly, and frightful Wounds, that were given by the Roman Swords, whereby Heads were cut in two pieces, notwithstanding the *Macedonian* Brazen Helmets, and Legs and Arms were cut away notwithstanding any Brazen Greaves or Boats, wherewith they were guarded. And yet, *Vergilius* saith, the Roman Swords were made for pricking and thrusting, as well as for cutting, slashing, or cleaving; the Souldier was taught to use his Sword both ways, yea; thrusting was more and oftner used, than the other, as that which gave Death sooner than cutting did, and did not expose the Body of the Souldier to danger; so much, as the other did. And it is certain enough, that at *Idina*, *Perseus* his Phalanx was disorder'd and routed by the Roman Sword-men, who getting within the long Pikes of the *Macedonians*, with thrusts pierc'd the most naked places of their Bodies. *Vergilius* seems to allow to every Souldier two Swords, one longer than the other, he calls them *Spatha* and *Sempiterna*, Swords and Half-Swords; you may call them Swords and Daggers. They carried, he saith, their Swords on their right sides, and so saith *Polybius* too; but where they carried their Daggers, none of them tells. But *Josephus* says, they carried their longest Sword on their Left side, and the short one on the Right. Some Authors would persuade us, that the *Gauls* carried Swords as long as the Spears of other Nations, and that the points of their Spears were as long as other mens Swords. *Livy* says not so much, but he writes, that they had very terrible Darts.

Because the Roman Pilum was not properly a Dart, I shall English it, as *Estius* his Translator doth, Javeline. *Vergilius* in the fifteenth Chapter of his Second Book, makes two kinds of it, the longer and the shorter, the first was five foot long, and the second three foot long; the first was also called *Halibis*; the Iron of both was Triangular, and to every heavy armed Souldier he allows two Javelines. But we need not believe him in any of these assertions. First, for the length of the Pilum, *Polybius* affirms, that the shaft or handle of it was four inches of circumference, that the Timber was four foot and a half long, and the Iron as much; but near the half of the Iron was clasp'd to the Timber, that the one half only added to the length of the Javeline: And thus by *Polybius* his account, the Roman Pilum was near seven foot long, almost two foot longer than *Vergilius* his longest; and might with more reason be called *Halibis*. Some think, that only the *Haspians* and *Principes* carried these Javelines, and that the *Tribuni* had a Weapon of eight foot long, like our Half-Pikes, which they manag'd with both their hands, till they came within break of Sword, and that in *Marius* his time the use of it was cut. As to what *Vergilius* saith, that every Souldier had two Pila, History contradicts him, that allows in ancient times but one; whether they had two or none in his own time, he knew best; but the old Romans dard'd their Javelines, as they were advancing towards the Enemy, and were commanded by their Generals to make haste to come to dint of Sword, esteemed by them the Prince of Weapons. So *Cæsar*'s Legionaries at *Pharsalia*, were order'd, after each man had



How they  
were thrown.

had cast his Javeline, to run to the shock, which accordingly they did. The manner of throwing their *Pila*, was, that the first Rank threw first, and immediately bowed down, that the second Rank might cast over their heads, so did the third, and fourth, and the rest, till all the Ranks had thrown. When they stood in order of Battel, they us'd to stick their Javelines in the ground, till the sign was given; so it seems they were sharp at both ends, and no doubt, in time of Battel they might have made a Palliadeo of them against Horse, as *Suedish* Feathers have been used in our time, yet we read not in History, that any such use was ever made of the *Roman Pila*.

Roman Pistils.

How arm'd.

The Saguntine  
Falerica.

Roman Darts.

Roman Slingers.

Balarick Islands.

Aganxi.

Benjamites.

Being now to speak of the *Roman* light armed foot, I shall desire my Reader once for all to take notice, that *Vegetius* was desir'd by the Emperour *Valentinian* to give him the Constitutions, Laws and Practice of the Ancient *Roman* Art of War, and not of any customs lately crept in: Notwithstanding which he reckons among the light armed foot, *Plumbati*, whom he likewise calls *Maioribarbati*, and *Fistibularii*, whom I cannot English otherwise, than the first to be Lead-casters, and the second to be Slingers with Battoons: He reckons also Archers, but in Ancient History we do not read of any of those three, for the old *Romans* acknowledg'd no other light arm'd or *Vesties*, but Slingers and Darters. Both these were armed Defensively with Head-pieces of Raw-Hides, and a Target four handful long, and of an oval form. For Offence, the Darter had a Sword, and seven Darts; the Slinger had a Sling, a Sword, and a number of Stones. Some allow also to both of them a little Javeline of three or four foot long. The *Spanish* Darts being wing'd at the point, could hardly be pull'd out of a Shield, or the Body of a man; such Arrows are common, and are called Barbed. But the *Saguntine* Dart, which was called *Falerica*, deserves to be taken notice of. *Livius* describes it thus in his twenty fifth Book: *Falerica* was a kind of Dart used by the *Saguntines*, when *Hannibal* besieg'd their City, (perhaps they invented it at that siege) it had a long shaft, round and even every where, except toward the end of it, and that was headed with Iron, three foot long, Tow being wrapp'd about it, smear'd with Pitch; this Tow they fired, when they were to lance the Dart, the violent motion increas'd the fire, inasmuch, as when it could not pierce the Body, it forc'd the Souldier to cast away his Shield or Corset, and so expos'd him disarm'd to the Darts or Arrows which were shot afterward. The Timber of the *Roman* Dart might be two foot long, and the bigness of a mans finger; the point of it of Iron, one foot long, sharp, small and subtle, that it might pierce, and in piercing bow, that so an Enemy might not make use of it, by throwing it back again, but this was the practice of other Nations as well as the *Romans*; yet I pray, observe what *Livy* saith in contradiction of this. In that Battel, which I mention'd but a little before, the *Triarii* gather'd up all the Darts (for they were allow'd to carry none of their own) which were strayed all over the field, and, no doubt, had been all cast before, and with these they disorder'd the *Gauls* (who had made a Pent-house of their Shields) and so put them to flight. What shall we then believe? And is it not strange too, that these Darters would throw their Darts four hundred foot; for my part, I dare not believe it, and if it be true, certainly the blow could not be mortal.

The *Roman* Slingers used to cast Stones out of ordinary Slings, which they wheel'd about their heads, and would hit at the distance of six hundred foot; for no less (as *Vegetius* affirms) was allow'd them at their exercise. Other Slingers the Ancient *Romans* had not. The Inhabitants of the *Balarick* Islands, which now are called *Majorca* and *Minorca*, were esteem'd both the best and the first exercisers of the Sling, the Mothers refus'd to give their children meat, till they had hit the mark was given them to throw at. *Livy* in his thirty eighth Book crys up the *Aganxi* Slingers, of whom one hundred not only beat back the stout *Samians*, when they sallied out of their Towns, but also never missing to hit them, when they appear'd on the Parapets of their Walls, forc'd them to render their City to *Marcus Fulvius* the *Roman* Consul. And yet it is more than probable, that neither the one nor the other were skillful or so ancient practicers of the Sling as the *Israelites* for there were 700 of one Tribe who could hit within an hair-breadth. With this Weapon did *David* obtain the Victory over *Goliath*, of which I shall speak in another place.

*Vegetius*

*Vegetius* hath reason to prefer the Sling to the Bow, in this regard, that an Arrow cannot wound unless it pierce, but a Stone bruifeth though it pierce not, and if it be of any weight, it killeth, notwithstanding the resistance of any Head-piece or Corset.

In the times of the Emperours, or a little before, came the *Plumbati* or *Mariobarbati* in fashion with the *Romans*. *Vegetius* tells us, what great services they did in the reigns of *Dioclesian* and *Maximian*, but doth us not the favour to describe the thing it self. They threw Bullets of Lead of one pound weight. I do not remember whether *Livy* mentions any of them to have been among those *Roman* Slingers, who beat the *Gallo-Grecians* at *Olympus*. The *Fistibularii* or Battoon-Sling was a Sling of Leather tyed to a Battoon of four foot long, which the Slinger manag'd with both his hands: and out of which, saith *Vegetius*, he threw Stones as out of an *Onagra*, with so great force, that neither Target, Head-piece, or Corset could resist it. But these expressions are ordinary with him. I am of the opinion there was no difference between the *Plumbati* or Lead-casters, and the *Fistibularii*, or Battoon-Slingers, but that the first cast Lead, and the last great Stones; but how far, our Author tells us not.

Archers were not reckon'd among the *Vesties*, till the second Punick War, and even then, they were rather Auxiliaries, than either *Romans* or Allies. They were however made good use of after *Hannibal* invaded Italy. *Vegetius* in the fifteenth Chapter of his First Book, affirms, (for which he hath no authority of History) that the fourth part of the youth of *Rome* was train'd to the use of the Bow, for we read of no such custome. *Scipio* *Emilianus* (who destroy'd *Carthage*) made much use of Bow-men against the *Nimaphites*, and without them, if you will believe *Vegetius*, he thought he could not overcome that Valorous Enemy. The Emperour *Justinian* made a singular good use of some of his Archers, which was this: He caus'd them to put on such Defensive Arms as his Legionaries wore, and mix'd them together; these Bow-men pour'd showers of Arrows on the Enemy, before their heavy armed could come within distance either to cast their Javelins, or draw their Swords; yea, the nearer they were, the more mischief they did, and when they came to a close medley, they quit the Bow, and took them to their Swords. How great use was made of Auxiliary Bow-men by the *Romans*, may be conjectur'd by this, that when some of *Pompey's* Legions storm'd one of *Cassars* Castles at *Dirrachium*, and were beat off, thirty thousand Arrows were reckon'd to *Cassars* himself, all which had fallen in the Sconce: And one *Scavo* a Centurion, shew'd his Shield to his General, wherein were one hundred and thirty holes. Observe by the way, that Targets resist the violence of Arrows. Some write, that *Augustus* caus'd them to levy *Roman* Citizens to be Archers, both on Foot and Horse-back; perhaps he had been taught to do so by the losses his Competitor *Anthony*, and before him *Cassus*, suffer'd by the *Parthian* Bow-men. The wicked Emperour *Domitian* was laid to be punishing an Archer, that *Suetonius* writes, he could direct his Arrows to the mark between the fingers of a Boy, stretched one from the other, without hitting any of them; of such we have heard in later times.

After the *Roman* Souldiers were levied and arm'd, they were marked in the Hand, or some other place of the Body, and an Oath of Fidelity taken of them, which *Vegetius* in the fifth Chapter of his Second Book describes to be this; as it was impos'd by the Emperour *Constantine* the Great: *I Swear by God, by Christ, and by the Holy Spirit, and by the Majesty of the Emperour, whom I worship, that I will do all things that he commandeth me, and that I shall never desert his service, nor refuse to dye for the Roman Commonwealth.* Let us observe some things of this Oath: First, That in these times, Christian Souldiers thought it no sin to pay Civil Worship to their lawful Prince. Secondly, They took more liberty than they should have done, to swear by the Emperour; for this being an Oath taken with mature deliberation, and in Judgement, was a greater sin in them than it was in *Joseph*, to swear rashly (by a bad custome he had learnt among the *Egyptians*) by the Life of *Pharaoh*. Thirdly, Our Author hath forgot to tell us, what manner of Oath the *Roman* Souldiers swore before the Emperours were converted to the Faith, or what Military Oath was made

Lead-casters.

Battoon-Slingers.

Archers Auxiliaries.

A good practice.

Shields resist Arrows.

Roman Military Oath.



to the State before the Heathen Emperours usurp'd it; though this should have been told us, who desire to know the Military constitutions of the Ancient Romans. I suppose, they swore by *Jupiter*, and all the rest of their Gods, to be faithful to the Senate, and People of *Rome*, to be obedient to their Commanders, and not to desert their Standards or Ensigns. This or the like Oath was exacted by the several Tribunes of every man under their Command. But I must inform my Reader that this publick and judiciary Swearing Fidelity was not practis'd by the Romans till the Second Punick War. For *Livy* witnesseth in his 22 Book that before that time no Oath was required of the publick Officers either of State or Militia, only the Foot Souldiers in every Century, and the Horse-men in every Decurio, were accustomed to promise and swear one to another, not to fly one from another, or to desert the service. But after *Hannibal's* Invasion, a formal and solemn Oath was impos'd, which, I believe, had its first rife from the Oath which *Publius Cornelius Scipio* at that same time both swore himself, and forc'd other young Gentlemen (who, after the rout of *Canna*, were preparing to leave Italy) to swear in these words: *I Swear with all my Heart, that I shall not desert the Republick, nor suffer any other Roman to desert it: If willingly I fail in this, then may the Greatest and Best Jupiter inflict on Me, my House, Family, and Goods, the worst of evils.* This Swearing and Marking were called the Military Sacraments, after which the Souldiers were enroll'd, and enter'd in pay; neither was it lawful for a Roman to fight with an Enemy till he had taken the Oath, and if he kill'd an Enemy before he swore Fidelity, he was to be punish'd as a Man-slayer. The word Sacrament, was by the Fathers in the Primitive times borrowed from the Militia, to signifie the Initiation, and Holy Mysteries of the Militant Church.

*Polybius* tells us likewise, that the Souldiers at the time of their enrolling, swore to obey all the Commands of the Consul, and of all Officers under him. He says likewise, that when they came to be encamp'd, another Oath was exacted, not only from the Souldiers, but all that followed or belong'd to the Camp, whether Bond or Free, Master or Servant, not to steal any thing out of the Leaguer, and that, if they found any thing by chance, they should bring it to one of the Tribunes.

Other Oaths were likewise sworn, sometimes voluntarily by the Souldiers with mutual consent, sometimes impos'd by some of the Commanders, most whereof were rash or vain; particularly one, That they should not return from Battel without Victory, as *Livy* in his Second Book informs us. And *Cæsar* in his Seventh Book of the *Gallick War*, says, that no man should return either to his Parents; Wife, or Children, who did not charge twice through the Enemy; which being agreed on, all were forc'd to swear. And in his Third Book of the Civil War, he tells us, how *Labiennus* swore never to desert *Pompey*, but to share with him in all his Fortunes; the like did the rest of his Army. This Oath was sworn at *Pharsalia*, and was ill kept, for both *Pompey* deserted his Army, and was deserted by all those who had sworn to stand by him.

## CHAP. IV.

Of Sieges, and Defence of Towns and Forts, and of the great Engines and Machines used in them, by the Romans, and other Ancients.

THE several ways by which Towns, Castles, and Forts, in our Modern Art of War, (as they are described in the twenty fourth Chapter of my Discourses of the Modern Militia) are taken, were all used by the Ancients; for Gun-powder hath only augmented the violence and fury of the Battery, and furnish'd us with more fearful and mortal Darts, than the men of old were acquainted with. In ancient times, Towns were taken by Circumvallation, and starving the Defendants out of them, they were taken by formal Sieges and approaches, they were taken by Assault, by Scalado, by Surprizal, and by Treachery; and they are still taken by some of these. If they conceiv'd the place, either for its Situation, Fortification, or Defendants, to be inconsiderable, that it did not deserve a formal Siege, or that they either could not, or would not spend time upon it, they storm'd it very soon after they came to it, with Ladders or Grapples, or with a Tortoise or Pent-house made of their Shields, whereof I spoke in the foregoing Chapter. And in doing this, they environed it with a *Corona*, as they called it, or a Crown; which is, they drew up their Armies round about the Town, in manner of a Crown, leaving no part free from being invested. But *Græcius* says, that the Hebrew Interpreters tell him, that when their Ancestors were to assault a Town, they left a part of it free unenvir'd, *non cingebant Coronâ*, that whoever came out at that place and submitted, should be pardon'd. I think this circumstance had prudence in it as well as pity, and verified the saying, *A Golden Bridge for a Flying Enemy*. This *Corona*, or Crown, was sometimes a single Crown, sometimes a Double, and very often a Triple one, according to the quality or greatness of the place, or the number of those that were to attack it. If it were a Three-fold Crown, the first was compos'd of the heavy armed foot, who were to give the assault, and in it to defend themselves with their Targets, and other Defensive Arms: Behind them was the Second Crown, of the *Velines* or light armed, whose business was, with Darts, Stones, and Arrows, to beat away the Defendants from the Parapets, that the heavy arm'd might storm with the less opposition. Behind these *Velines*, was the Third Crown, which consisted of the Cavalry, and these stood for two uses, first, to hinder the Foot from flying, (a thing practis'd sometimes in the Modern Wars) secondly, to prevent any danger that might arise by the sudden arrival of an unexpected Enemy. If it was not thought fit to try this sudden way of Expugnation, or that it had been try'd without success, then approaches were made with the help of those Engines, which have been time out of mind laid aside, as altogether useless in our Modern Expugnation of Forts.

These Machines were of two kinds, Lesser and Greater. The Lesser were the Mofles and all manner of Mantilets, which were indeed no other but Pent-houses and Shrowds, and under that name you may comprehend the *Vinea*, *Plutei*, *Crates*, and such like; under the shelter whereof the Ancient approached to strong holds. The Greater Engines were the Tortoise, the Ram, the Scorpion, the Onagra, the Balist, and the Catapult; for most of ones, which, men have not yet found out proper words in the Modern Languages. Then there was that great Engine which excell'd them all for efficacy, and matter of admiration, both to Antiquity it self, and to us too, who have seen and heard the Thundring Canon; and that was, the Moving or Ambulatory Tower.

To give a particular description of all these, and of the Mechanical Structure of them, belongs properly to an Engineer, saith *Tarducci*, who was one himself. And *Steneucius* says, there's much difficulty and obscurity in the explanations of their frames, which he who would curiously know, may, saith he, consult *Vitruius*, that great Master of Architecture. And when these Engines were in fashion, a General of such Artillery may, saith the same Author, look on some places of *Turmein*. I shall also tell my Reader that Authors differ much in the description of these Machines; but if any desire to see the Figures of them, I refer them to the same *Steneucius*, and if he do not satisfy their curiosity, perhaps *Justus Lipsius* in his *Polemiceiken*, will do it fully. However, it is fit I speak a little of every one of them, and of their several uses.

The *Romans* were so far from challenging to themselves the Invention of these Machines, that it is certain, they had not the Use of them from the beginning of their City, nay, nor of their Republick, after they had banish'd Kinglyth. It is true, *Lucy* says, that one of their Kings, *Servius Tullius*, appointed two Centuries of Tradesmen, for making Warlike Engines, but these were of the lesser kind. At the Siege of *Vail* (which lasted ten years) they had *Aggers*, or Ramparts; *Vinea*, or Vines; and Towers, but not Ambulatory ones. The *Vinea* and *Pluteus* are very oft confounded by Authors, and made to be one thing. Some make the difference between them to be, that the *Pluteus* was made to floop but on one side, the *Vinea* defended, and floop'd on both. But *Vogelius* makes them differ in this, that the *Pluteus* had Wheels, the *Vinea* not. They were eight foot high, seven broad, and six long, some say, fifteen; for Authors do not agree. They were made of small Timber, and were rais'd on Legs, and being interwoven with Twigs, sometimes of the Vine-tree, they represented Arbours, and from thence had the denomination of *Vinea*. Above they were covered with Hair-cloth and Raw-Hides, to save them from Wild-fire; as also with Hurdles, but below them with strong Boards, where great opposition was expected; they had within them Rafter, on which was a Gallery, wherein the Heligons were shelter'd from Stones, Darts, and Arrows, when they made their approaches to the Ditch, and out of these they endeavour'd to chase the Defendants from their Walls and Parapets with all manner of millie Weapons.

The *Agger* was a Rampart of Earth and Hurdles, wherewith they en-  
cambled beleiged Towns, and for their own Defence, against either the  
Enemy within the Town, or abroad; they fortified this Rampart both  
within and without, for ordinarily they had two of them, with Stakes or  
Pallisades. In some places of these Ramparts, at a convenient distance one  
from another, were Sconces built, which they called Castles and Towers.  
The use of these *Aggers* was known in some places of the World before the  
name of *Ram* was heard of, or that any *Grecian* had put Pen to Paper, for it  
is of these Hurdles and Stakes, and other Timber for Ramparts, and it may  
be for the *Fence* and the Ram too, that *Moltis* is to be understood in his com-  
mand to the *Israelites*, not to cut down any Tree that bore Fruit, mention'd in  
the twentieth Chapter of *Deuteronomy*, of which I spoke before.

The *Musculi* were also of the Lesser Engines, made of strong Boards covered with raw Hides; they mov'd on Wheels: And under them men were shelter'd when they approach'd to the Walls and Ditches. Some very rationally fay, that the proper use of the *Musculi* was to help to draw forward the great Moving Tower, to cleanse and clear its way, and give it the name from that Fish which Naturalists fay, goes before the Whale to be its guide, and to discover Rocks and Shelves: And so *Vergil* seems to describe it. But others, particularly *Cæsar* (who deserves trust) makes it a lesser *Tefulus*, or Tortoise, and describes it at length in his Second Book of the Civil War. Others write; it had a snout like a Mouse, wherewith it pick'd Stones out of a Wall, and was therefore called *Murecululus*, and corruptly *Musculus*: And there be some who fay, it batter'd a Wall as the Ram did. So far do Ancient Authors differ.

## CHAP. VI.

Besides the Tortoises compos'd of mens Shields, spoken of in the foregoing Chapter, there was an artificial Engine, which the Ancients call'd a *Tefudo* or Tortoise. This was made of such a bigeais as it pleas'd the General of the Army, or General of the Artillery to appoint; within it was a great Beam, which sometimes had on the end of it an Iron Hook or Grapple, which they shut forth when they thought fit to draw Stones out of a Wall, or for other uses, and pull'd the Beam in again; when they pleas'd; and therefore they gave it the name of that Creature, which can put it self out of its shell, and in again when it pleaseth. And sometimes on the end of this Beam, saith *Vegesius*, was fasten'd a great Iron Head for Battery, and was call'd a Rams Head, or becaufe after every stroak, it was fashion'd in the form of a Rams Head, or becaufe after every stroke, it was forcibly drawn back, that at its return it might batter more violently, as the custom of Rams is, when they fight. This is all *Vegesius* speaks of the *Tefudo* or *Aries*, except that he makes the last to be put in the lowest Stage of the Ambulatory Tower.

of the Ambulatory I tower.

But other Authors tell us, that the *Aries*, or Ram was of it self a formidable Machine. And as the manner of our War is now, to give the worse conditions to the besieged, when they hold out the Battery of Ordnance ; so of old, those who did not yield before the Ram had touch'd the Wall, got the worse quarters. *Cæsar* in his Seventh Book of the *French War*, says, he gave some of the *Gauls* their lives, because they render'd themselves before the Ram began to batter.

The description of this Engine, is thus given us by *Achilles Terraccini* : A great Beam and of a great length, 200 foot and more, made like the Mast of a Ship, had an exceeding ponderous and great Head of Iron, which sometimes resembled that of a Ram, sometimes it had another shape. This Beam was supported by two other great ones, which made the bafe of the Engine, they meeting above in a sharp Angle, kept the Ram fufpended in an *Aquilibris*. It was manag'd by Souldiers behind, and as many on both fides as could be conveniently lodged, in Tortoifes, Mofcles, or other Pent-houfes, that were ordain'd to convey it. No folidity or ftrength of Walls was able to refift the contanguated and reiterated Verberations of this Engine, as *Josephus* in his *Jewish War*, and many other Authors witnefs. And yet we have feen Stone Walls of Towns, built by the Ancients, make a notable refiftance againft the Battery of Whole Cannon. It foon made fuch a breach in the Wall, that Miners could lodge in it, and enlarge it as they pleas'd. In the time of its Battery, it was defended above with Hurdles, Baskets full of Earth, and Raw Hides, and on both fides with Mofcles, Vines, and Tortoifes, out of, or from under which the befiegers inefficiently caft their miffiles againft the Defendants. And they, at the approach of the Ram to the Wall, beat it with huge great Stones, or heavy lumps and weights of Lead, tyed with ftrong Ropes or Chains of Iron to a Crane or Telenon : Thofe who were appointed to defend the Ram, endeavour'd to gripe thofe Ropes or Chains with long Hooks or Grapples ; and on the other fide the befieged efayed with long Scythes to cut the Cords, which govern'd and fuftain'd the Ram. The Defendants alfo ufed to hang over the Walls, Beds, and great facks fill'd with Straw, Feathers, or Wool, which broke the force of the firooks before they came to the Wall ; and thefe are all of good ufe in any Retrenchment fuddenly made up againft the Battery of Canon. In our time. The Invention of a more dreadful Engine than the Ram, the Ordnance, did not hinder this Engine to be made ufe of by *Devalvo*, Marquifs of *Pefcarra*, at *Pavia*, which when *Francis* King of *France* had befieg'd, and that the Imperial Army could not draw him out of the Park to *Battoli*, *Devalvo* in the night time with three Rams broke down the Park-Wall (which with *Glorio* faith, was of an admirable ftrength) not thinking it fit to do it with Cannon, for alarming the *French*, yet the violent firooks of the Rams were heard, but not at all fufpected ; paffage being made by thefe Ancient Machines, fome Horfe and Foot enter'd, who foon took poffeffion of the great Houfe or Lodge of the Park, call'd *Mirabelle* : This impos'd a neceffity on the *French* King to fight, and though he did it well, yet was he beaten; and taken,

How it was oppos'd.

The Ram made ufe of at Pavia by Devalvo.

Beside

H 2

**Then**

## The Telenon.

The Telenon was such another Engine, as that we draw Water with out of Wells, call'd a *Swope*, or like those Cranes, wherewith great burthens, packs, or weights are pull'd up and let down. It was a huge Beam of Timber laid cross way, ballanc'd on another Beam fasten'd in the ground, the one end of the Cross-Beam mounting up, when the other was depressed. The besiegers made use of it, by making at one end of the Cross-Beam a little Houle of Boards or Oiler Twigs, in which they might lodge three or four men, whom they might therewith set on any part of the highest Wall, to bring them Intelligence what the Defendants were doing. But the Besieged made better use of it, by tying great Stones or Lumps of Lead to it, with which, as is said before, they might beat in pieces either the Ram or Torse. And here I shall tell you, that the old Tactick *Ancien*, adviseth a hole to be digg'd through the Wall by the Besieged themselves, and out of it, with a Ram of their own, batter the Besiegers Battering-Ram. The Defendants used also, to tie to the Telenon, Hands, Drags, Claspings Irons, and Grapples, wherewith to lay hold on the Rams Head, as also by them (fasten'd to Iron Chains) to pull up men, when they came to assault their Walls; yea, and some of the Latest Engines also. *Terdaxus* is of the opinion, that *Archimedes* his famous Machine, wherewith he drew up Ships into the Air, and let them fall with violence, was no other thing than this Telenon, but he gives not his Reasons for this opinion of his.

## Ballist.

The Ballist was a great Machine, out of which were shot, as some say, Darts, Lances, yea, Spears of thirty foot long, but others say, that it threw only great Weights and Stones. *Vegesius* gives it only power to throw Darts; nor doth he at all mention the Catapult, which, some Authors say, shot very great Stones, and of it all other Ancient Writers take notice: And they are by them clearly distinguished the one from the other. *Philip*, the last King of *Macedon*, except one, at the Siege of *Echinum* had Ambulatory Towers, and upon them (saith *Polybius* in his Ninth Book) he had Catapults, and a platform besides for Ballists: And in his Fourth Book he says, that the *Sinopians* being destitute of all necessities, got abundance of rich gifts sent to them by several, and that particularly the *Rhodiens* sent them, besides many other necessities, four Catapults with Engineers to manage them; and more clearly in his fifth Book he says, that at the Siege of *Pala*, *Philip* had both Catapults and Ballists. The diversity of Judgements of Authors concerning these two great Engines, was this: *Vegesius* saith, the Ballist threw only Darts and Lances: *Amianus*, who was *Vegesius* his Contemporary, and both a great Souldier, and a great Engineer, speaks only of Stones for that Engine. *Valerius Maximus* and *Vitruvius* (both of them great Architects) affirm that Stones were the proper missiles of Ballists, and that Catapults threw Darts, Lances, and Spears. *Polybius*, a great Captain, in that cited place at *Pala*, says, *Philip* Ballists and Catapults threw Stones, and so confoundeth them; yet in another place he distinguisheth; for he saith, In that Battel at *Maminea*, which *Mechanides* the Tyrant of *Lacedaemon*, fought against *Philopomen* the *Achaean*, the first had Catapults, which he plac'd in the Van of his Army, and Waggon's laden with Darts for them, therefore they shot no Stones. But this is downright against a greater Captain than any I have yet mention'd, and that was *Julius Caesar*, (who besides his other perfections, was an excellent Engineer) he saith, in the First Book of his Civil War, that the Catapult threw great Stones. In such a diversity of opinions, I think, *Achilles Terdaxus* offers a fair expedient of agreement, which is, that it is probable, in the times of the Emperours the names of Catapult and Ballist were confounded, so that the one was taken for the other; or that by a new invention, not heard of before, both the one and the other threw both Darts and Stones.

The Ballist and the Catapult were made and fram'd according to the weight of the Stone, and the length of the Dart or other missile which they were ordain'd to shoot; as our Ordnance are founded according to the weight of the Bullet intended for them; from whence many of them have their denomination, as a three, four, or six pounder. I made mention of Ballists and Catapults, in the fourth Chapter of the *Grecian* Militia, the Invention of which some would bestow upon *Diogenes*, one of the Tyrants of *Syracusa*, but I have prov'd in that Chapter from Holy Writ, that they were used many ages before

Difference among Authors concerning these two Machines.

An expedient of reconciliation.

Of their Invention.

fore *Syracusa* was forc'd to submit to Tyranny. *Lysias* seems to give it to the *Syrians*, which may be true; and though I told you, *Oziel* one of the Kings of *Judah*, had them on the Walls of *Jerusalem*, yet it was no such shame for the two Tribes to borrow the Invention of Military Machines from Heathen Nations, as it was sin for the ten Tribes to borrow and follow the pattern of the Altar of *Damascus* from their Idolatrous Neighbours.

There were, if you will believe Authors, some of these Machines, which could shoot Stones of one hundred, some two hundred, and some of them three hundred and sixty pound; and those that cast one hundred pound, threw their Stones the length of two *Stadia*, or Furlongs, and these make the fourth part of an *English* Mile. It was a custom also to cast into Besieged Towns burning Iron, Vessels with molten Lead, dead Horses, and Tubs and Barrels full of excrements, or any thing else, that could infect, annoy, or vex the Besieged. And some write, that out of a Catapult was shot a long Spear, or Lance, from one Bank of the River *Danubius* (where it is broadest) over to the other. This I dare not believe, for, I suppose, that mighty River, before he discharge himself, may be more than two *Indian* Miles broad; and I will suppose likewise, that Gunners will confess, that no piece of Ordnance will shoot a Bullet so far point-blank, especially over a River.

*Vegesius* in the fourteenth Chapter of his Third Book, allows *Carroballists* to march with the Roman Army: *Terdaxus* thinks they were *Arceballists*, they shot, as our Author saith, both Darts and Stones. *Vegesius* saith, they had many Conductors; but in the last Chapter of his Book, he says, every Century had a *Carroballist* (this was a Ballist mounted on a Carriage) and he allows Mules to draw it, and eleven Souldiers of the Century to manage it: Now observe, that in *Vegesius* his Legion there were five and fifty Centuries, and therefore fifty five *Carroballists*; every one of which had eleven men to manage them. Multiply fifty five by eleven, the product is six hundred and five, and so many of every Legion *Vegesius* allows for these Engines. And I pray you observe here in passing, that *Vegesius* expressly allows eleven Souldiers for every Tent, or *Cannibition*, by which he doth not obscurely intimate, that the Files of the Roman Foot were eleven deep. The greater these *Carroballists* were, the further they carried their Darts; neither, saith our Author, could any Conflict resist their blow.

The Onager, saith *Vegesius*, shoots Stones like Thunder-bolts, greater or lesser, according to the bigness or thickness of its Cords; so it is a kind of Catapult or Ballist. It hath its name (as *Seneca* saith), from the *Greek* word, which signifieth a Wild Ass, for those Animals when they are huped, sing Stones with their heels, at those who pursue them.

The Scorpion, saith *Vegesius*, shoots small and subtle Darts, whereby present death was procur'd. But *Amianus* makes the Onager and the Scorpion to be all one thing; and he avers the Onager to be a new word brought in the room of the old one, which was *Scorpio*; and in the description he gives of it, cited by *Seneca*, he makes it only to cast great Stones, and no Darts; so great a difference there is between him and *Vegesius*, who liv'd both at one time. Yet several are of *Vegesius* his opinion, and say, the Scorpion threw Darts and Arrows, and poison'd ones too, and that from thence that Engine had its name. But on the other hand, this seems not probable; if it be true, as it seems to be, that all or most Nations have with a secret alliance made it their constant practice and custom, and so to pass for *Lex gentium*, or the Law of Nations, to abstain from all such malices, as shooting poison'd Darts, Arrows, or Bullets, or from poisoning of Victuals, Liquors, Waters, and Wells, observ'd also in our Modern Wars. We read, it's true, of some exceptions from that general custom, and that Poysons have been used in open just, and declared Wars, but for these perhaps invincible necessity may plead an excuse. The like we may say of Assassination of Princes, Generals, or eminent Commanders, whom a declared Enemy may lawfully kill, as *Eliab* kill'd *Eghe*, or as *Seecola* intended to kill *Perseus*; but it is not at all lawful, but against the practice of a fair and declared War, to poison, export, or hire any other, especially those who belong to, or are under the jurisdiction of that Prince or General, to kill any of them. But for all this, I do not deny

A strange story.

*Carroballist*.

A File eleven deep.

Onager.

Scorpion.

Of Poison'd Arrows, Bullets, Darts, Waters, or Wells.

Of Assassination.

deny, but a Sovereign Prince or State, may lawfully set a price on the head of a powerful Rebel, against whom they cannot proceed by the ordinary way of Justice. This much I have taken occasion to say on this subject, that I may not trouble my Reader with it hereafter. But to our present purpose, I say that the *Carroballist*, the *Onager*, and the *Scorpio*, are but several species and sorts of the Catapult and Balist.

Ambulatory Tower.

And now I come to speak of the Moving or Ambulatory Tower, whereof that which *Vegetius* writes is enough to astonish any Reader, who hath not heard of it before, but he who will read other Writers, will easily believe all *Vegetius* says on that subject: He tells us, they were built after the form of Houses, thirty, forty, or fifty foot broad, and so high as to equal the height of Towers on the Wall. The Tower which our Author describes, is three stories high: In the lowest he lodgeth a Ram, with men to manage it, and that, when the Tower came within convenient distance, batter'd the Wall. In the third and highest stage he placed the *Vehes*, who assisted the Defendants with Darts and Arrows, and pelted them with Stones out of their Batton-Slings, to necessitate them to quit the defence of the Parapets: And in the middle Story he placeth a Bridge, one end whereof being laid upon the Wall, and the other remaining fix'd within the Tower, Bands of armed men pass'd safely over, and then, faith our Author, *Illico capta est Urbs*, immediately the Town was taken. But he is mistaken, for Towns have been defended, when all these things were done. This is the Moving Tower, which is called *Turris Vegetiana*.

*Turris Vegetiana* three stories high.

If this Tower of his be wonderful enough, what shall we say of those Towers which were one hundred and twenty Cubits high, that is, one hundred and eighty foot, and sixty or seventy foot broad, in which might be eighteen or twenty several stages or stories, and every one of these capable to contain Balists and Catapults, and men to manage them, besides arm'd Souldiers to handle their Weapons. Or what shall we think of that Tower whereof *Livy* speaks in his thirty second Book, which one of the Roman Consuls made of several stories, out of which (you must suppose by Bridges) he sent whole Cohorts of Legionaries, one to sustain and relieve another, against a *Macedonian* Phalange, that stood in Battel ready to receive them within the Walls; and we are to believe, that the *Roman* Cohorts at that time were about five hundred strong, and yet the *Macedonians* made the place good against them all. The same Author tells us of another Tower, which *Hannibal* made at *Saguntum*, in which he had numbers of armed men, besides his great Machines.

A stupendous Tower.

*Stenochus* tells us, that *Virginius*, Master of the Machines, or General of the Artillery, writes of a Moving Tower, which weigh'd three hundred and sixty thousand pounds, not reckoning the Men, Arms, and Engines that were within it: And that it could resist the force of Stones shot out of Balists of three hundred and fifty pound. But that which is more admissible than all I have yet said, is, what the same *Virginius* writes of an Engineer, who made a Counter-machine within a Besieged Town, by which he drew one of the Besiegers Ambulatory Towers, within the Walls of the beleaguerr'd Town. Let me say here with *Ovid*, *Si sit credenda vetustas*.

An incredible Engine.

These Moving Towers were composed of great Beams, Joists, Rafters, and Boards, cover'd with Raw Hides, and some of them were fac'd with Iron. They mov'd on many Wheels, which were push'd forward below with the strength of many men, assisted with Levers; the Tower was open behind; that it might more conveniently be thrust forward by those numbers of men ordain'd for that purpose. Before it went many Mantlets, Vines, and Mosses, full of armed Souldiers, who were both to make way for it, and to defend it from those, who might fall out to burn or destroy it. It was sometimes drawn by Beasts of Carriage; but these had Machines before and about them, to defend them from the Darts and Arrows of the Besiegers. This last part being neglected by *Urian King* of the *Goths*, when he besieged *Rome*, the famous *Bellisarius*, who was within the City, suffer'd the Tower to come pretty near the Walls; and then caus'd to be killed the Beasts with Darts and Arrows; this made the Tower stand still, and so render'd all its preparations (which were very costly) ineffectual, and the Fabrick it self contemptible and ridiculous to the Besieged.

Several

Several means were us'd to frustrate the effects of this dreadful Machine; these were, First, A Desperate Sally, by which the Besiegers guards being beaten from the Tower, it self became a prey, and was easily burnt. Secondly, They us'd to undermine the ground, which the Tower was to traverse (and that was soon seen and perceiv'd) before it approach'd the Walls, and that indeed was a sure way, for the vast weight of it, not having ground to support it, would quickly make it sink and stick fast. Thirdly, They us'd to make such a Tower within the Walls, and oppose it to that without. This was, no doubt, a good help, but a very costly one. And Lastly, They endeavour'd to burn them with Wild Fire, or Fiery Arrows.

Sometimes these Ambulatory Towers were made with that Artifice, that when one of them approach'd the Wall, whose height the Tower seem'd not to surmount, suddenly a smaller Tower (which was hidden within the greater one) of one or two stories high, was elevated with Scruces, to the great terror and astonishment of the Besieged City.

*Turricula*

I told you in the fourth Chapter of the *Grecian* Militia, that *Dinocrates* could not be the first Inventor of the Moving Tower, (though it be very probable, he hath added much to it) for his Father's Master made use of one of them at *Gaza*, and *Curtius* in his Second Book says, that *Alexander* had one of them at the Siege of *Macedon* in *India*, which seem'd so wonderful to the *Barbarians*, that they thought some Deity, or more than humane strength did assist that Magnanimous Prince. One of these Towers which *Julius Caesar* erected against a Town of the *Nervians*, (if I mistake not) wrought a contrary effect, for the Defendants laugh'd and flouted at it, as a thing made to no purpose, since it could not hurt them at such a distance; till they saw it begin to move towards their Walls, and then they began to have other thoughts.

The Moving Tower of an Ancient Prince.

All these Machines were ordinarily made in the place where they were to be us'd, but if the Generals conceiv'd that at the Towns they intended to besiege, they could not be accommodated with things requisite for these Fabricks, then they carried all the materials along with them, on Camels, Mules, Horses, Carts, and Waggon; As the Great *Turk* carrieth his Metal with him, till he come where he intendeth to make use of Ordnance, and there he causeth them to be founded.

Besides all these ways spoken of for expugnation of Towns, the Ancients made frequent use of Mines; this the *Romans* call'd *Cuniculus agere*, because Mines resemble the digging of Rabbits; neither did the Besieged in those times want the knowledge to find out Mines, and provide Counter-mines against them. The way of Mining they us'd, and we still do, is all one, except that they wanted the springing of Mines by Gun-powder, and therefore the use they made of Mines produced a two-fold effect. First, The Mine being brought within the Town, without taking notice of the Walls, Souldiers suddenly issued out, and run to the Ports to open them, and so make way for the Besiegers to enter, and at that time ordinarily Alarms were given to all quarters, that the Besiegers might be diverted, and not suffer'd to observe the effect of those who were enter'd the Town by the Mine: Such a Mine, and the effect of it, *Hannibal* had at *Saguntum*.

Mines.

First effect of the Ancients Mine.

Secondly, When they had made large Chambers in the Walls, they under-propt them with logs of dry Timber, and having laid store of combustible matter beside them, so soon as the Army was ready to storm, Fire was put to the Train, and the supporters being burnt, the Wall immediately fell, over the ruins whereof the Besiegers enter'd. And this effect had the Great *Alexander* Mine at *Gaza*. *Arrian* tells us of a Shield of Brats us'd in his time to discover Mines, for if it were plac'd directly above the place where the Miners were working, it would utter a sound; later times have found a Drum and Dice upon it, or a Basin of Pease or Beans serve the turn as well.

Second effect.

The same *Arrian*, an old *Grecian* Tactick, adviseth against all manner of the Ancient approaches to Besieged places, to hang up great Sails within the Walls, which he will have to serve for three uses. First, For Blinds, that what is done within, may not be seen by those without, a thing ordinarily practis'd

Mines how discovered.

practis'd in our Modern Wars. Secondly, That all the Darts and Arrows that are cast or shot, even from the Moving Towers, may be receiv'd in their Sails, where sticking all the day long, they can do no hurt, and at night may be taken out, and thrown or shot back to the Enemy. This would be useless against our Bullets. Thirdly, They were notable Defences against Fiery Arrows, shot ordinarily to fire Houses thatch'd with Straw or Reeds.

But indeed, there is no such solid or sure defence against all manner of Approaches and Mines, against all Machines and Engines of the Ancients, and Batteries of Modern Artillery, as that which the same Author *Artes* speaks of, and that is, a Double Wall, and a Double Ditch. For the first, being long, and well defended, the second imposeth a necessity on the Besiegers to begin new Approaches, new Batteries, and new Mines. But if the place be not doubly fortified, then he adviseth the Besieged to make a Counter-mine within that part of the Wall, against which the Assailants make their Battery. The same is done still, or should be done in all besieged places. It is that we call a Retrenchment, and the Germans an *Alfurd*. It was by this the *Placians* kept out the long Siege of their Town against the *Lacedaemonians*, till hunger made them yield to their merciless Enemy: And hereby did the *Samiens* frustrate all the means the *Roman* Consul used for the expugnation of their City, with Catapults, Rams, and Moving Towers, till Famine forc'd them to submit to his cruel pleasure. Concerning Mines, Countermures, or Retrenchments, you may see a little more in the twenty fourth Discourse of the Modern Art of War.

Counter-  
mures or Re-  
trenchments.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. V.

## Of the Military Exercises, Duties, Burthens, Marches, and Works of the Roman Souldiers.

THE Roman Souldiers being Levied, and Armed, and having sworn Fidelity, we are in the fourth place to see how they were Train'd and Exercis'd. And first, We will take all the help *Vegitius* vouchsafeth to give us: And assuredly, you will think he speaks very fully of all manner of Exercise, when I tell you, that he hath bestow'd upon that affair alone eleven full Chapters of his First Book, to wit, the 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 Chapters, wherof oftener than once, he tells us one thing twice over. And, as if he had forgot that he spent so much Time and Ink on that Subject in his First Book, he falls to in the twenty third Chapter of his Second Book, which he entitles *De Exercitiis Militum*. But for all this, he hath not done the third part of the work that might in reason have been expected from him; which you will believe to be true, when I have told you all he saith of that matter, and all I inform you of concerning it from other Authors. That which *Vegitius* saith of the Roman Exercises in all those Chapters, is briefly this: That the *Latine* word *Exercitus*, an Army, is deriv'd *ab exercendo*, from Exercising: That the *Tyranni*, or raw Souldiers were Train'd in the *Campus Martius*, near his Field, which lay near the *Tiber*; in which (when they were weary of their Land exercises) they walk'd themselves, and learn'd to Swim, a thing very incumbent for a Souldier to practise, because, saith *Swimming*, in that case, when they either follow or retire from an Enemy, swim Rivers. Before *Vegitius* go further, I must remember him of two things: First, that *Campus Martius* got but that name after the *Turquines* were banish'd out of *Rome*, for it belong'd to them in propriety; and at the time of their leaving the City was a Corn-field, as *Livy* tells us. Now certainly the *Romans* had their Military Exercises the whole time of the Reigns of their seven Kings. Secondly, I say, as Swimming is fit to be learned by all young men, especially Souldiers; so I think an Army is in a desperate condition, when the men who compose it, are put to swim for their safety from a pursuing Enemy, for by that shift, hardly will the tenth man escape; nor needs a retreating Army fear much hurt from an Enemy who cannot overtake it but by Swimming over Lakes and Rivers. But our Author proceeds, and tells us, that an Army must be taught to march in Rank and File; that an Enemy may take no advantage by finding it in disorder: The *Romans* had two kinds of a March, the Ambulatory, and the Cursory. By the first, they were (if so required) to march twenty Italian miles in five hours, and by the second, twenty five in four hours, with their full Arms, Baggage, and Burthens. Thirdly, He informs us, that the Foot Souldier was Train'd at a Stake or Pallisade of Wood, six foot long, fixed fast in the ground; he had a Target of Oiers, and a Club or Battoon of Wood; both of them double the weight of the Shield and Sword he was to make use of in earnest: With these he was taught to strike at the Pale or Stake, as if it had been an Enemy, to make fencs and foyns at several parts of it, as if it had had Head, Body, Legs and Arms; but more especially the Roman Souldier was taught to thrust and stab with his Sword, for they found that by that manner of fence, they had the advantage of those Enemies who used slashing and cutting Swords. And at the same stake they were to cast their *Pila* or Javelines. But at other marks (namely, Sheaves of Corn or Grass) the *Vallies* were taught to shoot and cast their missile Weapons; whether these were Stones or Lead, out of Slings and Bannoons, Slings,

The summe of what *Vegitius* saith of Exercise.

Two kinds of March.

Exercises of the Foot.

Of the Horse.

Slings, Arrows out of Bows, or Darts out of their Hands. Fourthly, The Foot were taught at these Exercises to carry burthens of sixty pound, that being habituated, they might thereafter more easily carry their own Arms, Provisions, Baggage, or what else they were commanded to bear. Fifthly, The Horse men were taught to mount Wooden Horses in the Fields, if it was Summer; but in Winter, in Houfes made purposely for that use, and thereafter to mount living Horses, at first, without Arms, but after they were expert, they were to get on Horse back with full Arms, either at the Right or Left side of the Horse, and as you will find hereafter, without Stirrups, and with drawn Swords or Maces in their hands. Thrice a month, saith Vegetius, by the constitutions of Augustus and Adrian, the Veteran Armies were to be Exercised, and to march ten miles out of their Camp, and back again that day. And he saith, that Souldiers were taught to run, leap Ditches, and to make Ditches and Ramparts. This is the substance of all that Vegetius delivers to us in those mention'd eleven Chapters of his First Book. Now in the twenty third Chapter of his Second Book, he troubles himself and his Reader with the repetition of most of this, only he adds, that the young Souldiers, or *Tyroner*, were Exercised twice a day, morning and evening, the Veterans once a day; and this was done without intermission. So it seems what he speaks here, is meant of Training particular Souldiers or Companies once or twice a day, and what he said before, was of Exercising the whole Army once a month. Thus far, and no further, we have the help of Vegetius in the matter of Training, Drilling, or Exercising.

Burthens.

Before I inform you further of the several kinds of the Roman Exercises, I must see what Burthens the Roman Souldiers were obliged to carry in their Marches, whether those were Ambulatory, or Curfory. And first, I believe, that the weight of sixty pound, which Vegetius saith they were bound to carry, was meant only of their Arms, Defensive and Offensive. And I suppose, you may be of my opinion, if you consider their heavy Head, Back, and Breast-pieces, their Greaves, Tassels, Target, and an Iron Boot, a Javeline or two, and a Sword, and it may be, a Dagger too. And if these weighed sixty pound, what shall we say of their Fardles, their Provisions, the Stakes and Palliados they were bound to carry, and of some utensils to make ready their meat? and these perhaps were carried alternatively by those that belong'd to one *Contubernium*; for if I conjecture right, Beasts of Carriage were only allowed for carrying their Tents and Hand-mills. Quintus Cincinnatus being chosen Dictator, to lead an Army against the *Aequians*, caus'd every Legionary of his Army, besides his Arms and Baggage, to carry five days meat, and twelve Palliados. It is true, his march was but short, the Territory of Rome being then of no great extent. And yet, you will think the Romans have been but at that time raw Boys, if you observe what follows. Scipio Africanus the Younger (who destroy'd Carthage) caus'd every one of his Foot Souldiers to carry provisions for thirty days, and seven Stakes, wherewith to Palliade his Camp. Caesar saith, that Africanus Pompey's Legat in Spain, caus'd his Souldiers to carry meat for twenty five days, besides Stakes. The Famous Consul Marius intending a Reformation of the Roman Discipline (in his time corrupted) thereby to make himself more able to overcome the *Cimbrians* and *Tenones*, who had invaded the Roman Empire with a Deluge of men, made his Souldiers march with such excessive Burthens, as if they had been Asses, and thereby got them the name of Marius his Mules, *Muli Mariani*. To march at a running pace or trot twenty five miles in four hours so heavily loaded is truly admirable, and if you will consider what I have said in the Ninth Chapter of the *Grecian* Militia, what Burthens Philip's *Macedonians* carried, and how far they marched, and observe what I say here of the Romans, you cannot but be ready to suspend your belief. And such marches under such heavy burthens not being now practis'd, I shall not blame you to think them well near incredible, as Louis de Montgomerie seem'd to do, when he saith in his *French* Militia, that such Souldiers not being now to be found any where, he thinks (according to Pythagoras his Transmigration) they were converted into the Mules and Asses of *Auvergne*. And indeed our Modern Armies (whose heavy arm'd are scarce so well arm'd for Defence as the Roman

Louis de Montgomerie.

Velites

*Velites* were) do not march twenty Italian miles in one day, but with a very great loss in the Rear, whereas the Romans march'd further in five hours; which was practis'd by Caesar, when he march'd after, and overtook the *Edugians*, who had deserted them: He march'd with all his Cavalry, and four Legions of his Foot. It is true, his Souldiers carried no Baggage with them; for that was left in the Camp with his Legate, who stay'd behind, with two Legions to maintain the Siege of *Gargovia*. It is written of Galba, (who was afterwards Emperour) that when he was Legate in France, he run on foot at the Emperour Calig's Chariot the whole time that his Army march'd their Curfion; which, as I have said, was twenty five miles in the space of four hours; Galba being then forty six years old. Vegetius saith, a Roman Army marched ordinarily twenty Italian miles in one day, and this is verified by Caesar, who calls it, *Unius Diei iustum iter*: The just march of one day. But if the ground were rocky, Woody, full of Marishes, or otherwise of ill passage, then they were necessitated accordingly to take their measures, as well as other Nations were. In *Thessaly*, four thousand Romans, who were sent but as a fore-party (and were not troubled with Baggage) by the Consul *Marius Philippus*, had much ado to march fifteen miles in two days, saith *Livy* in his Forty fourth Book. But Souldiers were undoubtedly eas'd of those insupportable burthens, when this very strict Discipline became neglected and corrupted; and that there were almost as many *Soujats*, *Drudges*, or Slaves in the Roman Armies, as there were Souldiers in them: As when (the afterward Emperour) *Vespasian* march'd with sixty thousand men against the *Rebellious Jews*.

Marches almost incredible.

The just March of one day.

Being perfectly wearied of those terrible Burthens, I return to the exercises of the Roman Souldiers, and these I find divided into three kinds. The first is, of those who were peculiarly and properly called Military Exercises; the second, of those duties the Souldiers owed to their Superiour Officers; and the third, of their work and fatigue.

The Exercises properly called Military, were of seven sorts. First, To march or run in full Arms twenty, or twenty five miles in four or five hours time. Secondly, To leap over Ditches. Thirdly, To swim Rivers, at which *Julius Caesar* was excellent. Fourthly, to skirmish or fight with Sword and with Target, heavier than ordinary ones. Fifthly, To lance and throw Darts and Javelines. Sixthly, To throw Stones at a mark, either with the Hand, Sling, or Batton-Sling. Seventhly, To mount or dismount a Horse on any side, in full Arms, with Swords or Maces in their hands, and without a Stirrup: The last *Vegetius* forgot, yet of all these sorts he hath made mention.

First kind of Military Exercises.

The Second kind of Exercises was of those Duties and Services the Souldiers owed and payed to their Officers and Commanders, beside the publick duties they owed to the State. These were to set up their Tents and Pavillions, to make convenient places for their Servants, Necessaries and Baggage, and sometimes to empale them round about, to keep all places about their Lodgings and the Streets likewise clean from mire, dirt, or dust, and (if they were to encamp for any time) to lay the ground with Sand, and much more of this nature. These services all Souldiers were bound to perform, except such, who for some reasons, were exempted and freed from all publick duties, and were only bound to fight, and wait on the Consuls. Those who had no exemption were called *Munifices*, Duty-doers. There are some who say, that the *Triarii* were free from these duties, and particular services to Officers; and full well it might be so, since they were bound to look to the Horses of the Cavalry, and therefore in Encamping were constantly quarter'd beside them, as you will see in my discourse of their *Caltramentation*. But from other publick works they were not free, for they fortified the Camp; which both *Paulus Emilius* and *Caesar* testified, when they made the *Triarii* fortify with Spade and Mattock, while they fac'd the Enemy with the *Hastati* and *Principes*.

Second kind.

The third kind of a Roman Souldiers Exercise was work and labour, which in our Modern Armies is not so unusual, as *Lappus* would make it, as shall be demonstrated against him in its proper place. Indeed, there were not such creatures as Pioneers known in the old Roman Armies, all was wrought by the Souldiers

Third kind.

themselves; yea, some write, that their *Velites* were not admitted to work, as unworthy to be employed in a service of so much reputation, and so it seems, it was a Maxime with them diametrically contrary to ours, which was, The greater Fatigue, the greater Honour. Of these publick works there were many kinds, these were, the Cutting, Carrying and Squaring Turf and Sods, Stakes and Pallisadoes for their Camps, Castles, Towns, Forts, and Scones, the fortifying all of these, working and digging at the Approaches, and expugnation of Forts and Towns, the making and managing great Engines, Mining, Countermining, making Retrenchments or Countermures, cutting deep Ditches and Channels of a very great length, building Magazines, Amphitheatres, and other huge and vast Edifices, and all these with many more, not only in time of War, but of the calmest Peace, when no necessity could be pretended for them, and those not so much for the ornament of Countries and Provinces, (though that was likewise taken into consideration) as to insure the Souldiers to toil, and to keep them habituated to it, that when they were necessitated to fatigue in earnest, they might find it easie, as that which was no new thing to them; and they found that this labour procur'd to the Souldiery both health and strength. *Suetonius* says, that *Galba*, before he was Emperour, *Veteranum et Tyronum militum assiduo opere corroboravit*; He strengthen'd both his old and raw Souldiers with daily work and labour. And *Scipio* the lesser, kept his Army constantly at hard work at the Siege of *Nimantia*, where he frequently told his Souldiers, That he who would bathe his hands in the blood of his Enemies, must first soil them with dirt and mire. It must be observ'd, that the *Romans* fortified their Camps with their Swords at their sides, as we read in Sacred History *Nehemiah* did, and made the *Jews* do, when they re-built the Walls of *Jerusalem*. We read, that *Corbulo*, a great Captain, and Reformer of decay'd discipline, put two of his Souldiers to death, because he found them working at a Rampart, the one without either Sword or Dagger, the other with a Dagger, but without a Sword. The same *Corbulo* being commanded by his Tyrannical Master *Nero*, to make Peace with the *Germans*, left his Army should languish with idleness, caus'd them to cut a Ditch three and twenty Italian miles long, between the Rivers of the *Maas* and the *Rhine*; for it was a rule with them, That labour hardens and corroborates, whereas idleness weakens and effeminates; the truth whereof is taught us by experience.

But truly, who will rightly consider the stupendous works of the *Romans*, made by a few men, and in a short time, may (as one observeth) say, they were those Gyants, who, as the Poets feign, call one Mountain on another, so to climb up to Heaven. For not to speak of their building Temples, Theatres, Castles, Towers and Baths, their draining Marshes, cutting out Channels, Caulfying ways, and Paving streets, all which are the works of Peace, Who can read without admiration, of their Works and Fortifications in the time of War, as particularly either *Cæsar's* Circumvallations at *Alfida*, which he made both exceedingly broad and high, wonderfully strong with Towers and Castles, well Pallisadoed both before him and behind him, the first to besiege *Percennius* within the Town, the second to defend himself against the united force of all the *Gauls*, who he knew were preparing to come and raise the Siege, a work of sixteen miles circumference; or those works of his at *Dyrachium*, whereby he had almost besieg'd *Pompey*, both stronger, and better provided than himself. *Spinola's* Circumvallations at *Brada* in the years 1625 and 1626, gives us ground enough to believe those of Great *Cæsar* to be true. But methinks the *Narratives* far surpass'd them all, who (as you have it in *Cæsar's* Fifth Book of the *French War*) having learned something of Fortification from some Prisoners or Fugitive *Romans*, besieg'd *Cicero*, one of *Cæsar's* Legates, in his Winter quarter, where they made a Circumvallation of fifteen miles circumference, the Rampart eleven foot high, and the Ditch fifteen foot broad or deep, without the help of any Tools, except their Swords, (wherewith they cut the Turf and Sods) and their Head-pieces and Hands, wherewith they call up the Earth, and all this in the space of three hours. An action so far beyond humane strength, that it would far surpass all possibility of belief, if it were not warranted by the down-right relation and authority of so renown'd an Author, and an eye-witness.

The

The *Roman Novitates* or *Tyrons* were taught their Military Exercises, properly so called, by those who were nam'd *Campi Doctores*, as *Vegorius* calls them right, and not *Campi Doctores*, as *Strabo* (who comments on *Vegorius*) misnames them, for they who taught them their Exercises were indeed their Masters, so long as they stay'd with them; but were not their Officers and Commanders. They were as our Drill Masters in Towns or Counties, and had twice as much Pay and Proviant as the common Souldier, which was indeed as much as the Centurion had. After the Legions march'd from Rome, every File was Drill'd and Train'd by its Leader, who was call'd *Decanus*, and *Caput contubernii*, because a whole File was lodg'd in one Tent or Hut: And this *Decanus* was also to have the inspection of their Arms, that they were kept bright, clear, and sharp; and of their clothes, that they were kept in good order; for all which he had some small allowance more than the common Souldier. I shall conclude this Discourse of Exercises, with what *Jesphus* says of them: The *Roman Exercises* in Arms are (saith he) Battels without Blood, and their Battels are Exercises with Blood.

Observe here, that *Polybus* speaks not one word of any of these three kinds of Exercises, and *Vegorius* nothing of the second kind.

*Campi Doctores* Drill-masters.

*Decanus*, a File-leader.

## CHAP. VI.

Of the Roman Infantry, and all its several Bodies, and their Officers.

HOW the Ancient illustrious *Romans* divided their Foot into heavy and light, and how both were Arm'd, I have sufficiently inform'd you. But there are some who say, they had no light armed Foot, till *Hannibal's* time, I know no authority for this. It is true, *Livius* saith in his twenty sixth Book, that at the Siege of *Capua*, when it stood for *Hannibal*, was the first time that the *Roman* light armed Foot were mingled with the Horse; but this will not infer, that the *Romans* had no light armed Foot before that Siege of *Capua*. The truth of that affair was this: The *Capuans* at their Sallies ordinarily worsted the *Roman* Horse, till one *Novius*, a Centurion, made a proposition, that in such Rencontres the Horse-men should take Darters on the groups of their Horses, which was done. Now when the Besieg'd Sallied, and came up to the *Roman* Horse, the *Velites* alighted, and run before the Horse-men, throwing their Darts, (whereof they were order'd to have seven) at the Enemy, and then retir'd to their own Horse, having done (as may be supposed) so much mischief to the *Hannibals*, and brought them into such disorder, that the *Roman* Horse often had a cheap Market of them. *Novius* might well have been the first *Roman* that thought of this way of fight of Horse and Foot mixed together; but it was practis'd long before his time by the Great *Alexander*, and others. And *Cæsar* bears witness, that long after *Novius*, *Antiochus*, King of the *Germans* used and practis'd it, who leas'd it not from *Novius*, or any other *Roman* in the world. *Livius* thinks, that in *Cæsar's* time, there were no *Velites*, and I am content to be of his opinion, for though it be certain enough, that when *Cæsar* liv'd, there were in the *Roman* Armies, Slingers, Darters, and Archers, (all which were *Velites*) yet it may be said, these were but Auxiliaries; for after the *Socii*, or *Alies*, were made Burgeses of Rome, and that Rome it self was Mistress not only of all Italy, but many other places of the World, and so could for her Money get Mercenaries when she pleas'd.

*Velites* mixed with Horse.

is



it is probable, the Romans made no election but of heavy arm'd or Legionaries. But the reason *Lipfius* gives for his opinion will not prove the thing; it is this: *Caesar* sometimes intermix'd his Cavalry with *Antequani*, now they were heavy arm'd, therefore he had no *Velites*; but this will not follow; for why might not the heavy arm'd Foot fight among the Horse, as well as the Horse many times were brought to fight among the heavy arm'd Foot, for that depended on the Consul's pleasure, to bring some Foot from the Battel to the Wings, or some Horse from the Wings to the Battel, a thing frequently practis'd.

*Velites* where  
marshall'd.

These *Velites* had their denomination a *Velocitate*, from Swiftnefs. In time of Service or Battel, they were sometimes employ'd in the Rear, sometimes in the Flanks, but for most part in the Van; and when they were over-muster'd, they retir'd to the intervals of the Legionaries. Some apprehend, that in their Retreat they divided themselves into three Bodies, the first behind the *Hastati*, the second behind the *Principes*, and the third behind the *Triarii*. But assuredly they are mistaken, for after the *Velites* had quitted the field, the heavy arm'd began the Combat, first the *Hastati*, and they being worsted, retir'd to the *Principes*, but this they could not do feafibly, if a Body of *Velites* stood between them and the *Principes*, nor could the *Principes* retire to the *Triarii*, if another Body of *Velites* stood between them. And therefore I think I have reason to conclude, that when the *Velites* were beaten out of the field, they retir'd straight to the Rear of the *Triarii*, through the direct intervals of all the three Classes of the heavy armed, and there attended the Consul further pleasure. Yet if you look on any Figure of a Legion, you shall ordinarily see the *Velites* drawn up in three distinct Bodies, behind the three several Battalions of the Legionaries, which might have been done when they were marshall'd, before the Fight began; but for the reason I have spoke of, could not be after they had fought, and retir'd. They fought a *la disbandade*, keeping no Rank or File, nor had they peculiar Officers, as the *Grecian* light armed Foot had. Several scribe, nay positively affirm, they were to obey the commands of the Centurions of those heavy arm'd *Maniples*, behind whom they were order'd to stand, when the Army was marshall'd. Is it not pity, that neither *Polybius* nor *Vegetius* would clear us of these doubts, considerable enough, since they concern so considerable a member of the Ancient Roman Armies? And since *Lipfius*, *Terduzzis*, and the Lord *Preffice*, magisterially take upon them to marshall them in three distinct Bodies, and to be commanded by the Centurions that stood in the Van of the Maniples of these Legionaries, drawn up before them; is it fair dealing in them, not to tell us who commanded these *Velites*, when they were skirmishing, and fighting in the Van of the *Hastati*, and when all the Centurions of the heavy armed were obliged to stay behind, and attend their charges, in their several Maniples and Cohorts?

How they  
fought.

By whom  
Commanded.

The Body of the heavy armed Infantry was compos'd of three several Classes; those were, the *Hastati*, the *Principes*, and the *Triarii*. The first Class was of the *Hastati*, who were, as I told you before, the youngest in the election, and for most part *Novitiate*. I find no difference of their Arms from those of the *Principes*, and what those were, I have told you in the third Chapter, to which henceforward I constantly remit you, as to the matter of Arms. But I conceive they had their name of *Hastati*, as *Hasta*, that is, a Spear, which probably they have carried in the Reigns of some of their Kings; and though afterward they came to change their Weapon, yet they still retain'd their name. These *Hastati* made the first Battalion, whatever *Vegetius* say to the contrary, as shall be sufficiently demonstrated, when I come to examine his Legion. The second Class was of the *Principes*, who were the strongest and lustiest men, and had most of them serv'd formerly, and were in the strength of their age, and had their denomination, per-adventure, because they were the principal men for strength and vigour; these made the second Battalion of the Legion. The third Class was of the *Triarii*; *Lipfius* thinks they were called so, *quasi Terarii*, because they made the third Battalion. I think the Etymology is far sought, but it is fit I admit it, because I cannot give a better. Yet it is certain that their more ancient name was

*Hastati*.

*Principes*.

*Triarii*.

was *Pilani*, and their whole Body or Squadron was called *Pilum*, no doubt, from *Pilum* the Javeline; and if so, then it is more than probable, that in older times, neither the *Hastati*, nor the *Principes* carried Javelines, because both of them in History are called *Antequani*. In *Polybius*'s time, the *Triarii* carried no Javeline at all, and yet even then they kept their old name of *Pilani*. All the difference of Arms that I find between them and the other two Classes, both before, and in *Polybius*'s time, is, that the *Triarii* carried a short Spear, which they call'd *Hastula*, of nine foot long; and I have told you in the third Chapter, that the *Pilum* or Javeline, by *Polybius*'s own description, was near seven foot long. Why these short Spears were given them instead of Javelines, Authors tell us not. *Lipfius* makes a conjecture, which in my opinion is a very sorry one. He saith; the *Triarii* being plac'd in the Rear of the other two Battalions, their Javelines could have done them no service against an Enemy at so great a distance. What a pitiful Reason is this? For the *Triarii* were not bound to fight with either Javeline, short Spear, or any other Weapon, till either the *Principes* and *Hastati* retir'd to them, or that they themselves were brought up to the Van; and in any of these two cases, Javelines would have serv'd them to as good purpose, as they did the two Battalions marshall'd before them. And if these short Spears serv'd the *Triarii* better when they came to fight, than the Javelines, then they should likewise have serv'd the other two Classes better than the Javelines, and so the *Pilum*, or Javeline, should have been laid aside as useless. And therefore, I think, *Lipfius* here hath not hit the mark. To me, it would rather seem, that in a medley, when perchance an Enemy vigorously pushed the *Principes*, the *Triarii* could not, without wronging their Friends (who were retiring), cast their Javelines with so much advantage, as they could manage those short Spears. In the Country now call'd *Lombardy*, then *Gallia Cisalpina*, the Roman Consul, *Furius* and *Flaminius*, met with a numerous Army of the *Cisalpine Gauls*, these carried terrible long and heavy Swords, to avoid the fury whereof, the Romans thought it fit to take the short Spears from the *Triarii*, and give them to the *Hastati*, that either with them they might keep the Enemy at a distance, or while the *Gauls* were slashing at those short Spears, and that their Swords (for their weight not very manageable) were at the ground, the *Hastati* with their short Swords might get within them; and this succeeding as it was projected, I gain'd the Romans the Victory; as *Polybius* in his Second Book tells us. I would he had told us too, whether these *Hastati* made use both of their own Javelines, and the short Spears of the *Triarii*, which is not improbable; or if they exchanged Weapons for that day. But here give me leave to ask *Polybius*, *Vegetius*, *Lipfius*, *Terduzzis*, and all others who tenaciously prefer the Roman Arms to all others of the World, Whether a long *Grecian* Spear of eighteen foot, would not have done better service against the *Gauls*, than either a Javeline or a short Spear? Or if a Macedonian Phalangie, strongly arm'd, carrying Pikes of one and twenty foot long, would have much valued or feared the long and heavy Swords of these *Cisalpine Gauls*. These *Triarii* were the eldest and most experienced of the Roman Foot, and therefore were kept for the last Reserve, not at all fighting, if the other two Bodies beat the Enemy; but if those were beaten, or order'd to retire, (as sometimes they were) then they arose and made a fresh and furious onset, and if that prevail'd not, the safety of the Army depended either on their Fight, or on a safe and orderly Retreat. Hence in desperate cases they us'd to cry, *Uspite ad Triarios periculum est*; History tells us, that while others were fighting, the *Triarii* rested themselves, till the Consul or General gave them either an Order or a Sign to rise. But in what posture they rested, whether they knelt, or sat; or if they knelt, whether they did it on one knee or both; or if on one knee, whether on the Right or the Left, is not to me very clear. *Vegetius*, in the twentieth Chapter of his first Book, seems to say on both knees, *genuibus pascis*, are his words, and indeed this was the easiest way question. In the sixteenth Chapter of his second Book, he makes them kneel but on one knee, and this, I believe, is the truest. But in the fourteenth Chapter of his third Book, to my thinking, he makes them sit; which, I suppose, could not

Called *Pilani*.

Carried short  
Spears.

Why they  
carried not  
Javelines.

Observation.

*Triarii* rest.

But how, if  
both knees.

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be true at all, for at that posture they could not with any conveniency make a Pent-house of their Shields, which both he and Polybius say, and which Reason teacheth, they were bound to do, to save themselves from the Enemies missiles.

Ordinarily  
the Triarii  
kept for the  
last Reserve.

There is no doubt, the *Triarii* did often recover the honour of the day, when it was well near lost. When *Lucius Purius* was well beaten by the *Volsians* at *Sauricum*, *Livy* tells us in his sixth Book, that *Furius Camillus* advanc'd seasonably with his *Triarii*, charg'd gallantly, and obtain'd the Victory. The *Latines* after an obstinate fight at *Vejevicius*, had fair hopes of Victory, when they had wholly defeated the Left Wing of the *Roman* Army, and in it kill'd the Consul *Decius*; and forc'd both the *Hastati* and *Principes* to give ground on the Right hand: But *Marius* with his *Triarii* fell freshly upon them, and recover'd the Battel. Polybius in his Second Book says, The *Triarii* were not only kept for the last Reserve on the Land, but at Sea likewise in their Naval Battels. Yet were they not always left for the last, for at or near *Capua*, the Consul *Publius* perceiving by the extent of the *Sannites* Army, that they intended to out-wing him, (a danger to which most of the *Roman* Armies were obnoxious) did not stay till the *Hastati* and *Principes* had fought, but presently call'd up both the *Principes* and *Triarii* to the Van, and of them making a large Front, by a furious charge of all his three Bodies march'd in Breast, routed his Enemy. Neither do I make any doubt, but those six Cohorts which *Cæsar* call'd up to the Front of his Army at *Pharsalia*, were *Triarii*, for he says, he call'd them *ex tertio agmine*, out of the third Battalion. He did it to add his Horse against *Pompey's* Cavalry, which far surpass'd his in numbers; and to these Cohorts himself attributeth the Victory. And if he had not call'd them up before the fight begun, but delay'd (according to the ordinary custom) till his *Hastati* and *Principes* had retir'd; perhaps he should have made use of them too late; but he fore-saw the danger of that well enough, and prevented it.

But not always.

Since the *Hastati*, when over-powered, were to retire to the *Principes*, and both of them, when over-master'd, to the *Triarii*; there is no question, but in each of these Bodies there were distances and intervals prepar'd, wherein to receive one another, whether by the Retreat of the first to the second, or of both first and second to the third, or by the advance of the second and the third to the first. That these intervals were, is granted by all, but what measure or pedise of ground for any of them, is not at all punctually set down by any, for any thing I know, an inexcusable oversight! but I shall speak of them all in my Discourse of Intervals. Here I shall only take notice of two things. First, That *Machiavel* errs, when he says in the Third Book of his Art of War, that the *Hastati* had no interval, but fought in one Body, *Spiss & firmi*, Thick and close. For, if so, the *Principes* could not advance to their assistance, yet conveniently and safely receive them (when they retir'd) within their intervals, if they had not been march'd in smaller Bodies. I suppose this fancy had its birth only in *Machiavel's* Brain, whose Head, no doubt, was full of more huffish notions. The second thing I am to acquaint you with in this place, is, that whatever distance was allow'd between the Maniples or Cohorts of the *Principes*, for receiving the *Hastati*, the double proportion of distance must have been given between the Maniples or Cohorts of the *Triarii*, in regard they were to receive both the *Hastati* and *Principes*. Polybius in his fifth Book avers, that though the number of the *Hastati* and *Principes* might vary, and be greater or lesser, according to the strength or weakness of the Legion, yet the number of the *Triarii* never alter'd; but they were constantly six hundred. Now in his time the number of the *Principes* was twelve hundred, and that of the *Hastati* as many. *Achilles* & *Terpandus*, not adverting to what I have said of distances, concludes first, that the two foremost Battalions were march'd twelve deep, & which I will not grant him; and next, that the *Triarii* were drawn up but six deep, which I would not fail to deny him, though I had grant'd him the first. His reason for the last assertion is, that the *Triarii* being but half the number of the other two Battalions, could not make an equal Front with the other two, unless they were drawn up, but half their depth: But he doth not take heed, that if they had, made an equal Front of men with the other two, they could not have receiv'd both the other two in their intervals,

Error of *Machiavel*.

A mistake of *Terpandus*.

vals, but only one of them, and then they had not done that, for which purpose they stood in the third Battalion: And if he had adverted, that the intervals between the Maniples of the *Triarii*, must have been double that which was allow'd to the other two Classes, that stood before them, he would have march'd six hundred as deep as he did twelve hundred, for the double distance between the several Bodies of six hundred, made six hundred of equal Front of ground with the twelve hundred before them: so you may easily consider that notwithstanding the disparity of their numbers, the difference of the several Intervals made the Front equal, (as to the ground) of all the three Battalions of *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*.

The Reason, and the only Reason why we must believe, that the *Triarii* were constantly six hundred, is because Polybius said it was so; but I shall suppose, it was neither so before his time, nor yet after his time, nor doth he offer to give any reason why it was so in his time. *Lipsius* (who is very ready for such things) offers to give two Reasons for it, the first whereof is stark naught, and it is this, That the *Principes* came back to their assistance; and by this argument they needed not have been so many as six hundred, because both the *Hastati* and *Principes* came back to their assistance, and by this Reason the *Principes* should have been but six hundred, because the *Hastati* came back to their help, before they were obliged to fight. But his second Reason speaks better sense, which is, That the Consul (who ordinarily stood near the *Triarii*) came with the *Evocati* of the *Romans*, and the *Extraordinarii* of the *Socii* or Allies, and join'd with the *Triarii*. What these *Extraordinarii* were, shall be told you in my Discourse of the Allies, and what the *Evocati* were, I shall tell you just now.

*Triarii* but  
600 in every  
Legion.

And why.

If you will believe *Lipsius*, the *Evocati* were only of the *Roman* Nation, but I think, I am obliged rather to believe *Cæsar*, who saith, he had his *Evocati* out of *Gauls*, and at that time of his Civil War, the *Gauls* were either Enemies, or Auxiliaries at best. Those of the *Evocati* who were *Romans*, were such as had serv'd out their time, and by the Laws of their Militia, were not bound to follow the War; yet upon the Intreaty or Letters of the Consul, Pro-Consul, or General, came without constraint, to wait upon him or them in that expedition. Some of them serv'd on Horse, some on Foot, and were put in Troops and Companies, and had their Officers and Pay; but were exempted from all manner of Military duties, except fighting, and attending on him who commanded in chief. A great many of them went with *Scipio* to *Africa*; three thousand of them went to *Macedon* with *Titus Flaminius*, two thousand went with *Pompey* against *Cæsar*. And *Augustus* in one expedition had ten thousand of them. Besides these *Evocati*, there were Volunteers, who having serv'd out their time, were not ordinary Soldiers, and not being call'd out by the Consul, were not properly *Evocati*; neither had they any pay, but went to the War merely of their own motion and free-will; either to do their Country service, or to acquire Riches or Honour to themselves and families, or for all these three respects together.

Now, these were, besides all these Foot, which I have mention'd; some of the poorer sort call'd *Proletarii*, and *Capite cens*, that were not admitted by *Servius Tullius*, King of *Rome*, to be enrolled for the War, but were left to serve at Sea, which at that time was esteem'd dishonourable, in comparison of the Land service. Yet in time of danger they were bound to take Arms (which were given them out of the publick Magazines) for the defence of the Walls of the City. But in process of time, they came to be enrolled in Legions, particularly with *Marius* against the *Tamoni* and the *Cimbrii*.

*Livius* in his eighth Book, writing of that War, which the *Romans* had with the *Latines*, mentions *Rorarii* and *Accensi*, in two several Bodies, and he places them behind the *Triarii*; they were call'd from the Rear, according as the Consul or General had use for them: They were the light armed Foot, and had those names till the *Romans*, belieg'd *Capua*, in *Hannibal's* time; then and there, it seems, they got the name of *Kelarii*, and that they kept. They were call'd *Accensi*, because they were the meanest in the Centre, and *Rorarii*, a rare, from *Dew*, because in skirmishing they scatter'd themselves, as Dew doth on Grass. I shall tell you more of them in my Discourses of a Roman Legion.

*Rorarii* and  
*Accensi*.

Each

Legion.

Each of these three Classes of the heavy armed Foot was divided into Centuries. Two Centuries made a Maniple, three Maniples made a Cohort, and ten Cohorts made up a Legion. A Roman Legion was of greater or lesser number, according to the pleasure of the King, Senate, People or Emperor, who was invested with the Sovereignty, or as the exigency of the present condition of affairs seem'd to require. *Romulus* ordain'd it to consist of three thousand men, one thousand of each Tribe; whereof there were but three in his time, though afterward they came to be thirty five. Whether the Kings who succeeded *Romulus* kept the Legion at three thousand Foot, I know not; but after Monarchy was banish'd the City, Legions came to be four thousand strong, sometimes five thousand, and twice, (if I mistake not) six thousand and two hundred.

A Centuriate and Centurion.

Let us now speak of the several Bodies of a Legion, and first of a Century. At the first constitution, I doubt not, but a Centuriate consisted of one hundred men, and its Commander was called Centurion, both the words being deriv'd from *Centum*, a hundred. But thereafter that band of men called a Centuriate, in Legions of four thousand, or four thousand two hundred (which was most, ordinary) came to consist but of sixty men in the two Classes of the *Hastati* and *Principes*, and but of thirty, in the third Class of the *Triarii*. In the Class of the *Hastati* there were twenty Centuriates, at sixty men each of them, and those were twelve hundred. Just as many Centuriates, and of that same number, for the *Principes* made twelve hundred more. In the Class of the *Triarii* there were likewise twenty Centuriates, but each of these consisted but of thirty men, which made six hundred, it all three thousand heavy armed. The other thousand or twelve hundred were *Velites*. But though each of those Bands were but sixty or thirty strong, yet they, and their principal Commander kept their ancient denominations of Centuriate and Centurion. There were sixty Centuriates in a Legion, though *Vegilius* speaks of but fifty five, which shall hereafter be examin'd. The Centurion was chosen by the Tribune (as I formerly told you) and he had liberty to chuse his own Sub-Centurion, whose station was in the Rear, and was indeed nothing but our Bringer up. *Polybius* his Interpreter calls the Centurions, *Ordinum Duces*, Leaders of Files, or of Centuriates: if *Ordo* be taken for a Centuriate, as perhaps it was; the Sub-Centurion he calls *Agminis Conductorem*, and that is directly our Rear-man. This will not make a Centurion and Sub-Centurion to be our Captain and Lieutenant, (as some would have them to be) and if you will be pleas'd to consider that a Roman Centurion commanded but sixty, some of them but thirty men, and was himself no otherwise arm'd than the rest of the Centuriate, only distinguished by his Crest, and that he stood in Rank and File with the rest, either on the Right or Left hand of the Front of the Maniple: I suppose, you will think with me, that the Roman Centurions, for the matter of either Power or Honour, were no other than our Corporals, and their Sub-Centurions such as Lancepikes, especially where Foot Companies are (as in our own time they were in several places of Europe) three hundred strong, and consequently every Corporalship sixty men. The Centurions badge was a Branch, Rod, or Twig of a Vine, wherewith he had power to beat or whip those of his Centuriate as they deserv'd. It is not half an age since a Corporal us'd to carry a Musket-rest in his hand; wherewith he might beat those of his Corporalship according to their Misdemeanors. Neither will the matter of Profit or Pay make any difference between them, the Roman Centurion having but double allowance of either Wages, Provision, or Donatives of what the common Souldier had, and so have our Corporals in all or most of our Modern Armies. *Polybius* informs us, that the Centurion might nominate his Sub-Centurion, that in case he should dye in Battle, the other should succeed him; and by this it should seem, that so long as the Centurion liv'd, the Sub-Centurion had no command at all. But we do not at all read of Sub-Centurion till before that great Battle was fought between the Romans and the Latines, that a Roman Centurion, who was of a weak Body, knowing he was to encounter with a Latine Centurion who was strong, desir'd to have one joyn'd to him as his helper or Sub-Centurion, to assist him, as *Livy* at great length relates the story in his eighth Book; and this, it may be, gave

Centurions our Corporals.

Sub-Centurion his rifle.

the rise to that despicable Office of a Sub-Centurion, who is called an Option by *Vegilius*; a word, I do not remember to have read in any other Author, except once in *Polybius*. The Tribunes very often used their Centurions as we do our Marshals and Proforces of Companies, and worse, in causing them to lead the Malefactors out of the Camp, and there either see them put to death, or do it themselves. After *Julius Caesar* had usurp'd the State, his Successors, the Emperours, used their Centurions directly as their Hang-men, in causing them to put to death with their own hands, such as they in their Arbitrary Government had ordain'd to dye. So one of them with his own hand kill'd the Emper's *Messalina*, the Emper's *Claudius* his command, but by the direction of his freed Bond-slave *Narcissus*. Another of them assist'd at the horrid murder of the Emper's *Agrippina*, after he had basely struck her over the head with a Battoon. Every Centuriate had a Banner or Colours, and the Ensign-bearer was chosen by the Centurion; nor can I find, that this Ensign-bearer was any distinct Officer, but only some one of the common Souldiers, whom for his Courage and Strength the Centurion entrusted with the Ensign; for his Command was none at all, and his profit as little, being no otherwise paid than as other Souldiers were, only he was a step nearer preference than they.

Centurions sometimes Hang-men.

Two Centuriates made a Maniple, so called from a wisp or handful of Hay, tyed to a long Pole, which perhaps was the first Ensign that ever *Romulus* carried. The Maniple had no particular Commander, the oldest Centurion commanded the Right hand Centuriate, and the youngest the Left hand one. The Maniple had two Ensigns, one for each Centuriate. And this *Lipsius* (convinc'd by *Hilfory*) acknowledg'd in the first Dialogue of his fourth Book of his Commentary on *Polybius*, yet in the third Dialogue of that same Book, he seems to allow but one Ensign to the Maniple. But he doth worse, for in the third Dialogue of his second Book (speaking of that passage in *Livy*'s eighth Book, where he makes three Ensigns to be in one Maniple, made up of *Triarii*, *Rorarii*, and *Accensi*) *Lipsius* saith it might be so; for, saith he, there may be Colours where there is no Commander, whereof the *Rorarii* and *Accensi* had none. This is strange Doctrine, Colours without Commanders. But observe more, that notwithstanding the Authority of *Livy*, *Polybius* and *Vegilius*, who give an Ensign to every Centuriate, *Lipsius* in the eighth Dialogue of his second Book, declares his opinion to be, that a Maniple consisting of two Centuriates, had but one Ensign. In what Roman Authors he hath read this I know not, but I am confident he saw neither of the two, *Lipsius* will allow but one Ensign for a Maniple. *Spain*, and the Estates of the Netherlands, which began a little before he began to write. But it is fit we hear and answer the Reasons, wherewith he endeavours to confirm his opinion: First, He cites *Varro*, who mentions but one *Signum*, or Banner, in one Maniple. It is answer'd, That *Varro* in that place intended not to inform us, whether there were two Ensigns or one, in the Maniple, that not being the subject or matter of his discourse; and therefore when he spoke of one, he did not deny but there might be two. Secondly, saith *Lipsius*, Since there was but one Eagle in the Legion, there should be but one Banner in the Maniple. Truly, he might as well have said but one Banner in the Cohort, the Analogy would have held as well, if not better. It was the Romans pleasure to have but one Eagle in every Legion, and one Colours in every Centuriate, and the question is *de re gestis*, of the thing done, and not of the causes and reasons of the deed it self. Thirdly, he saith, *Polybius* speaks of two *Significari*, or Ensign-bearers, but not of two Ensigns. Neither doth that which *Lipsius* adds, help him, that he thinks, the one Ensign-bearer was to relieve the other when he was wearied. To the first part of this Reason, I say it is of no force; for when *Polybius* said, there were two Ensign-bearers, he said in these words, There were likewise two Ensignes. For if *Lipsius* should say, In one Brigade there are two Colonels, would not any man infer, That there were two Regiments in that Brigade. To the second part, That the one Ensign-bearer serv'd to relieve and ease the other; it is but a conjecture of *Lipsius*, and he guesseth not always right. For why should there be two Ensign-bearers for one Ensign, since there was but one Eagle bearer for one Eagle, which was much heavier, and of more consequence than an ordinary

A Maniple.

Lipsius will allow but one Ensign for a Maniple. His Reasons examined, and answer'd. First.

Second.

Third.

Fourth.

ordinary banner. Fourthly, he tells us that when *Cæsar* beat *Pompey* at *Pharsalia*, he took nine Eagles, that is, faith he, one for every Legion, but he took only one hundred and eighty Ensigns; now, faith *Lipſius*, if there had been two Colours in every Maniple, he should have taken five hundred and forty of them. I wonder why ſo grave a Man as *Lipſius*, would propoſe ſo ridiculous an argument; for firſt *Cæſar* got not all *Pompey's* Eagles, for himſelf writes, that *Pompey* had one hundred and ten Cohorts, theſe made up eleven complete Legions, but *Cæſar* got but nine Eagles, and ſo he wanted the two belonging to the other two Legions; and if he had got all the Enſigns that be- longed to thoſe nine Eagles, (reckoning two Enſigns to every Maniple) he had got no fewer than five hundred and forty, or yet (according to *Lipſius* his own account, reckoning but one Banner to every Maniple) if he had got all, he ſhould have got juſt two hundred and ſeventy, yet *Cæſar* declares he got no more than one hundred and eighty. What will follow upon all this, but that all the reſt of the Enſigns eſcaped, as well as the two Eagles, or that they were torn or deſtroyed by the Bearers, as is uſual in our own times for Enſigns to do. But he concludes, that whatever the Maniples of the *Principes* and the *Haſtati* had, yet each Century of the *Triarii* had but one Colour, becauſe of their ſmall number, but his conjecture is ill grounded, as not agreeable to ancient ſtory; for it being agreed on, that thirty Men of the *Triarii* ſhould make a Century, that Century ought to have had an Enſign as well as a Century of ei- ther the *Haſtati* or *Principes*, which, according to *Polybius*, conſiſted of ſixty Men, and according to *Vegitius*, of one hundred Men. And we ſee the like practice in our Modern Companies of Foot, which are ordained to be but of one hundred a piece, they have Colours as well as Companies of one hundred twenty fix, or one hundred forty eight Men, or others of full three hundred Men.

All Centu-  
ries had Co-  
lours.Apology of  
the Author.

I hope, if I queſtion the truth of ſome things, which *Lipſius* avers either here, or afterward, it ſhall not be eſteemed arrogance in me, for I reverence the memory of that great and learned Man, but it will, I ſuppoſe, be granted me, that he might eaſily erre in things that belonged not properly to his pro- feſſion, though I believe, no one Man hath given greater light, to the *Roman* Hiſtory, than he hath done. In the fifth Dialogue of the fifth Book of his Commentary, he himſelf gives free liberty to all Military Perſons to examine all he writes on a Military ſubject, provided, they be not omnium literarum & artium rudes, that is not altogether rude, and wholly ignorant of all Learning and Arts.

A Cohort

A Cohort conſiſted of three Maniples, but neither were theſe three Man- iples all of one claſſe, nor was the Cohort marſhall'd in one equal Battalion or Front, but it was order'd thus: A Maniple of the *Haſtati*, a Maniple of the *Principes*, and a Maniple of the *Triarii* made a Cohort, and theſe were mar- ſhall'd ſo, that the Maniple of the *Principes* ſtood at a diſtance juſt behind the Interval that was (I pray you obſerve it) between two Maniples of the *Haſta- ti*, and not directly behind one of the Maniples of the firſt claſſe, and the third Maniple of the Cohort, which was of the *Triarii*, ſtood directly behind the Interval that was between two Maniples of the *Principes*. And to ſpeak it once for all, this was ever the *Roman* cuſtome, of marſhalling theſe three claſ- ſes of *Haſtati*, *Principes* and *Triarii*, except once at *Zama*, where *Scipio* drew them up in a direct and ſtraight line, one juſt behind another, leaving one Interval directly oppoſite to that, which was before it, to give way to the fury of *Hannibal's* numerous Elephants, ſaith *Livy*, of both his Elephants and Horſe, ſaith *Polybius*: I ſhall neither buſie my Reader, nor my ſelf with the etymology of the word *Cohors*, which may be a *Greek* word, that ſigni- fies a cloſe or incloſure; but I ſhall ſay, that though the centuriate was ſome- times ſtronger, ſometimes weaker of Men, according as the Legion was ap- pointed to be, yet ſtill a Maniple was the ſame, that is, a Band of Men conſiſ- ting of two Centuriates joyn'd together, and a Cohort was ſtill the ſame, that is, a Body compos'd of three Maniples, though not joyn'd together, till ne- ceſſity forced either the retreat or advance of ſome of them. And being a Legion conſiſted of ten Cohorts, and the ſtrongest Legion we read of (as to its number of Foot) was ſix thouſand two hundred, I admire, why in the de- ſcription of the Ancient *Roman* Legion, *Vegitius* makes his firſt Cohort to con- ſiſt

How Mar-  
ſhall'd.

ſiſt of one thouſand Men and more, and all the other nine of five hundred and fifty apiece, whereas according to the number of his Legion, (which was ſix thouſand and one hundred) each Cohort ſhould have conſiſted of ſix hundred and ſixteen Men, or thereabouts. Neither doth his Commentator *Stiehehus* defend him well, by telling us, that there were *Millenaria Cohortes*, Cohorts of thouſands, for theſe were not Legionary Cohorts, but Bands, Battalions, or Bodies of ſuch Companies, Centuriates or Maniples, as the Pretor, Conſul, Imperator, or General chuſed and appointed to attend him in the time of War, and were called *Cohortes Prætoriana*, or Pretorian Guards, and were ſtronger or weaker, more or leſs numerous, according to the power, or the pleaſure of the Commander in chief, and afterwards they were the Guards of the Em- perors, in time both of Peace and War. The firſt we read of that had one of them was *Posthumius* the Dictator mentioned by *Livy* in his ſecond Book. The great *Scipio* gathered a choice number of his friends and Dependes together, to attend him in his *Carthaginian* Voyage, caſed them of all Duties, but fight- ing, and allowed them a third more of pay, than others had. *Julius Cæſar* had none of them. *Augustus* had nine thouſand of them, whom he called *firmamentum Imperii*, the firmament, and eſtabliſhers of the Empire, but in time they came to be the Electors of the Empire, the Murderers of the Emperors, and the bane of the Commonwealth: ſome of them ſerved on the Horſeback, and yet ſtill retained the name of Cohorts.

Vegitius his  
Cohorts.Pretorian Co-  
horts.Emperour's  
Guards.

I believe *Lipſius* conjectures right enough, that in the time of the civil Wars, where Armies were made up of many Legions, and theſe made weak by long and continued Marches, frequent Sieges and Battels, then I ſay, it is pro- bable, Cohorts were modell'd in one Body, and uſed, as Maniples uſed to be in more ancient times; yet for all that, I will not grant to *Lipſius*, that the Co- hort conſiſted of leſs than ſix Centuries, though they might be very weak, nor yet will I grant, that every one of thoſe fix Centuries had not its own Centu- rion, and Enſign: for as in our Modern Regiments, a Captain is ſtill Captain, though his Company be not twenty ſtrong, and hath Colours always, till the Regiment is broken; ſo among the *Romans* every Century or Ordo had its Centurion and Enſign, till the Legion was diſmiſſ'd and diſbanded, which was frequently enough done.

Cohorts mar-  
ſhall'd as  
Maniples.

In every Legion there were ten Cohorts, neither had a Cohort any parti- cular Commander over it, more than the Maniple had, ſo as yet, the Centu- rion was the higheſt Officer, yea the only Officer in a Legion, except the Tri- bunes, whereof for the moſt part there were fix in a Legion, be the Legion of what ſtrength it would, yet the Legion was not divided among the Tribunes, nor had any one of them a particular command of any part of it, but all of them, and every one of them had the command of the whole Legion; but to ſhun both conſuſion and contention, they commanded about a month by turns, for *Polybius* in his fifth Book informs us, that two Tribunes had the command for one month alternatively; his meaning certainly was, two Tribunes in a Con- ſular Army, in which there were two Legions of *Romans*, beſides Allies, and that is ſtill one Tribune for every Legion, and ſo the Tribunes had their turns, if it be true what *Polybius* ſuppoſes, that the Army ſtaid in the Field but ſix Months, and ordinarily they ſtaid abroad all the Winter over, the firſt pra- ctice whereof was at the Siege of *Vais*, and then, no doubt, the Tribunes took their turns of command, as they did in the Summer time. Here now, you ſee, we have ſix Tribunes in a Legion, and but one Tribune in a Legion. The other five had that ſame reſpect, ſervice, and obedience paid them, with him who commanded, and ſate in the Council of War with the Conſul, as well as he.

How many  
Cohorts in  
a Legion.Military Tri-  
bunes.

The power and authority of the Tribunes was great enough, they judged of all cauſes, Civil, Criminal, and Military, but the laſt appeal was referred for the Conſul, or General. They might impoſe pecuniary mulct and fines, and puniſh by deſalcation of Pay, or Proviand, and by whipping likewiſe; yea *Polybius* ſays, they might paſs a ſentence of Death, others ſay, not without the Council. They received the Teſtera, or Watchword from the Conſul, where- of I ſhall give you a more perfect account in another place. They went

Their Power.

Their Duties.  
before

before to see the Camp measured out, according to the form of the *Roman* Caltramentation, whereof hereafter.

Their station  
in Battel.

Lipfus erres  
in his con-  
jecture;

And in the  
reason of it

The Authors  
conjecture.

But where these Tribunes had their Stations in the time of Battel (for sure the other five were not idle then) neither *Polybius* nor *Vegorius* tells us one word; Doubtless they are to blame, for concealing that, and many other considerable points of the *Roman* art of War. And here again, I am forced to engage with *Lipfus*, who very frankly offers his conjecture, which is this; That all the six Tribunes stood beside or near the Consul, and that was, faith he, beside the Eagle on the right hand of the *Triarii*; but if he had remembered of some things, that no question he knew, he would not have vented this opinion of his: For, first, the Consul could not be beside two Eagles, and therefore the Tribunes of both Legions could not be beside him. Secondly, The Consul, as all History witnesseth, was so far from being constantly at the Eagle, that he was but very seldom beside any of the Eagles, except when he was to lead the *Triarii* up to the assistance of the other two Classes, and many times he did this by a sign, and not in Person. Thirdly, it had been great shame for a knot of Colonels to have stood all of them beside the *Triarii*, when the other two Battalions of *Hasarii* and *Principes* were at hot work with an Enemy. Now, the reason, which *Lipfus* gives for this guess of his, is as extravagant as the conjecture it self, and I pray you, hear it. Because, faith he, the Tribunes in the *Roman* Camp quarter'd all very near the *Prætorium*, or Consuls Pavilion: and therefore, that in time of Battel, they should all be beside or near the Consul, is an Inference not worthy the youngest Novitiate in Logick: for, if this reason were valid, then all the Horsemen should have been embattel'd in the rear beside the *Triarii*, because in the Camp they quarter'd all beside them, as you shall hear afterwards. But since guessing is in fashion, why may not I guess too? yes, by *Lipfus*'s permission, I think I may. I shall lose but little. My conjecture then shall be grounded on two undeniable truths, the first is, that the Tribunes had the command of the Horse, as well as of the Foot: The second, that the *Roman* Horse were almost constantly marshall'd in one Wing, and for the most part, in the right Wing, the left one being ordain'd for the Cavalry of the Allies, add a third truth to the other two, that the Horse had no Officers to command them, but Decurions, and these were Independent one of another: Let us then allow one of the six Tribunes to command the Horse. In the next place let us order two experimented Tribunes to stay with the *Triarii*, and the other two to command the *Principes*, and the sixth with my consent, shall fight with the *Hasarii*. If this conjecture of mine please the Reader, as little as that of *Lipfus* pleaseeth me, I shall not break my heart for the matter, for I have met with greater disappointments.

As to any other Officer of the Infantry, in the old *Roman* Militia, I find none. *Vegorius* tells us in the seventh Chapter of his second Book, of some mean Office-bearers, who perhaps in his time had some small allowance of pay more than ordinary: But in *Polybius*'s time, and before it, they were nothing but *Gregarii Milites*, common Soldiers; and we are now speaking of the ancient constitutions of the *Roman* Militia. But with *Vegorius* I shall speak a word of these meaner Office-bearers. *Tesserarii*, who received the word from the Tribunes. *Metatores* went before with the Tribune to measure out the Camp. *Mensores*, who in the Field gave the Soldiers ground for their Huts and Tents, and their several Lodgings in Towns and Villages, as our Quarter-masters and Fourniers do. *Librarii* were petty Clerks and Scriveners, who kept the accounts of Pay, proviant, and donatives; all these in ancient times were appointed and chosen by the Centurions, remaining still common Soldiers, and changed at their pleasure. In that same Chapter *Vegorius* speaks of *Ordinarii*, *Qui in prælio primos ordines ducunt*, who in Battel, faith he, led the first orders. But here, to me he is very obscure, for *Ordines* may signifie *Estates*, which is not meant in this place; *Ordines* signifies Centurates, and so *Cæsaubon* in his translation of *Polybius* useth it, and *Ordines* is very often taken for both Ranks and Files. If *Vegorius* had used *Ordines* here for Centurates, then assuredly he would have said the *Ordinarii* were the *Principes*, or of them, for according

Tesserarii,  
what.  
Metatores,  
what.  
Mensores,  
what.  
Clerke.

Ordinarii,  
what.

according to his account, the *Principes* made the first Battalion, and so were *Primi ordines*, that is, the first Centurates. But if by *Ordines* he meant Ranks, as all along he seems to do, then his *Primi ordines*, or first ranks, were nothing but File-leaders, whereof, indeed the Centurion himself was one, and the Dignity he had, was, that he marched and fought either on the right or left hand of his own Centuriate, as when two were joyned in a Maniple, the oldest Centurion stood on the right hand of the Maniple, and the youngest on the left. It is there also, where the same Author tells us, of some who were called *Angustales*, that were joyned to these *Ordinarii*, but he makes it not clear to us, what duty they did, nor could they at all belong to the Ancient *Roman* Militia, having been but ordain'd by *Augustus*, from whom they had their Denomination. The *Flaviales*, he saith, were, *tantum secundis Augustales*, the second *Augustales*, being instituted by the Emperor *Flavius Vespasian*, from whom they had their name. What shall I say of these *Augustales* and *Flaviales*, but that these two Emperours, have bestow'd, it may be, a little more allowance of Pay or Bread upon some common Soldiers, than upon others, and as a mark of their favour, have perhaps, appointed the second or third Rank to be next in honour to the Front, or the Rear, and those who march'd in them, to be call'd by their names, *Augustales* and *Flaviales*. *Vegorius* his *Torquati*, *Simplares*, and *Duplars*, were such as had received gold Chains, or Bracelets, single or double, as rewards of their Valour, Vertue and good service, who besides had many times given them a double allowance of Bread, Fleish, and Wine: All these were nothing but common Soldiers, who enjoy'd such benefits as these we have spoke of; and perhaps were not privileged from the Duties of those Soldiers, who were called *Ministri*, whereof I spoke formerly. As to *Vegorius* his Trumpeters and Horn-winders, whereof he speaks in that same place, I shall have a Discourse of them in a Chapter apart.

Angustales,  
what.

Flaviales,  
what.

Torquati,  
what.

All of them  
common  
Soldiers.

It is there likewise, where *Vegorius* speaks of the Creation of Tribunes, who, he saith, were chosen by the Emperours, after they were vested with the Sovereign Power, and had their authority given them per *Epistolam sacram*, which I may english by an Imperial Patent, or Commission. But in my Discourse of Election, I have shewn you, who used to chuse the Tribunes after the Ancient *Roman* way. And in the same Chapter it is, that our Author qualifies those (whom *Levy* calls *Subcenturiones*, and *Cæsaubon* out of *Polybius*, *Agminis Coactores*) with the name of *Optiones*, they signifie all one thing, and I think, Bringers up: yet among these Rear-men there was one, who was chosen by the Centurion to assist him, and this was the Sub-Centurion, our Lancespicate, if he was so much. But I pray you, take notice how *Vegorius* describes these Persons: *Optiones ab optando appellati, quod antecedentibus aggritudine præpositi, tanquam adoptati erant, acque Vicarii solum universa curare*, *Optiones*, faith he, they were called from wishing, or adopting, because those who marched before them, being hindered by sickness, they as their adopted and Vicars used to have a care of all things. By this description, they were nothing but Bringers up, and all Bringers up could not be Sub-centurions. And at best, the Sub-Centurion had all his power from his Centurion, and was, as his adopted Child to succeed him in his charge after his death, whether that happen'd by a natural or a violent way. But so far as I can yet perceive, this Sub-Centurion, this *Agminis Coactor*, this *Optio*, this adopted Child, signified nothing, nor could officiate any way, till his Father the Centurion dyed, or at least, till he either fell sick, or chanced to be wounded, and then this Adopted Son of his might supply his place, as his Deputy.

Tribunes.

Optiones, what.

Vegorius his  
description  
of them.

I find in some Authors, that every Legion had a Physician, but whether every Centuriate, Maniple or Cohort, had a Chirurgeon, I know not, for I find nothing of it in any Author I have read. But since nothing is more certain, than that the *Roman* Soldiers and Officers were frequently wounded, and that we read of Consuls and Dictators, who have made it a part of their work (as indeed it was) to visit, comfort, and cherish the sick and hurt, in their Tents, and Huts, I think, we need not doubt, but their Armies were well provided of these Artills, without whole help, the comfortable words of a General, nay of a Prince, to a heavily diseased Person, could signifie but little.

Physicians &  
Chirurgeons.

The Eagle.

The Eagle was the Ensign or Banner of every Legion, it being the Arms of the Roman State, as it continues to be to the German Roman Emperours to this day. It was carried on the top of a long Pole or Spear, and was entrusted to the care and keeping of the first Centurion of the Legion, and that was he who commanded on the Right hand of the *Triarii*, but whether he carried it himself, or had only the inspection of it, and was to answer for the loss of it, I have read no Author who clears me, nor doth *Lisius* offer me any help. And therefore I shall be of the opinion, that the Centurion who had the Command of the Legion next to the Tribunes, ought not to have been hinder'd in the exercise of his function, especially when he was both to fight himself, and teach others how to fight, with so great a burthen, as was the Eagle, with its long Pole; and till I get better information, I shall think that he had some other strong lusty fellow to bear it, for the defence whereof, many Centurions at several occasions, lost their lives. I told you before, that in ancient times the whole Battalion of the *Triarii* was called *Pilus*, and themselves *Pilarii*, hence it is, that the first Centurion of that Class (to whom the Eagle was recommended) was called *Primipilus*, and was the first of the whole Legion, to which degree of honour (as being then capable to be a Tribune) he ascended by many steps, as having been a Centurion of, and in all the other two Classes before: He had some privileges, more than other Centurions had; one whereof was, that he might sit in Council with the Consul, Legates, and Tribunes. He who carried the Eagle was called *Aquilifer*, or Eagle-bearer; who still, I think, could not be the *Primipilus*, of whom *Vegetius* in the eighth Chapter of his second Book, says only *Aquila præerat*, He had the care of the Eagle.

Primipilus, and his privileges.

Ensigns.

The other Ensigns or Banners, of which I said every Centuriate had one, and consequently every Manipule two, were called *Signa*, Signs or Ensigns; for anciently *Vexillum* belong'd properly to the Horse, and was that which we now call a Standard, though some Authors in later times have confounded *Vexillum* and *Signum*, and make them both signify one thing. In these Ensigns of old, were drawn the Pictures of their Heathenish Gods, as likewise of some Beasts and Birds, as of a Lion, a Tyger, or a Dragon, to stir them up to courage, fury, revenge, and bloodshed; particularly, the Wolf was not forgot in their Colours, to denote, I think, that the founder of their City was nurs'd by one of them. After the State was changed into a Monarchy, ordinarily they had in their Banners, the Pictures and Images of their Emperours: And *Vegetius* speaking of them in the seventh Chapter of his second Book, calls them that carry'd them, *Imaginiferi*, qui *Imagines Imperatorum portare solebant*: Image-bearers, who used to carry the Images of the Emperours. The Images of those proud and ambitious Princes had a reverend kind of Worship paid to them. So we read in *Cornelius Tacitus*, that *Tiberius*, a Parthian Prince, when he had left his own, and came to *Corbulo's* Army, ador'd *Nero's* Image. There was a great Banner, not heard of in ancient times, that they called *Labarum*, which was never carried into the Field, but when the Emperour was personally with the Army; this resembled our Royal Standard.

Images.

Labarum the Imperial Standard.

Antesignani.

And Postsignani.

Subsignani.

Why so called.

But here is a question. Since all the Centuries in all the three Classes had Colours, why the *Hastati* in several Histories are called *Antesignani*, as those who march'd before the Colours; and the *Principes*, *Subsignani*, as those which march'd under the Colours; and the *Triarii*, *Postsignani*, as those who march'd after the Colours: which seems to import that none of them had Ensigns but the *Principes*? To which is answer'd: The Colours of the *Hastati* and *Principes* being before the *Triarii*, and their own Colours in the first Ranks; the *Triarii* were properly enough called *Postsignani*. The *Principes* were *Subsignani*, because with them, say some, were the principal Colours, and by this same Reason they will have the *Hastati* to be *Antesignani*, because (though they had Ensigns of their own) yet they march'd before the Principal Colours. Indeed we must be satisfied with this Reason, for lack of a better, and truly it is better than that of some, who say, the *Hastati* were call'd *Antesignani*, because in time of fight, they sent back their Ensigns to the *Principes*. This cannot hold, if it be true what we read very often in History, that in time of

of Battel or Assault, the Ensigns, sometimes the Eagle it self, was cast into the Battalion or Camp of the Enemy, to animate the Souldiers to advance and charge with greater courage and fury to recover their Banners. This differ'd far from sending them back to the next Class of heavy armed.

*Vegetius* speaks of a *Præfatus Legionis*, the Colonel, Brigadeer, or Major General of the whole Legion, who had the command over the Tribunes; but though it be undeniable, that such an Officer should have been, yet since neither *Polybius*, or any Ancient History mentions him, we must conclude, he hath come in request long after the Emperours had possess'd themselves of the Sovereignty of Rome. If any think, the Legates were these *Præfati*, I will tell them it was not so from the beginning, as I shall shew in my Discourse of a Consular Army.

A Commander of the whole Legion.

Upon the whole matter, I cannot find that in the Ancient Roman Militia, there were any other Officers in a Legion, but the Tribunes and Centurions; I still except the Decurions of Horse, whereof I shall speak in the next Chapter. All others were but Temporary Deputies, without Office or Pay, or else privileged Souldiers, made free from some duties, or benefited with some Donatives, for some particular pieces of good service performed by them, which did not at all make them Officers; and to aver, they were Officers without Pay, is something ridiculous. Now that none had Pay as Officers, but only Tribunes and Centurions (I speak still of the Foot) and that all others had Pay and Donatives only as Common Souldiers, shall be, I hope, clear'd by me, in my Discourse of the Roman Pay. That which, indeed, humbles me most is, that the Ensign-bearers were not reckon'd to be Officers, and I conceive this hath been a neglect in both *Vegetius* and *Polybius*, that they have not given us right information of that matter. For I cannot but suppose, the Romans did assuredly give to their Ensigns some more than ordinary allowance for carrying the Colours; especially, since the third part of the Souldiers Pay and Booty, and of their Largeesses and Donatives too, was deposited in the Ensigns hands, or at the Colours, till the time of the Souldiers Dismission; of which hereafter.

No Foot Officers but Tribunes and Centurions.

Yet on the other hand, to my best understanding, *Cæsar* doth not acknowledge any Foot Officer or Commander in a Legion, or in the Army, but Tribunes and Centurions. Hear himself in two several places: The first is, in his first Book of the Civil War, where he says, The Chieftain swore first, after him the Tribunes, after them the Centurions; and then, faith he, the Souldiers by Centuries. Not one word here of Sub-Centurions, Options, Ensign-bearers, Tesseraries, Messengers, Clerks, and the rest of that crew, who indeed were all of them but Souldiers in these Centuries. The second place is in his third Book of the Civil War, there he tells us, how an Oath was sworn not to desert *Pompey* (very ill kept) first, says he, *Labienus*, as Chief, swore, then the Legates, (whereof *Labienus* himself was one), then the Tribunes, next then the Centurions, and then the whole Army.

## CHAP. VII.

## Of the Roman Cavalry, and all its Officers.

The sum of what *Polybius* saith of the Horse.

WE have but a slender account given us of the *Roman Horse* by *Vegetius*. All he saith on that Subject amounts to this: In the fourteenth Chapter of his Second Book, he says, As a Band of Foot is called a Century or a Maniple, so a Company of Horse is called a *Turma*, that is, a Troop: That every one of these Troops consisted of thirty two Riders, whereof the Commander was called a Decurion, and he describes him to have been a person not only well Arm'd and Hors'd, and active and expert in all feats of Horsemanship, but able to teach his Troopers to be so likewise, and to keep their Arms bright and clean, and their Horses in good case. In the twenty third Chapter of his third Book, he informs us, that the Cataphract Horse-men, or Cuirassiers, arm'd at all pieces, are free from Wounds (how could this be, when their Faces were not covered?) but were not able, saith he, to do great matters, because of the heaviness of their Armour, yet good at close fight, either before the Foot, or mixed with them, to beat a Battalion of an Enemy. This is all. So we remain ignorant (till he come to marshal his Legion) of the strength of the Cavalry, and even then, for him, we know not how the Horse-men were levied or elected, how they were paid, how they watched, or what other duties they were bound to do, how deep they were marshall'd; when and where they marched, or fought, what distances were between their Ranks and Files; and what intervals between their *Turmes*, or Troops. Let us see how *Polybius* will help us in all, or in any of these.

Omissions of *Vegetius*.

Election of the Horse-men.

In his sixth Book he says, In old times two hundred Horse were assign'd for every Legion, and these were elected, after the Foot were levied; but in his own time, and long before it, three hundred Horse were appointed for every Legion, and were elected before the Foot; and elected they were not by the Consuls or Tribunes, as the Foot were, but by the Censor. This is all *Polybius* saith of their election. Out of History we find that the *Roman* Horse-men were all of the *Equestrial* Dignity, that is, Gentlemen; yet in ancient times they serv'd on Horses bought at the public charges, and when any of them committed gross faults, their Horses were taken from them, which was justly accounted an ignominy. Thereafter when they came to serve on their own Horses, (yet on the public wages) there was a lustration, or muster of them; when the Censors pleas'd, but ordinarily it was once in five years, of all those of that Rank, who were able, both for their Persons and their Purse, to serve on Horse-back, and then they rode in State on the best Horses, and in the best equipage they were able to procure, and past by the place where the Censors sat as Judges. All those who could be accus'd of no Misdemeanour, rode on without interruption, but such as the Censors could charge with enormous crimes, were stopp'd, and commanded to sell their Horses, which was no small disgrace to them. And this Muster, or Show, was called *Transvectio*.

*Transvectio*.

Of the Duties of their Horse-men, their Guards and Watches, and of their Pay, *Polybius* speaks not much, I shall say something of each of them in their proper places. He speaks a little of the Distance between Troops, of which I shall treat in my Discourse of Intervals.

First difference between *Polybius* and *Vegetius*.

The same *Polybius* avers, That the three hundred Horse, levied or elected for each Legion, were divided into ten Troops, every one whereof consisted of thirty Riders, which made up completely three hundred Horse. Here *Polybius* and *Vegetius* differ, the last allowing thirty two Horse-men to a Troop, and the first but thirty; for certainly in Companies of so small a number, two made

made a considerable difference. Out of these thirty Riders, says *Polybius*, three *Præfetti* were chosen, by whom he tells not, but lets us suppose by the Consul, or some of the Tribunes. He on the Right Hand had the command of the Troop: In his absence, he on the Left Hand had it; and he not being present, the third did officiate. These three chose three others, to be *Agrinii*, or *Turma Cohortes*, for so *Cassiodorus* renders it in *Latin*. The first Elected *Præfectus*, was called *Turma Duxor*, the Leader of the Troop; the other two were called *Decuriones*, and I suppose one of them carried the *Vexillum* or Banner, though *Polybius* tells us nothing of it: And yet it should not have been omitted, since every Troop had a Standard. Now by this reckoning of *Polybius*, so weak a Troop was but a Caporalship, and he who commanded it but a Caporal: The two other *Decurions* but Leaders of Files, and the three *Agrinii Cohortes* but Bringers up. For we do not find that any one of them was supernumerary, but the contrary, that all of them were members of the Troop, and elected out of the number of the thirty; so that without chose six, *Polybius* his *Turma* were but twenty four strong: Nor shall you find that any greater Pay was allowed to any of these six, than to the other four and twenty. And this difference is also to be observed between *Polybius* and *Vegetius*, that the first speaks of three *Decurions*, and as many Sub-*Decurions*, the last only of one *Decurion*. Nor indeed do I find at all any warrant in History, for *Vegetius* his thirty two Riders, since all agree, that for most part three hundred Horse were levied with each Legion, and these three hundred divided into ten *Turmas*, which made thirty for each Troop. But we shall examine how he disposeth of these two supernumerary Riders, when we come to speak of his Legion.

Second difference.

How deep, or how many in File these Troops were, none of our Taciticks directly write; no more than they do of the depth or the height of the Foot. An inexcusable oversight: For without the knowledge of that, we can neither know nor guess what ground a Maniple, Cohort, Troop, or Legion, could or might take up. *Vegetius* gives us some ground to conjecture, that in his opinion the Foot were eleven in File: For in the last Chapter of his second Book, (as I observed before) he saith, for every Carroballist, Mules were appointed to draw it, and to manage and have a care of it, a *Contubernium* of Soldiers, that is, saith he, eleven men. This will not positively make eleven in File, yet it gives a strong presumption, that *Vegetius* thought so, which if he did, and that it was so indeed, all Masters of the Military Art have taken up their measures wrong, in appointing Foot Files to be of even and equal numbers, as five, twelve, ten, eight, and six. As to the *Roman* Horse, some may have mistaken *Polybius*, who think he insinuates, they were marshall'd eight in File: For who will consider right what he writes, will find that in that place he spoke not at all of the *Roman* Cavalry. The passage is in the twelfth Book of his History; where he puts himself to much trouble, to demonstrate the vanity and absurdity of *Calisthenes*, his Relation of that great Battel fought in *Cilicia*, between *Darius* and *Alexander*, where that Historian saith, that the *Persian* King marched with thirty thousand Horse in Battel, and called up his mercenaries to him, who were as many: All this in a ground not above fourteen *Stadia* or Furlongs in Latitude, which makes but one *Italian* mile and three quarters: As also that *Alexander* marched in Battel with his whole Foot forty *Stadia*, five *Italian* miles, in an uneven, woody, and broken ground. The impossibility of both which, *Polybius*, as an experienced Captain, undertakes to demonstrate. And this he could not do, unless he had first considered how deep the Horse were marshall'd; otherwise he could not know of what Longitude the front of thirty thousand Horsemen would be, whether they would require more ground than the fourteen Furlongs allowed by *Calisthenes*, as no doubt they did. And therefore he agrees on eight deep; his words are these: In just Battels, saith he, the Horse Battalion is so ordered for most part, that its deepness consisted of eight Riders. Now first he saith, for most part, *Ut plurimum*, not always; for indeed I doubt not but he knew well enough, it was not always so. Secondly, he speaks there of *Persian* and *Græcian* Armies, and what he says of the deepness of their Horse Squadrons, cannot be appropriated to the *Roman* Cavalry. But he concludes at eight deep, eight hundred Horse would take up in front one hundred and twenty five Paces, which is one Furlong; and consequently

Deepness of the *Roman* Horse not told us.

*Polybius* against *Calisthenes*.

*Persian* Horse eight deep.



quently eight thousand Horſe needed to have for their Front twelve hundred and fifty paces, that is ten Furlongs: And therefore *Darius* his thirty thouſand Horſe being eight deep, would in Front have poſſeſſ'd of ground four thouſand ſix hundred eighty ſix paces, more than thirty ſeven *Stadia* or Furlongs, and theſe will make more than four *Italian* miles and a half; and as much ground *Calisthenes* muſt have allowed to his Mercenaries. Obſerve here, that *Polybius* allows for one hundred Horſe in Front one hundred twenty five paces, which is more than ſix foot for a Horſe-man to ſtand on, and for diſtance between him and his ſide-man.

We know not  
how deep the  
Roman Horſe  
were.

But if *Polybius* his meaning be, that the *Roman* Horſe were marſhall'd eight deep, then *Vegetius* his thirty two Riders will do better than *Polybius* his thirty in a Troop, becauſe thirty two will make four Files compleatly, whereas thirty makes but three Files of eight, and a broken one of ſix. In ſuch a miſt do theſe two great Maſters of the *Roman* Art of War leave us, out of which neither accurate *Lippius*, or any other of my reading hath offer'd to guide us. I conceive, according to thirty in a Troop, ten deep might have done well, and who can tell but *Polybius* meant ſo, when he appoints three Decurions to be File-leaders, and three *Agrinios* or *Turma Coſtores*, to be Bringers up. But that was indeed too many, it making the Longitude or Front ſo ſmall, as render'd it very eaſie to be environ'd or ſurrounded.

Unbridled &  
Unſaddled  
Horſes.

In theſe very ancient times, many Nations fought on Horſes, neither Bridled nor Saddled, and ſome had Saddles, but no Bridles; hence we read, that the *Africans*, eſpecially the *Numidians*, divided their Cavalry in *Franctos*, & *Infractos equos*, into Bridled, and Unbridled Horſes: And it is a wonder, to read in *Livy* with what dexterity and agility theſe unbridled Horſes were ruſ'd and manag'd by the Hand, the Foot, or Rod of a Rider. Some again had Bridles for their Horſes, but no Saddles; ſo had the *Germans*, who laugh'd at the *Romans*, as ſoft and effeminate, for riding on Saddles; and yet theſe very Saddles which the *Romans* uſed, were nothing but a covering made of ſome piece of Cloath or Stuff, rich or mean, according to the quality of the Rider, or at beſt, of ſome bundle ty'd together for the eaſe of the Horſe-man, without either Iron or Timber in it, as our Saddles have; neither had any of them any Stirrups, to eaſe the Riders Legs, for theſe came fiſt in faſhion in *Nero's* time, if *Lippius* his obſervation holds. Any thing of that nature that was uſed before, was but a Ladder of Cords, Wood, or Iron, to help the Horſe-man to mount his Horſe, if he were aged, indiſpoſed, ſick or lame; and ſo ſoon as he was on Horſe-back the Ladder was remov'd; perhaps not unlike to thoſe Iron Ladders of two or three ſteps high, uſed over all the *Netherlands* for Paſſengers to get up to their Waggon. Hiſtory tells us, that *Maſiniſſa*, King of *Nubidia*, when he was fourſcore years old, or near that age, could mount his Horſe, without the help of any Stirrup or Ladder. And certainly, not only the *Romans*, but all other Nations were taught to get on Horſe-back without any of them, as now youths are taught in Academies, and did ride (inur'd to it by cuſtome) with as much eaſe without Stirrups, as we do now with them.

To charge  
with Unbridled  
Horſes.

The *Romans* ſometimes cauſ'd their Cavalry to unbridle their Horſes to make a furious charge, which often ſucceeded well. *Livy* in his eighth Book ſays, it was practis'd againſt the *Volſcians* with ſucceſs: And in his fortieth Book, he gives us the relation of a Battel the *Celſiberians* fought in Spain againſt the *Roman* Prætor *Fulvius*, wherein the *Romans* were very near worſted, the Enemy having caſt himſelf in a Wedge (at which manner of fight he was thought almoſt invincible) bore down all before him, till the Prætor told his Horſe-men, that charging deſperately on unbridled Horſes might recover the Victory; for, ſaid he, formerly ſuch a practice hath produced good effects. The Cavalry obey'd his order, and by a furious charge with Lances, routed the *Celſiberians*. Such a command in our time would be accounted both unpracticable and ridiculous; yet we may believe, that Horſes were ſo taught and manag'd then, that they would obey their Maſters without Bridles; and this we may ſuppoſe not to be impoſſible, the Rider making uſe of his hands; but truly, I think it ſomething ſtrange to read, that *Julius Cæſar* could ride great Horſes, without a Bridle at the full gallop, with his hands clapt together behind his back.

Julius Cæſar  
an expert  
Horſe-man.

Some-

Sometimes the *Roman* Generals, when they ſaw an Enemy prevailing, have brought their Cavalry, or a part of it, to the place of danger, and cauſ'd them to alight from their Horſes, and fight afoot with their Swords. This both reinforced the Battel, and mightily encourag'd the Foot, by ſeeing that thoſe who might have ſav'd themſelves by flight, reſolv'd to live and dye with them. Authors do not inform us how they diſpos'd of their Horſes when they came to the Foot Combate; but I ſhall imagine they did not let them go whether they pleas'd, but either appointed their ſervants (if they had any) or ſome of their own number to look after them; and I ſuppoſe alſo, they alighted before they came to the place where they were to fight, for ſhunning conſuſion, and putting their own Foot in diſorder. *Cæſar*, before he began his Battel with the *Swiſzers*, made all his Horſe-men diſmount, and appointed them their ſtations, where they were to fight afoot; and to ſhew them a good example, he alighted fiſt himſelf, and ſent away all the Horſes a good way from his Army, thereby to encourage his Legionary Foot, and make his Horſe-men know that their ſafety depended only on their own valour. But I believe he gave order that the Horſes ſhould be brought back ſo ſoon as the Enemy was perceiv'd to fly; for we find he and his Cavalry were ſoon reſumpunt, and follow'd the chace very far: And I know no reaſon why it may not be believ'd alſo, that he kept ſome on Horſe-back by him, to carry all the Directions he gave, to the ſeveral Bodies of his Army in time of the Battel, which himſelf fighting on foot, could not perform. *Græculus* (betrayed by his Hoſt) being environ'd by an ambuſh of *Hannibalsians*, alighted, and fought well for his life, though he loſt it: But I think, he ſhould rather have hazarded to break through on Horſe-back to get to his own party, which was not far off, ſince death would ſtill have been the worſt of it. This ſtory you may read in *Livy's* twenty fifth Book. Though this practice ſucceeded well ſometimes, yet was it unfortunately attempted by the Conſul *Æmilius*, at the Battel of *Canna*; for after *Aſdrubal* had routed him and his Horſe on the Right Wing, he made his Horſe-men alight, and fight on foot among the Legionaries, as *Livy* tells us in that twenty fifth Book. And it would ſeem that *Hannibal*, that great Captain, did not approve this cuſtome; for the ſame Author ſays, when it was told him what the *Roman* Conſul had done, he ſhould have ſmil'd, and ſaid, He might as well have deliver'd them to me bound hand and foot.

Horſe-men  
fight on Foot.

I know not, if in our Modern Militia, this could be advantageouſly practis'd, being the Arms of our Horſe and Foot differ very much, whereas thoſe of the *Romans* were almoſt all one. I have indeed ſeen at the aſſaults of Towns, Horſe-men commanded to alight, and ſtorm with the Foot: And this hath reaſon for it, in regard that with their Piſtols, Carabines, and Swords, they were as able for that ſervice as the Infantry. Yet *Machiavelli* (who will needs reform the Modern Militia, and caſt it in his own Mould) gives us an inſtance that it was practis'd in the Field, a very little before his own time, and long after that Gun-powder had mightily alter'd the face of War. In the ſecond Book of his Art of War, The Count of *Carmignola*, General for the Duke of *Millan*, had ſix thouſand Men of Arms, and but a few Foot; with theſe he fought a Battel againſt the *Swiſzers*, arm'd with long and ſtrong Pikes, and is by them worſted, and forced to quit the Field. The Earl finding what advantage a Pike had againſt Horſe, preſented them once more Battel, but coming near, he order'd his Cuiraffiers to alight (in imitation belike of *Julius Cæſar*, fighting againſt the ſame Nation) and fighting on foot, then, ſaith he, the *Swiſzers* Pikes not being able to pierce the Corſlets of the men of Arms, they were totally routed by *Carmignola*. Was it not well, that the ſtrong Pikes of the *Swiſzers*, puſh'd by their robuſt Arms and Bodies, did not overthrow the Earls Cuiraffiers, though the points of them could not pierce their Armour.

Machiavelli

*Philip de Comines* tells us, that at the conſus'd Battel of *Montleberry*, between *Lewis* the Eleventh, King of France, and *Charles* the Warlike, Duke of *Burgundy*: The ſaid *Charles* commanded many of his Gentlemen, who were Men at Arms, to alight from their Horſes, and joyn in fight with his Archers of Foot. Which action (ſays the Author) was honourable, and encourag'd others; and this

cuſtome

customs (says the same Philip) the *Burgundians* had learn'd from the *English*, when both of them, being Confederates, waged War together against *France* for the space of thirty two years, without any truce.

The custom, which the *Romans* had to mix Foot with Horse, begun at the Siege of *Capua*, was so frequent afterward, that I need not give many instances of it. *Cæsar* seldom fail'd to do it. When *Percingetorix* had rais'd all *Gaul* about his ears, he sent for *German* Horse and Foot, who were accustom'd to fight one in company of the other, as he tells us in the seventh Book of his *Gallick* War. In *Thessaly*, finding himself far inferior in Horse to *Pompey*, he constantly mixed some of his *Antigonians* (who were Legionaries, and heavy armed, and of the youngest sort, and so more able to march and run) with his Horse; who became so expert in that manner of fight, that, as himself witnesseth in his third Book of the Civil War, two hundred of his Horse join'd with the like number of these Foot, were not afraid to buckle with thousands of his Enemies Cavalry. And it was with that manner of fight, that he made that honourable retreat of his from *Dirrachium*, in spite of *Pompey's* whole Army that pursu'd him. And it was with the assistance of six Cohorts of his *Triarian* Foot, that his Horse beat his Competitors Cavalry at *Pharsalia*, and got him the Victory, as himself both confess'd and foretold. At *Uxata* in *Africa*, when he offer'd to fight against *Scipio*, *Pompey's* Father-in-law, he drew up all his Cavalry on his Left Wing, and with them mixed all his light armed Foot, who, it seems, were Auxiliaries. The *German* Horse-men used every one of them to chuse a Foot-man, whom they knew to be stout, strong, and swift: These Foot-men either skirmish'd before the Horse, as the *Romans* did at *Capua*; or fought in company with them; or stood at a distance behind them, that the Horse might retire to them; and if both were forc'd to quit the Field, then the Foot-men laid hold on the Manes of the Horse, and with that help run as fast as the Horse gallop'd, till both came to their main Body; of all which *Cæsar* informs us in the first Book of the *Gallick* War. And this manner of fight was practis'd by *Arivivsus*, King of *Germany*, and by *Percingetorix*.

We find in History, that when the *Romans* were to give Battel, assist'd by their Allies, for most part their Cavalry was marshall'd on the Right Wing of their Army, and the Allies on the Left: So at *Canna*, *Paulus Æmilius* stood on the Right Wing with the *Roman* Horse, and the Consul *Varro* on the Left, with the Horse of the Allies. Once *Scipio* at *Zama* gave the Right Wing to *Massinissa*, King of the *Numidians*, and appointed *Lælius* to command the Left Wing, compos'd of *Roman* Horse. But when they fought without Allies, then their Horse were drawn up on both Wings; and sometimes, as I have said, interlin'd with Foot; but scarce, or rather never, did I read in any ancient History, that they were marshall'd by Troops among the Legionary Foot, whereof I shall tell you more hereafter, when I come to speak of *Vegetius* his Legion. And how the same *Vegetius* contradicts *Polybius* in the matter of the *Roman* Horse-mens Guards, shall be spoke of in my Discourse of Guards, and Rounds.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. VIII.

## Of their Trumpeters, Horn-winders, and of the Clallcum.

Since we have now spoke of both Foot and Horse, it is fit we know to what Martial Instrument or Sound both should hearken. I find *Tubicines*, these were Trumpeters; *Cornicines*, these were Horn-winders; and *Buccinatores*, who, I think, used the Horns of Cows and Oxen; and the *Clallcum*. All these were common to both Horse and Foot, neither had the one any title to pretend to either of these, more than the other had; nor were any of them peculiar to the one more than to the other, though now the Horse Troops appropriate the Trumpet to themselves, as the Foot do the Drum.

The Trumpet is an ancient Instrument of War; at first, and I believe, for many ages, made of Brass; hence the Poet, *Adre clere Viras*, though the luxury of after-ages made their composition of Silver. We find they were common to almost all Nations not long after the deluge, and frequently used by a very ancient people; and which is more, by a people chosen and beloved of him, who promulgated his Law to them by found of Trumpet, as well as by the dreadful noise of his *Abborral* Cannon. But as it was used in the Temple to found the praises of the Highest, by the Priests, who all, or most of them, had the skill of a Trumpet: So was it used in the time of War with their malignant neighbours; but which was worse, too much made use of by them for Sedition and Rebellion. To your Times, *O Israel*: Words, which with the preceding ones, have sounded loud enough in our own ears, and in our own days.

The *Grecians* learned the use of the Trumpet from the *Tivians*, and these having their name and original from the *Tivians*, had their Trumpets also from them. The *Tivians* being near neighbours to the *Tews*, learned many things of them, and probably the Trumpet likewise. The *Greeks* had the use of the Trumpet in *Æneas's* time, for he speaks of it in his Poems: Yet it seems they knew nothing of it at the Siege of *Troy*, else that Great Poet would have made mention of it in his Verses. This famous War of *Troy* fell out to be in the days of *Jephie*, Judge of *Israel*; and who knows but the fable of *Agamemnon's* unwilling attempt to sacrifice his Daughter *Iphigenia* to *Diana*, in whose room came a Hart to be a voluntary offering, was borrowed by Antiquity from the true Story of *Jephie's* vowing to sacrifice the first thing met him without the doors of his house; which chanc'd to be his only Daughter. But be that as it will, certain enough it is, that the *Israelites* made use of Trumpets three hundred years before either *Jephie* fought with the *Ammonites*, or the *Grecians* besieg'd *Troy*.

The use of the Trumpet is still retain'd, and in probability will, till the last Trumpet summon proud man to arise from the dust, and give an account to his great Creator, why he made so much use of that Martial Instrument for the destruction of his fellow Creatures. *Vegetius* says in the twenty second Chapter of his second Book, that the Trumpet was founded by the *Romans*, when they went out to War, and when they were commanded to retire; as also when the Souldiers were called out to any work or labour imposed upon them, whether it were to fortifie themselves by Ditch or Rampart, or to make their marches either Ambulatory or Curfury. Briefly, The Trumpet required the Souldiers to move, but not the Ensigns, Standards, or Baggage.

The *Cornicines*, or Horn-winders, were those who sounded on Instruments Horn-wind-made in the fashion of Horns, and, I doubt not, but in the Infancy of that Empire, they were no other but real Horns, such, perhaps, nay, without all peradventure, such as Swine-herds sound to gather together their herds. Yet these

Horse and Foot mix'd together

practis'd by *Cæsar*,

And by the ancient *German*.

*Roman* Cavalry how marshall'd.



these Horns, we must confess, gather'd these men together, who overcame Armies, subdued Nations, subverted Kingdoms, and destroyed Cities; but the honour over all Horns was given to that of the Ram, by the miraculous sound whereof the Walls of *Treviso* were laid equal with the ground. At the found of these Horn-winders the Ensigns, Colours, and Standards moved. But in time of Battel both Trumpeters and Horn-winders sounded: *Pariter canunt*, says *Vegetius* in that same place; he might have said the *Buccinatores* too, if he had pleas'd. But what difference was between the *Cornicines* and these *Buccinatores* I know not, for both sounded on Instruments of loud Wind-Musick, bowed like Horns, unless that all the *Roman* guards were set by the sound of Trumpet, and were relieved by the found of the Horn Instrument. His words are, *A Tubicine omnes Vigilia committuntur, & suis horis à Cornicine revocantur*. Now what is this, but that both the Trumpet sounded, and the Horn blew at the relief of the Guards? The Trumpet, when four Souldiers went to the Post where they were to keep Sentinel a whole Watch, (that was three hours,) and the Horn when those that were reliev'd came from their Post.

Buccinatores.

Classicum,  
what it was.Vegetius his  
description  
of it.Lipsius his  
conjecture of  
it.

I should in the next place tell you what the *Classicum* was; and should be glad if any Body would tell me what it was. I know *Classicum* commonly is taken for a Trumpet sounding a charge, *Classicum canere*; and this hath its rise from the custom the *Roman* Consuls had; when they were to begin the Battel they caus'd the *Classicum* to found, which immediately was followed by all the Trumpets and Horn Instruments of the Army. But for all this, I doubt still whether the *Classicum* was an Instrument, or the found of an Instrument, and to speak according to our words of Art, a Point of War; or if it was the noise of many Warlike Instruments all founding one thing at one time: Let us hear *Vegetius*, and I am afraid he will make the matter more obscure. He describes it thus: *Classicum appellatur, quod Buccinatores per cornu dicunt, hoc insigne videtur Imperiis, quia Classicum canitur Imperatore praesente, aut cum in Militum capitaliter animadvertitur*. That, saith he, is called the *Classicum*, which the Horn-winders speak by the Horn. And this, says he, seems to be an Ensign of Sovereign command, because the *Classicum* sounds when the Commander in chief is present, or when a Souldier is to be capitally punished. What shall we make of all this? If we understand not now what the *Classicum* is, *Vegetius* will say he is not to be blam'd; but for all that, I am, for him, still in the dark. That which the Horn-winders speak by a Horn, is to me very dark language; and yet that language of a Horn must be an Ensign of Imperial power; and withal, if a Souldier be to be hang'd, he must have the honour of that Ensign of Imperial power. *Lipsius*, who seldom fails to guess, and sometimes hits right, thinks the *Classicum* was not one Instrument, or yet the found of one Instrument, but the noise of many, whether these were Trumpets or Horns, or both, which was one of the badges of Supreme Power; for where there was but one Consul, there was but one of them; and where two Consuls were together, there were two of them; and besides other duties, they founded when the Consuls were at Supper: for this reason the famous *Carthaginian Afrubalus*, when he began to suspect that he had to do with two *Roman* Consuls, bid his Guards, Foragers and Waterers of Horses, take heed, and acquaint him, if they heard two *Classicums*; and having learn'd it was so, he concluded, that the Consul (who he thought was diverted by his Brother *Hannibal*) was joyn'd with the other, with whom alone he conceiv'd his work to be. For my part, I incline to believe, that in History it is promiscuously taken for the found, and sometimes for the Instrument, one or many, either Trumpets or Horns. They were made use of in all Banks and Proclamations. The *Classicum* was an Ensign of Supreme Command, for by it all the emergent and occasional orders of the General were promulgated; and by it both Officers and Souldiers were call'd together to hear the Commander in chief's pleasure made known to them: And hence it is, like, it had its derivation, because by it the three Challes of *Hastati*, *Principes* and *Triarii*, were call'd together to hear these Harangues and Orations, which frequently the Consuls uttered in their

Whence it  
had its name.

their Tribunals or Pulpits; whether they were for admonition, encouragement, or punishment; and upon the account of this last, *Vegetius* is to be understood of his capital animadversion.

Left I forget to do it hereafter, I shall in this place take occasion to tell you, that besides this *Classicum*, there were two other badges of Imperial power, these were the *Prætorium*, and the Bundles of Rods and Axes. The *Prætorium* was a fair, and a large high Pavilion, wherein the Consul lodged, and kept his Councils of War. The Rods and Axes signified he had power to scourge and behead; these were carried by Lictors or Sergeants, whereof a Consul had twelve, a Proconsul six, a Legate as many, a Prætor had I know not how many, for it makes but little to our purpose. When *Scipio*, Pompey's Father-in-law, came with his Legions out of *Asia*, and joyn'd with him in *Thessaly*, Pompey order'd a *Prætorium* to be erected for him, and that he should have a *Classicum*; I suppose, a knitchel of Rod and Axes too; though *Caesar* doth not mention the last in his Commentary.

Badges of so-  
vereign power.

As the Trumpet was of Brass, so in process of time the *Cornu* and *Buccina* were made of Brass too, and all the three who founded, or winded them, were called *Antatores*. Every Troop of Horse, and every Maniple, if not every Century of Foot had one, either a Trumpet, or a Horn, or both. I find not that these Trumpeters and Horn-blowers had any greater allowance of Wages, Proviant, or Fodder, for either themselves or Horses, than other Horse-men and Foot-men had (for with the first they rode on Horse-back, and with the second they marched on Foot) at any time; perhaps having spent much of their breath in founding and blowing, they were eased from other works of toil and labour, and those were not a few. Whether the *Buccina* was founded, or rather winded, at the relief of every guard, as *Polybius* says it was, shall be spoke of in my Discourse of Guards and Rounds.

Antatores?

## CHAP. IX.

## Of the Roman Pay, Proviant, and Donatives.

IT is reported of that brave *Athenian Themistocles*, that he affirm'd, whoever would shape or form the great Monster of War rightly, must begin with his Belly; and therefore before we joyn our Horse and Foot together, we must see how they shall be maintain'd. The *Romans* were a frugal people, till their successful Wars made their City the Treasure-house of the Worlds riches. The Pay they allow'd their Souldiers was sparing enough, but *Vegetius* tells us not what it was. I find that three hundred years after the foundation of *Rome*, the Horse-men serv'd on their own charges; they might do it the better, for though their achievements were often honourable enough, yet their expeditions were but short, for either upon a Victory or a Rout, they hasten'd back to the City. But after the Senate began to look far beyond their ancient limits, wages were allow'd out of the publick Treasury for both Horse and Foot. *Polybius* in his sixth Book informs us, that a Foot Souldier had the allowance of two *Oboli* a day, both which (if I mistake not) make but one *English Penny*; and a small measure of Wheat: A Centurion had a double allowance, and a Horse-man, the triple of a Foot Souldiers Proviant and Wages, and a measure of Barley every month for his Horse. They allow'd to the *Socii*, or Allies, as much Wheat and Barley as they did to their own Souldiers, but they were oblig'd to maintain themselves with their own

Roman Wages  
and Proviant.

M

Monies.

Monies. But he tells us also, that what Proviant, Clothes, yea, what Arms were given to the *Roman* Souldiers, had rates set upon them, and were defalcated from their wages. Truly, I should think their pay, at two half-pennies a day, could hardly furnish them with Meat, much less Clothes and Arms; or if in that cheap world they could be furnish'd with all three at that rate, they could not have much Money to seek, at least very little to depose at their Colours; for this defalcation would indeed make their Pay very inconsiderable, and very unproportionable to the great duty and services exacted from them. But *Lippus* will mend the matter presently, by telling us, that many times the State quit the Souldiers freely what they owed for either Arms, Proviant, or Clothes; or if any thing was taken, it was so insignificant, that the Souldier parted with it pleasantly, and without grumbling. I do not care much to be of *Lippus*'s opinion, though he hath not told us who were his Informers; for *Polybius* is positively of another judgement, in that place which I have cited: Nor do I remember, that in any other place of his History, he speaks any thing of the *Roman* Wages.

Here you may observe, what I told you before, that in the *Roman* Infantry there were no other Officers, properly so called, but Centurions and Tribunes, because all others had but the allowance of common Souldiers, both in Wages and Proviant. A Tribune had the quadruple of a Souldiers Pay. Nor can I find that the *Præfidi*, or Decurions of the Horse, had any more allowance of either Meat or Money than other Troopers had. The *Grecian* Pay, as to the proportion of it, was like the *Roman*, a Centurion having a Souldiers double allowance, a Horse-man triple, and a Chiliarch quadruple.

But the *Roman* Souldiers had a greater encouragement to endure their hard fatigue than Pay, and that was the Plunder and Pillage of a Countrey, a besieged Town, Castle, or an Enemies Camp. This was not due to them, and many times they got no share of it, in regard, for most part, it was brought all to the *Quæstor*, or Treasurers quarters, and fold, and out of the Monies made by that sale, the Army was paid their wages, and the overplus was sent in to the Treasury of *Rome*. But the Consul, or General, having the disposing of it all in his power, very often gave it as a largess to the Army, either for some good service done, or to encourage them to undergo some difficult and hard piece of work to be done. Neither had any man liberty to take what he could catch, but all was brought to a publick heap, and sold by the Treasurer, and then proportionably divided among all, according to every mans quality; a Centurion receiving double that which a Souldier got, a Horse-man triple, and a Tribune quadruple: So that they who fought in the Field, and they who stay'd for the defence of the Camp, they who storm'd a Town, and they who stood in Reserve, shared all alike in the Booty.

The *Romans* gave all their Proviant to their Armies in Corn, and did not trouble themselves to make it either into Meal or Bread; and in their strict discipline, Bakers were all banish'd from their Camps, and the Souldiers order'd to grind their Corn themselves, (Hand-mills or Querns being allow'd them for that use) and thereafter to bake their own Bread. Many times they took not the pains to do either the one nor the other, but boil'd their Wheat with a little Salt, and so eat it up for Portage. They us'd to carry with them Lard or Bacon, or some other fat, wherewith they smear'd their Bread. A little Bottle with Vinegar they bore also about with them, with a very small quantity wherof they gave a relish to their Water, which was their ordinary drink, though Wine was not forbidden them; for *Mahomet* had then not intimated the World with his Doctrine, nor discharged the use of the juice of the Grape, which cherisheth the heart of God and Man. The *Roman* Souldiers then drank Wine, for it was allow'd them, when conveniently it could be got; though Drunkenness was a crime seldom heard of among them. There were also sometimes Oxen, Sheep, and Beesves divided among them, for preparing and making ready wherof, in the strictest time of their Discipline, the Souldiers were permitted to carry a Bras-Pot, a Spit, and a Drinking Cup; but I suppose, one of every kind of these utensils were not allowed to every one of the Souldiers, but to a *Centurion*, or

Their ordinary  
Meat,  
And Drink.

Centurion.

or Tent-full of them, whether that consisted of ten, eleven, or twelve. It was not permitted to them to dine or sup when they pleased; but it being known by the *Classion* when the Consul went to Table, the Tribunes went to theirs, and so both Centurions and common Souldiers went to dinner with found of Trumpet. May not a man say, that here was a great deal of more state, than good fare. Those Generals who exercis'd strict discipline, appointed their Souldiers to take their dinner standing; marry, they permitted them to sit at Supper; and I conceive, this was but a very sober courtesie, to suffer a man who was weary with toil the whole day, to sit down to his Supper at night.

Besides all this, the *Roman* Souldiery had reason to expect a Donative from their Victorious Generals, when they enter'd the Imperial City in Triumph. This custom was very commendable; for the Largess given to them, incited others to carry themselves gallantly against an Enemy, since they saw that in some measure, they would be sharers with the chief Commander, both in Honour and Profit. What was given at that time to the common Souldier, was a rule to the Officer, for a Centurion got double, a Horse-man triple, and a Tribune quadruple. *Scipio the African*, at his magnificent entry into *Rome*, gave four hundred Altes to every Souldier, some say but forty: if the first, it was noble enough, and no more neither; (for it would have amounted but to twenty five shillings Sterling) if the last, it was contemptible, for it signified but half a Crown. *Lucius Amilius*, who subverted the *Macedonian* Monarchy, gave at his Triumph to every Souldier one hundred Sesterces, (which might be about fifteen or sixteen shillings Sterling) and proportionably to the Centurions, Horse-men, and Tribunes. But besides the evil effects which many of the Consuls avarice produc'd, their ambition to bring in great sums of Gold and Silver to the Treasury, and their vanity to give their Armies Donatives at their Triumphs, set them on to the committing many Insolencies, perfidious, unjust and disavowable Plunders and Cruelties, which makes the names of some of the bravest of them infamous to posterity. Take one instance, *instar omnium*, of that same *Amilius* I just now spake of: The desire he had to bring the vast Treasure of King *Perseus*, and all he had scrap'd together in *Macedon*, into the *Roman* Treasury; and withal, to give a Donative to his Army at his Triumph, tempted him (and the temptation prevail'd with him) to plunder the whole Towns of *Epirus*; the people wherof were no Enemies, nor ever had wrong'd the *Roman* State: And this execrable act he did under trust, the Inhabitants imagining no such usage; nor was plundering all the mischief he did them, for he sold their persons, to the number of one hundred and fifty thousand of both Sexes for Slaves; and with the Money of that sale he gave the Donative we spake of, to his Army. An action so full of baseness, inhumanity, perfidy, and injustice, that Sir *Walter Raleigh* saith, If any History spoke but one word to the contrary, no man would believe it could be true: You may read the story of it in the last Book of *Titus Livius*.

The half of the Donatives were ordinarily deposited at the Standards and Ensigns, to be kept there for the use of the Souldiers till their dissolution, lest they should idly or vainly spend it: This reason was sufficient and strong enough; but there was another, and it was this, that the Souldiers knowing a part of their stock and substance to be beside the Colours, they should never desert them; but manfully fight for the defence of that, in the preservation wherof they were so deeply concern'd. Though this was certainly a very prudent order, yet I cannot consent to what *Vegetius* saith of it in the twentieth Chapter of his second Book, that it was *ab antiquis divinitus institutum*: For he should have remember'd, that he wrote of the Heathen *Romans*; and himself having the knowledge of the true God, he knew likewise, that the best of their Ordinances were but of Humans, and not Divine Institution.

In that same Chapter *Vegetius* says, that every Legion had ten bags, for the keeping this moiety of the Donatives; that is, a bag for every Cohort;

Donatives at  
Triumphs.

A detestable  
action.

Half of Dona-  
tives depo-  
sited.

hort; and an eleventh bag there was, in which every Souldier cast something once a month, and that was reserv'd for the Burial of those Souldiers, who were able to leave nothing for their Interment. A very laudable custom, for the Burial of the Dead was ever in all Nations in high request. Truce for some days or hours to Inter the slain, was seldom or never refus'd by the most imbitter'd Enemy. *Hannibal* bestow'd Burial on his Enemy *Marcellus*: And his Brother *Asdrubal*, at the desire of *Scipio*, buried those Roman Tribunes whom he had kill'd in Battel. And *Justin* in his sixth Book tells us, that when the *Grecians* desir'd liberty to bury their dead, it was a tacit acknowledgement that they were overcome. But *Vergilius* will have these Bages to be kept by the *Signiferi*, the Ensign-bearers, whom therefore he will have not only to be faithful and trusty men, but learned, that they might perfectly keep the accounts of all that was confign'd in their hands. And here indeed he is (as *Lipsius* in another place calls him) *solus & negligens*; having forgot that in the seventh Chapter of his second Book he told us, that the *Romans* had *Librarii*, Notaries or Scriveners, who kept the account of all that belong'd to the Souldiery; therefore not the *Signiferi*, or Ensigns, whose employment was to attend their Colours.

Burial of the Dead.

Roman Pay augmented.

*Julius Caesar*, after all his Victories, doubled the wages of the Roman Souldiers for ever: The succeeding Emperours, according as they stood in need of the help of the Sword-men, especially of the *Prætorian* Cohorts, augmented their Pay, and some of them for their bounty, were degraded and murder'd by those very same Souldiers.

## CHAP. X.

Of a Roman Legion, Marshall'd according to *Titus Livius*, with *Lipsius* his amendments.

THE word *Legio* hath its name *ab eligendo*, from electing: It was a great Body of men, divided not only into several small Bands, but into three distinct Classes, *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, embattel'd one behind another; as I have shown you in my discourse of the Roman Infantry. A Legion was not always of a like strength, for sometimes it consisted of three thousand, sometimes four thousand, or four thousand two hundred, sometimes five thousand, or five thousand two hundred; and twice I find it was of six thousand, or six thousand two hundred, once with *Scipio* in *Africa*, and the second time with *Emilius* in the *Macedonian* War.

Lipsius's vicious description of a Legion.

*Titus Livius*, that famous Historian, in his eighth Book giving a particular account of the great Battel fought between the *Romans*, and their old Allies the *Latines*, marshals the Roman Legion in such a confused way, that he is not at all intelligible; and hath given just reason to both Learned and Military men, to think that place is corrupt, and a sense made of it, never intended by the Author. To avoid prolixity, and that I be not at the trouble to give you *Livy's* words, first in *Latine* and then in *English*, I shall give you the story as it is translated by *Philemon Holland*, (except where he mistakes) and then shew the errors of that description of a Legion.

In former times, saith *Livy*, the Roman Battalions stood thick, and close together like the *Macedonian* Phalanx, but afterwards they were ranged into Bands more distinctly, and last of all they were divided into thinner Squadrons, each of them containing three-score Souldiers, two Centurions, and one Portenign.

enign. The Van-guard were *Hastati*, Javelineers, in fifteen Maniples distant a little way from one another; such a Squadron had twenty light armed, who carried a light Javeline, and some Darts to cast afar; all the rest were Targeteers. This first front contained the flower of the youth, who grew up as Apprentices in War-service. Then follow'd after them of men of stronger and riper years as many Maniples, and these were called *Principes*. These were follow'd (not hard at heels, as the Translator adds) by all the Targeteers in gallant Armour. That Battalion of thirty Maniples was called *Antipilem*, because the other fifteen Orders were placed under the Ensigns (not hard before them, as *Philemon* very viciously translates it) and of these, every Order consisted of three parts, and every one of them was called *Primum Pilum*: It consisted of three Ensigns, and every one of these had one hundred eighty six men. The first Colours had with it the *Triarii*, old Souldiers, and of approved valour: The second had the *Rerarii*, men of less experience, and younger years: The third was of the *Accensi*, of whom they had least confidence, and therefore cast them in the Rear. Thus far *Livius*, and Mr. *Holland*, who put him in *English*. And indeed we have enough, and too much of this stuff. Let us now observe the errors of this discourse.

First, It is questionable, if ever the *Romans* used the *Macedonian* Phalange, The errors of a Body compos'd purely of Pike-men; it is spoke of by none: and that this is a great Body in after times was cast in Maniples, to me is fabulous; for certainly Maniples were used by *Romulus*; and though this were true, we must not for all that grant, that every Maniple had but sixty men (that being only true of the *Triarii*) or if that were granted too, sure we will not acknowledge that every band of sixty (except still the *Triarii*) had two Centurions, and one Ensign. Secondly, That every Class of the *Hastati*, *Principes* and *Triarii*, had fifteen Maniples, is against all Antiquity, and the current of most, if not all Authors, who allow no more Maniples to a Legion but thirty, nor Centuriates but threescore, except *Vergilius*, who reduceth the number of the Centuriates to fifty five. Now *Livy's* description of a Legion makes it contain forty five Maniples, and ninety Centuriates, and all this is point blank against himself in other places. Thirdly, We are told, that each of the fifteen last Orders was divided into three parts, and every part was called *Primum Pilum*. Is there any thing more ridiculous, than to call that first, which was but second or third? And if these forty five parts (for so many, if multiplied by three, it extends to) be all first, which of the forty five shall be last? Fourthly, Every one of these parts had its Colours; and so in the third Class there were forty five Ensigns, and but fifteen in each of the other two, a thing nothing probable. Fifthly, Every one of these Ensigns had one hundred eighty six men. Assuredly this is so extravagant, that it cannot plead for any shew of truth, for multiply one hundred eighty six by forty five, the product will be eight thousand three hundred and seventy, and so strong by this account, must the *Triarii* have been joyn'd with the *Rerarii* and *Accensi*; a thing so notoriously and palpably false, that it deserves no refutation.

This passage of *Titus Livius* hath been, no doubt, observ'd by many of his Readers, long before *Justus Lipsius* was born; yet for anything I know, he is the first man that offer'd him help, and indeed he hath done gallantly, to vindicate so renowned an Author from these injuries the first Printers of his Decades have done him: For *Lipsius* saith, that assuredly this rhapsody of nonsense proceeded from the little understanding they had of the true Text. And *Strucius* on another subject says, that Printers in the printing old Manuscripts have committed such gross faults, that he knows not whether that admirable Art of Printing hath done more hurt or good to the Common-wealth of Learning, but to our purpose.

*Lipsius* helps the matter thus: Where we read, *Prima acies hastatarum Manipuli quindecim*; (We should read, *Manipulique decem*: And so there were always ten Maniples of *Hastati*, but not fifteen. For, *Triginta Manipulorum agmen* (which is meant of both *Hastati* and *Principes*) read *Viginti*, and so there were but twenty Maniples of both these Classes. And where the vulgar Decade bears, *Quia sub signis alii quindecim ordines locabantur*, we ought to read, *Alii decem ordine* (not *ordines*) *locabantur*. *Alii Decem*, of what? Of Maniples.

ples; and so being ten Maniples of the *Triarii*, as there were twenty of the other two Classes, we have no more but our just number of thirty Maniples in the whole Legion. Fourthly, Where you find it written, *Earum unanquamque (scilicet partem) primum pilum vocabant: Lipsius* desires you to read, *Earum unanquamque primam, primum pilum vocabant.* Lipsius tells us all this by piecemeal, as I have told it you; *Terducci* sums it up, together in *Latine*, and then translates it into his *Italian* language. I shall give it you in *English* thus: Every *Ordo* (that is Centuriate) had sixty two Soldiers, one Centurion, and one Colours: The first *Acies* or Battalion was of *Hastati*, in it were ten Maniples, distant a little one from another; these were the flower of the youth: As many Maniples of a more robust age follow'd, who were called *Principes*: Those who follow'd them were all Targeteers, in brave Armour. That Body of twenty Maniples was called *Ampilani*, because under the Ensigns other ten were placed in order, every first whereof was called *Primum Pilum*. Assuredly Lipsius hath very rationally corrected this corrupted place of *Livy*, and hath render'd it obvious to sense; whereas before it was totally unintelligible: And I wish that this place of Lipsius's amendment, were always inserted when *Livy* is Reprinted.

But not all.

And errs himself.

But I wish also, that Lipsius had mended another escape, which immediately follows; for in that same corrupted place of *Livius*, we read that every *ordo Triariorum tribus ex vexillis constabat*; that is, Every Maniple of them had three Ensigns; this impression Lipsius retains, and that brings him to the necessity (whereof I told you in my Discourse of the Infantry) to say, that Ensigns or Banners might be without Captains or Leaders; the matter stands thus: *Livius* in this Battel marshals the *Rorarii* behind the *Triarii*, and the *Accensi* behind them: Which at that time was politically done by the Consul *Manlius*; for having to do with the *Latines*, who were perfectly well acquainted with the manner of the *Roman* Embattelling, and who marshall'd their Army in that same fashion; he put those raw blades of the *Rorarii* and *Accensi* behind his experienced *Triarii*; and when the *Latines* prevail'd over the *Roman Hastati* and *Principes*, the Consul subtly caused the *Rorarii* and *Accensi* to arise, whom the *Latines* conceiving to be the *Roman Triarii*, caused their *Triarii* to come to the flock with these *Rorarii*, and after some fight put them to flight; then did *Manlius* advance with the true and fresh *Roman Triarii*, who easily overthrew the weary, and something disorder'd *Latines*, over whom he gain'd a glorious Victory. Now observe, that the *Rorarii* and *Accensi* were *Vexilli*, and so had neither Officer nor Colours; and that every Maniple of the *Triarii* had two Centurions, and two Ensigns; call them *Signa* or *Vexilla*, as you will: And therefore I admire, neither can I wonder enough, why Lipsius for *ex tribus Vexillis*, will not desire us to read *ex duobus Vexillis*; being every *Triarian* Maniple had two Ensigns, and the *Rorarii* and *Accensi* none. Surely he might have changed three into two, as easily as thirty Maniples into twenty, and fifteen into ten; and by the bargain have sav'd himself from a Paradox, of Colours without a Captain, and a Captain without Colours.

Lipsius mistaken.

Neither can I pass, how the same Lipsius in that same place, thinks that *Livy* should be mended, for saying that the *Roman* Legions in that same War with the *Latines* were five thousand strong; for Lipsius is of the opinion, it should be read four thousand; and all this, I think, to cast all *Roman* Legions in *Polybius* his Mould of four thousand, or of four thousand two hundred. The reason he gives for his judgement is, I think, exceedingly weak: Because, saith he, *Livy* in that same eighth Book of his History confesseth that ten years before that War, the Legion was no stronger but four thousand Foot. An ill consequence: For it might very well be true, that ten years before, the Legion was but four thousand, and yet it might have been thought very fitting to add one thousand to them in the time of that dangerous War with the *Latines*. The year before *Scipio* carried the War out of *Italy* over to *Africa*, the Legions were but five thousand apiece, yet he made some of them fix thousand. The year before *Lucius Aemilius* went to *Macedon*, the Legions were but five thousand, yet in that expedition of his, they were made up to six thousand. If one year brought forth such alterations, ten years might have produced greater.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XI.

Of a Legion, Marshall'd according to Vegetius.

I May with much reason, desire that from my Reader, which *Vegetius* desires from his; and that is, that what is writ by him on this subject, may be attentively read, and read over again; because, faith he, the description I am to give is difficult and obscure. Indeed, what others who have perused him have found, I know not; but I am sure I find his description of a Legion both difficult and obscure, as he hath made it. This he Prefaceth in the fourth Chapter of his second Book, and in the sixth Chapter of that same Book he gives us the ordering of a Legion, and the Marshalling it, in this manner:

You must know, faith he, that in every Legion there are ten Cohorts, but the first excels the rest both in number and dignity: It consists of the choice men, and with it is the Eagle, which is the prime Banner in every Legion. This Cohort hath in it one thousand one hundred and five Souldiers of Foot, and one hundred thirty two heavy armed Horse-men: It is called the Milliare or Millenary Cohort, and is the head of the Legion; for from it, when they are to fight, the rest of the first Battalion is marshall'd. The second Cohort consists of five hundred fifty five Foot, and sixty six Horse, and is called the Cohort of five hundred. The third Cohort hath the like number of Horse and Foot, but in it, faith he, there must be the ablest men, because it stands in the middle of the Battalion. The fourth Cohort hath five hundred fifty five foot and sixty six Horse. The fifth hath just as many, but it hath need, says he, to be composed of very stout Souldiers, because, as the first Cohort is to stand on the Right Wing of the Battalion, so the fifth is to stand on the Left hand. These five Cohorts make up the first *Acies*, or Battalion. Our Author proceeds, and tells us, The sixth Cohort consists of five hundred fifty five Foot, and sixty six Horse; in it must be those of the younger years (he means the *Hastati*) because the sixth Cohort hath its station behind the Eagle, and the Ensigns. The seventh Cohort hath in it five hundred fifty five Foot, and sixty six Horse. The eighth hath as many, but they must be courageous men, because they keep the middle of the second Battalion. The ninth consists of five hundred fifty five Foot, and sixty Horse: And so doth the tenth, but the Souldiers must be good Warriors, because they stand on the Left hand of the second Battalion. Now you see the first Battalion consists of three thousand three hundred twenty five Foot, and three hundred ninety six Horse. And the second Battalion of two thousand seven hundred seventy five Foot, and three hundred and thirty Horse: Add these together, the aggregate will be six thousand one hundred Foot, and seven hundred twenty six Horse. And so the Legion is completely divided into these two Battalions, without Reserve for a third Body; which, I pray you observe. And he avers there should not be a lesser number (mark it) of armed men in every Legion, a greater sometimes hath been. And for a Corollary to this division of a Legion, he saith, in the eighth Chapter of that same Book, that there were in every Legion fifty five Centurions. If any man be not satisfied with what he hath said already, he may read him in the fifteenth Chapter of that same Book, and there he shall be sure to hear him speak that same language, with very little difference.

The first Battalion of Vegetius his Legion.

The second Battalion.

Our Author says, By the example of one Legion he will declare how the same Field should be marshall'd, when a Battel is to be fought. The Horse, saith he, are to be plac'd in the Wings; let us remember this. The Body of

of the Foot, faith he, begins to be order'd on the Right hand, where the first Cohort is plac'd: To this is joyn'd the second Cohort; the third stands in the middle of the Battalion: To it joyns the fourth, and the fifth stands on the Left hand. All, says he, that fought in this first Battalion; were called *Principes*; and there he describes their Offensive and Defensive Arms, needles here to be spoken of. The second Battel, says he, was of the *Hastati*, arm'd as the *Principes*. After these were the light armed, with *Plumbata*, Swords, Bows and Arrows; Slingers there were likewise, who cast Stones out of Slings, and Batton-slings; also Darters, who, he faith, shot Arrows out of Manuballists and Arcuballists. Thereafter he tells us, (forgetting what he said but seven or eight lines before) that the second Battalion (O Memory, where art thou) consisted of *Hastati*: And, faith he, (not remembering he had told us the same words in the sixth Chapter) In the second Battalion, on the Right hand, was plac'd the sixth Cohort; to which was joyn'd the seventh: The eighth kept the middle Battel, accompanied with the ninth; and the tenth Cohort kept constantly the Left hand of the second Battalion: And so our Author ends that Chapter. Thus we have twice in two several Chapters the description of a full Legion divided into ten Cohorts, and these ten marshall'd in two Battalions or Classes of the *Principes* and *Hastati*, without any mention of the *Triarii*, or leaving room for them.

*Triarii* forgot.

But in the sixteenth Chapter of that same Book, as if some body had awaken'd him out of his dream, he says, after all these Battalions, the *Triarii* were placed, arm'd with Cataphracts, Head-pieces, Swords, Daggers (*Semispathii*) two Darts, and Lead-Bullets (Weapons given to that Class by none but himself.) These *Triarii*, says he, kneeling on one knee rested, till the first Battel chancing to be beaten, they might renew the fight. If any man think he hath done well to remember the *Triarii* at last, who were the Romans greatest strength, I shall be content he enjoy his opinion, provided he let me keep mine; which is, that he needed not now have mention'd them at all, since he hath already marshall'd his Legion; all the ten Cohorts of it, and all the full number of six thousand one hundred Foot, completely without them; whereof I shall tell you more in the next Chapter.

*Velites*.

In the seventeenth Chapter of his second Book he informs us, that in the beginning of the fight the *Principes* and *Hastati* stood still, and mov'd not; and the *Triarii* kneel'd or late (for he speaks of both postures) till the light armed had skirmish'd, and were beat in to the Legionaries; and after the Victory, the heavy arm'd kept their ground, and stood like a Wall, leaving the pursuit of the routed Enemy to the Horse, and the *Velites*.

Legion once more marshall'd.

But I cannot find in my heart to part with *Vegetius*, till I see how he will yet be pleas'd to dispose of the *Triarii*: And I find him in the fourteenth Chapter of his third Book begin *de novo* to marshal the Foot, as if he had never spoke one word of it before. It is, faith he, the Law of embattelling, to place the old and experienced Souldiers in the first order (here he confounds *Ordo* old and experienced Souldiers in the first order. In the second were the *Hastati*, and *Acies* and these were called *Principes*. In the third Order or Body was of the swiftest *Velites*, as Darters, and the youngest Archers. The fourth was of the youngest Archers, (Good Lord, again youngest Archers) and these, faith he, who were called Lancers, and were also called *Mariobarboli*, and were Lead-carriers: If these beat the Enemy, faith he, they pursued him too; but if they were beaten, they were receiv'd by the first and second Battalion; suppose of heavy armed: You see how *Vegetius* loves to refresh his Readers memory. Well then, the third and fourth Battalions fought before the first and second, or any of them came to the shock. In the fifth Battalion our Author places Carbolists, Slingers and Batton-Slingers. But I must propose a question or two by the way. First, Did the third and fourth Battalions, both which, as you see, he makes to consist of the *Velites*, after they had fought with, and were repell'd by an Enemy, retire only to the Rear of the *Hastati*, or to the Rear of the Army? I suppose the last, though *Vegetius* through inadvertency, faith only to the Rear of the two first Battalions; for if so, they had undoubtedly obstructed very much the advance of the *Triarii*, or the Retreat of both *Principes* and *Hastati*; my next

Strange repetitions.

Two questions.

next Query is, why *Vegetius* doth not appoint the Slingers, and Batton slingers to skirmish in the Van, as well as the *Velites* of the third and fourth Battalions, since they were all light armed: and if it be said the Slingers could cast their stones over the heads of the two Battalions of heavy armed, I answer first, their stones would do less hurt at that distance. Secondly, the Archers in the third and fourth rank could have done as much. Thirdly, the keeping their station and place in the fifth Battalion hinder'd the *Triarii* to advance. Now if these of *Vegetius* his third and fourth Battalions were obliged to go to the Van, and fight or skirmish there, why did he not appoint the light armed of his fifth Battalion to do so too, since they were all lyable to one body. But I hinder him to Marshall his sixth Battalion. The sixth order or body, faith he, consisted of (and now welcome *Triarii*) Warriors furnish'd with all manner of Arms and Weapons, whom the Ancients called *Triarii*. These, faith he, us'd to fit (then they kneel'd not) behind all the other Battalions, that being whole and found, and in breath, they might with more vigour attack the enemy, for if any thing fell out otherwise than well with the Battalions that stood before them, all hopes of recovery depended on them. Now if our Author hath spoken well of the ancient Roman Legion, I am sure he hath spoken enough of it. He hath been at much pains to make up that Legion, but that you may the better see the defects of it, I shall be at the trouble to take it down in pieces in the ensuing Chapter.

*Triarii*.

## CHAP. XII.

*Vegetius his Legion reviewed and examined.*

Whoever hath read, or shall be pleas'd to read *Vegetius* his Treatise *De re Militari*, will believe with me, that he intended nothing less than to write the Military constitutions and customs of Levies, Arms, Exercising, Marshalling, Embattelling, Marching, or other Laws and Points of the Art of War us'd in his own days; but in the contrary, the Roman way and method of War of the ancient times. And this he professeth all along, not only in his Prologues to his Master the Emperour *Valentinian*, but almost in every Book of his Treatise. In the Prologue of his second Book, he says, the Emperour had commanded him to set down the *Antiqua*, the ancient customs. In the Prologue to his third Book, he avers, that the Emperour had commanded him to abbreviate in one Piece all the ancient Military Customs and Constitutions which were dispersed and scattered in several Books and Authors. And in one word he Entitles his Epitome, Institutions of Military matters out of the Commentaries of *Caio*, *Cassius*, *Trajan*, *Adrian*, and *Proculus*. Now, none of these wrote, or could write of any Military Customs practis'd in *Vegetius* his time, as having liv'd several ages before him, and he acknowledgeth himself that the Art of War of his days was but a shadow, and scarce that of the ancient one. But by the way I must tell you, that *Steuarchius* thinks *Adrian* wrote no Military Constitutions, since at his desire *Eliau* had compos'd that Piece *de Instrumendis Aciebus*, whereof we have spoken. But his reason is exceedingly weak, for *Adrian* might very well have written the Roman Military Art, and yet have desired *Eliau* to write the *Grecian* one. But to return, *Vegetius* in the twentieth Chapter of his first Book having given us an account of the ancient Roman Arms, acknowledgeth that they were wholly worn out, and that in comparison of them, the Foot of his time were naked, which had given so great an advantage to the Barbarous Nations of the *Goths*, *Huns*, and *Allans*. To the Eighth Chapter of his second Book, he gives this title, *Of those who were leaders of the*

*Vegetius* obligeth himself to write of the old Roman Militia;

Not that of his own times

*Ancient Centuries and Files.* And the Seventh Chapter of that Book he begins with these words, Having expounded, saith he, the ancient ordering of a Legion. And in many other places he witnesseth, that it is the ancient Roman Militia, that he is to open to us, and no new one which had deviated from that old one.

This being premised by me to anticipate objections, I make bold to charge *Vegitius* with seven gross Errors in the description of his Legion, yet all seven will not amount to one mortal fin, (which, they say, be likewise seven) nay, nor to one capital crime. But if he be guilty of all these, or any of these, then I say, he is not so good as his word in the fourth Chapter of his Second Book, where he promisseth *Ordinationem Legionis antiquæ, secundum normam Militariæ Juris exponere*. To expound to us the right ordering of an ancient Legion according to the Rule of Military Law. But I shall endeavour to justify my charge in this following order.

First Error.

First, I question the number of his Legionary Foot, which he makes to be six thousand one hundred, and all heavy armed; mark that I read once of six thousand, and once more of six thousand and two hundred, (and in that number were comprehended the *Velites*) but never of six thousand and one hundred. The truth is, *Romulus* made his Legion three thousand, after him it was augmented and diminished according to the King, Senate, or peoples pleasure, or the necessities of the State to 4000, to 4200, to 5000, to 5200, and sometimes (but very seldom) to 6000, or 6200, as Regiments are now made stronger and weaker in our modern Levies, according to the pleasure of the Prince or State who makes them; but for most part the ancient Roman Legion was 4000, or 4200. *Livy* in his Sixth Book says, four Legions were levied against the *Gauls*, each of 4000 Foot. In his Seventh Book, he says, that in the Consulship of young *Camillus*, four Legions were raised, each of 4200 Foot. In his Eighth Book he tells us, that in the War against the *Latins*, every Legion consisted of 4000 Foot. In his Ninth Book he makes the Legion to be 4000 Foot, in the War against the *Samnites*. In his 21 Book he speaks of six Legions, each of them 4000 Foot. And not to spend more time in Instances, the same Historian (out of whom and *Polybius*, I suppose *Vegitius* borrowed his greatest light of History) says in his 22 Book, that every Roman Legion was 5000 Foot in the time of their dangerous War with their redoubted enemy *Hannibal*; but after that was ended, they were reduced to 4000 till the *Allobrogean* War, except that some of them were made 6200 by *Scipio*. Unless then once in *Africa*, and once in *Greece*, we never find a Legion 6000 strong, but never at all to be 6100, as *Vegitius* would have it to be constantly. He would have done himself much right, and his Reader a great favour to have told who levied these Legions of 6100, if it was so in his own time, or yet in the decadency of both the Roman Empire and Militia, that makes nothing to his purpose, it is the ancient customs we require of him, for it is these he promised to us. But if we take in all these three Bodies of light armed Foot which he so frequently mentions in the number of the Legion, as *Polybius* doth the *Velites* in his Legion, and proportion 400 light arm'd for every 1000 heavy arm'd, as the same *Polybius* doth; then *Vegitius* his Legion shall exceed 9400, of which we read in no story. Now if all these Instances I have given out of *Livius*, and in another place shall give out of *Polybius* be true, when *Vegitius* his assertion, that a Legion should have no fewer than 6100 heavy arm'd Foot, can have no truth at all in it, and that also which he subjoins in that same sixth Chapter of his Second Book must be false.

Second Error.

Secondly, I cannot believe him that either every Troop consisted of 32 Horse, or that 726 Riders belong'd to every Legion. If I trust either the one or the other, I must give the lye to two more ancient Writers than himself, that is *Polybius* and *Livius*. The last whereof in his Seventh Book saith, four Legions were elected, and for every one of them 300 Horse. In the dangerous War against *Hannibal*, no more but 300 Horse for a Legion. *Livy* in his Ninth Book speaks but of 300 Horse for every Legion in the War with the *Samnites*. In the great battel of *Canna* they were but 500, as that Historian witnesseth in his 22 Book. In his 29 Book he saith, *Scipio* had no more in *Africa* but 300 Horse for every Legion, the Foot whereof were 6200. And his brother *Lucius Scipio* had

had no more in *Africa* but 300 for every Legion of 5400 Foot. Neither had the Consul *Emilius* more Horse for a Legion in *Macedon* than 300, though the Foot were 6000. Once I read in *Livy*, it is in his 40 Book, and if I remember right, it was against the *Ligurians*, that 400 Horse were ordained for each Legion; otherwise according to *Livius*, the number was constantly 300. *Polybius* all along in his History allots no more Horse to a Legion but 300, except once, (and I pray you observe it) it is in his Second Book, where he saith, the Senate sent two Legions to *Skylia*, each consisting of 4000 Foot, and 200 Horse; and as this is the least number I read of, so that of *Livy's* 400 Horse against the *Ligurians* is the greatest number of Horse for one Legion. In the Wars against both the *Gauls* and *Carthaginians*, *Polybius* gives but 300 Horse to every Legion. In the dividing his 726 Riders, *Vegitius* errs twice, first for allowing 22 Troops of Troops to the Cavalry, Ten being the ordinary number; next for allowing 32 Riders to each Troop, whereas there were but 30. Both which assertions of mine are grounded on History, and are likewise taken out of *Polybius* his Sixth Book, as I have made it appear in my Discourse of the Roman Cavalry. Besides, our Authors error in *calculo* may be charged on him as a *Peccadillo*, for though we should admit 22 Troops in every Legion, and thirty two Riders in every Troop, the number will not amount to 726, for multiply 32 by 22, the aggregate will be but 704. But in steps *Stenechius*, and lends *Vegitius* his hand, and says the Decurions must be added, who being 22 in number, (one for every Troop) makes *Vegitius* his number 726 complete. But this shall not help him, for Decurions, Standard-bearers, Trumpeters, or Horn-winders, (if Troops had any of the last) were all of the number of the 30, and none of them Supernumeraries, as I have made it appear out of *Polybius* in my Discourse of Cavalries; and therefore they must be of the number of the 32 likewise. And if I should permit *Stenechius* to make the Decurions supernumeraries, he will be obliged to give me leave to reckon the Cornets and Trumpeters not to be of the number of the 32, and these being 44 in number would increase the horse of every Legion to 770, and if he please he may reckon the *Turme*, *Centuriones*, or Bringers up, who by *Polybius* his account were three for every Turme, and consequently 66 in 22 Troops, and then an addition being made of all, we shall find the aggregate of the Horse for *Vegitius* his Legion to be 836.

The third complaint I make is that *Vegitius* marshals two Troops of Horse with every Cohort, and four Troops with the first Cohort. Observe that here it is not the question whether this way of Marshalling be good or not, nor is it the question, whether it be not good, that Foot & Horse should be near one another when they fight, but the question is, whether the ancient Romans used this way, or not; or if this be the right way of ordering or Marshalling an old Legion, which *Vegitius* promised to give us. I aver it is not; and I know no old Author will contradict my assertion: It will be lost labour to instance these Battels described by ancient Historians; who mention nothing like this manner of Embattelling. In my Discourses of Both Infantry and Cavalry, I have shown how Horsemen have fought on foot, how they have fought with horses unbridled; and how Foot and Horse have been mingled together in Skirmishes, and Battels; but I read not in any Author of this method of Marshalling, that *Vegitius* speaks of; nay the current of History evinceth the contrary for most part; the Horse were drawn up in the wings, and the Foot in the Battel. So it was at *Canna*, where the Consul *Emilius* fought on the right hand with the Roman Cavalry, and *Terentius Vaso* on the left with the Horse of the Allies. The like was done at the Battel of *Metaurus* against *Afrubal*. In the two Battels which *Scipio* fought in *Africa*, the very same was practised. Sometimes all the Horse were Marshalled in one of the wings as *Caesar* drew up all his in the right wing of the army; and *Pompey* most of his Cavalry on the left hand of his army at that great Battel of *Pharsalia*, where these two brave Romans fought for no less wager than the Empire of the World. At *Utiaca* the same *Caesar* being to offer Battel to *Scipio*, *Pompey's* Father-in-law, drew up all his Horsemen on the left-wing of his army, and mixed Foot with them. *Polybius* in his 14 Book informs us that the Great *Scipio* being to fight against *Syphax*, Marshalled his Roman Horse in one wing, and his Auxiliaries in the other. And which is very observable against *Vegitius*, he says in that same place, that in doing so, *Romana Adversaria*

Third Error

*consuetudinem simpliciter servavit.* He simply and purely observed the custom of the Roman Militia.

Nor will it be one full step out of my way to tell you, that I think Horle do not at all belong to a Legion, it being as I suppose wholly composed of Foot; for though most Historians tell us, that when Legions were levied, Horle were also raised, and punctually for every Legion 300 Horle, yet must not that be understood as that these 300 Horle were to be reckoned to be a member or part of that Legion; nay, most Authors disjoin them, and lay, to many Legions, and so many Horle were raised. Let *Cæsar* an Author beyond all exception be Judge. In the Seventh Book of the French War, he says, he gave to his Legate *Labienus* (the same who afterwards deserted him) four Legions, and kept six with himself; and that you may be sure he meant only Foot, he informs that he ordered him to take a part of the Cavalry with him, now many he tells not; but if every Legion was to have a set number of Horle, that great Captain (who loath'd no words in his Commentaries) needed not have mentioned Horle; for when he said, he sent four Legions, we should have known that 3000 Horle were sent according to *Vergilius* his account of 750 Horle for every Legion, or 1200 according to the true account of 300 for every Legion.

In his Third Book of the Civil War, he sent *Cælius Longinus* to *Trebula* with one Legion, and two hundred Horle, not with 750, nor yet with 300. He sent *Calpurnius Sabinus* to *Ecetia* with five Cohorts, and a few Horle. He sent *Cornelius Domitius* to *Macedon* with three Legions and 300 Horle. Hear him speak once more, for he deserves to be heard; he tells us in that same Book, that *Scipio*, Pompey's Father-in-law, brought out of *Syria* to *Greece*, *Omnes Legiones, Equosque*: All the Legions and the Horsemen. If Horle belonged properly to Legions, why did he distinguish them, who knew the Military Art, and the words of the Art best of any? But *Vergilius* shall be invincible for me, unless he beat himself, which he will presently do. For notwithstanding all he hath said, in the sixth Chapter of his Second Book, yet in the 13 Chapter of that same Book he confesseth that *Equites locantur in corpibus*: Horsemen are placed in the wings. And in the 17 Chapter, he says, *Equites requantur in corpibus, ut ut jussit omnes junda sunt pedibusque*: The Horsemen are placed in the wings, so that all the heavy arm'd Horle join with the Foot: What means that, join with the Foot? It is that one part of them joined with the Foot on the right hand, and the other on the left; and so himself clears it in that very Chapter, where he saith, If Horsemen be too weak, according to the custom of the Ancients, Footmen who are swift, arm'd with light Targets, and exercised in that manner of fight, are to be mixed with them; for Foot mixed with the Horle, and Horle joined to the Foot, are two several things. And in the first Chapter of the same Book he saith the Horle are called the wings, because they protect the foot, *ad similitudinem alarum*, to the similitude of wings: Let now any man reconcile *Vergilius* to himself, and he and I shall be very soon good friends.

But the *Hastati* make a terrible clamour, and cry they have wrong done them by *Vergilius* in Marthalling, the *Principes* before them. They say that being the youngest and least experienced, it was some honour done to them to place them in the first Battalion, for thereby they were exposed to the first fury of an enemy, which many times they valiantly repell'd; if not, they served at least (as the Great Turk's *Asaps*) to blunt both the Enemies Courage and Swords. The *Principes* cry as loud, that *Vergilius* hath rob'd them of the dignity, they always had to stand in the middle between the *Hastati* and the *Triarii*, and to be look'd on as the reforcers of the Battel, when the *Hastati* were worsted. But neither of them hath so good reason to complain as the *Triarii*, whom we shall hear anon. And assuredly to me it seems very strange, that not only in the mentioned places, but all along in his whole Treatise, our Author Marthalls the *Principes* before the *Hastati*, against the universal consent of all History. *Livy* in his Seventh Book tells how *Annus* the Consul drew up his *Hastati* in the Van, the *Principes* in the middle, and the *Triarii* in the Rear, against the *Gauls*; and then was the Roman Discipline strictly observed. So were the *Hastati* in the Van, when *Marcullus* fought at *Canusium* with *Hannibal*, *Liv.* lib. 27. And in his 37 Book he informs us that *Scipio Africanus* in the battel he fought with *Antiochus*, ordered his *Hastati* in the Van, the *Principes* in the middle, and the

*Triarii*

*Triarii* in the Rear. And that I may not weary my Reader with instances, I believe, and upon good grounds; that in all *Livy's* Decads that are extant, *Vergilius* not any for him shall not read, that the *Hastati* were placed behind the *Principes*, except once that it is written (I suppose not by himself) in his Thirtieth Book, that *Scipio* in his battel against *Sipontem*, with *Africanus* Marthall'd the *Principes* before the *Hastati*. And *Lipsius* hath good reason to think that this place is falsified, since *Polybius* (out of whom it is like *Livy* hath the story) writes the very contrary, that is, that *Scipio* Marthall'd the *Principes* behind the *Hastati*; and if this place were not corrupted, then *Livy* should contradict himself, for in his Eighth Book he says once for all, that *Hastati omnia primi pugnant inibant*: The Javelineers, saith he, first of all began the battel. And sure the same *Scipio* at the battel of *Zama* against *Hannibal*, placed the *Hastati* in the Van, by a good token; for they were so mixed with the enemy, that he was glad to found a Retreat for them, that he might have ground to bring his *Principes* up to the Medley, which the same *Livy* reports to us.

In the fifth place *Polybius* complains that *Vergilius* hath murder'd five of his Centurions, for he in his Sixth Book appointeth sixty for every Legion, whereas *Vergilius* in the eighth Chapter of his Second Book produceth but five; yet he needs not be afraid to be brought to any juridical trial for this falsification. Truly it seems strange to me that *Polybius* his Legion consisting but of 3000 heavy arm'd, should have sixty Centurions, and that of *Vergilius*, which was a hundred more than twice as strong, should have but 55, for all his 6100 were heavy arm'd; as he describes them in that same Chapter. I can fancy no reason for this, but that it was his fancy to write so: I confess indeed it is more than probable that at the first institution, by *Romulus*, that band of men which was called a Century, consisted of one hundred men; and so the Centurions were no more but thirty, and in process of time in a Legion of that same strength might be sixty; for as I told you in my Discourse of the Infanteries, though the particular bands of a Legion came to consist but of sixty men, and those of the *Triarii* perhaps but of thirty men, yet still the denomination of Century and Centurio remained as before, but never was a Centurio heard of that commanded more men than one hundred, except in *Vergilius* his Legion, in the first Cohort whereof (consisting of 1100 men) every Centurio commanded 184 men; if there were but six Centurians in that Cohort, as is to be supposed; for if you divide 1100 by six, the Quotient will be 184, with the fraction of, one 4; but till *Vergilius* his number of 55 Centurians be made more clear to us, than yet it is, we may safely believe with *Polybius*, that in one Legion though not so strong as that of *Vergilius*, there were no fewer than sixty Centurians, to which *Titus Livius* doth give his consent in his Eighth Book, as the place is amended and corrected by *Lipsius*, according to the true and genuine sense of the Author.

Sixthly, to my sense it is undeniable, since the Roman Militia was reformed, and indeed almost instituted by *Tullius Hostilius*, that there were ten Cohorts in every Legion, even when it consisted but of 3000; three Centuries at that time making a Cohort, and afterwards three Maniples, every one whereof was composed of two Centurians. If the Centuries consisted of full hundreds, then each Manipule contained two hundred, and consequently the Cohort consisted of six hundred. And so we may suppose *Scipio* and *Annulus* their Cohorts to have been, when their Legions were six thousand a piece; and this Cohort of 600 men is the strongest we read of, for in my Discourse of Roman Infanterie, I have distinguished the Pretorian Cohorts from the Legionary ones. But a Cohort of 1100 men, as *Vergilius* will have his first Cohort to be, is not to pass muster, and as little warrant he had to make every one of his other nine Cohorts to consist of 555 heavy arm'd. Sure he might with more ease to himself have given to his right-hand Cohort 700 men, and to every one of the other nine, 600; and this had completed his Legion of 6100, and by the bargain he had kept fifty Centurians in it, by giving to the six Centurians of the first Cohort, 116, or 117 men a piece, and to every Centurio of the other nine Cohorts, 100. Or if he had made his Legion completely 6000 and no more, he might have given equally to every Centurio of sixty one hundred men, and this had been the fairest and impartiallest dealing. But how the whim of his fractions of fives

flow



Seventh  
Error.

flew in his head I cannot tell, unless to trouble both himself and his Reader.

But seventhly, Room, room, cry the *Triarii*, they can have no longer patience either to kneel or sit, they are all on foot, *Conclamant arma*, they expect neither *Principes*, nor *Hastati* to retire to them, but advance in full arms, threatening they will be members of the Legion, and the principal members too; and in the Legion they will be, though it were over *Vegetius* his belly. They are very angry that in the sixth and 15 Chapters of his Second Book, he should have mustered a complete Legion without them, their clamour is so loud, that to pacify them, *Vegetius* in the 14 Chapter of his Third Book, assigns them place behind three bodies of light armed, and ordains them to be the sixth Battalion, and to give them some ease after the wrong he had done them, he allows them to sit, whereas before he had order'd them to kneel, sometimes on one, sometimes on both knees. But indeed they have no reason to be satisfied with such favours, since he hath wholly exterminated them out of the Legion, in both his descriptions of it; for he divides the whole Legion, and all the ten Cohorts of it, and every man of these ten Cohorts into two *Acies*, or Battalions; in the first whereof he placeth the *Principes* consisting of five Cohorts, in which are 3325 men. In the second he rangeth the *Hastati* in five Cohorts, in which he musters 2775 men, which make completely up his full number of 6100 heavy armed. So you see in both these places there is no room left, nor mention made of the *Triarii*. And though in his Third Book he appoints them to be in the Rear, yet the Legion being made up of the *Principes* and *Hastati* without them, it must follow that in *Vegetius* his account the *Triarii* were no Legionaries. Besides all this, they accuse him of either theft or robbery; because in the beginning of the 6th Chapter of his Second Book, he hath either stoln or violently taken from them the *Eagle*, and given it to the first Cohort of the *Principes*; for they aver that it, being the prime Ensign of the Legion, was recommended to their care, and the keeping of it to their *Primipilus*, or first Centurion. How *Vegetius* will answer to all these accusations, I know not, but those who will defend him had best do it out of his own Books; for I have consulted his Commentator *Steuclinius*, and find he pleads nothing at all for him, nay, nor seems not to take notice, that he stands in need of his help, for Commenting on that same Chapter I last spoke of: all he tells us is that there was but one *Eagle* in a Legion, wherewith he saith he thought fit to acquaint *Nevitates* (a great secret) and that there were many Ensigns, and is pleased to give us the figures of those Images *Vegetius* speaks of, this is all. And indeed to tell it once for all, *Steuclinius* is large and prolix enough to explain things where no difficulty appears, but where matters are debatable, I find in him nothing but a profound silence.

*Steuclinius*  
taxed.

*Vegetius* his  
Tautologies.

I shall not need to tell my Reader how *Vegetius* repeats things over and over again, nor how his Tautologies are obvious, *Ulysses ad naufragum*, nor yet what brave men, experienced Soldiers, and expert Warriors, he will have to be plac'd in the Cohorts that stand on the right and left hands, and in the middle of both his Battalions, of which he composeth his Legion. But I dare presume to say that if any of the ancient Roman Dictators or Consuls, who Triumphed gloriously over their enemies, had liv'd in the Emperour *Valentinianus* time, they would rather have chufed to have submitted the fortune of their battels to the doubtful Die of War once more, than to have Marshall'd their Legions after *Vegetius* his Model.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. XIII.

### Of a Roman Legion; Marshall'd according to Polybius.

I speak so often of *Polybius*, that I think it will not be amiss to tell you what he was. His Father *Licortus* was a famous Citizen of *Argalopolis*, who by his Valour and Vertue came to be the Supreme Magistrate (whom they call'd Prætor) of all the *Achaans*. This Prætor by his charge preided in their Councils, and was their Chieftain in their Wars. *Licortus* succeeded to the renowned Captain *Philopomen*, who was cruelly forced by the *Messinians* (after he was their Prisoner) to drink a full draught of deadly Poison. *Polybius* was a Souldier in *Greece*, and as himself witnesseth in his eleventh Book, was a Commander in the *Achaan Army*, under *Philopomen*, at the Battel of *Maninea*, against *Machanidas* the Tyrant of *Lacedæmon*, who was there overthrown and kill'd. He was long after that a great favourite, yea, a Counsellour of that *Scipio* who was sometimes called *Africanus Minor*, and sometimes *Numantinus*; because he ended the *Carthaginian* and *Numantine* War, with the destruction of both Cities. There were some reasons why *Scipio* should be kind to *Polybius*, because his Natural Father *Lucius Æmilius*, (for this *Scipio* was but the adopted Grand-child of the great *Africanus*) was the Author of carrying many hundred *Achaean* Prisoners to *Rome*, (for no reason but suspicion) among whom *Polybius* was one, who lay full seventeen years Prisoner there, where he had leisure enough to learn both the *Roman* language and customs. *Scipio* was a very great Captain, a strict reformer of the old *Roman* Militia, and a severe Disciplinarian, from whom *Polybius* could not but know all the mysteries of the *Roman* Art of War, being a person of so great abilities, as those parcels of his History, yet extant, speak him to have been; and truly we have reason to be sorry that we are rob'd of those Books of his, of which all-devouring time hath deprived us. Let us hear how he marshals a *Roman* Legion.

A Legion in that *Scipio Minor's* time, consisted of four thousand two hundred men, as many times it did both before and after him; whereof six hundred were *Triarii*, and made the third Battalion, oblig'd to kneel on their Right knee, till either the other two Classes retir'd to them, or that the General commanded them to rise and advance. These, he saith, were never more than six hundred, though the Legion chang'd to be four thousand two hundred, as many times it did. And for this we must take his word. Before the *Triarii* stood the *Principes*, men in the flower of their age; and before them, the *Hastati* in the Van; they were the youngest and rawest of all the heavy armed; each of these two Battalions consisted of twelve hundred; and all the three were alike arm'd, except that the *Triarii*, instead of *Pila*, carry'd short Spears; of all which I have spoken sufficiently already. So you see all *Polybius* his heavy armed amounted to three thousand: The rest, which were twelve hundred, were, saith he, *Veltæ*; and these, he says, were levied of the poorest and most inconsiderable sort of the people. Nor do I find, that he divides these twelve hundred *Veltæ*, into three Squadrons; one whereof should stand behind every one of the Classes of the heavy armed, of all which I have already spoke, in my discourse of the Infantry; and yet *Terdazis*, and the *Sieur de Preissack* would fatter this upon *Polybius*: But indeed, in my judgement, he leaves the light armed to be dispos'd of in the Flanks, Van or Rear, as the General conceiv'd they might be most useful. He appoints his Legion to be divided into thirty Maniples (suppose still the heavy armed) each Maniple to consist of two Centuriates; to every Century he allows an Ensign and a Centurion, whom he permits to chuse his Sub-Centurion.

The *Polybius*  
Legion.



Centurion; of all which I have already spoke. The numbers of the *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Velites*, might alter, according to the strength of the Legion, but not the *Triarii*. He tells us, that three hundred Horse were levied with every Legion; but says not, that they made a part of every Legion. These three hundred Horse he divides into ten Turns or Troops, and Officers them, as I have shown you in my Discourse of the Cavalry. He leaves them to be marshall'd, where the Commander in chief thought they might do best service. And now we have the *Polybian* Legion.

No word here for all this, how deep, that is, how many in File, either of Horse or Foot; or what, or how much ground was allowed for distance between Files or Ranks; or yet how great the Intervals were between the several Maniples of every one of the Classes, or what between the Classes themselves, or between the several Troops of Horse. A great oversight, for of all these we are forc'd to hear other mens conjectures, and make use of our own, as we shall offer to do in the following Chapter.

## CHAP. XIV.

## Of Distances, and Intervals of the several Bodies and Battallions of the Foot and Horse.

Before we proceed to our conjectures, it will be fit, first to know what this word *Interval* properly signifies, and how it is taken. In both Ancient and Modern Fortifications, Towns, Castles, and Camps were defended not only with Ramparts of Earth, and Walls of Stone, but also with great Logs or Stakes of Timber, which we call *Pallisades*, these the *Romans* in their language called *Valli*, and, I suppose, thereafter the Rampart it self got the name of *Vallus* and *Vallum*; hence perhaps our Wall. These Stakes were, and are of two kinds, longer and shorter; the first stood straight up from the ground, the second had the one end of them fixed in the Rampart, and the other lying on it, to hinder an approach to it; distinguished by the *Germans* by several names, for they call the long Stakes *Pallisades*, and the short ones *Stockadoes*, both the one and the other sharp-pointed at both ends. The Ground, Earth, or part of the Rampart, between two *Pallisades* or *Stockadoes*, is properly called an Interval; but it is borrow'd, and appropriated to any distance between Bodies greater and smaller; yea, to the space that is between one time and another, an Interval of time is now language proper enough, and Physicians borrow it, and call an Intermitting Ague, *Febris Intervallata*, an Intervall Feavor.

What distance or Intervals there were between *Roman* Ranks, and between Files between several Bodies of either their Horse or Foot, no ancient Author hath clear'd to us; but left us to grope in the dark. Nor can we well guess at them, till we descend how many in File both Horse and Foot were marshall'd. I told you before, that *Vegetius* in the twenty fifth Chapter of his second Book, seems to make the Foot eleven deep, because, as I told you, he orders a *Contubernium* of Souldiers to manage a Carroballist, and that, he saith, consisted of eleven men. But this doth not prove that *Vegetius* his File was precisely eleven, no more than what he saith in the fifteenth Chapter of his third Book (that ten thousand men drawn up in six Ranks, will take up so much ground in Front) will prove, that the *Roman* Foot were drawn up six deep. And so for *Vegetius*, we know not the deepness of either the *Roman* Foot or Horse. Nor will we be one jot the wiser for *Polybius*.

*lybius*; for the discourse he hath in his twelfth Book, where he speaks of Horse eight in File, doth not concern the *Roman* Militia; for he speaks there of *Macedonian* and *Persian* Warriors, and is confuting *Calisthenes* his History of the Battel of *Issus*; between *Alexander* and *Darius*, as I noted before. *Achilles Terdentius* imagines the *Roman* Foot to have been twelve in File, but that was to make good his conjecture of the quantity of ground a Consular Army took up, whereof I may chance to speak hereafter. But the common opinion carries me along with it, that both the *Roman* Horse and Foot ordinarily were marshall'd ten in File, but upon emergencies, Generals might alter it; though, I confess, the strong reason for it to me seems very weak, which is, that the Leader of the Horse was called *Decurio*, and he of the File of Foot *Decanius*; for this last is appropriated to other Offices; and the first by *Allian's* Translator is given to the Leader of a *Macedonian* File, which consisted of sixteen. But this supposition, as probable, we must make the basis or ground, on which to build our most probable conjectures of the Intervals of several Bodies and Classes, in which both our Authors give us small assistance, yet I shall give you all I can pick out of them, or others, on that Subject.

When *Polybius* in his twelfth Book told us, that for most part Horse-men were ranged eight deep (meaning, I think, the *Persian* Horse) he subjoins, that there must be an Interval between several Troops; but what that Interval was, he forgot to tell us: It is pity, he who knew things so well, should needlessly have kept them up from us as secrets; the reason he gives for an Interval between two Troops doth not weigh much, because, saith he, they must have ground for conversion; that is, to face to either Right or Left hand, or by any of them to the Rear. If any of these be needful, whole Squadrons of four, six or eight Troops joyn'd together, may do it as easily and conveniently as single Troops, which consist of three or four Files at most. But conversions on that same ground are seldome necessary, never convenient. But being left to guess, how many foot of Interval, Troops ten deep required one from another, I conjecture, eight Foot; which I ground on that, the same *Polybius* saith in that same twelfth Book, which is, that a *Stadium*, or Furlong, contain'd eight hundred Horse drawn up in Battel. Then I say, First, a *Stadium*, is the eighth part of an *Italian* mile, one hundred twenty five paces, six hundred twenty five Foot. Secondly, eight hundred Horse, being at our Authors rate eight in File, are one hundred in Front. Thirdly, For every Horse-man to stand on Horse-back, and room to handle his Arms; I allow, with others, four foot of ground, and so for one hundred Horses, four hundred Foot. Fourthly, According to *Polybius*, and, I suppose, the *Roman* rule, the eight hundred Horse must be divided into several Troops, and in each of them but thirty Riders; so there will be twenty complete Troops, and twenty Horse-men for the twenty seventh Troop. Fifthly, Twenty seven Troops require twenty six Intervals. Now allow with *Polybius*, a *Stadium* for eight hundred Horse-men; that is, for one hundred in Front, and for these hundred allow with me four hundred Foot for the Horse-men to stand on, you will have of six hundred twenty five foot of ground for your twenty six Intervals, two hundred and seventeen foot; and that will be eight foot, and near one half, for every Interval. So my opinion is, (if I understand *Polybius* right) that the Interval between two single Troops was about eight foot.

But let us fancy the *Roman* Horse to have been ten in File, and so every Troop only three in Front, for so I probably think they were; and let us remember, that in every Consular Army there were twenty *Roman* Troops, and forty of the Allies; in all sixty. Fancy those sixty Troops drawn up in one Field, upon one of the Wings of the Army (as several times all the Cavalry was marshall'd on one Wing) they must have fifty nine Intervals. Next, remember that sixty Troops, at thirty in a Troop, were compos'd of eighteen hundred Riders; these drawn up, ten in File, made one hundred and eighty Leaders; allow to every one of these four foot, that will amount to seven hundred and twenty foot; then for fifty nine Intervals (which, according to *Polybius*, sixty Troops must have) you are to allow four hundred seventy two foot (at eight foot for each Interval) I suppose still that which I can scarcely believe, of so many Intervals; but add four hundred seventy two foot, to seven hundred

Nor by *Polybius*.

Roman Horse and Foot ten deep.

Intervals between Troops

Conjectured

Out of *Polybius*.

Too many Intervals.

and twenty, the aggregate will be eleven hundred ninety two foot. How these sixty Troops, marshall'd so thin, so few in Front, with so many Intervals, could stand out the brisk and furious charge of a numerous and courageous Enemy, is beyond my fancy: unless they have been interlin'd with well-armed Foot.

Overfight in  
Polybius.

As to the Distances between Bodies of Foot, *Polybius* in the twelfth Book so often cited, allows expressly six foot between Files; but he is to be understood in that place of the *Macedonian* Phalanx, confusing the impertinent relation of *Calisthenes*; but he speaks not there or elsewhere of distance between *Roman* Files: And yet here is an inadvertency in that great man, as we shall see another immediately in *Vegitius* of the same nature. *Polybius* allows six thousand foot of ground for the Front or Longitude of sixteen thousand men sixteen deep, and so we have one thousand Files; between every one of the Files he allows six foot of distance, so the distances do completely take up his six thousand Foot, and so no ground is allow'd to stand on; to which, if he had adverted, he would have allow'd one foot to each man whereon to stand, and consequently seven thousand foot for one thousand Files in Front. But I shall not question the six foot of distance between Files, being I have told you in the *Grecian* Militia that much was necessary for their Pike-men between Ranks on their march, though not between Files; and that in standing in Battel, they used *Densatio*, three foot of distance, and in fight, *Confusio*, one foot, and a half.

Two in *Vegitius*.

*Vegitius* is more inexcusable than *Polybius*, for he allows for the Ranks one foot of ground to stand on, in these words, *Singuli Bellatores singulis obtinent pedes*. Every Combatant, says he, takes up one foot of ground. But that he allows none for them to stand on, when he speaks of Files, I prove thus: In the fourteenth Chapter of his third Book, he allows three foot of distance between Files; and in the next place saith, that ten thousand men, marshall'd six deep, made a Front of sixteen hundred sixty six; and so it doth with a fraction only of four; hitherto he is very right, but concludes very ill, that these sixteen hundred sixty six Files took no more ground up in Front but one thousand paces, that is five thousand foot. A thing purely impossible, for three foot of Distance is allowed by himself between File and File; and next, sixteen hundred sixty six Files require sixteen hundred sixty five distances; multiply sixteen hundred sixty five by three, the product is four thousand nine hundred ninety five; these want but five foot of *Vegitius* his one thousand paces. Where shall then the sixteen hundred sixty six Combatants stand, certainly they had sixteen hundred sixty six foot of ground to stand on; add sixteen hundred sixty six to four thousand nine hundred ninety five, the aggregate is six thousand six hundred sixty one foot; a third more than *Vegitius* allow'd to sixteen hundred sixty six Files: In imitation of him, *Torducz*, commits the very same error in his fifth and sixth Chapters. In the next place, *Vegitius* allows six foot of distance between Ranks, because men must run when they throw their Darts and Javelines, for so they cast them with greater force; *Vibemontius*, saith he, I think he speaks reason, but not at all sense; when he avers, that six Ranks of men (having one foot of ground allow'd for every Rank to stand on, and six foot between one Rank and another) took up forty two foot of ground, from the Van to the Rear; that is, as I think, from the toes of the Leaders to the heels of the Bringers up; for, by his own account and allowance, six Ranks can take up no more from Van to the Rear than thirty six foot; as thus, six foot for the six Ranks to stand on, and thirty foot for the five distances. The error seems to have proceeded from a fancy he hath had, that six Ranks must have six intervals, which is not only false, but ridiculously childish: In regard, in six Ranks, there is one distance between the first and second Rank; the second between the second Rank and the third; the third between the third and fourth Rank; the fourth between the fourth and fifth rank; and the fifth distance between the fifth and sixth Rank. And for his first error, that sixteen hundred sixty six Files take no more ground in Front than five thousand foot, it will be a folly to defend him by saying, three foot were but allowed both for Files to stand on, and distance between them, for a distance (as *Lieutenant-Colonel Eliason*, in his complete Body of the Military Art describes it well) is a place or Interval of ground between every particular File and File, and Rank and Rank, and therefore no part of that ground on which the Files or Ranks stand. When

The first in  
distance of  
Files.

The second of  
Ranks.

Definition of  
a Distance.

I look'd

I look'd upon these places of *Vegitius*, and consider'd them, I could not but approve of *Lippus* for qualifying him (but on another account) with the Titles of *Solus & negligent*.

The same *Lippus*, in the fourth Book of his Commentary, quarrels with *Polybius*, for not informing us what distances the several Maniples kept one from another, nor what intervals were kept between the three great Classes; and if that piece of *Polybius* be not lost with others of his works, assuredly it was an inexcusable oversight. I dare not accuse *Vegitius* of this neglect, though *Lippus* seems to do it; for I am apt to believe, that what he speaks of the distances between Ranks (as I have understood him, it is in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters of his third Book) he may have meant Intervals between the greater Bodies; for in these places he useth the words *Ordo* and *Acies* indifferently, and though *Ordo* be sometimes taken for a Rank, sometimes for a Band or Company, yet *Acies* is ever taken for a Battel, or Battalion. And to me it is clear enough that in the mentioned places he takes *Ordo* for Battalion, and makes six of them, the first of *Principes*, the second of *Hastati*, the third, fourth and fifth of light armed, the sixth of *Triarii*. Now it is palpable, these great Bodies were not Ranks (for every one of them, if I mistake not, consisted of ten Ranks) but were all several Battalions, whereof, as I told you before, he compos'd his Legion. But whether he meant Ranks or Battalions, the error I mention'd was still the same, in making six several Bodies (be they Ranks, Files, Squadrons or Battalions) to have six distances, for they cannot possibly have more than five. But if in these places he allow'd but six foot of Interval between these Classes, and great Bodies, it speaks him to have been almost out of his wits when he wrote it, as the Reader may collect from the ensuing Discourse.

*Vegitius* had  
to be under-  
stood.

But being neither *Polybius* nor *Vegitius* help us much in the matter of Intervals, *Lippus* in his fourth Book comforts us, and tells us, he will not suffer so profitable a business as is the knowledge of Intervals to remain in darkness; *In finibus nostris*, are his words, In the Borders of Night; and therefore promisseth out of the plentiful Magazine of his own reading, to clear the whole matter to us. But I am afraid he will not be a man of his word, for the greatest undertakers, are seldom the best performers: However it is fit we hear him, for he deserves it.

*Lippus* under-  
takes much.

First, He tells us, that he conceives, that the Interval between the *Hastati* and the *Principes* was fifty foot, and between the *Principes* and the *Triarii* one hundred. Next, concerning the Intervals between the Maniples of any of the three Classes (which the *Romans* call'd *Via Directa*) he saith, if the *Velites* were to stand in them, the Interval might be of twenty or thirty foot; if not, ten foot was enough. This is briefly all he says on the matter. But assuredly, if this learned man could conveniently have left the University of *Louvain*; and followed the *Spanish* Armies but one Summer, or, as we call it, one Campaign; he would have seen, under the conduct of the famous Dukes of *Alva* and *Parma*, (the greatest Captains of that age) who liv'd at the time that he was writing his Books, how pitifully simple that School-speculation of his was. I must confirm my opinion with Reason, for authority of Writers I have no more than he, and that is none at all.

But performs  
little.

Each of the two Classes of the *Hastati* and *Principes* consisted of twelve hundred men, which being marshall'd ten deep, made one hundred and twenty Files; *Vegitius* allows three foot distance between Files, these make three hundred and sixty foot in Front, add one hundred and twenty foot for the Files to stand on; the ground that either of these Battalions stood on, was four hundred and eighty foot in Longitude; but to shun debate, I shall be content to allow but one foot for every File to stand on, and two foot of Interval between Files, and so the Front of the *Hastati*, (though they had been all marshall'd in one Body, as they were in several Maniples) took up three hundred and sixty foot. A less space of ground cannot rationally be given for an Interval between them and the *Principes*, than the three hundred and sixty foot they took up in Front; for when they either fled or retir'd to the second Battalion, they must have had sufficient ground to cast themselves in some good order, by Maniples to take up their places in the Intervals of the *Principes*. Now three hundred and sixty foot is but seventy two paces, which certainly are soon traced by

Interval be-  
tween *Hastati*  
and *Principes*

men either flying or retiring hastily. For to imagine that the Romans punctually kept Rank and File, when they were necessitated to a speedy Retreat, is a vain speculation. If this be allowed me, then it cannot be denied me, that the Interval between the *Principes* and the *Triarii* must have been twice as great, that is seven hundred and twenty foot, because the third Battalion was in time of need to receive both the other two. Here then were two great Intervals, one between the *Hastati* and *Principes*, and the other between the *Principes* and the *Triarii*, both of them called by the Romans, *Via transversa*. This conjecture of mine may seem rational enough to those who have observed in our modern Armies, the Intervals between the Brigades Marshall'd in the Battle, and these of the reserve, for less ground for them than what a Brigade takes up in front, is not usually given.

Between  
*Principes* and  
*Triarii*.

Supported  
out of Poly-  
bius.

But to support my own opinion, and convince *Lipsum* of the vanity of his, I shall pick something out of the 1<sup>st</sup> Book of *Polybius*, where he tells us that *Hannibal* marshal'd his third Battalion more than one Stadium behind his second one, and in doing so, says he, he followed the Roman custom; observe this. Now a Stadium is six hundred and twenty five foot, and this wants but ninety five foot of my allowance of seven hundred and twenty for an Interval between the *Principes* and the *Triarii*; and for that remember that he said more than a Stadium, and you may believe without heretic, it was the fourth part of another Stadium, and if so, *Hannibal's* Interval between his second and third Battalion was seven hundred and eighty one foot, that will be fifty one foot more than I required between the second and third Roman Battalions.

But *Lipsum* would maintain his conjecture with two Instances out of *Caesar*, but when they are examined, they may happily make more against him, than for him. The first is, when *Africanus* was to fight with *Caesar* in Spain, the ground between the two Camps where the two Armies were ranged was but two thousand foot, whereof saith *Caesar*, every Army took up a third, the third Third being left for the Charge. Will *Lipsum* infer from this, that the Interval between the first and second Battalion was but of fifty foot, and that between the second and the third only of one hundred? No such matter, for where the ground was so scarce, three foot between ranks was enough; and I doubt if ever more was allowed to the heavy armed, nay nor so much, after their *Pila* were cast; a third part of two thousand foot will be six hundred sixty six. Draw up all the three Battalions one behind another, make each of them ten deep, they will make in all thirty Ranks, for which allow twenty nine distances, each of three foot, will make eighty seven foot, and thirty foot being allowed for the thirty ranks to stand on, will amount to one hundred and seventeen foot, on which ground all the thirty ranks could conveniently enough stand. Now we have five hundred forty nine foot for the Transverse Intervals, which were two. Of the five hundred forty nine foot, allow two hundred to the Interval between the first and second Battalion, and three hundred forty nine for the Interval between the second and the third. But here you will say, the two Transverse Intervals had not so great a space of ground as I required for them; I grant it you, and what then; I did not oblige Roman Generals to allow so much ground when they had it not, but to give as much when conveniently they could. And even here I have demonstrated, that though *Caesar* and *Africanus* were pinched for want of ground, yet both of them might have allowed more by fifty foot to the least of the Transverse Intervals, than *Lipsum* doth to both the Intervals.

The second Instance is, when *Caesar* says, *Pompey* drew up his army in *Thessaly*, so near his Camp, that darts could have been cast out of his fortifications over the heads of all his three Battalions, and therefore he concludes the Intervals between them must have been of a very small extent. To this I give a two-fold answer: First, I suppose these Darts were to be cast out of Scorpions, Onagers, and Catapults, and if these, or any of them could shoot Spears (as it is written of them) over the *Danube*, where it is broadest, then I believe (though I never saw that River) they could throw Darts more than four Stadiums, or Furlongs, which will be two thousand five hundred foot, and all the ground I require for a Roman Army Marshall'd in three Battalions one behind another, allowing six foot between Ranks, and three hundred and sixty between the first and the second Battalion, and seven hundred and twenty between the

His second  
Instance con-  
futed.

second and the third, amounts to no more but twelve hundred and seventy two foot.

My second answer is, that at that time *Pompey* had no mind to fight, and therefore drew up near his Camp, that he might fall back to it, when he pleased, (as he then did) and so in Marshalling needed not keep the ordinary custom of Intervals.

But the Intervals *Lipsum* gives between one Maniple and another in all the three Roman Classes of Foot which were called the direct ways or *frontes*, not these Transverse ones whereof I have spoken, are yet more irrational, and his conjecture of them less obvious to sense, as of the other. He saith if the *Velines* be to stand in these Intervals, they may be of twenty or thirty foot, if not of ten. But I say first, if the *Velines* stand there, they are no Intervals at all. Next, if they be ordered to stand between the Maniples of the heavy armed, as much of ground must be allowed them, as wherein they can conveniently stand and fight; now that cannot be certain, but according to their number, as suppose them twelve in front, (whether ten, six or four deep, it matters not) *Lipsum* must allow them twelve foot for their twelve Files to stand on; and thirty three foot for eleven distances between Files, and that is forty five foot: Where are then *Lipsum's* twenty or thirty foot. But *Lipsum* knew well enough that the *Velines* were not to stand in the Intervals of the heavy armed, but only either to advance to the Van, or retire to the Rear through them; and he knew too that the Intervals between Maniples were principally for the Maniples of the first Class to fall in the Intervals of the second Class, and the Intervals of the third Battalion for the Maniples of the other two to fall back to them: and therefore to allow but ten foot for every one of these Intervals is an inexcusable error in him, and a conjecture which hath no coherence with sense, nor can ever be justified by reason. That General never breath'd that could draw up a band of men consisting of twelve Files in ten foot of ground. Now every Maniple of the *Principes* and *Hastati*, according to *Polybius* whom *Lipsum* follows, consisted of one hundred and twenty men, and these being ten deep, constituted twelve Files, these have eleven Intervals, every one of which being three foot, make thirty three foot; add twelve to that for the twelve Files to stand on, the aggregate is forty five foot, and if you allow but two foot for every Interval between Files, the Interval between two Maniples must be thirty four foot, for it is not possible you can allow less ground for an Interval than that which a Body possesseth, that is ordain'd to stand in that Interval. Hence I think it is obvious to common sense, that all the Intervals between the Maniples of the *Hastati* and *Principes*, were of forty five foot, or thirty four at least. And those of the *Triarii* of ninety foot, or fifty eight at least, in regard they were to receive the Maniples of both the *Hastati* and *Principes*.

True Inter-  
vals between  
Maniples.

In the clearing this point of Distances I have been perhaps too prolix, and have used repetitions, which I condemn in others; but being it is almost impossible to have so much as a general notion of a Roman Army, how it was Marshall'd, (or of any other Army) unless you know the Intervals, I have not thought it amiss to spend a little paper on that Subject. And indeed we are left as in many other Points (necessary to be known) so in this to grope in the dark. Nor have I been so severe to the learned *Lipsum* for his extravagant conjectures of Roman Intervals; but I shall be ready to accept (and desire others to do so too) of his own excuse, which I shall give you in his own words, as I find them in the fourth Book of his Commentary. *Enn. sinbra meam, aut verum veterum, quas Lipsum excusat per levis conjecturas, & fallacia visibilia videntur.* Ah, says he, my darkness, or that of ancient things, which indeed we must hunt after with uncertain conjectures; and through fallacious footsteps.

## CHAP. XV.

## Of the Roman Allies, and Auxiliaries, and the mistakes of some Authors concerning them.

YOU may read very frequently in Roman story of *Socii*, Allies, and Confederates, who were obliged by Covenant and Stipulation to send out such an assistance of men for the City of Rome as the Senate or the Consul required, till a little before *Julius Cæsar's* times, after that you shall read no more of them, for then they were all made Citizens of Rome, and reckon'd to be of one Incorporation. The difference between Allies and Auxiliaries was, the first could only be *Italians*, the second, were of any other Nation. Hence it is that though we read of no Allies that join'd with *Lucullus*, *Sylla*, *Pompey*, *Cæsar*, *Anthony*, *Vespasian*, and his Son *Titus*, yet we find their Armies mightily strengthened by Auxiliaries. But indeed the Romans did but fool some of the Italian Towns and Republicks with the goodly show of Alliance, and the honourable title of *Socii*, whereas truly they used them no better than Vassals, obliging them to follow them in the pursuit of their ambitious designs, with as many Forces of Horse and Foot, as the Senate pleased to impose on them, and to serve at their own charges, except a little Proviand, which with the help of these same Allies they took from an enemy. Hence came these many grievances of the Confederated Towns, mentioned in the Roman Histories, and once a total rupture of the *Latins* from them, till after much blood shed they were reduced to their former condition.

Till the Romans had over-masted *Hannibal*, *Philip of Macedon*, and the great King of Syria, *Antiochus*, we shall seldom read of any of their Armies that were not puſsantly assisted by their Allies: the number either as to Foot or Horse, of which that assistance consisted, may be collected from the several times of their conjunction; but that they were determinately and constantly fix'd to such a number, can never be prov'd out of ancient story; yet I and *Vegetius* very positive in it, and in the first Chapter of his Third Book, he offers to assure his Reader that neither Allies nor Auxiliaries were ever in any army stronger than the Romans. Take his own words. *Ille tamē puto servata est ne unquam amplius multitudo Sociorum Auxiliariūvis esset in Castris, quam Civium Romanorum*: That care, saith he, was taken that no greater number of Allies or Auxiliaries should be in the Camp, than of Roman Citizens. And *Machiavelli* in the Third Book of his Art of War, says that every Consular Army consisted of two Legions, which were eleven thousand Foot, and two Legions of Allies, which made also eleven thousand Foot. I shall first break a word to both of them together, and then severally to each of them. Both of them had read *Livy*, and till they had produced a more Authentick Historian, none of them should have given him the lie so broadly. This Author in his Twenty first Book tells us, that after *Hannibal* came to Italy, *Cor. Scipio*, and *Sempronius* levied six Legions of Romans each of four thousand Foot, and for every one of them three hundred Horse, and in that same place he calls up the total of them to be twenty four thousand Foot, and eighteen hundred Horse, and of Allies saith he, forty four thousand Foot, and four thousand Horse. This wanted but four thousand of the double number of the Roman Foot, and four hundred more than double the number of the Roman Horse. In his Thirty fifth Book he informs us that in the War against *Antiochus* the Consul *Quintius* raised two Legions, each of five thousand Foot, in all ten thousand, and six hundred Horse; and of the Allies, saith he, twenty thousand foot, and eight hundred Horse. The number of the Foot was double the Roman Infantry, and the Horse exceeded the Roman by two hundred. In the *Asrian* War, a little before that of *Macedon*,

Roman Allies ill used.

Number of the Allies,

Mistaken by *Vegetius*,Mistaken by *Machiavelli*;Prov'd out of *Livius*.*Livy*

*Livy* in his forty first Book says, ten thousand Roman Foot, and three hundred Horse were levied, and of the Allies twelve thousand Foot, and six hundred Horse. And to make short, hear him once for all in the Third Book of his History. It was agreed and concluded, saith he, that the Army should consist of two parts Confederates, (these then were the *Latins* and the *Ætrocki*) and one third part Citizens. If these instances evince not the rashness of that assertion, that the Allies were never stronger than the Romans, then *Livy* hath basely cozen'd us. But *Vegetius* will perhaps bring *Polybius* to support him, who in his Sixth Book says, The Allies Foot were for most part equal with the Roman Foot, but their Horse were double the number of the Roman Cavalry. To this I answer first, that by this account the Allies were stronger than the Romans, their Horse being double the number of the other, and therefore they were not of equal strength. Secondly, what if *Polybius* had said that both *Vegetius* and *Machiavelli* aver, *Quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus*; and indeed if he had said so much, he had nodded to the height of a perfect sleep, and might have been said to have dream'd. Thirdly, he says not that the Foot were always of equal numbers, but *ut plurimum*, for the most part, and I question the truth of that too. And lastly, if he had meant they were always of a like strength, he had foully contradicted himself; for in his Second Book he hath these words: Before *Hannibal*, saith he, invaded Italy, the Romans levied against the Gauls four Legions, each consisting of five thousand two hundred Foot, which were twenty thousand eight hundred Foot, and for every Legion three hundred Horse, which were twelve hundred; and of the Allies saith he, were raised thirty thousand Foot, and two thousand Horse. And in that same Book he saith, that the Roman preparations (I suppose against *Hannibal*) amounted to seven hundred thousand Foot, and twenty thousand Horse, a third part whereof (considering the sense of that time) could not be Romans; and yet (saith this Historian) *Hannibal* invaded them with few more than twenty thousand men.

To *Vegetius* I shall say particularly, that when he avers the Romans suffered not their Auxiliaries to exceed their own strength, he did not remember what *Livy* told him in his Twenty fifth Book, how *Quintus Scipio* trusting to the aid of thirty thousand *Celiberian* Auxiliaries, was betray'd by them when he was to fight with *Asdrubal*, for they left him every man, and join'd with the *Carthaginians*. A Caveat (saith the Historian) for the Romans, and all other States and Princes, to take no more Auxiliary strangers in their Camps than they could well overmaster. In the next place I shall make bold to ask *Machiavelli*, what he meant in the Third Book of his Art of War, where he says, though the Confederates Foot never exceeded the Roman Foot (the contrary whereof I have prov'd) yet their Horse, saith he, were permitted to be some more. Say you some more, yes indeed, some more, if it be true, what you self said a little before, that the Roman Horse of a Consular Army were but six hundred, and these of the Allies one thousand four hundred: This is a *semper mirum* indeed. But it is probable I may meet with him upon this very same subject in the next Chapter.

But we shall not be able to make an estimate of the marshalling, marching, or encamping of a Roman Consular Army, till we condescend on the number of the Allies, without whom few or none of them in ancient times went to the fields. Let us therefore without further contest follow the authority of the famous Historian and Captain *Polybius*, who (as I have cited his words already) says, the Allies for most part were equal in Infantry with the Romans, and double the number of their Cavalry. Then it will be clear, that not only in our Authors time, but often both before and after it, every Legion of the Allies consisted of four thousand two hundred Foot, and their Horse for every Legion were six hundred, because we may conjecture probably out of *Livy*, the Roman Legion was of that strength, and that the Horse were three hundred.

Out of the number of the Allies, by the Consuls appointment, were taken those whom the Roman Historians call Extraordinaries, and these were not a few, for they were the fifth part of the Foot, and the third of the Horse; as suppose out of two Legions, consisting of eight thousand four hundred Foot, one thousand six hundred and eighty were taken, which was the fifth part, and out of twelve hundred Horse, four hundred were taken, which was the third, and out of

*Polybius de-loaded.**Vegetius wrong in the number of Auxiliaries;**And Machiavelli of the Allies.**We must follow Polybius for the number of the Allies.**The Extraordinaries of the Allies.*

An idle conjecture.

these were the gallantest, best arm'd, best mounted, and of the greatest repute. There be some such as *Lippus* and *Torducci*, (who would gladly make us believe they have conversed with the Ghosts of the old Roman Politicians, and so know their *Arcana* and secrets) who say this was done under the mask of an honourable employment, to keep them at a distance from their friends, that they might not combine to the prejudice of the Roman State; and they say that upon this same account the rest of the *Socii* and Allies were in March, Camp and Battel, kept asunder by the interposition of the whole Roman Infantry: I may believe it was so, because I never heard any ancient Roman say any thing to the contrary. But if these Confederates had intended to have betrayed at any time their Imperious Allies, the Romans, they might easily have contriv'd the matter either in Camp or Battel, to have joined with an Enemy to the evident destruction of as many Romans as were then in the Fields: For in Battel the left-hand Legion of the Allies, and all their Cavalry being marshall'd together, might without any stop have stept over to an enemy, as in the discourse of a Consular Army will appear. And in a Camp the two sides of it were recommended to the care of the Allies, (as you will see in their *Castrametation*) and soon may a man be deceived who trusts the Aphorism, *Disce diffidere*, Learn to distrust. If all this might have been true, where Roman and Allies Legions were of equal strength, sure in Armies where the Allies were far more numerous than the Romans, they might if they had intended it, have done mischief enough.

Selesti of the Allies.

Out of these Extraordinaries were some chosen both of Horse and Foot, and these were called *Selesti*, as *Polybius* his Interpreter renders it, or *Ablesti*, as *Lippus* will have it to be. These, says *Polybius*, did not only lodge in the Camp behind the Tribunes, and near the General, but also in Battel, and on other occasions they used to attend the Consul, and the Quæstor, but of what number these *Selesti* were, neither *Polybius*, or for any thing I know any for him, doth inform us.

Roman Consuls power over the Allies.

These Legions and Horse-Troops of Allies were Officer'd, Marshall'd, Encamped, and Disciplin'd according to the Roman custom, only with this difference, that those who commanded Roman Legions were called Tribunes, but those who commanded the Legions of the Allies were called *Præfetti*. I conceive the reason of the difference of the title was this, the Tribune was elected for most part by the Tribes, whence he had his name *Tribunus*; but those of the Allies were nominated by the Roman Consuls (for the Allies had no power to appoint or Commissionate their own *Præfetti*; that had intrencht too much upon the Lordly power the Romans still kept in their own hands) and were bound most strongly to obey that Consul with whom they join'd. So we see how little difference the haughty Romans made between their Confederated friends and their vassals, which I hinted in the beginning of this Chapter; and in this point the Consuls had more power over the Allies than over the Romans themselves; for the Roman people for most part chose the Roman Tribunes, and not the Consuls.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. XVI.

### Of a Roman Consular army, and some Mistakes concerning it.

I Know not from whence this denomination of a Consular Army is come, unless it be that *Polybius* in his Sixth Book saith, that ordinarily every year four Legions were levied for the States service, two for every Consul, and this *Livy* doth witness to have been done often. But neither the one nor the other hath asserted that a Consul never had more or fewer Legions in his Army than two. *Polybius* means that a Consular Army consisted for most part of two Roman Legions; six hundred Horse, with two Legions of Allies, and twelve hundred Foot. But he never said that it was constantly so, for then he had contradicted his own History in many places. But I rather conceive Authors call that a Consular Army which had in it the above specified number of Horse and Foot, by the authority, and upon the word of *Vegetius*, who describes both a Pretorian and a Consular Army in the first Chapter of his Third Book. I shall faithfully English his words thus: The Ancients (saith he) having by experience learned to obviate difficulties, chose rather to have skilful than numerous Armies; therefore they thought in Wars of lesser moment, one Legion with the Auxiliaries, that is ten thousand Foot, and two thousand Horse might suffice, which the Prætors as lesser Chieftains often led in Expeditions. But if the enemy was reported to be strong, then a Consular power with twenty thousand Foot, and four thousand Horse was sent, with a greater Captain. But if an infinite multitude of the fiercest Nations did rebel, then too great necessity forcing them, two Chieftains with two Armies were sent, with this command, that either the one Consul, or both, should look to it, that the Commonwealth should receive no damage. In fine (saith he) since the Roman people was to make War almost every year in several Countries, against divers enemies, they thought these forces might suffice, because they judged it was not so profitable to entertain great Armies, as those that were well exercised and trained in Arms.

*Vegetius* describes a Pretorian, and a Consular army;

And contradicts himself,

Thus far *Vegetius*: let us take his Discourse in pieces, and examine it according to his own writings, and no mans else.

First, In the sixth Chapter of his second Book, he avers, there should be no fewer in a Legion than six thousand one hundred Foot, and seven hundred Horse: In this place, he saith, a Pretorian Army, (wherein there should be a Legion of Romans, and another of Allies) should have ten thousand Foot, and two thousand Horse; the Foot two thousand two hundred fewer than in his own account there should be in two Legions, and the Horse five hundred forty eight more than himself allows to the Cavalry of two Legions. And to let us see, that he will keep a proportionable way in contradicting himself, he says, against a strong Enemy a Consul was sent with twenty thousand Foot, and four thousand Horse; and that is, as he explains himself in the fourth Chapter of his second Book, two Legions of Romans, with the help of the Allies; now I beseech you hear him speak for himself; and first, in the sixth Chapter of his second Book he says, that the Legion must consist of six thousand one hundred Foot, and seven hundred twenty six Horse. Secondly, in this first Chapter of his third Book, he makes four Legions of the Roman and Allies Foot to be but twenty thousand, which by his own rule should have been twenty four thousand four hundred; for his words formerly were, that no Legion should be under six thousand one hundred, and those heavy armed too; and whereas by his own appointment, in the sixth Chapter of his second Book, every Legion should have had seven hundred twenty six Horse, more than any other Author allow'd: In this Chapter he increased their number to one thousand, for he orders the Horse of four Legions to be full four thousand, the Foot of a Consular Army four thousand four hundred below,

Secondly in a Consular army,

and

and the Horfe one thousand ninety fix above his own allowance. You fee how *Vegetius* clafheth with *Vegetius*, it is not that quarrel with him.

In the fecond place, he faith, if an infinite multitude of fierce Nations rebelled, againft whom? Certainly he means againft the *Romans*; but how could they rebel, before they profest to be fubject? Affuredly, thefe fierce Nations he fpeaks of, fware neither fealty nor homage to *Romulus*, nor *Rome* when he firft founded it. If they defended themfelves, fo long as they could, from the dominion of ftrangers, they did what nature commanded them, and were no Rebels. He will find *Spain* it felf, after long and bloody Wars, never reduced to a Province till *Augustus's* time. You fee what words his Inadvertency prompts him to utter. In this cafe of a great Rebellion, he fays, two Confuls with the Armies were joyn'd together, with a command to look to it, that the Common-wealth fuffer'd no damage. But this command was given many times when two Confuls did not, nor needed not bring their forces together.

Thirdly, You have heard him aver, that in the great wars, which the *Roman* State manag'd, their greateft Army confifted of twenty thoufand Foot, and four thoufand Horfe, twenty four thoufand in all; and that two of thofe Armies joyn'd together, making of both forty eight thoufand Combatants, did fuffice in the greateft danger. Truly *Vegetius*, if *Hannibal* had been alive when you wrote this, he could have inform'd you, that he forc'd your Mafters, the *Romans*, to joyn two fuch Armies and more, before ever they had to do with thofe fierce Nations you fpeak of; except a few *Spaniards*, and the *Celapine* or *Italian Gauls*; unlefs you take the *Sicilians* and *Carthaginians* to be thofe fierce Nations; with the firft whereof they quarrel'd and invaded them, and with the fecond broke Peace, without either regard to Juftice, or fenfe of Honour. But tell me, had the two Confuls at *Cannæ*, no more but forty eight thoufand *Romans* and Allies? read *Polybius* his fourth Book, you will fee they had eight Legions of *Romans*, and as many Allies, at five thoufand Foot each Legion, and three hundred Horfe, and thefe extended to eighty thoufand Foot, and feven thoufand two hundred Horfe, reckoning the Allies Cavalry double that of the *Romans*. Read *Livy's* twenty fecond Book, you will fee *Hannibal* kill'd at that fame Battel, forty five thoufand *Roman* Foot, and two thoufand feven hundred Horfe, befides Allies; and the fame Hiftorian will tell you in plain language, that the *Roman* Army at that place confifted of fourfcore and feven thoufand fighting men. And before *Hannibal* enter'd *Italy*, had the *Romans* no ftronger Armies againft the *Gauls* than forty eight thoufand men? Yes, both *Polybius* and *Livy* will tell you of far greater numbers, read in other Hiftories whether *Marius* had but forty eight thoufand *Romans* againft the fierce Nations of the *Cimbrians* and the *Teutones*. How vain a thing it is then for an Author of *Vegetius* his reputation to aver, that againft the mightieft Enemy, two Confular Armies, each of twenty four thoufand men, were fufficient, againft the current of Hiftory.

Fourthly, He lays it down for an unquestionable truth, that one Conful had never more than two Legions of *Romans*, and as many of the Allies, againft the moft powerful Enemy. Be pleas'd to hear his own words, in the fourth Chapter of his Second Book: "*In omnibus Auctoribus invenitur, singulis Consulibus adversus Hostes copiofiffimos, non amplius quam binas duaxiffe Legiones, additis auxiliis fectorum*: In all Authors, faith he, it is found, that every Conful never led more againft the moft numerous Enemies than two Legions, with the affiftance of the Allies. And that it fhould not be faid, he had writ fo manifef an untruth, without a reafon, he adds, "*Tanta in illis erat exercitibus, tanta fiducia, ut civis bello, dua legiones crederentur fufficere*. They were fo well train'd, and had fo great confidence, that two Legions were thought to be fufficient for any War. Did ever man write fo? If two Legions were fufficient in any War, why were four Legions and two Confuls, employed againft the fierce Nations, he juft now fpoke of? But I will come nearer him, and tell him, that it is very often found in Authors, that one Conful or General had the Conduct of more than two Legions, and therefore *Vegetius* his words that I cited laft muft either be falfe, or thofe Authors whom I fhall cite, do grofsly abufe us. I fhall not repeat the bufinefs of *Cannæ*, but be pleas'd to take thefe other Inftances.

When

When *Cæfar* heard of the dreadful preparations of the *Helvetians*, to flop that inundation, he pofts to *Italy*, and raifes two new Legions, joyns them with three *Veterans*, brought them to *Eggenz*, and with one he had there already, he made fix in all, and with thefe fought the *Helvetians*, and thereafter, *Atius Julius*, all in one Summer. This he writes in the fecond Book of the *Gallick War*. Here were more than two Legions, yet but one Conful. In his fifth Book he fays, he invaded *England* with five Legions, befides a vaft number of *Gauls*, *Nomians*, and *Balearians*, having left his Legate *Labiens* in *Gaul* with 3 Legions, and three thoufand Horfe; here a Conful's Legate commanded more Legions than two. The moft part of the time *Cæfar* ftay'd in *Gaul*, he had ten Legions, till *Pompey* and the Senate cheated him of two of them. *Petrus* and *Africanus* had feven Legions in *Spain*, *Pompey* had eleven at *Pharfalia*, befides a world of Auxiliaries; and there *Cæfar* had eight, and at *Brundifum*, when he was in purfuit of the flying Senate, he had twelve Legions. Thus we fee, that Great *Cæfar*, the moft daring Conful that ever was, thought not two Legions fufficient againft any Enemy, or in any War. Before his time, the two Confuls, *Marius* and *Scipio* joyn'd their Armies together againft the *Cimbrians*; and, as *Florus* tells us, loft in the Battel eighty thoufand *Romans*, and forty thoufand Servants and Baggage-men. Sure in thefe two Confular Armies there were four Legions four times told. And the fame Author fays that *Mark Anthony the Triumvir*, entered *Asia* with eighteen Legions, and sixteen thoufand Horfe, all thefe Confuls and their Legates liv'd long before *Vegetius*, and I doubt not but he hath read all their ftories: but I fhall lead him up to thofe times, when his *Romans* were not fo powerful as to raife fo numerous Legions, and yet in them we fhall fee that the Confuls were not flinted to two Legions a piece, and he hath very confidently declared, they were: *Polybius* faith, that before the fecond Punick War, the *Romans* had feveral hundred thoufands in arms; I hope then no man (except our Author) will fay, that every Conful had but two Legions allotted him. In the Confulship of young *Camillus*, the City being environ'd with enemies, ten Legions were levied; two of them were left for defence of *Rome*, four were given to the *Prætor*, and *Camillus* took four to himfelf, each confifting of 4 thoufand two hundred Foot, and three hundred Horfe. Thus we fee not only that a Confular Army had four *Roman* Legions in it (a thing denied by *Vegetius*) but a Pretorian one had four, to which our Author allows but one. You may read this in *Livy's* Seventh Book, and in that fame place he tells us, that the Conful *Popilius Lenus* marched with four full Legions againft the enemy, leaving a confiderable army at *Rome* to wait on all hazards. In his Sixth Book, he faith old *Camillus* (who defeated the *Gauls*) marched with four Legions againft the *Volftians*. One Inftance more, which may ferve to decide the queftion if there were any, the fame Hiftorian in his Second Book informs us, that the Dictator *Marcus Valerius*, levied and enrolled ten Legions, whereof he gave three to every Conful, and kept four to himfelf. Obferve, that at that time the *Latins* were Allies, and levied their proportions, as many Foot as the *Romans* did, and twice as many Horfe, if not more of both the one and the other. Obferve alfo, that in thofe times the *Roman* Seignory was of no large extent; for *Livy* fpeaking of thefe Levies of *Valerius*, fays, fo many Legions were never levied before; he means, never at one time. Thefe are fufficient enough to prove *Vegetius* to have been too confident, when he faid that never *Roman* Conful conducted more than two *Roman* Legions, even againft the moft numerous Enemies.

But he is in no danger for all this, becaufe he is fupported by one, who by his other writings hath made himfelf well enough known, and that is *Niccol Machiavelli*, who in the third Book of his Art of War, very magifterially tells us, that the Allies Foot never exceeded that of the *Romans*, but their Horfe were fome more; I have fpoken to both thefe in the laft Chapter: But he adds, that the *Romans* in their greateft neceffity never ufed more than two Confular Armies, and that each of them confifted of twenty four thoufand Combatants. I hope, the Inftances I have ufed againft *Vegetius* in this fame caufe, may ferve fufficiently to confute *Machiavelli*. But here I muft obferve the *Florentines* prefumption, in the modelling his *Roman* Confular Army. Firft, He makes every Legion to confift of five thoufand five hundred Foot, a thing

P 2

Inftances of later times to the contrary: Of *Cæfar*,

*Petrus* and *Africanus*, *Pompey*,

*Marius* and *Scipio*,

Of more ancient times,

Before the fecond Punick War,

Young *Camillus*,

*Popilius Lenus*,

Old *Camillus*,

*Marcus Valerius*.

*Machiavelli* his assertion

His inadvertency,

His contradiction of Roman story.

A bold assertion of *Vegetius*.

Confuted.

we never heard from any other Author, nor he from *Vegetius*; who is constantly for six thousand one hundred Foot. Next, he makes the Cavalry of the Allies to be seven hundred for every Legion; contrary to most Authors, who make them but six. But we shall let that pass with him, that thereby he may make up his Consular Army of twenty four thousand men; thus: Two Roman Legions, eleven thousand Foot, Allies Foot as many, these amount to twenty two thousand; then six hundred Roman Horse, and fourteen hundred of the Allies, are two thousand Horse; in all twenty four thousand. Let this, I say, be given, but not granted him; why concludes he positively, that two Consular Armies consisted of fifty thousand fighting men? Where did the Secretary of *Florence* learn this Arithmetick, to make fifty the aggregate of twice twenty four? Yet if he be not guilty of more dangerous errors, we may pardon him this. But to return to *Vegetius*, he gives me too oft just occasion to think that *Lipfius* wrong'd him not much, when he said of him, that he was, *Veterum rerum parum firmiter Sciens*; Not thoroughly acquainted with ancient matters.

## CHAP. XVII.

*Of a Consular Army, Marshall'd in the Field; and of some general Officers belonging to it.*

IN so important an affair, upon the right or wrong managing of which, depended the conservation or ruine, not only of the Roman Armies, but of the State; *Polybius* affords us no more light than what he hath done in marshalling the Legionary Foot; and if he be right in that, we are to look for little or no help from *Vegetius*, whose ordering of a Legion we have rejected; only we admit what he says in the fifteenth Chapter of his second Book (though thereby he contradicts himself) that, *Equites locantur in cornibus*: The Horse are placed in the Wings. But having in the several fore-going Chapters shown you how (as far as any Authors have given us light) the Foot were marshall'd; of what number both they and the Horse were, and how they were drawn up; of what number the Allies were, and how they were divided: I suppose, our business now is, how to joyn them in one Body or Army, and when it comes to a battel, to observe what customes were used by the Romans, and other Ancients.

Though as either occasion offer'd, emergency required, or necessity forced, the Roman Captains used several figures and forms of Battels, yet that which was most ordinary, and most used, was the quadrate or square; but I do not at all mean an equilateral one, as *Terducci* would gladly have it to be, to which purpose he puts himself to more trouble than he needs; and in doing so, he shews himself more an Engineer (as I believe he was to *Bassa* the Emperour, *Rodolph* the Second's Captain General in *Transilvania*) than a Marshal of a Field needs to be. But I mean such a Quadrate or Square, as the General of the Roman Army imagined, that either the ground, the posture of the Enemy, or his own designs did or might prompt him to make. But in regard we can say but little to Marshalling, till we confend, of what and how many members ordinarily the Roman Armies were composed, and though the numbers of both Roman and Allies Legions varied oft, yet because for most part the Legion consisted of four thousand two hundred Foot, and the Horse were three hundred, and that ordinarily two Legions, and six hundred Horse were sent to the Field with a Consul, and that also for most part the Foot of the Allies was equal to that of the Romans, and almost constantly they were double their

number

number in Horse; let us follow *Polybius*, and say the Consular army consisted of sixteen thousand eight hundred Foot, and eighteen hundred Horse, in all eighteen thousand six hundred.

Neither do I think I can tell you better how a Roman Army was Marshall'd, when it was to fight, than to inform you how *Scipio* the Great, or the African drew up his Army when he was to fight against *Syphax* and *Adribal*, and that out of the Fourteenth Book of *Polybius*. There the Historian tells us that the Roman Consul drew up his Foot in the Body or Battel, first his *Hastati*, next his *Principes*, and thirdly his *Triarii*; on the right wing were his Roman Horse, and on the left his *Numidians*. And here our Author in one word, and once for all tells us, that it was the constant custom of the Romans to Marshall their Armies in that fashion: His words are, *Et in hoc Romana Militia consuetudinem simpliciter servavit*. And when the same *Scipio* fought against his redoubted enemy *Hannibal*, he did the very like, only with this alteration, that he commanded his Legate *Laelius* to command the Roman Cavalry on the left wing, and set King *Masini* with his *Numidian* Horse on the right.

This one example may teach us how the Roman Armies were ordinarily Embattled. But here is no word of the Allies. I suppose, if *Scipio* had any, as likely he had, their Horse were join'd with the Roman Horse in one of the wings in both those Battels, since the other wing at both times was given to the Auxiliary *Numidians*. But where an Army was purely composed of Romans and Allies, they were Marshall'd as we may gather out of *Polybius* his Sixth Book, and other Authors in this manner, the Roman six hundred Horse were placed on the right wing, upon their left-hand the first Legion of the Allies Foot, consisting of three thousand four hundred (for eight hundred of it was taken out for Extraordinaries) upon the left-hand of the Allies first Legion, stood the first Roman Legion, and next it the second; and upon the left-hand of it was Marshall'd the second Legion of the Allies; and upon the left-wing stood the Confederates Cavalry to the number of eight hundred, for four hundred of their twelve hundred were cull'd out for Extraordinaries. Now those eight hundred Horse of the Allies were divided into twenty Turnes or Troops, as the Roman six hundred Horse were likewise, but with this difference, that in every Troop of the Allies there were forty Riders, but in the Roman Troops there were only thirty. Thus was the gros or bulk of the Roman armies Marshall'd. As to the *Evocati* of the Romans, and the *Extraordinarii* of the Allies, *Polybius* hath told us no more than what I have told you in my Discourse of the Allies, that they were Encamped besides the Consul, and were to be near him in the field, and to wait on the Treasurer also. But we are left by him and others to conjecture how, in what particular place or places, they were ordain'd to fight. And truly I shall be easily induced to believe that sometimes the Consul placed three hundred of the Allies Extraordinary Horse on the right hand of the Roman Horse in the right wing, and so made that wing stronger by one hundred than the other, for otherwise the left wing had been two hundred stronger than the right. The fourth hundred of the Extraordinary Horse, *Terducci* will have to stay with the Consul, and probably they did so. The Allies Extraordinary Foot were divided into two great Squadrons, one whereof stood between the first Legion of the Allies, and the first Legion of the Romans, on the right-hand of the Battel; the second Squadron stood on the left-hand of the second Roman Legion, between it and the second Legion of the Allies.

Thus *Lipfius* and *Terducci* will have it to be, and I think it may be probable enough that it was so, yet I doubt none of these two can tell me, who told them that it was so. In another place *Lipfius* thinks that both the *Evocati* and *Extraordinarii*, at the Consul's command, join'd with the *Triarii* to reinforce the Battel, and truly this is not improbable, but the question is where they stood before they were commanded to join with the *Triarii*: for as *Lipfius* Marshall's them in the Intervals of the *Triarii*, they would hinder the *Principes* and *Hastati* to join with the *Triarii*. What *Terducci* saith on this subject, I suppose he hath out of *Lipfius*; for though they were coetaneous, yet I find *Lipfius* often cited by *Terducci*. But I shall wrong none of them, if I say that neither of them in this particular had more warrant than their own *Levis conjecturae*, & *fallacia vestigia*, as *Lipfius* calls them. If you will believe *Vegetius* in the eighteenth Chapter of his Third Book,

Roman Army Marshall'd by Scipio.

Army of Romans and Allies Marshall'd together in the Field.

Station of the Extraordinaries uncertain.

Terducci over nice.







The Consul  
sure when he  
went to any  
Expedition.

The chief Commander of the army, when he was to march from the City, was obliged to sacrifice in the Capitol, and there to take his *Auspices*, the foreboding Omens, or (as *Philemon Holland* calls them) the *Offs*, of his good fortune in that Expedition, and then he rode out of the City in great state and splendor, *Paludatus*, in a glorious and rich Embroidered Coat of Arms, conveyed by a gallant company of his choicest friends, with his *Lictors*, or *Servants* before him, with Axes and bundles of Rods, the ordinary number whereof (if the General was a Consul) was twelve. These solemn Rites, Ceremonies and Customs might not be neglected; if they were, the Generals had neither the prayers and good wishes of the people, nor the willing obedience of their armies. *Caius Claudius* going to *Illyria*, went from *Rome* in the night-time, without any solemnity, but so soon as he came to his army, he found his Soldiers in a mutiny, which though he punished severely enough, yet he found himself necessitated not only to go back to *Aquileia*, but to return to *Rome* it self, there to make his Vows, sacrifice, and go out of the City in pomp, according to the accustomed manner.

Valius neglect-  
ed.

But for all we have said of *Roman* armies, we see not yet where the *Velites* were marshall'd, nor how they fought; we must believe that which is most probable, that they were marshall'd behind the *Triarii*, and that they marched through the Intervals of the heavy armed, to the Van, and fought there till they did either beat the enemy, or were beaten by him back to the Reer. If any desire to see the figure of a Consular army, he may meet with one of them in *Terentius* his Book of the ancient and modern Machines, and another in *Lipsius* his Commentary on *Polybius*, each after the fancy of the Author, but since I intend not in this Treatise to present my Reader with any figures of my own, I shall not trouble him with any that belong to another.

## CHAP. XVIII.

### Of several Figures of Armies used by the Ancients in their Battels.

If a General or Commander in chief have not the choice of the ground where he is to fight, he must marshall his army according to the advantages or difficulties of it. But if he may make choice of the place of Battel, then no doubt he may model his forces as he pleaseth, without tying himself to any precepts or precedents of others. Notwithstanding which he must be very wary, not to cast his army in such a figure as carries along with it intricacy, such as may make both the ordering and observing it difficult, and more especially he was to be very shie of changing the Figure of his army in the time of action, in regard that the bulk of an army is composed of such members as are for most part rude, gross, and of so dull understandings, that they are not able in an instant to apprehend the reasons of sudden alterations, or to dive into the designs of their great Commanders; and therefore a change of the form of a Battel, after an army is engaged, may cast it into confusion, which may quickly render it a prey to an attentive and vigilant enemy.

Dangerous to  
alter the Fi-  
gure of an  
Army in time  
of action.

Five Figures  
of Battalions.

Quadrate  
Turric.

The Figures of Armies used by the Ancients, not only *Grecians* and *Romans*, but even of those Nations, likewise whom both these were pleased to qualifie with the title of *Barbarians*, were for most part of five kinds. These were the Quadrate or Square, the Wedg, the *Tenaille*, or Tong, the Saw, and the Globe.

The Quadrate or Square they subdivided into three sorts, to wit, the *Turric*, the *Lying Lateral*, and the *Simple Lateral*. The *Turric* was that Battel whose height or depth was much greater than its front; As, draw up a thousand men

ten six deep, let them face either to the right hand or left, you shall see them but six in front; and a hundred sixty six deep, it is the *Quadrate Turric*, so called because its height or depth makes it look like a Tower; it was but seldom used, and indeed it is very useless.

The *Simple Lateral* is where all the *Lateral* or sides of the Battel, that is front, reer, and both flanks are of a like extent. One hundred men drawn up ten deep, gives you the *Simple Lateral Quadrate*, because it is a Battel equal on all sides, it is also called the *Equilateral quadrate*, of this form were the ancient *Egyptian* Battels, as I have told you in the *Grecian Art of War*: ten thousand of their men Marshall'd a 100 deep, made them a 100 in front, a 100 in reer, and a 100 in each flank, so that face them any way you please, still they were a 100 in front.

Simple Lateral  
Quadrate.

The *Lying Lateral* square, or quadrate, is a Battel in which the front is of a greater extent than the flank, or where there are a great many more men in the rank, than in the file as 16000 men (after the *Grecian* way) Marshall'd 16 deep, gives you a front of 1000 men; and the flank but of 16. And this was usually both the *Grecian* and *Roman* way of Embattelling, and continues so still in our Modern armies. So when you read in story that an army march'd in a Quadrate form, as *Livy* speaks both in his Second and Thirteenth Books, and *Salust* also says, that *Adrianus* march'd against *Jugurtha* with a Quadrate army; you are to understand it, that they march'd in order of Battel, ready to fight, and that the form of their Battalions was Quadrate; but do not imagine they were *Equilateral*, or *Simple lateral*: It is from the *Quadrate* form (which the *Romans* call'd *lying Lateral*) consisting of four angles; that our word *Squadron* hath its denomination; a word used now (for any thing I know) in all *European* Languages. By what I have said it appears, that though it were granted to *Terentius*, as it is not, that the *Romans* drew up their Foot twelve deep; yet that will not conclude their Battalions, whether lesser Bodies or greater, to have been *Equilateral* quadrate; as he would have them to be, for in their Maniples drawn up, as he would have them twelve deep (since every one of them consisted of an hundred and twenty men) they could make but ten Files; now ten in front, and twelve in file, makes no more an *Equilateral* Battalion, than a hundred twenty men Marshall'd ten deep, and twelve in front can represent that figure. This *lying Lateral* quadrate, whereof I now speak, is that form of Battel whereof *Vegerius* is to be understood, when he speaks of a quadrate army with a long front.

Tridangel nice-  
ly curious.

The *Wedg* I have spoke of in my discourses of the *Grecian* Militia, but I would not have my Reader to imagine that these *Wedg* battels spoken so much of in ancient Histories, were such as are painted to us, beginning with one man, then two, next three, and so to the end of the Chapter (though that method might be well enough observed in a small body either of Horse or Foot) but they were Battalions condensed, and at close order, the point consisting of a good many men, yet pointed, because the Body grew broader and broader, till you came to the Reer where it was broadest; for to imagine that in the heat of the fight, any Battalion of the most experienced Soldiers, can be suddenly cast into so punctual a form, (as first one, then two) by the readiest General that ever was, is a Speculation never reduced, or reducible to practice. And so you are to understand the *Wedg* in which the *Theban Epaminondas* cast some of his Infantry at the Battel of *Maninea*, whereby he broke the *Laconian*, was not a *sim-flam* of one, two, three, and four, (he had no time to tell straws) but a good massie body of men, perhaps of fifty, sixty, seventy, or a hundred in front, growing greater till it came to the end. This *Wedg*-battel consisted of three angles, the foremost point making one, and the broad end furnish'd the other two; and indeed it is a Triangle, but not an equilateral one. I told you in another place out of *Livy*, how the *Ciliberians* had well near routed the Pretor *Fulvius* by their *Wedg*-battel, till he defeated them with a desperate Charge of unbridled Horses. He who thinks that this *Wedg*-battel of these *Spaniards* began with one man at the point, and by equal degrees came to a great many at the end of the *Wedg*, hath a strong imagination. *Livy* in his twenty second Book calls that Battalion of *Macedonians*, (who stood ranged in Battel within the Walls of *Cenebra* to receive the Assailants, when the *Roman* Consul was to storm) a *Wedg*, and yet it was a Phalange condensed, only smaller at the point, than at the rest of its dimensions. And he might have call'd it

Wedg-figure.

How it is  
rightly to be  
understood.

a Tortoise, or Tortoise, if he had pleas'd, for they stood all covered with their Shields and great Targett, which representing the Tortoise covered with its shell, gave that figure of Battel its denomination.

Globe, or  
Ring-figure.

The Globe battel was a Battalion that appear'd to be of a round figure, and if it was perfectly round, the *English* have worded it well, in calling it a Ring. I find it often mention'd in modern than in ancient stories. I should think those who use it, were on the defensive, for men standing in a perfect Globe-figure, can neither pursue, nor run away without breaking their order, and figure of their Battel, and so unglorie or unrich themselves. Mr. *Elton* gives us its figure, and tells us right ingeniously how it is made; but sure it is not feasible for great bodies to cast themselves into that figure, I incline to their opinion who think it was but a Wedg of a lesser body, and being smaller seem'd more Circular. And I the rather think so, because *Cæsar* in his Books of the *Alexandrine* War, says, that *Domitius* one of his Legates sav'd a Legion by casting it in a Ring, when the rest of his Army was routed, at *Nicopolis* by *Pharnaces*; for if that Legion had been in a perfect round figure, it could not have retir'd as it did, from him who by his victory was master of the Field.

Tenaille, or  
Xonge.

The *Tenaille*, Tongue or Shears, was nothing but the reverse of the Wedg, and was to be used only against it, for whereas the Wedg was sharp at the point to pierce any Battalion that stood against it, so the *Tenaille* open'd its arms to receive and embrace the Wedg, having its bulk notwithstanding behind to oppose it, if it could not be broke by the arms of the *Tenaille*. And a Squadron may very soon cast it self in a *Tenaille*, either by advancing its two flanks (the Body standing *quad square*) or yet by making the middle part (against which the point of the Wedg prepares) retire a little, both the flanks standing still, either the one or the other way makes the Squadron a *Tenaille*.

The Saw.

The Saw was a great Battalion composed of several Squadrons, all marshalled in the form of Wedges, the angular points of which Wedges represented the teeth of the Saw, and the Bodies of the several Wedges standing in a direct line represented the body of the Saw. Some have writ that the several Maniples of a *Roman* Legion did represent the Saw, taking the Bodies of the Maniples for the Teeth, and the Intervals for the body of the Saw.

But how could that be, for the Bodies of the Maniples, and the several Intervals between these Bodies, were all of one equal front, and so are not the teeth and body of a Saw; and unless these Maniples had been made a little sharper at the front, than of either ten or twelve men, the resemblance would not have holden. We do not read that the *Romans* used it at all.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. XIX.

Of some Customs used by the Romans, and other Ancient Nations, before in the time of, and after their Battels.

The *Grecians* sung a Hymn and a *Pæan*, both before and after their Battels; but before they began, unless they were surprized, they offer'd Sacrifices to such of their Gods and Goddesses, as either they hoped would be for them, or feared might be against them. The inspection of the Entrails of the sacrificed Beasts, was an ordinary thing with the *Greeks*, as all their Historians tell us; nor was this custom peculiar to them, for the Enemy of Mankind was worshipp'd by the *Romans*, and other Nations, as well as by the *Grecians*. Before the *Romans* came to the Battel, they were somewhat nice in observing how the Sacred Pullets did eat their allowance; they furnish'd a fair occasion to the Chieftains to usurp a power to persuade or dissuade the Consuls from fighting, when they pleas'd. Instead of these, in our Modern Wars, before the Battel, the Turk with great devotion, attends the sight of the new Moon; and both he, and other *Mahometans*, how loud enough to their Impostor, who is otherwise so taken up, that he hath no leisure to hear their habblings. Christians either humbly offer, or should humbly offer the Sacrifices of their Prayers to the True God, who gives Victory to whom he pleaseth. In the Primitive times, they sung a *Pæan*, and a Hymn, *Crus* *Kais*.

After the Heathens thought they had made their Deities propitious, their Chieftains laboured to encourage their Armies with good Words, Speeches, Orations, and Promises of Rewards: Their Speeches were sometimes premeditated, and sometimes extemporary. The *Roman* Generals used to harangue their Armies, when they were to promulgate new Ordinances, to punish grievous Crimes, or to fight with an Enemy; sometimes in the Camp, and sometimes in the Field. And all this was also done by other Nations, though it may be not so well.

When the *Roman* Generals resolv'd either to fight or offer Battel, they caus'd a Scarlet or Purple Coat of Arms to be hung upon the point of a long Spear at their *Prætorium*, or Pavilion; and this was *Signum Pæna*, the sign of Battel; and then every one prepar'd himself for his proper work. But before that, for most part, the Souldiers had direction to refresh themselves with Sleep and Meat, and this indeed was well done of them; but they were not the only men who did it; other Nations used it, particularly, we read, that *Hannibal* practis'd it at *Trevis*; for there he order'd his Army, the night before he fought, to take their rest and refreshment, and next morning set upon the *Romans* when they were fasting; to which *Livy* in his twenty first Book, mostly attributes his Victory. After these things the Army was marshall'd in the Field; whereof I have already spoken sufficiently.

Being ready to come to the shock, the *Tessera*, or Word was given, which all, both Officers and Common Souldiers received, that by it they might know one another, and so discern an Enemy. The *Tessera* was either one Word, or one Sentence, as *Felicitas*, *Libertas*, *Veni*, *Genetrix*, (one of *Julius Cæsar*'s *Optima Mater*, given by *Nero*, The word of Sons. Among the Emperours, after their conversion to the Faith, *Deus*, *Nobiscum*, God with us, was ordinary; and so it continues to be often used among the *German*, *Danish*, and *Swedish* Armies. Next to the Word, was the Shout, and this either was not, or should not be raised, till the Armies were at that distance, that they could immediately come to blows: This was done to encourage their own men, and terrifie their Enemies. *Livy* in his fourth Book informs us, that where this

The Scarlet,  
or Purple  
Coat of Arms.

Refreshment.

The *Tessera*,  
or Word.

*Ballus*, or  
thout.

this cry or shout was very loud, shrill, and continued without interruption; it was interpreted to be a certain sign of Victory: but if it was dead, cold, and unequal, often begun, and often interrupted, it beway'd fear and discouragement, and portended ruine and destruction. It was used by all Nations, as well as the Romans, and the word *Baritus*, whereby Historians express it, was borrowed from the Ancient Germans, whose cry, they say, founded like the pronunciation of that word. They cry'd no more after they came to the medley, else it would have hinder'd them from hearing the Commands of their Officers, either by word of mouth, or the Trumpet. Though the loud noise of Cannons, and Muskets in our Modern Wars, may seem reason enough to suppress this ancient custom of shouting, yet it neither ought to be, nor yet is it banish'd out of our Armies. The Germans, French, Danes and Swedes, in their advance, and before they give Fire, have their *caracoles*: And no doubt, with an advance, a strong beats and inflames the Blood, and helps to encourage. The late Marshal, and his Armies, made but too good use of it. These things were previous to a Battel, First, The Purple Coat of Arms at the Consul Ravallion. Secondly, The Exhortation or Harangue. Thirdly, The Marching the Army. Fourthly, The Word, or *Tessera*. Fifthly, The *Classium*. And Lastly, The Shout or *Baritus*. Of the first five that were ordinarily practis'd, *Caesar* speaks in the second Book of his *Gallick War*, as necessary, for when he was almost surpris'd by the *Nervians*, he wisens thus: *Caesar*, (saith he of himself) had all things to do at once, the Standard to be set up, (that is, the Scarlet Coat) his Army to marshal, his Soldiers to exhort, for cause the lige to be given by the Trumpet, and to give the Signs; this last Sign, saith he, the *Tessera*, otherwise the words had been superfluous, of which that great man cannot be taxed. As to this last Sign, which was the Word, the Ancients found that same difficulty, with which all Armies are still troubled, and that was, that by the often requiring and giving it, the Enemy came to the knowledge of it, and then it was useless. *Livy* tells us, that he reads in *Polihypus*, that one *Aulus an Aro-cadian Captain*, being to fall on the *Lacedaemonians* in the night time, or, as we now call it, to beat up their quarters, instead of a Word, he commanded his Army to require no Word at all, but to use all those who fought a Word, as Enemies; so that the demanding the *Tessera*, beway'd the demander to be a *Lacedaemonian*, who at that time receiv'd a notable overthrow. The Roman Consul, when he was to fall on, caus'd the *Classium* to sound, which was seconded by the nearest, and immediately by all the Trumpets, Horns, and Horn-pipes of the Army.

And now the Battel begins, concerning which an old question is not yet perhaps decided, Whether it was better to give or receive the charge? The Roman Dictator *Cassius* (as *Livy* hath it in his sixth Book) being to join Battel with a powerful Army of the *Volsicians*, commanded all his Foot to stand still, and fix their Javelines in the ground, and forcethe the Enemies charge; which being violent, put them out of breath, and then the Legionaries clos'd with them, and routed them. Great *Pompey* gave the like order at *Pharsalia*, but not with the like success, for he was totally beaten. But *Machaevell* with his accustomed confidence (to give it no worse name) in the fourth Book of his Art of War, takes upon him to give the decisive sentence, and awards the Victory to him who receives the charge: And saith also, that most Captains chuse rather to receive than give it, yet he instances only one of the *Fabii*, who, by receiving the charge of the *Sannites* and *Gauls*, was Victorious. But we must listen to a greater Captain than any he hath named, and himself to boot, and that is *Julius Caesar*: who by giving the charge in the *Thessalian Plains*, gain'd the Sovereignty of the Roman Empire, and blames *Pompey* for following the bad advice of *Triarius*, to wait till *Caesar* charged him. His words, whereby he seems to void this difference, you have in the third Book of his Civil War, which are these in *English*: "But on the contrary, says he, I think this was done by *Pompey*, without any shew of reason, (meaning his keeping his Soldiers from advancing to the charge) because therein, saith he, I know not what gallant vigour, and natural inclination to courage born in all men, which Captains ought rather to cherish, stir up, and augment, than any way mollifie, or restrain. Thus far Great *Caesar*. But on the other hand, if an Army be drawn

A pretty story.

*Classium* a sign of Battel.

A question, whether to give or receive the charge?

*Machaevell's* opinion.

*Caesar's* judgment of it.

up in an advantageous ground (suppose a Hill, or fenced with Marshes, River, or Rock) the quitting of which may prove prepolical (as the loss of all advantages) especially in matters of War (which) it alters clearly the case, and those who have done it either in Ancient or Modern Wars, to the irrecoverable loss of their Masters, have much mistaken *Caesar*, who never practis'd it, and assuredly those who do it, had need of good fortune, otherwise they may be sure to be branded in true Histories with either perfidy; or inexcusable folly; and even in Romances, with too much generosity.

In the title of Battel, all both Commanders and Soldiers did their duties, by punctually obeying the commands of their Generals, though to the certain and inevitable loss of their lives; if not, they were sure to incur those punishments, whereof I shall speak hereafter. Nor were they obliged to obey the commands given them before the Battel only, but all those orders and signs that were given them in the time of Battel: These *Vegetius* in the fifth Chapter of his third Book, calls Signs, and divides them into three Signs in this Battel. Signs, Vocal, Semi-vocal, and Dumb. The Vocal were the verbal commands of the Officers, especially the Consul, and Tribunes. The Semi-vocal were the several sounds of *Classiums*, Trumpets, and Horns; as *March*, *Charge*, *Retire*. The Dumb signs were the Ensigns, Standards, and Eagles; as also the elevation of the Hand, of a Colour, or a Lance, or the shaking of a Spear by a Consul, or General: But these were agreed on before the fight began, and were either given to the whole Army, or but to a part of it; as, when you see such a thing done, then you are to do so and so. These Dumb signs would not do much good in our Battels; where the smook of Powder would render many of them imperceptible.

And now the Battel is ended, and the Romans are either Victorious, or have lost the day: If the first, they were to pursue the Enemy to his Camp, or clearly out of the Field; and not only so, but to follow him to close, that he might have no time to rally, and to force him out of his strong holds, before he recover'd breath to gather strength. But we shall find not only *Flaminius* defective in this so important a Duty of a Great Captain, but many of the Romans themselves, even against this *Carthaginian* Arch-enemy of theirs. *Livy* informs us in his twenty seventh Book, that at *Cannae*, *Marcus* beats him; *Flaminius* gets to his Camp, and in the night time marches out of it; *Marcus* not pursuing him, got work enough to do with him afterward. The same Author tells us in his twenty ninth Book, that the Consul *Sempronius*, and Pro-consul *Licinius* fought with the same *Flaminius* in the *Bracon* Countrey, and defeated him; but they not pursuing, he got the rest of his Army safely to *Craton* next day. In his thirty first Book he says, *Philip of Macedon* was worsted by the Romans in two Horse fights, but not being pursued by the Consul, and leaving great Fires in the Camp, he escap'd to the Mountains. *Caesar* defies all his Enemies to challenge or charge him with this oversight; for he never beat one of them in the Field, (which he did very often) but he was sure to be Master of his Camp before he slept. But you may read all along in *Livy*, when the Roman State was but beginning to grow, that when their Dictators or Consuls had beaten any of their Neighbours, *Tuscani*, *Vibini*, *Volsicians*, *Sannites* or *Latines*, for most part, they made no more ado, but march'd back to the City, which, I suppose, the ambition of a Triumph frequently led them to.

But if these very often Victorious Romans receiv'd the foil, as sometimes they did, they did even that which many more ancient people did before them, and many younger have done since; and that is, they either fled, or retir'd: If they fled downright, without taking notice of their Camp, either their speed carried them away, or they saved their lives; by submitting to such conditions as themselves often imposed upon those, who by the chance of War, came to be their Captives; of which I shall speak in my discourse of Prisoners. Of what advantage or disadvantage flying or retiring to a Camp was, shall be touch'd, when I come to view *Livy's* his comparison of the Ancient and Modern Militia. In this place I shall only say, that the Romans did not always leave their Camps fortified and mann'd, when they went out to Battel. At *Cimbra*, the Consul *Fabius* made his Baggage-men demolish the fortification of his Camp, and fill up the Ditches, while he put his Army in Battel array,

To keep advantages.

Signs in this Battel.

Not always practis'd by the Romans.

Never omitted by *Caesar*.

Of a Retreat to a Camp.

array, in which he issued out, fought the Enemy, and beat him, as you have it in *Livy's* ninth Book. And it is in that same Book, where he tells you, that the Dictator *Q. Fabius* order'd *C. Fabius* to fall upon the *Sannites*, with his new levied Army, while the Dictator himself, at another quarter fall'd out of his Camp with his whole Army, and did not only not leave any to defend the Camp, but order'd likewise all his Tents and Baggage to be burnt, that by taking away all hopes of a Retreat, he might force his Soldiers to fight courageously, both for the safety of their lives, and the recovery of their goods, or the equivalence of the safety of the plunder of the Enemies Camp, all which came to pass. The next, by the plunder of the *Roman* Dictator, History tells us, hath been practis'd like of this action of the Dictator himself, when he invaded *England*, by others, particularly by *William* the Conquerour, when he invaded *England*, who after his landing, caus'd them to burn all his Ships, which were not so few as eight hundred.

*Uasalus vi-*  
*ctus, nullum*  
*spem salu-*  
*tem.*

## CHAP. XX.

## Of the March of a Consular Army.

Supposing that, which very often fall out, that the *Romans* gain'd the Victory in their last Battle, and had again nestled themselves in their Camp, let us see in what order they march'd out of it, either to pursue an old Enemy, or to find out a new one. In this point of the *Roman* Militia, *Lipius* puts himself to some needless trouble to comment on *Polybius*, for I think he is so clear in it, that *Lipius* doth him disservice, in offering him his help, where he needs it not at all. I shall therefore tell you, how *Polybius* ordereth the march of a Consular Army, without staying for *Lipius* his tedious explications.

*Lipius* officious.

Preparations to a March.

At the first found, of the Trumpets and Horns, every man gather'd his Baggage, Burthens, and Fardels together, and had them ready to truss up, if they were Officers, on their Pack and Sumpter horses; if common Soldiers, on their own Backs; At the second found they loaded either themselves, or their Beasts: And at the third found they march'd. Now, though *Polybius* mentions it not, nor *Lipius*, (who will comment on him) yet we are to believe, that all Consuls were so discreet that they made no great Interval of time between the second and third found, because it could not be very pleasing to either Man or Beast, standing under heavy burthens, to lose any of that time which they might have sav'd in making their Journey.

Order of the Roman March.

After the third found, they march'd in this order: First, march'd the Extraordinaries of the Allies, as being nearest the Consuls Pavilion, and near to the *Praetorian* Port. These were follow'd by the first Legion of the Allies, and after it, the Baggage of the Extraordinaries, and of that first Legion. In the third place march'd the first Legion of the *Romans*, and its Baggage after it. Fourthly, The second *Roman* Legion, followed by both its Baggage, and the Baggage of the second Legion of the Allies: Which in the fifth place was follow'd by the second Legion of the Allies, that was in the Rear of the Infantry. The place where the Cavalry was to march, was uncertain; sometimes in both Extraordinary and Ordinary Horse march'd all in the Van, sometimes in the Rear, sometimes on both the Flanks, without the Baggage, according as the General resolv'd to make use of them; taking up his measures by the nearness of an Enemy in either Van, Rear, or Flank: And sometimes the Cavalry march'd divided into Van and Rear. *Polybius* shews us also, that if there were ground enough, and great suspicion of an Enemy, then the Baggage of the *Hastati* of every Legion was sent before them, which they followed themselves, after them came the Bag-

gage

gage of the *Principes*, and then themselves followed in the third place; by the Baggage of the *Triarii*, which themselves follow'd. If an Enemy appear'd in the Van, the Baggage of the *Hastati*, was immediately turn'd to a side, and the place where it had been, was possess'd by the *Hastati* themselves; the same was done by the *Principes* and *Triarii*. And we may suppose, that if an Enemy appear'd in the Rear, the Baggage of the *Triarii* was turn'd aside, and its place possess'd by conversion; or facing to the Rear by themselves, and the other two Battalions in that same manner were to second them. What I have said of one Legion, is spoken of all the four of a Consular Army, the two *Roman* Legions, and the two of the Allies.

But in *Polybius* his description of the march of a Consular Army, there arise to me some difficulties, which *Lipius* hath not at all clear'd, nay, nor spoken of, though he speak enough of that, which may be well enough understood without him. As first, consider how it can be imagin'd, that the ground would always allow the *Romans* to march in the order I last spoke of, that is, every great Battalion of a Legion to have its Baggage in the Van of it: For by such a March, in a Countrey full of Hedges, Ditches and Inclosures, it is not possible, but their Legions would be wonderfully embarrass'd with their Servants, Horses, and Baggage, neither could the three Battalions of every Legion, or of all the three, upon the attack of an Enemy make their evolutions from among their Baggage so dextrously and readily, but they might by an active pursuer, be brought to inextricable difficulties. I am therefore of opinion, that Time hath robb'd us of a page or two of *Polybius* his Writings, which would have explain'd this, and have made us know his own sense, better than either *Lipius* or *Torducous* doth. The last of these two doth wonderfully please himself in affirming, that an Army should always march in that very order, wherein he who commands it; resolves to fight. Here he fights with his own shadow, for, I suppose, none will deny, that an Army should march in Battalions, great Bodies, Brigades, and Squadrons, yea, all in Breast, if the ground will permit it. But if not, then I hope, *Torducous* will permit a General to march in such Bodies, small or great, as with convenience he can. But what if I deny to *Torducous* the thing it self, for I dare aver, never *Roman* Chieftain intended to fight an Enemy in that order, as *Polybius* makes the Consular Army to march: For who will fancy the *Hastati* fought with their Baggage before them, or that the *Principes* advanced to the relief of the *Hastati*, through their own Waggon and Carts? But grant him all he says, to be true, what is that to the thing in question, which is, whether the ordering the Baggage to march between the several Battalions of a Legion, was conducing to obtain the great and main end and scope of all Armies, which is to overcome an Enemy? And since I think it was not, I am still of the opinion, that *Polybius* his right meaning is not yet fully elucidated to us, either by himself, or any other person whatsoever.

And I will deal yet more freely, I do not well, or rather not at all understand, what is meant by the Baggage of the several Battalions of *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*; for what belonged to the Soldiers was carried on their own backs, (if all be true that we have told you formerly) except their Tents and their Hand-mills, and these, might with little loss have taken their hazard in the Rear of every Legion, nay, of the whole Army, if the Enemy was expected in the Van; or, they might securely enough have been sent to the Van, if the Enemy was in the Rear. So as still *Polybius* his dividing the Baggage of a Legion into three parts, and putting a third before every Battalion, is mysterious to me.

*Lipius* stands gazing and admiring at the excellent order of the *Roman* march, and cries out, *Mira eorum hic Providentia & Dispositio*: Their Providence and Order here, saith he, was wonderful. But I wonder much more, that this Order of theirs did not sometime bring mischief upon them. For first, you are to believe, that the daring *Romans* for most part fought their Enemies, who in that case could not but be in their Van, either marching to meet them, or marching away from them: If the Enemy march'd to meet them, the *Roman* Baggage, either before the Legion it self, or between the several Bodies of it, could not but give them those inevitable embarrasses, and inconveniences, where-

Some difficulties and doubts concerning the march of the Baggage.

Not at all clear'd by *Polybius*, or any other.

*Roman* Soldiers carried all their own Baggage.

whereof I have spoken. If an Enemy marched from them, why did he present a people as the Romans were, make their own Baggage a hindrance to them in overtaking that Enemy, in whose pursuit they marched? For let any man consider it right, the Great Baggage, that is, the Artillery, Engines, and Machines, or the stuff whereof they were to be made, their spare Arms, the Shops where, and Utenils wherewith they were made; the Consuls Pavilions and great Baggage, the Treasurers train of Monies and Proviant, and many times of Plunder, would take up so much ground between the several Legions and Troops, that without these hindrances, a Consular Army might have join'd an Enemy in less time by half than it could do with them; which *Cæsar* speedily march from *Gergovia* after the *Adunæ*, without Baggage, did sufficiently demonstrate.

What advantages the *Nervians* propoed to themselves, by the manner of the March of the Roman Baggage between Legions (and fore these advantages had been greater, if every Battalion of a Legion had had its Baggage in the Van of it) will be known to any who will attentively read *Cæsar*'s Second Book of the *Gallick War*; for they having learn'd how the Romans us'd to march, resolv'd to set upon his first Legion, whilst its Baggage gave a stop to the rest to come up to its assistance: *Cæsar*, who was as happy as prudent, and as prudent as fortunate, learn'd their design by his Spies, and presently alter'd the manner of his Countries March: He commands his Cavalry to set forward, and after it six Legions, and after them the Baggage of his whole Army, and in the Rear-guard two Legions more. If he had not done so, he might have receiv'd a notable, yea, an indelible affront from that stout and warlike Nation; which as it was, left him not the Field without a very bloody resistance. Nor was this the only time *Cæsar* did so (though it is the only time mention'd by *Lipsius* and *Torduxi*) for when he advanc'd with four Legions against the *Bellovaci*, he caus'd three Legions to march first, then the Baggage, which his fourth Legion followed. Perhaps he practis'd this more frequently, though it is not often mentioned: And in all his Retreats, he ever sent his whole Baggage to the Van of his Army. Thus you see Great *Cæsar*, (who lived long after *Polybius*) did not tie himself so strictly to the custome of the Roman March, but he both could, and did alter it, according as he thought it stood with the conveniency of his affairs; and so should all prudent Captains do.

We cannot tell how the *Vlites* march'd.

But I cannot get one view of the *Vlites*, in all this March, and here our Authors leave us again to our conjectures. Certainly, if the whole sixth Book of *Polybius* his History be extant, and if some parcels of it are not lost, (as I shrewdly suspect there are) he forgot himself, when he forgot to tell us, where and how the Roman light armed (who made up more than the fourth part of the Infantry) march'd; for to tell us (as *Lipsius* doth) that they march'd where the Consul appointed them, is to tell us just nothing; for neither heavy armed Foot, nor Horse march'd where they pleas'd, but where the General order'd them. Yet it is a probable, and a very rational conjecture, that the *Vlites* march'd nearest that place where the Enemy was, whether that was in the Van, Rear, or Flank of the Army, since they were by their skirmishes to begin the Fight. But I fear in the next Chapter we shall have more groping, before we find the quarter where they lodg'd.

Observe, that the Legions of both the *Romani* and *Socii* did change Van and Rear daily by turns. I have told you before, the Roman ambulatory March was twenty Italian miles in four hours, and the cursory twenty five. But I suppose, without Baggage; and with it twenty miles was *Unius diei iustum iter*; The just march of an Army for one day.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. XXI.

## Of the Quartering, Encamping, and Castrametation of a Consular Army.

After a long, and it may be, a hard and tedious March, it will be time to lodge our Consular Army; and lodged it must be in Towns and Villages, or in the fields. If in the first, they had nothing to demand from their Hosts, but Bed and Lodging, and were to pay for all they spent in meat, drink, or fire. In the time of the Emperours, the Legates and Presidents of Provinces, caus'd them to furnish the Armies (as they march'd through their jurisdictions) out of the publick Magazines (which was discount from their wages by the Treasurers) or caus'd the Countrey people to bring in provisions of all kinds, as to open Markets, where they were sold to the Souldiers for ready money, at the ordinary rates of the Countreys, in which the Armies chanc'd to be; the contraveners, and disobeyers of orders being severely punished. The way in which Officers and Souldiers us'd to be quartered in Houses (to avoid strife between them and their Hosts) was this: The whole house was as equally divided, as might be, into three parts, whereof the Master of the house chose the first, the Souldiers the second, and the third and last return'd to the host, who by this means had two thirds.

Quartering in Towns and Villages.

When the Army was to be quartered in the Field, which we call Encamping, (and which consisteth of two parts, Castrametation and Fortification) the common Souldiers had a harder labour than in their days March, in regard, (beside the measuring the ground) they were to Fortifie the Camp, with Ditch, Rampart and Pallisado, and to pitch the Tents of all their Commanders, and cleanse their quarters, before they got leave to take notice of their own Tents, or Huts.

Souldiers hard labour in Encamping.

In the matter of Castrametation (which is one part of Encamping) after the Roman way, we are to borrow all our light from *Polybius*, and our own conjectures; for *Vegetius* speaks but very little of it, and that little is in very general terms. But for the Fortification of the Camp, we are more oblig'd to *Vegetius* than *Polybius*. The first spends five full Chapters on Encamping, to wit, the twenty first, twenty second, twenty third, twenty fourth and twenty fifth of his first Book; and either for fear that he had forgot something in all these Chapters, or else, according to his custome, to refresh his own or our memories, he falls again to his Castrametation in the eighth Chapter of his third Book. The sum of all he saith on that Subject will amount to this:

"He laments that, in his time, the ancient custome of fortifying Camps was worn out, for want whereof, says he, we have known many Roman Armies afflicted by the sudden incursions of the barbarous Nations: Besides, saith he, if they be worsted in any Battel, having no Camp to retire to, they fall by the edge of the Sword unrevenge'd, like brutes; neither doth the Enemy make an end of killing them, till he is weary of pursuing them. He says, The Army is to Encamp where it may have store of Fuel, Wood, Water and Fodder, where the air is wholesome, and free from Marishes; and if it be to stay any time, it must be well looked to, that no Hill be near, from whence an Enemy may assault it, and that the place be not subject to inundations of Waters. The Camp is to be of such an extent, that neither Men, Beasts, nor Baggage, be pinch'd for want of room; nor must it be so large, but that the Fortifications of it in all its circumference, may be sufficiently defended by the men that are within it. This is all he says of Castrametation. As to the Fortification of the Camp, he tells us one and the same thing of it, in the twenty fourth Chapter of his first Book, and in the eighth Chapter of his third Book,

Summ of what *Vegetius* saith of Castrametation.

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and

And of fortifying the Camp.

and it is shortly this: "That there were three several forts or ways of fortifying a Camp: First, if there was but little danger, the Rampart should be made but three foot high (supple above the line) and this Rampart was to be made of Turf cut out of the place where the Ditch should be, and the loose earth of the same, the which Ditch should be nine foot broad, and seven deep; and this was called *Fossa tumularia*, or a Ditch suddenly cast up, and it seems was used when the Army was to stay but a night or two, and so ease my near it.

Thus far *Vegetius* is clear, but in describing the other two ways of fortifying, he is extremely confused, both in his first and third Book. But if I guess right at his meaning, he intends to tell us that the second way of fortification was when an imminent danger of an enemy appeared, then the Ditch was nine foot deep, and twelve broad, and the Rampart above the line four foot high; and thirdly, when they found themselves in the greatest hazard, the Rampart was planted about with these Stakes and Palisado's, which the Soldiers were obliged to carry about with them. So that reckoning from the top of the Rampart to the bottom of the Ditch, it was thirteen foot high; and the Ditch it self twelve foot broad. I would he had said either eleven or thirteen, for then he had not contradicted himself, for he told us before that in fortification the Romans were accustomed to observe an odd number. The Turf whereof the Rampart was made, used to be half a foot deep, one foot broad, and one foot and a half long.

Thus far *Vegetius* concerning the Fortification of the Roman Camp.

But that which he adds in the eighth Chapter of his Third Book, is not to be omitted, That all Generals who Encamp their Armies for any time, as the Romans did frequently whole Summers, and whole Winters, (the first whereof were called *Astiva*, and the last *Hiberna*) should have a provident care, and should make it their great work, that not only fuel, fodder and water be supplied near hand, but that all manner of necessaries for back and belly, and all munitions may be brought safely, and without impeach of an enemy to their quarters. To which effect, if there be not fortified places all along the Country through which these provisions are to be transported, then some ought to be builded; one whereof should second another; these *Vegetius* calls Castles, *Castella*, a Diminutive, as he tells us from *Casra*.

Castella what.

The Ancients either in their own Territories, or in those of their Conquests, did even so as is practised to this day, and that was, They built Forts, Towers, Sconces and Castles in these places where it was thought they might be most useful, either for the preservation of the Country from the sudden incursions of ill affected neighbours, or to put such a restraint on the inhabitants themselves as to keep them from rebellion; for this purpose long and strong Walls were sometimes built with excessive cost and labour; we may yet see some reliques of *Severn* walls, built for the safety of the *Britains* from the incursions of the *Scots* and *Picts*.

For what use built.

The Castles which they intended to keep constantly guarded, were for most part built round, of thick and strong walls to resist the battery of the *Rams*, and if they had Curtains, these were flanked a *Palmique* with round Towers. These *Castella* the Romans called also *Burgae*, I know not whether they borrowed the word from the *Germans*, or the *Germani* from them, for the old Dutch word *Burg*, yet in use, signifying a Strength, Hold, Fort or Castle; many of them were built by the Romans in *Germany*, and some of them are to be seen at this day. The Governours of these Castles or Forts were called *Magistri* or *Magistri Burgorum*, which at first were only committed to them; during the pleasure of the Consuls and Emperours; afterwards by the liberality and bounty of Princes, these Keepers were made hereditary Governours, and long after, the Castles and Burgs themselves, with many fair lands belonging to them, were given to them and their heirs in property for ever; to hold them in *Vassalage*. Hence comes the name of *Castellans*, a title of great honour and profit in *Poland*, where they enjoy it but for life, the King having the disposal of it after ward. Hence the title of *Burggrave* in *Germany*, which in the language of that Country is of greater honour than the title of an Earl, which in *Dutch* is simply *Grave*. And that dignity of *Burggrave* to this day is there very honourable; and

Kept

Burg a Latin and a German word, signifies a Fort.

Castellan.

kept by the greatest Princes of the German Empire as an addition, and that no small one to the rest of their great Titles, as the Elector of *Brandenburg* is the hereditary *Burggrave* of *Nuremberg*.

In process of time Villages, Hamlets, and little Towns were built besides these Burgs, many whereof are become great and famous Cities, which keep yet their denomination from the *Burg* or Castle, besides which they were at first edified, such as *Strasbourg*, *Augsburg*, *Nuremberg*, *Wurzburg*, *Lansburg*, *Norimburg*, *Hamburg*, and many others. And as at the first building these Castles or Burgs, the Keepers were called *Magistri Burgorum*; so to this day the principal Magistrates and Mayors of Cities are called *Mayors*.

The Roman Soldiers having finished the fortification of their Camp, are next to be lodged within it: I am afraid it will not contain them all; yet let us see how *Polybius* will accommodate his Consular Army, for we have done with *Vegetius*.

It was the duty of that Tribune whole lot or turn it was to officiate for the Legion, to go before (no doubt with a guard) and some Centurions with him to take up ground for the Camp, and to measure out all the several quarters of it. Which that you may the better comprehend, we shall divide the Roman Camp into two, but not equal parts; these were called the upper and the lower parts: in the upper lodged the Consul, the Treasurer, the Legates, the *Evocati* of the Romans, and Extraordinaries of the Allies, the lodgings of the Tribunes and *Præfetti* were also there, and in it was the Market-place, and a large place to receive strangers. In the lower part of the Camp were quartered all the four Legions of the Romans and Allies in several Maniples, and all the Troops of Horse, of both the one and the other.

Division of the Roman Camp into two parts.

The Tribune who measured the Camp, first chose ground for the *Prætorium*, that is the Consul's Pavilions and Tents, and allowed for it two hundred foot square, the superficial measure whereof was eight Italian miles; for multiply two hundred by two hundred, the product will be forty thousand foot, and these make eight miles, and no doubt himself, his friends, servants and baggage might be well enough accommodated in such a compass of ground. That ground was marked with a white flag, and all the other quarters with red ones. And here be pleased to observe that the Romans keeping constantly one way of *Castrametation*, they were so well acquainted with it, that no Soldier any of the Army saw by the white flag, where the Consul was to lodge, but every one knew how to go straight to that quarter that was design'd for him: As well, saith *Polybius*, as Citizens know how to go to their houses, after they enter any of the Ports. Upon both hands of the *Prætorium* were the quarters of the Treasurer and Legates; for the first were allowed two hundred foot in length, and a hundred in depth, for each Legate a hundred foot long, and fifty deep.

who were quarter'd in the upper part of the Roman Camp.

To the Foot of the *Evocati* of the Romans, *Lipius* and *Terdenzi*, and the *Sieur de Preissack* following him) allow eighty foot in length, and two hundred thirty eight in breadth, and to the Horse of the *Evocati*, eighty foot in length, and a hundred twenty five in breadth; perhaps they gather this out of *Polybius*, but I am very sure, notwithstanding any of their assertions to the contrary, the number of the *Evocati* being uncertain, (for they were voluntary, sometimes more, sometimes fewer, and so not definite) one and the same measure of ground could not always, and at all times be allowed to them. But all these being thus quarter'd on both sides of the *Prætorium*, there was a street of one hundred foot broad, which traversed the breadth of the Camp, the name whereof is forgot, between which Street and the Alarm place were lodged the Extraordinaries of both the Cavalry and Infantry of the Allies; for the quarters of their Horse eighty foot in breadth, and a hundred sixty seven in length were allowed; and for their Foot two hundred foot in length, and seventy in breadth. Within the Extraordinaries of the Horse was the Market-place, which they called *Forum*. Without the Foot of the Extraordinaries, and next them was the place of arms, or the Alarm-place, and this was of one equal breadth in all the four quarters of the Camp, to wit two hundred foot, kept yet in our Modern *Castrametations*. Next to this place of arms was the Rampart, and that Port which was called *Porta Prætoriana*, the *Prætorian* Port. Now though the Roman Consul by this account was not in the middle of his Army, (as *Xenophon* would

Evocati.

Extraordinaries.

Alarm-place.

Prætorian Port.

would have all Generals to be) *Lipsum* thinks it enough that he was in *medio* *Ducum*, in the middle of his Captains; I know not why this was enough, but let us see how.

Behind the *Prætorium* on the right hand of it were the Tents of the six Tribunes of the first Roman Legion, and upon their right hand the Tents of the six *Præfetti* of the Allies, on the left hand of the *Prætorium*; at some distance behind it were the Tents of the six Roman Tribunes of the second Legion, and on their left hand the six *Præfetti* of the second Legion of the Allies were quartered. The *Sicm de Preissack* and his Translator Captain *Chap* therein delineated one of the Roman Camp place the Tents of all the twelve Tribunes, and twelve *Præfetti*; as *Lipsum* doth in his first figure, which himself found subject to censure, and therefore helpt it in the next Page. In the first he makes the left hand Tribune of the first Legion, and the right hand Tribune of the second Roman Legion to place their Tents close behind the *Prætorium*, and by that means they took away the mutual prospect of the Consul from his Legions who were quartered behind him, and of the Legions from the Consul's Pavilions which was pitch before them. This *Preissack* did also, but *Lipsum* helped and mended his by leaving the *Prætorium* visible to all quarters; and this *Preissack* was bound to do likewise, but he did it not. Besides this error, *Preissack* allows a hundred and fifty foot-square for every Tribunes Tent, whereas *Polybius* allows but fifty, and allows enough when he doth so; this I conceive to be the Printer's fault; whereof I thought fit to acquaint the *Sicm de Preissack's* Reader. So you see that the twelve Tents of the Roman Tribunes, and the twelve Tents of the *Præfetti* of the Allies, took up twelve hundred foot of ground-square; fifty foot square being allowed to each of them. Observe here that *Polybius* tells us not at all where, or in what place of the Camp the Allies *Præfetti* lodged, and this gives just cause to *Lipsum* to complain of his carelessness in this point, which *Lipsum* himself hath very well supply'd in quartering them where they should be, that is in the front of their Legions, as the Roman Tribunes were placed by *Polybius* in the front of theirs, as I have told you, and in imitation of *Lipsum*, *Preissack*, and *Terdazzi* quarter them just so. This is all I have to say concerning the *Castrametation* of the Superior or upper part of the Roman Camp. And so I come to the lower one.

Below the Tents of the Tribunes there was a Street which traversed the whole breadth of the Camp, and divided the superior part of it from that inferior one which I am now to describe. This Street was a hundred foot broad, and was called *Via Principalis*, the principal Street; whether it had that name, because it was near the Consul's Pavilion, the Tribunes Tents, and the Eagles; or because if the Camp was of any long continuance, they erected their Altars in that Street is no great matter. This Street was intersected by another, which did run the whole length of the Camp, from the *Decuman Port*, to the *Prætorian* one. This Lane divided the right hand Roman Legion from the left hand one, and consequently had on each side of it the half of the Consul's Army. On the right side of it were quartered the Horse and Foot belonging to the first Roman Legion, and on the right hand of that Legion the first Legion of the Allies in this following order.

Nearest to the Street was quartered the Cavalry belonging to the first Legion, all in one Row or Street; call it as you please, for *Polybius* his Interpreter useth both *Striga* and *Vicus*, a Row and a Street. This Row was divided into ten several quarters, each of which was to contain and lodge a Troop consisting of thirty Riders, with their Horses, Arms and Baggage. Every one of these ten Quarters was a hundred foot square, and consequently the whole Row was a thousand foot long, and a hundred foot broad. If you please to multiply a hundred by a hundred, you will find the product ten thousand Foot, and so much ground had every Troop of thirty Horse allowed to it. And that I may tell it you once for all, every Maniple of the *Principes* and *Hastati* had as much, but not the *Triarii*, as you will see anon. On the right hand of the Horse were quartered the *Triarii*, who being but half the number of the *Hastati* and *Principes*, to wit, six hundred, they had but fifty foot of ground in breadth, but in length as much as the Horse, to wit, a thousand foot, divided equally into ten parts, to every one of which parts was assign'd a Maniple consisting of sixty men.

men. Multiply a hundred by fifty (for every Maniple of the *Triarii* had a hundred foot in length, and fifty foot in breadth) the product is five thousand foot, and so much ground of superficial measure had every Maniple of the *Triarii*. They were obliged to have a care of the Horses belonging to the Cavalry, to feed them, and see that in the night they strayed not to the disturbance of the Camp, and so you may think the Horsemen needed the fewer Grooms. Next the *Triarii* was a Street fifty foot broad; on the right hand of it was a Row of Tents, in which lodged the *Principes*, who were twelve hundred in number, divided into ten Maniples, each consisting of a hundred and twenty men: to every Maniple was allowed as much ground as to a Troop of Horse, to wit, a 100 foot square; so to all the ten Maniples a thousand foot in length, and a hundred in breadth. On their right hand quartered the *Hastati*, all in one Row, twelve hundred in number likewise, and had an equal allowance of ground. The *Hastati* were divided by a Street fifty foot broad from the Allies, who constantly quartered on their right hand.

You will remember that in my Discourse of the Allies I told you that the third part of their Horse, and fifth part of their Foot were taken out to wait on the Consul, and were called *Extraordinaries*, whom accordingly I have quartered in the upper part of the Camp near the Consul. Their Horse at first were six hundred for every Legion, whereof two hundred being lodged in the upper part, we have but four hundred to quarter in the lower part of the Camp: These being by one third stronger than the Roman Cavalry, had of ground a third more in breadth allowed, but alike length; the quarter then for the Horse of the first Legion of the Allies was a thousand foot in length, and 133 1/3 foot in breadth, which contained them well enough; this quarter was equally divided into ten parts for ten Troops, each consisting of forty Riders. Upon the right hand of these Horse were quartered the Foot of the Allies first Legion, remember every one of their Legions at their first coming forth was three thousand heavily armed, as the Romans were; but the fifth part of that number to wit, six hundred being taken away by the Consul, and lodged besides him, we have now but two thousand four hundred to quarter, for whom as much ground was allowed, as to both the *Principes* and *Hastati*, as to the breadth, so they had a thousand foot in length, and two hundred in breadth; multiply the one by the other, the product is two hundred thousand foot, which superficial measure of ground contain'd them well enough. I must tell you of an oversight I have observed in my Lord *Preissack's* Roman *Castrametation*, which is, that he allows to the Allies Foot as much ground as I have done now, but no more ground to their Horse than to the Roman Cavalry, which was not fair, being the one was stronger by one third than the other. It is of little or no consequence to us to know, nor is it worth our curiosity whether the Allies quarter'd their Foot by Maniples, or by Cohorts; concerning which *Lipsum* to me seems to be very needlessly solicitous. Upon the right hand of the Allies Foot was the alarm-place constantly two hundred foot broad, and next to it was the Rampart.

We are in the next place to quarter the second Roman Legion, and the second Legion of the Allies, which is soon done by allowing to every part and member of them the like quantity of ground for length and breadth, as we did to those of the two Legions on the right hand, as thus: On the left hand of that Street which I told you run from the *Decuman* to the *Prætorian* Port, and intersecteth the *Via principalis*, were the ten Troops of Horse belonging to the second Roman Legion lodged, all in a Row; next them the *Triarii*, upon their left hand, a quartered. Street fifty foot broad, on the left hand of which lodged the *Principes*; next them the *Hastati*, on their left hand another Street of fifty foot broad; upon the left hand whereof were quarter'd the Horse of the Allies, and on the left hand of them their Foot, on whose left hand was the Alarm-place, and next to it the Rampart and Ditch.

And now we have our whole Consul's Army very formally quarter'd in a Camp of an equilateral square figure, as *Lipsum*, *de Preissack*, and *Terdazzi* The figure of it needs have it to be, though hereafter upon strict examination, we shall find it not to be exactly so. And what needs the whole be so, where all the parts neither are or can be equilateral? In the upper part of the Camp the *Prætorium* and the Tribunes quarter, with those of the *Præfetti* of the Allies, were, equilateral

*Principes*

*Hastati* of the first Roman Legion quartered.

Horse of the Allies first Legion lodged.

And their Foot all in one Row.

The other two Legions quartered.



lateral square, but so were noisibly quartered to the Quæstor, Legates, *Evocati*, or *Extraordinarii*. In the lower part of the Camp, the quarters ordain'd for the several Troops of Horse, and for the *Maniples* of the *Roman Hastati* and *Principes*, were equilateral, but so were neither the quarters of the *Triarii*, nor of the *Allies* Horse and Foot.

In the next place before I go further, I shall tell you that in this Camp there were four Ports, these were the *Prætorian*, *Decuman*, and the right hand principal Port, and the left hand principal Port. The two first were at the two ends of the Camp, and the other two at the two sides. The first had its name because it was nearest the *Prætorium*, and out of it the Consul marched. The *Decuman* serv'd for bringing in provisions and fodder, for taking Beasts out to water; as also out of it were carried the Soldiers that were ordain'd to be punished; from whence some think it hath the name *Decumana*, from the Decimating Soldiers alike guilty, and punishing the tenth. But we read in *Livies* thirty fourth Book, that the *Gauls* assaulted Consul *Sempronius* his Camp, and enter'd it at the Port *Quæstoria*, and committed great slaughter till they were beat out. We read also of a Port called *Quintana*; which some think was all one with that called *Quæstoria*; and had this name from the Quæstor, or Treasurer, who lodg'd near it, and the other from the Street *Quintana*; near which that Port was; but the Quæstor's quarters being afterward remov'd to the superior part of the Camp, to be near the Consul, that Port was shut up.

Observe next that in the *Roman* Camp there were eight Streets, five whereof went in the length of the Camp from the one end of it to the other, and were called *Via Directa*; or direct and straight Streets; the other three travers'd or crost the Camp in the breadth of it, and were called *Via transversa*; or cross Streets. Of the five direct Streets, one divided the length of the Camp equally into two halves, and on each side of it, as I told you, lay the half of the Consul's Army Encamped.

Between the *Triarii* and *Principes* of the first *Roman* Legion was the second direct Street; between the *Roman Hastati* of the first Legion, and the *Allies* first Legion was the third direct Street. Between the *Triarii* and *Principes* of the second *Roman* Legion was the fourth direct Street, and between the *Roman Hastati* of the second Legion, and the *Allies* second Legion was the fifth direct Street. All these five Streets were each of them fifty foot broad. But all five of them either never had names, or have lost them. The three cross Streets travers'd the latitude of the Camp. The one of them was in the upper part of the Camp, and divided the *Prætorium* from the quarters of the *Extraordinarii*, and was of one hundred foot broad, and hath lost its name. The second cross Street divided the upper part of the Camp from the lower one, as I told you before, and was called *Via principalis*, and was likewise a hundred foot broad. The third cross Street intersected the quarters of the Legions right in the middle, leaving five *Maniples* on every side of it, as likewise five Troops of Horse from the sides; it had its name of *Quintana*, and was fifty foot broad. These were the Ports and the Streets of the *Roman* Camp.

Be pleas'd likewise to observe that *Polybius* in his Sixth Book (out of which Shop all this stuff of the *Roman* Castrametation is brought) makes the length of the Camp to be between the *Prætorian* and the *Decuman* Port, and where these are, he calls the two ends of the Camp, and the breadth of it he reckons to be from the right hand principal Port to the left hand principal one. All this being premised, we may now take up the *Podisme*, or foot-measure of the *Roman* Camp, as we have described it. And first the length of it from the *Prætorian* Port. Two hundred foot are allowed for the place of Arms, seventy for the *Prætorium*, and fifty for the *Tribunes* and *Præfetti* their quarters, and this closeth the superior part of the Camp; for the places ordain'd for the Quæstor, Legates, *Evocati*, and *Forum* were on both sides of the *Prætorium*, and so added nothing to the Camps Longitude. After this, reckon for *Via principalis*, a hundred foot, and for the length of the Legions quarters a thousand foot; for the Street *Quintana* fifty foot, and for the Alarm-place besides the *Decuman* Port two hundred foot. If you will add these together, the aggregate will be two thou-

Four Ports in the Roman Camp.

Eight Streets in the Roman Camp.

Five direct ones.

Three traverse Streets.

The Longitude of the Camp.

thousand and fifty Foot, which is the Longitude of the whole *Roman* Camp.

If you will exactly know the breadth of it, be pleas'd to enter the Camp at the principal Port on the right hand, and traverse that Street till you come to the left hand Port, and at your entrance you shall find two hundred foot for the place of Arms, next to that two hundred foot for the Foot of the *Allies* first Legion, and then 133½ foot for their Horse, next 80 of it, them a Street of fifty foot, on the left hand of that a hundred foot for the *Hastati*, and a hundred for the *Principes* of the first *Roman* Legion, and on their left hand you will see a Street fifty foot broad; and besides it the *Triarii*, who possess fifty foot, and upon their left hand the ten Troops of Horse belonging to the first Legion, who take a hundred foot for the breadth of their quarters; then you will see that Street which runs from the *Decuman* to the *Prætorian* Port, (except where the Consul's Pavillion hinders it) which is fifty foot broad; and upon the left hand of it you may perceive the quarters of the Horse of the second *Roman* Legion, take up a hundred foot in breadth, and the *Triarii* next them fifty foot, on whose left hand is a Street fifty foot broad. Next to it behold the *Principes* have a hundred foot, and the *Hastati* a hundred foot; then you will perceive a Street fifty foot broad, which divides the *Hastati* from the *Allies* of their second Legion; their Horse you will see, take 133½ foot in breadth, and on their left hand their Foot have two hundred foot; and next them you will come to the Alarm-place, still two hundred foot broad. And when you have traced that place of Arms, and are come to the left hand Port, which they call *Sinistra principalis*, you may if you please add these numbers together, and you will find the aggregate to be two thousand and seventeen foot, which is the latitude of the whole Camp.

You may remember that the length of our Camp was calculated to be two thousand and fifty foot, and the breadth of it being two thousand and seven; yet such as makes its figure not to be perfectly equilateral square, which is the figure so much contended for. But *Terdemus* says that here a rigorous strictness in the measure is not to be look'd to, things being done, says he, in a Martial not a Geometrical field. But I am of opinion that no measure should be more strictly observed than that of ground allowed for Encamping, for if it be not, you shall hardly shun strife and altercation, and which is worse, disorder and confusion.

Now let us see if you please, how much ground this Consul's Camp contained, or (which is all one) what was the superficial measure of it. This you may do, by multiplying the length by the breadth, to wit, two thousand and fifty, by two thousand and seventeen, the product will be (if I have cast it up right) 4134850; divide this number by five, to make paces of it, the Quotient will be 826970, and this will want only thirty paces of eight hundred and twenty seven *Italian* miles.

I with *Polybius* had left us a figure of his Camp, for if he did, it is lost. To supply which defect, several have attempted to do it. *Lipsius* gives us one in his Commentary on *Polybius*, you may fee another in *Achilles Terdenus* his Military Machines, the third in the *Sieur de Pressac* Military questions; these two last for most part borrow theirs from *Lipsius*, for they differ not except in some few things which I have touch'd in passing. A fourth is to be seen in *Strabo* his Commentary on *Vergilius*, and indeed that differs from *Lipsius* his figure in some material points, if I have observed well, and they are these.

First, *Strabo* allows fifty foot in length for the quarters of the *Eladi* of both Horse and Foot, more than *Lipsius* doth. Secondly, he takes these fifty feet from the *Tribunes*, and quarters them in a parallel line with the *Evocati*; whereas *Lipsius* quarters them behind the *Evocati* and the *Prætorium*. Thirdly he leaves no room for the *Præfetti* of the *Allies*, who were twelve in number, and for whom *Lipsius* allow'd six hundred foot square, (to wit, fifty for every one of the twelve) and in a parallel line with the *Tribunes*, below the *Evocati*, and next to *Via principalis*. Fourthly, *Strabo* alters the whole life of the Camp, for he makes the *Decuman* Port to be nearest the *Prætorium*, and the *Prætorian* Port to be furthest from the Consul's Pavillion: so by this account that Port which to *Lipsius* is *Principalis dextra*, is to *Strabo*, *Principalis sinistra*; and so indeed he calls it in his figure.

I know

*Roman* Camp not exactly equilateral square

Superficial measure of the *Roman* Camp.

Several figures of the *Roman* Camp.

Differences between *Lipsius* and *Strabo* figures.

I know not how they shall be reconciled in these points, and especially in the last. For upon the one hand, I think it agrees with reason, that the *Prætorian* Port should have been nearest the Enemy, as out of which the Army was to march in quest of that Enemy; and no doubt, the Consul would chuse to lodge as near the Enemy as he could, and on the head of that Army of his own, which faced constantly towards the Enemy, since he did not quarter in the middle of his Army. And conform to this, we find the Fronts of the several quarters of both Horse and Foot; that were lodged in the inferior part of the Camp, to face all towards the *Prætorium*, and *Via Principalis*, on the other side whereof were the Tribunes quartered. Neither doth it seem reasonable, that the Consul, and his Tribunes quartered in the Rear of the Camp, for so they must have done, if they had lodged so far from the *Prætorian* Port, out of which the Army was to march. And all this makes for *Lipsum* his position of the *Roman* Camp: Yet I must tell you, that on the other hand, I think *Steuachius* may not only alledge his own Author *Vegetius* to be for him, but *Polybius* likewise. Let us hear them both, I shall *English* them faithfully. *Vegetius* in the twenty third Chapter of his first Book says, "The *Decuman* Port is behind the *Prætorium*, out of which the delinquent Soldiers are carried to their punishment. Behind the *Prætorium*, that is not far from it. And this insinuates, that the aspect of the *Prætorium*, or Consul's Pavilion, was towards the furthest end of the Camp, where *Steuachius* will have the *Prætorian* Port to be. For if *Vegetius* had meant, that the further end of the lower part of the Camp was the place where the *Decuman* Port was, he need not have said it was behind the *Prætorium*, but behind all the quarters of the Legions, as *Lipsum* makes it to be. And *Polybius* in his sixth Book, speaking of that nameless street which traverseth the upper region of the Camp, hath these words, and I pray observe them. "Over against the *Prætorium*, saith he, there is a street, which carrieth to the Postern parts of the Camp. Here he seems to be very clear for *Steuachius*; if he be not, hear him once more: He had been speaking of the extraordinary Horse of the Allies; and he adds these words: "Averse from these Horses, are quarter'd the Extraordinary Foot of the Allies, looking to the back of the Camp. Now these Extraordinaries were quarter'd in the upper part of the Camp, and not far from the *Prætorium*, and faced to the Rampart; which by this place *Polybius* was the back of the Camp; and consequently the Port nearest it, was the *Decuman*. I shall leave it to those who understand Castrametation better than I either do, or profess to do, to compose the difference.

Both of them differ in some things from *Polybius*.

But all four, *Lipsum*, *De Preissac*, *Terduzzi*, and *Steuachius* differ from their Master *Polybius*, for he expressly mentions a Forum, or Market place, and quarters for two Legates, to be all in the upper region of the Camp. The Forum, *Lipsum* hath not in his Figure, though it be mention'd in his Table, nor have *Preissac*, or *Terduzzi* one in theirs; a great oversight in all three. *Steuachius* hath indeed the Forum on the Left hand of the *Prætorium*, but for that he exterminates both the Legates out of his Camp, to whom the other three are so hospitable as to afford Lodging; and yet all four are one way or another inexcusable.

Roman Tents.

The Romans allowed Tents both to their Horse men and Foot, in every Tent were ten men, and those had the name of a *Contubernium*, whereof I spoke before, though *Vegetius* makes it to consist of eleven, wherein I believe few joyn with him. By this account, three Tents serv'd all the Horse-men of one Troop, and twelve serv'd a Maniple of Foot of one hundred and twenty Men. I find their Tents were made of Leather, for holding out of rain, and were carried at the publick charges. *Terduzzi* says they were low and flat, and he calls them in his Italian language, *Trabacche*; which is, Booths or Shelters. In this place *Lipsum* offers to fill up a corner of their Tent with a *Vas*, so he calls it; a Vessel, or a Tub, and indeed it is but the tale of a Tub, to say no worse of it) wherein he will have the Roman Soldiers to do the work of nature: He says, it is but his own conjecture, and truly, it is so poor a one, that he might have kept it to himself, and the Tub too. For who will imagine, except *Lipsum*, that the *Contubernals* did make one of these Vessels at every night's Leaguer, or else that they carried it about with them by turns?

the

the first very improbable, and the second exceedingly ridiculous. He might have learn'd of the Jews, and all late Castrametators too, to have sent them for such an errand a pretty way without the Camp.

The same *Lipsum*, and to second him *Terduzzi*, are very prolix in the commendation of the regularity, form, convenience, and order of this Camp; of which a man is oblig'd to believe no more, than what agreeth with his own reason. Among other things, the first of them will have us believe, that no woman was suffer'd in the *Roman* Camps. And because he foresaw that it might be objected, that *Scipio* the *Nemantine*, in his Reformation of Military Discipline, discharged the Camp of all Whores; from whence it might be infer'd; First, That married Women were still kept in the Camp; and Secondly, That Whores had been permitted to be in it before *Scipio's* Reformation; he boldly avers, that the *Latin* word *Scorta*, in that place is not taken for Whores, but for *Viri mulieris*. Whether the word will admit that interpretation, I dare not dispute with *Lipsum*, whom *Boccalini* stagem in *Parnassus*, confessing that he was nothing but a meer and a pure Grammarian. But I cannot understand what he means by his *Viri Mulieris*, if not those whom we call *Sodomites*, or Buggers: And if so, we may infer, that these were either allow'd of, or conniv'd at, before *Scipio* reform'd that sinful abuse: And this perhaps gave occasion to a Poets' with,

Women in Roman Camps.

*Lipsum* extri vagant.

*Romanis utinam patuissent castra puellis.*

Since Nature's Laws must be obey'd,

or men will go alway,

Why do you women then command  
out of your Camps to stray?

And if this be *Lipsum*'s meaning, then I am sure, the ancient Romans who gloried so much in the profession of moral Vertues, owe him the lye; I suppose; he forgot here what a little before he had told us in that same Book, out of *Tacitus*, that a lascivious woman was found in carnal act with a Soldier in the principal street, which was accounted Holy, because their Altars were erected in it; neither did the Historian complain, that a woman was in the Camp, or was found with a man in the Camp, but that she had profaned so sacred a place of the Camp. Now if no woman had been permitted to be in the *Roman* Camp, then that woman could not have play'd the Whore in so publick a place of it. But *Lipsum* knew well enough, that the Empress *Agrippina*, Nero's Mother, honour'd the place of her birth on the banks of the Rhine, with a Colony of Romans, which in time grew to be the famous City of Cologne; now she could not have been born there, if her Mother *Agrippina* had not been permitted to be in the *Roman* Camp with her Husband *Germanicus*.

*Columbia Agrippina.*

There is no doubt, but in the less ground an Army can be Encamped, the more defensible it is: But that Topick, *Exigua sit per plura, quod fieri potest per pauciora*; is not at all true, but with this restriction, *si aque commode fieri potest*: And therefore it shall be easily granted, that this almost equilateral Camp of the Romans was excellent, if all was contain'd within its circuit, that ought to be within it. But I am sure, upon a strict examination, we shall not find it to be so. *Terduzzi* says, the circuit of this Camp was eight thousand Foot, little more than one Italian mile and a half, and he saith right: He says moreover, that within it were quarter'd sixteen thousand eight hundred Foot, and eighteen hundred Horse-men, besides Servants. Herein he saith not right, as shall be demonstrated anon.

*Roman Camps defective.*

And first in this Camp, I find no place for an *Armamentarium*, or Magazine, no place for their Engines and Machines, their Catapults, Balists, Rams, Towers, and the rest of their Artillery; and though it be true, that these were carried seldom about with the Army, yet it is as true, that the materials whereof they were compos'd, were often carried with their Armies; and if this be not granted me, yet I am sure, they will allow a quarter for those who were to make, guide, conduct and direct them; and in a word, for those who were set aside for that service by *Servius Tullius*, King of Rome; but in this Camp there is no room at all for them, or for any Arms, or any thing

First, No *Armamentarium*, or Magazine in it.

thing else which might be said to belong to a publick Magazine; nor are they so much as mention'd by Polybius, *Lipsum*, *Du Preissie*, *Stouchius*, or *Terdusci*. Certainly, it had been undividely done to lodge them without the Camp, where the men might easily have been kill'd, and all the materials and utensils burnt or destroy'd by an Enemy. This *Terdusci* would seem to obviate, by telling us, that there was nothing in the Magazines, but Javelins and Arrows, and these he says would take up but little room: Yet he does not tell us where that little room was, for he assigns no void space for it. Next, he sets the Machines on the Retrenchment, let it be so. But did these Engineers, Carpenters, Smiths, and other Artificers, to whose care these Machines were recommended, lye night and day beside them, on that Retrenchment; I hope he will not say that. Thirdly he says, that the Treasurers' quarters, and the street *Quintana* might have been made of a lesser length on breadth, for reception of these Engines. Could any man have expected, to have heard such an expression drop from a person, whose other writings speak him to have been a great Master of Reason: For, who knows not, that in case of necessity, the *Prætorium*, the Legates and Tribunes Tents, and all the whole quarters, of the Camp might have been made of a lesser extent. We know from *Livy*, that when *Claudius Nero* made that march which prov'd so fatal to *Asdrubal*, and join'd with his Colleague Consul *Livius*, all his six thousand men were quarter'd and accommodated in *Livy's* Camp, without enlarging it; every Tribune of *Livius's* lodging a Tribune of *Nero's*, every Centurion a Centurion, every Maniple a Maniple, and every Troop a Troop; in doing which perhaps many of themselves walk'd in the Streets and the Alarm-place. But here we speak of a formal Camp, which should be of that capacity, as to contain all that ought to be within it. And therefore *Terdusci* having said but little for my satisfaction, I say still, that the Camp we have describ'd was deficient in this point; besides that, I know no place allow'd for Beasts of Carriage, appointed for carrying these Machines, Boats, Materials, and other necessities for publick use.

Secondly, No quarter for the *Velties*. But in the second place, I have a greater complaint to make, for I miss the *Velties*, for whom I find no quarters at all allow'd, and they were no fewer than four thousand eight hundred men in every Consular Army. *Polybius* is extremely careless of them, for as he assign'd them no place to march in, so he allows them no place to lodge in: This makes *Lipsum* exclaim, "O *Polybi*, cur. *siluisti?*" "per se sumus, &c. O *Polybius*, say he, why wast thou silent in this? by thee "we are either in an error, or darkness, one of which one word from thee "might have clear'd us." Concerning this important matter, men being left to guess, I shall tell you three several conjectures, and then choose which you will. And indeed it is a business of importance to send the fourth part of an Army to look for their quarters, when they might have been lodged with as much conveniency as the other three parts were.

Three Conjectures where they lodged.

First Conjecture.

First, Before *Lipsum* his time, some were of the opinion, that the *Velties* were divided among the heavy armed, and forty eight of them lodg'd with every Maniple of the *Principes* and *Hastati*, and twenty four of them with every Maniple of the *Triarii*; and by this way the twelve hundred *Velties* of every Legion were completely quarter'd. Now, you may easily make an account, that by this means four of them were quarter'd in every Teat of the heavy armed, a thing hard to be done, if not impossible; beside, that it made the *Contubernium* to consist of fourteen instead of ten, and according to *Vegetius*, of fifteen. This opinion *Lipsum*, with good reason, rejects as very extravagant, as indeed it is.

Second Conjecture.

The second Conjecture is his own, and it is this: That the *Velties* of the two Roman Legions were quarter'd at the two ends of the Camp on the Alarm-place, and the *Velties* of the *Socii*, or Allies, on the place of Arms on both sides. H: says, that they wanting Defensive Arms, and having but little baggage, little room would serve them. Yet room they must have, and no room they can have by this expedient of *Lipsum*, but what is taken from the place of Arms; the ground whereof *Polybius* (the great Doctor of the Roman Castramentation) will have to be no less than two hundred foot of breadth, and that for several good reasons express'd by himself, which quantity of ground

WAS

was always kept by the ancient *Romans*, and by the *Castramentators* in *Lipsum* his own days (who would have laugh'd at this fancy of his) and is still kept to this day. Neither could *Lipsum* allow less ground for the *Velties*, than the half of that which the heavy armed had, and that was rather too little; so that of necessity fifty foot must have been taken from the Alarm-place for their bad accommodation: Now this cannot be done without reflecting on *Polybius*, who if he had intended any such thing, would have allowed only one hundred and fifty, and not two hundred foot for the breadth of the Alarm place, which the Ancients call'd *Pomarium*. Next, how can you call that the place of Arms for the heavy armed, where the light armed have taken up their lodgings, and pitched their Tents? Besides all this, *Polybius* is very positive, that the Extraordinaries of the Allies should lodge nearest the Rampart, at the *Prætorian* Port, (the place of Arms being only between them and it) the heavy armed Roman Foot at the *Decumanus*, and the *Socii* at the two side Ports, which could not be, if the *Velties* were interposed between them and these Ports and Ramparts. And *Lipsum* might likewise have remembered, that one of the reasons why *Polybius* would have two hundred Foot of void ground between the Rampart, and the Souldiers Tents, was that the Souldiers by that distance might be safe from Darts or Arrows, thrown or shot in the night time by an Enemy over the Rampart. Unless *Lipsum* thought that the *Velties* receiving these Darts and Arrows in their Bodies, did serve as a second Retrenchment to the heavy armed. So be *Lipsum* his conjecture right or be it wrong, he may own it himself, and own it indeed he must, for he cannot father it on *Polybius*.

Third Conjecture.

The third conjecture is of *Terdusci*, who will have the *Velties* to be quarter'd without the Camp, in the *procastris* or Suburbs of it; and to bear them company, he sends out with them all the Merchants, Victuallers, and Souldiers; I think this the plainest language of all, for within he calls it was impossible to lodge them. But I admire what pretext of authority he hath out of History for this opinion; all he says is, that in time of danger, they were receiv'd again within the Camp, but he puts us just where we were, the question being still where they were quarter'd, when they were receiv'd within their Camp. For we read that the *Romans* were often besieged till he was reliev'd by the Dictator *A. Cincinnatus*; so was *Cicero* one of *Cæsar's* Legates by *Ambiorix*, and himself likewise forc'd by that same Enemy to keep some days within his Camp: Where were the *Velties* lodged all this while? And I pray you observe, that but just now *Terdusci* assur'd us, that within the Camp was quarter'd the Consular Army of sixteen thousand eight hundred Foot, and eighteen hundred Horse, and of that number he now sends four thousand eight hundred out of the Camp, for want of quarter within it, not to come back till time of danger: His own words are, *Recedendi digni, solo in tempo di pericolo*; Receiving them within, says he, only in time of danger. Here I am either mistaken; or *Terdusci*, besides the improbability of his conjecture, foully contradicts himself.

Thus we see the poor *Velties* very ill us'd; for if you will remember what I have observ'd of them in the preceding Chapters and in this, you will think with me, that they were marshall'd and fought I know not how, they march'd I know not when, and they were quarter'd I know not where. I shall not imagine for all that, that they were Spirits, but I think, it may be disput'd Problematically, whether they were *Individa Vagæ*, or not. And so I take my leave of them.

In the third place, I find in this Castramentation no more place or ground allow'd for Centurions, Decurions, Ensign and Standard-bearers, than for the common Troopers and Souldiers; and this confirms me in that opinion, whereof I have oft told you, that the *Romans* had no greater esteem of any Officer below a Tribune, than we have of Corporals and Lancepistols. *Terdusci* affirms they had more room, I wish he had told us how or where; for among the *Turmes* and Maniples, they had no more than private Souldiers and Riders, for any light he or any other hath given us.

Now all these defects proceed from the slim slim conceit of an equilateral All these do Square, whereas all might have been very well accommodated in a Camp of an oblong Figure, in adding more rows to the Latitude of the Camp, and keeping

ing the same Longitude. And the not doing this, I attribute to the obstinacy of these I have so often mention'd, *Lipsum, Pressac, Stenachius* and *Terduzzi*, and some others of their gang, who will rather lose 4800 men than an equilateral Figure; for I must advertise my Reader, that their Master *Polybius*, doth not only permit an addition to the Latitude but to the Longitude of his Camp. *Si magis copiose sint Legiones, pro rata ad Longitudinem & Latitudinem adjiciunt*: If the Legions be more numerous; accordingly they add to both the length and the breadth. And *Vegetius* tells us in the eighth Chapter of his third Book, *Pro necessitate loci, vel quadrata, vel trigona, vel rotunda, vel oblonga castra constituit*: According, says he, to the necessity or site of the place, you may make your Camp Quadrate, Triangular, Round, or Oblong: And in another place, he saith, Semi-circular: But for this Figure, I should think, it were requisite to have behind the Camp, either a Fortified Town, a Marsh, or an unfordable River, and guarded with a Bridge.

We may imagine, that the Camp of the *Israelites*, after they had cross'd the Red-Sea dry-shod, was the most orderly, as being directed by the all-wise God, who is the Sovereign Lord of Hosts, and we find both their Exterior and Interior Camps were quadrangular: For we read in the truest of Books, that in Quartering, three Tribes fac'd towards the East, three towards the South, three towards the West, and three towards the North. And within that vast Leaguer, was an inward one, consisting of the *Levites*, who encamped also in *Cares*, facing East, South, West, and North. These were the Guards of the Lords Ark. Yet being that the Sacred Text tells us, that all these Tribes were not of equal strength and number, it must follow, that those who were most numerous, had most ground allowed them, and consequently more rows of Tents, and more room for their Beasts and Baggage, and therefore the form of the whole Camp could not be Square, but oblong. And here I shall also say, that the manner of the *Israelites* Encamping and Castrametation did more resemble our form (whereof we shall speak in its proper place) than the *Roman*, for we find the Ark of God (who was the Conductor, and Great General of that Army) lodged in the Center and middle of the whole Camp: About it, the *Levites* (who were honoured to be its Guards) and without them, and about them the other Tribes, as they were marshalled by *Moses*, the man of God. And as they were Encamped, so we read they Marched: First, the Ensign of *Judah*, and under it three Tribes: Next, the Ensign of *Ruben*, and under it three Tribes: After them, marched the *Levites* in the middle of the Army, and in the center of them the Ark: After them came the Ensign of *Ephraim*, under which were three Tribes; and in the last place marched the Ensign of *Dan*, and under it three Tribes.

The Rampart and Ditch of the *Roman* Camp, as to both the ends of it, were made and defended by the two *Roman* Legions, and the Allies were obliged to fortifie and maintain both the sides of this Consular Camp, of which I have spoken perhaps more than enough. See the Figures of *Lipsum, Stenachius*, and the Lord *Pressac*.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. XXII.

## Of Guards, Watches, Watch-word, and Rounds.

If this Camp, though never so strongly fortified, be not carefully guarded, it will be but a prey to a resolute Enemy. Both the *Roman* and *Greek* Guards were, as ours are, of both Horse and Foot; the difference is this, they had several Guards for the day and the night, ours continue twenty four hours, unless some emergency alter the custom. You have the *Roman* Guards expressed by three several words common in Authors, and though all three signified Guards in some sense, yet if I mistake not (with submission to others) these three several words signified three several things. *Excubie*, *Vigilia*, and *Stationes*, were the three words. *Excubie*, I conceive, signified the men who kept Guard and Sentinel: *Vigilia*, the several distinct times, in which they were to keep Guard and Sentinel: And *Stationes* were the places where they kept Guard and Sentinel, which we call ordinarily Posts. The Ancients divided the night, Summer and Winter (beginning at six at night, and ending at six in the morning) into four *Vigilia* or Watches, allowing three hours to every Watch, after which time the Night-guards were relieved by the day ones; for we read not of any *Vigilia* in the day time. From hence we have in all ancient stories the actions of the night season, describ'd by the first, second, or third hour of the first, second, third, or fourth Vigil. And so the Knights of old, and some yet (Knighthood being a Military Order) were to keep their Vigils on the Eve before they received that Order. *Statio*, is a word that comes *Stationis* *à stando* from standing; and is, as I said, taken for a Post, yet the denomination is not from the place where, but the manner how they watched, and the posture is said to be standing: Yet it is not to be thought, that all the *Roman* Guards stood, only the Sentinel, for the other three that were on a Post, lay down and slept. Whether their Horse-guards stood constantly, their Riders being on Horse-back, Authors make it not clear: I suppose it was only the Sentinels; yet probably it was otherwise: And because it was an extreme fatigue either in the heat of Summer or cold of Winter, we read in *Livy's* 45 Book, that the Consul *Lucius Aemilius* in the *Macedonian* War, order'd the Horse-guards to be relieved at noon; so the day from six in the morning till six at night, was equally divided by two several guards of Horse: I know not whether the Foot-Guards were also changed, it seems not; else the Historian had mentioned it; and if not, that Consul hath had a more tender regard to Horse than Men. The Military word *Station*, hath since been appropriated to all other professions, yea, and to all other Trades, be they never so mechanick and low; yea, to all Magistrates and Office-bearers, how high soever, even to him who is vested with the Sovereign and Supreme Power: So that every man in his Station, is a word now proper enough.

The Ancients kept Guards both without and within their Camps: Within, the *Romans* order'd a Maniple to watch at the *Praetorium*, or Consul's quarters, day and night. Three *Quaternions* of Soldiers watched at the Treasury, two at the Legates quarters, and two for every Tribune, and one was appointed to look to the quarters of every Maniple; all these were of the *Principes* and *Hastati*, for the *Triarii* kept Guards at the Horse-quarters. Every hundred foot of the Rampart had a *Quaternion* of Soldiers to guard it. The reason why these Guards were called *Quaternions*, was, because each of them consisted of four Soldiers, that were ordered for one Sentinel, which they kept by turns. We find these Military terms of the *Romans* used by the Pen-men of the New Testament; in the twelfth Chapter of the *Acts of the Apostles*, it is said, that *Herod* delivered *St. Peter* to be guarded by four *Quaternions* of Soldiers.

A Quaterni-  
on, what.

Souldiers, that is, to four Guards, each composed of four Souldiers, every one of which Quaternions or Guards, was to keep a Centinel upon him. The Quaternio, or the four Soldiers was to watch full twelve hours, every one of them a Vigil, to wit, three hours; and it is to be presumed, one of them stood Centinel one whole Vigil, because they could not well by their Glafs divide a Vigil of three hours into four several parts; and truly that was too long, for in four hours time a Centinel might very readily have been both weary and sleepy.

Roman Guards  
without their  
Camp.

For any thing I yet know, the Guards without the Camp, were only kept in the day time, and before every Port of a Cohort or Foot, and a Troop of Horse watch'd; but when an enemy was near, their Stations or Guards were doubled, tripled, or quadrupled, according as the danger seem'd to require. This fifth *Terducci* was an ease-duty, because, says he, there were forty Cohorts, and forty Troops in the four Legions; and therefore he thinks they watch'd but every tenth night. But he did not consider how many Guards were kept within the Leaguer, for if he had, he might have concluded that the Foot ordinarily watch'd every fourth night; and when the Guards were doubled, or tripled, the Duty would come upon them every second, if not every other day. The Consul or General appointed the Stations or places where Guards should be kept without the Camp, which in reason ought to have been so order'd that they might have had succours according to the necessity or exigence of affairs, and therefore you may find that *Cæsar* when he caus'd his Guards to advance nearer the enemy, and further from his own Camp, he still command'd fresh Troops and Cohorts to be brought out to fill up their room, and to support and sustain those who were advanc'd in case of a retreat. *Livy* tells us in his Thirteenth Book, that *Marcius* was accus'd at Rome by the Tribunes of the people for keeping weak Guards without his Leaguer, and that they attributed the loss of both Camp and Army to that.

Defection of  
a Station,  
death.

It was death for any man of what degree or quality so ever to desert or leave his station, let the pretext be never so plausible or advantageous. *Livy* in his Fourth Book says that he read it in the Roman Annals, that the Dictator *Postumius* put his own Son *Anulus Postumius* to death for advancing beyond his station, though thereby he gain'd an advantage of the enemy. And though that Author writes that he did not believe it, yet it may be true for all that. *Lipfius* commends much the Roman custom of having four Soldiers on one Post, and for not committing the keeping of it to one Centinel, as the manner is now to have but one man at every Port of a Town. But this Bookish man was so much taken up with the Theory of the ancient Militia, that he studied but little the practice of the Modern; for I dare be bound for it, that in the Country where he lived he never saw a Centinel at a Port of a Town, but where there was a *Corps de Guard* clost by of more than four Soldiers, though they were not oblig'd to stand all Centinel at one time more than the Roman Quaternio was, whereof only one stood. But the old Tactick *Antea* will not have Centinels to stand single, but two or more together, and to stand but a very short time, for which he gives two reasons, first, for fear that being long on duty they might fall asleep; secondly, that they might have no time to practise with an enemy, but frequent rounds and visits of the Corporals might prevent both these.

Mistake of  
*Lipfius* of the  
Modern  
Guards.

Greecian Cen-  
tinels.

*Lipfius* quar-  
rels with *Pol-  
ybius*.

But without  
reason.

Roman watch-  
word, or *Tes-  
sera*.

*Lipfius* in this place falls also a quarrelling with his Master *Polybius* for not telling him what Posts the Allies kept within the Camp, or how the Ports and Ramparts were guarded. But he wrongs him; for when *Polybius* told him what Duties the Roman Legions performed, he gave ground enough to *Lipfius* (who is so ready with his conjectures) to guess that the Legions of the Allies kept the like Guards, and did the like Duties as the Romans did. And since *Polybius* had already said that the Roman Legions were bound to fortifie and defend the two ends of the Camp, and the Allies the two sides; I conceive *Lipfius* might without suspicion of witchcraft have guess'd, nay, past his word for it, that the Romans kept Guards at the *Prætorian* and *Decurion* Ports, and the Allies at the two principal Ports. And now I hope *Lipfius* is reconcil'd with *Polybius*.

The Roman Watch-word was given in this manner: The Tribunes whose turn it was to officiate, and the *Præfetti* of the Allies received it from the Con-  
sul,

sul, and towards night at the going down of the Sun, one of the last Maniples of Foot, and one of the last Troop of Horse lodg'd near the Decurion Port, (being made free of other Duty) went to the Tribune and received from him a piece of wood, perhaps of Parchment or Paper, which was called a *Tessera*, on which the Watch-word was written: this Soldier (whom *Vegetius* calls *Tesserarius*) and this Trooper carried the *Tessera* to the Centurion and *Decurion*, and deliver'd it to them before Witnesses, *adhibitis testibus*, and they in the same manner to their fellow Centurion and *Decurion*, and so from one to another till it came to the first Centurion and *Decurion*, who redelivered it to the Tribune, who by some note (which it seems every one of the several Clalles of the Legion had) or mark on the *Tessera*, immediately knew if it had gone through them all; if not, inquiry was made, and the Delinquent was soon found out (since in that case that every Centurion was to, prove by Witnesses that he deliver'd it) and severely punish'd. And this custom *Achilles Terducci* prefers to the Modern way of whispering the word in one anothers ear. But most men are better pleas'd with things they never saw, than with those they daily see, a *Festidium* or loathsomeness of our present condition being a mark of the depraved nature of man; for certainly the Watch-word in our times is given with as much security, and with a great deal of more ease than it was by either the *Grecians* or *Romans*. The several Guards or Quaternions of Soldiers, had each of them a *Tessera*, which were taken from them by the Rounds, as you will see anon.

*Terducci* ill ill  
pleas'd.

The Rounds were call'd *Circumitiones*, or *Circitiones*, and those who went with them, as *Vegetius* hath it, *Circumitores*, or *Circitores*. This duty belong'd to the Horsemen, as to those who in dignity were next to the Tribunes. By this also you may see in what small account Centurions were with the Romans, who did not trust them with visiting their own Foot-guards, (a thing any *Lancepessius* may do with us) but confer'd the honour of that on Horsemen. In every Legion one Troop was ordain'd to look after this duty every day by turns, but the whole Troop was not employ'd in it, only four of them had that service put on them. The manner was this: The Praefect or prime *Decurion* of the Troop order'd his *Subdecurion*, or his Deputy to acquaint such four whose turn it was to ride the Rounds that following night, and this the *Subdecurion* was bound to do before he din'd; as also at night he was to acquaint the *Decurion* of the next Troop, that it was his turn next night after to order the Rounds: If any of them fail'd in this duty, they were lyable to heavy censure. The four Horsemen who were appointed to ride the Rounds, cast lots who should ride the Rounds of the first, second, third and fourth Vigils. After that they went all four to the Tribune to be clear'd by him, what Guards they were to visit, and if there were any new Posts ordain'd besides the ordinary ones. Having done there, they went to sleep besides the *Præmipilus*, or first Centurion of the *Triarii*, which was quarter'd nearest the Eagle, and this was an honour to him, as *Terducci* says, and so indeed it might be; but I desire to know if they did not lye without the door of his Tent, in regard I think he could hardly accommodate them within. After Supper the Guards being set, he whose turn it was to ride the first round, went about the whole Guards belonging to that Legion, and from him who was Centinel he took the *Tessera*, which he carried away with him, and so he did from all the rest of the Quaternions; the like was done by the second *Circitor* in the second Vigil, and so by the other two in the third and fourth Vigils: hence you may see that every Soldier of the Quaternion had a *Tessera*, otherwise the four *Circitores* could not have brought back each of them one. If the Round found a Centinel asleep, he did not demand the *Tessera* from him, nor did at all waken him, but requir'd the other three to be witnesses of the misdeemeanor, and these three for honour sake convey'd the *Circitor* or Round to the next Guard. Why the three men who were awake should have left their Post to be kept by a sleeping man, only to complement a Round, let the admirers of Antiquity tell, I cannot. Yet I believe the Rounds found but few sleeping, for they had fires allow'd them, by the light whereof they might discern both an enemy and a Round, and one Guard was almost constantly calling to another to keep them awake: besides, it is not likely that all the other three of the Quaternion were asleep; and if any one of them were a-  
wake,

Roman  
Rounds.

A duty id-  
cumbent on  
the Horsemen.

A Centinel  
found asleep.

wake, it is not probable he would suffer his fellow Centinel to be taken sleeping. And in process of time they follow'd the example of the *Grecians*, and used Bells, by which one Guard corresponded and answer'd another; for *Polybius* tells us, that of all Nations the *Romans* were the aptest to learn and imitate the commendable customs of others. Next morning very betimes, the Rounders went and gave the Tribunes an account of their diligence; and where they found a *Tessera* wanting, either by the sleep, negligence or desertion of any of the Guards or Centinels; the Delinquent if apprehended, was punished by the *Fustuarium*, the manner whereof you may learn in the next Chapter five one. After the *Roman* Guards were set at night, it was not lawful for any man to go out of his quarters.

Grievously  
punished.

*Grecian*  
Rounds.

*Aneas* will have it that the *Grecian* Rounds went but from one Guard to another, and not round the whole Town, Fort, or Camp, for that says he, keeps many Rounds going together without confusion. He would have all Rounds or *Circitors* to ride where Horses might conveniently be had, but no Round either to go or ride till he were commanded so to do by his Superior, either by word of mouth, or some sign, suppose a fire or a Lanthorn. He will have all his Rounds to give the word to the Guards, and not to receive it from them, as the *Romans* did their *Tessera*, which indeed seems to be the surer way; but his Rounds he permits not to give the Watch-word, till the Guards require it. And in time of danger he will have the Guards when they require the word from the Rounds (if it be in the night-time) to utter some words or sounds (such as have been order'd by the General or Governor of the place) and the Rounds besides the giving the Watch word, to utter such counter-sounds as have been agreed on. But if it be in the day-time, (observe by this, that Rounds rode in the day, at least in the morning) then the Guards when they asked the word, were to give signs, and the Rounds counter signs, such as were confederated on by him who commanded in chief on the place. As suppose when one of the Guards required the word from the Round, he would put his Hat or his Head-piece on his face, breast, or belly, and upon that sign the Round was to advance, or order his Lance or Spear as a counter-sign.

## CHAP. XXIII.

### Of Prisoners of War, of Parleys, Treaties, and Articles.

SINCE brought War into the World, and though we do not read of any publick War before the Deluge, yet *Moses* tells us of a private one between the two Brothers *Cain* and *Abel*, which ended with the death of the righteous one.

Reason why  
Prisoners are  
taken in War.

In all publick Wars that ever were, Prisoners have been taken, over whom the Victor always assum'd to himself power of life and death. And I believe for most part, the lives of Prisoners were saved, not so much out of pity and compassion, as out of interest, thereby to draw advantages either by exchanging them for others who had fallen into that same misery, or by ransoming them for money, or to make profit of them by Drudgery and Slavery. And though we read not in the History of *Moses* (and I conceive it is not only the truest but the oldest in the world) of any Prisoners of War taken, before *Zai* was taken by *Amraphel* and *Chaderlamer*, yet I cannot imagin but *Nimrod* and his Successors (though bloody enough) spared the lives of many, whom they made Prisoners in those Wars which they waged against their neighbours; for I suppose Conquest was the best title they could pretend to for their Sovereignty, witness these words in the 14 of *Genesis*, *Twelve years they served Chaderlamer, and in*

the

the thirteenth they rebelled. Sute then before these twelve years they were free people, and that which made them Vassals was the longest and sharpest sword. And when *Abraham* rescued *Lot*, and his goods, the women also, and the people; there is no doubt but he took some Prisoners of *Chaderlamer*, his party, which he had beaten, else the King of *Sodom* had not said to him, *Give me the persons, and take the goods to thy self.*

The Law of Nations is that which all or most Nations agree in, either by a mutual, declared, or yet by a tacite assent. And therefore we may truly say that by the Law of Nations before Christianity shone over the World, Prisoners of War might be used as the Victor pleased, that is, either made slaves, or put to death. In this Discourse I shall only speak how the Ancients used their Prisoners, and of their Parleys, Treaties, and Articles before the Promulgation of the Gospel, reserving the Discourse of Christian Prisoners till towards the end of my Essays of the Modern Art of War.

The condition  
of Prisoners  
of War.

We are told by *Xenophon*, that after the Great *Cyrus* had taken *Babylon*, he told his Captains that it was a perpetual Law through the whole World that those who stood out in arms till they were overcome, might be disposed of, either as to their estates and goods, or their lives and persons, at the Victors pleasure. And if you will consider all the Wars that were managed either before or after his time, you will find he spoke truth; for it was not a perpetual Law, it was a perpetual custom to do all that he said. This speech of his was confirmed by the *Athenian* Embassadors, whom *Theopides* introduceth, telling the inhabitants of *Melus* (whom they had besieged both by Sea and Land), That Nature her self had put a necessity on all Conquerours and Victors in War to have the absolute dominion and power over those who were vanquished to be disposed of as the Victors pleased; which Law, said they, we did not make, nor are we the first who have made use of it, neither will we hinder it to be a perpetual Law to ages to come, being assuredly confident, said they, that if you had that power over us, that we probably may shortly have over you, you would not fail to put this Law in execution against us. So you see that both *Cyrus* and the *Athenians* thought Prisoners of War might be put to death if the Victor pleased, not only by the Law of War, but by the Law of both Nations and Nature.

*Cyrus* his  
taste of Pri-  
soners.

The *Atheni-  
ans*.

Before I go further, I shall premise one thing, at which perhaps many of my own Profession scruple, which is that notwithstanding any quarter granted in the field in time of Battel or skirmish, or at the assaults of Towns or Castles, he who commands in chief over the Victorious army may put all or any of the Prisoners to death that he pleaseth, without doing any wrong to the Law of War, because they had no quarter promised them by him either by word, or in writing, which we ordinarily call Parol. What quarter is given by any Officer who is inferior for the time, or by any Soldier, is but till the General or Commander in chief judg of the Prisoners, and then he may do with them as he pleaseth. But observe on the other hand, that though *Jure Belli* he may do so, yet when he puts Prisoners to death in cold blood, he may be justly branded with inhumanity and cruelty, unless those Prisoners have been Traitors, Rebels, Runaways, or Fugitives, or that Quarter had been promised contrary to the express command of the General; any of these alters the case. Such was that act of *Saul* King of *Israel*, who gave quarter to *Agag*, contrary to the express command of the Lord of Hosts, who had ordained him to die.

How a Gene-  
ral may use  
his Prisoners  
of War, *Jure*  
*Belli*.

Let us take a short view how this perpetual Law, whereof *Cyrus* and the *Athenian* Embassadors spoke, was executed in ancient times; and I believe we shall see that all Prisoners of War were either ransom'd, exchanged, put to death, or made slaves. The *Jews* differ'd a little from other Nations in the matter of Slavery, for *Deut.* 23. they had a Political Law, which order'd a refuge to their Slaves. Slaves certainly who came to that calamity by none of their own fault, and that is mostly to be understood of Captives of War. *Cyrus* found the Law he spoke of practis'd against himself, by *Tomiris* Queen of *Scythia*, who put him to death in cold blood, if the Historian tell us truth. How the *Assyrian* Monarchs used their Prisoners, though prophane story were silent, the Sacred Writ would inform us; by it we know how *Tiglah Pilser* took away the Ten Tribes of *Israel*, and *Nebuchadnezzar* the other two to *Babylon*, and

*Jewish* slaves.

T

how



How the Israelites used their Prisoners.

how this last put most of the Chiefs and Princes of the people to Death, after they were Prisoners, and caused the Children of King *Zedekiah* to be cut in pieces before his face; that after having seen so sad a spectacle, he might have his eyes put out, that so thereafter (as Sir *Walter Raleigh* observes well) he might never see any thing to comfort him. The Captains of Gods chosen people of *Israel* and *Judah*, thought not that their hands were bound up by any quarter that was given by their inferior Commanders and Souldiers, but held very ordinarily a Sentence of Death upon most of their Prisoners of War. *Jehoiachin* hang'd most of those Kings whom he took in the Land of *Canaan*. *Amasis* had his Thumbs and great Toes cut off, for so he had bid seventy two Kings before. *Zebah* and *Zalmunbah*, Kings of *Midian*, after they had quarter given them, were killed in cold blood by *Gideon*; perhaps by no other insinuation, than that of Revenge, because they had killed his Brethren. And by the way, I observe, that the *Israelites*, in their Civil Wars among themselves, gave very bad quarter: As for example, after the rest of the Tribes had killed in one Battle eighteen thousand *Benjaminites*, they put five thousand of them to the Sword in the chase, who no doubt, called for quarter: The Text saith, they gleaned them; that is, killed them one by one in the way, and after that, two thousand of them were put to death at *Gidom*, where I make no question, yielded themselves Prisoners. How many thousand *Ephraimites* were put to death by the *Gileadites*, when they bewrayed what they wore by the wrong pronunciation of *Sibbath*. *David*, King of *Israel*, not only slaughtered those *Ammonites* whom he had taken Prisoners in the War, but tortured them, and put them to cruel deaths: Whether he did this for any other reason, than to be revenged for the disgrace done to his Embassadors, by *Shinan* King of the *Ammonites*, I shall not offer to determine. But certainly the Prophet *Isaiah* gave a contrary advice to *Jeroboam* King of *Israel*, who asking the man of God, what he should do with those *Syrians*, who were shamefully brought into *Samaria*, in these words, *Shall I smite them, my Father? Shall I smite them?* Was answered, *With show smite those whom thou hast taken with thy Bow and thy Spear; nay, let Bread and Water before them, and send them back to their Master.* I confess, this was very fair quarter, but it was not to be imitated in all its points.

David very severe to his Prisoners.

*Isaiah* advi-  
seth to give  
fair quarter.

An occasion  
of bad quar-  
ter.

Inhumanity  
of *Alexander*.

Severity of  
*Cesar*.

The obstinate keeping out of Towns, Forts, and Castles, when there was neither hope nor probability of succours, hath been often the reason why the Belleged, after they have rendered, have been butchered to death, that is, after they had yielded to the discretion of the Conquerour, who, having granted no Articles or Conditions, may put them all to death, without any stand of mercy: He may do it *quod libet*, but he may be excus'd with severity, if not cruelty for it, yet generous Princes have practis'd it. *Timur*, a merciful Prince, cast the *Turks*, who were his Prisoners, both men and women, by hundreds to be torn and devour'd by Wild Beasts. The Great *Alexander* caused some thousands of the *Triantobes* Scourged and Crucified after they were Prisoners, because in defence of their City they had so long put a stop to the course of his Victories. But I think he cannot be vindicated from extreme inhumanity used to the Noble Governour of *Gaza*, who kept out that place courageously against him, till the never-failing Fortune of that daring Prince put the woful Governour into his hands, whose feet he caused to be bored, and through the holes he put Cords, and tying these to Horse-tails, in that manner caused him to be dragg'd about the City, in imitation, perhaps, of what *Homer* saith *Achilles* (of whom *Alexander* deriv'd his Pedegree) did to the dead body of the Valiant *Hector*. The *Penninsular* people in *Gaul*, were overcome by *Cesar* in a Naval Battle, yielded to his mercy; but because they had before given hostages and yet rebelled, and contrary to the Law of Nations had imprisoned his Embassadors, he put the chief men of them to death, and sold the rest for Slaves. And yet *Cassiodorus* has been of the hands of all those who had maintained the siege against him, and had yielded to his mercy, because they had rebelled before; yet the same *Cassiodorus* was known to be very merciful.

*Xenophon* in the first Chapter of his Third Book says, that Prisoners of War may be used without loss of Law, or Pieces of Justice, at the Nations pleasure: This is true, if there be no previous Articles or Treaty, that shall alter the

the case. The *Greeks* were cruel enough to their Prisoners: In that Naval Battle, wherein the *Lacedemonian* *Lisander* gained the Sovereignty of the Sea from the *Athenians*, he put three thousand Prisoners to the Sword in cold Blood. Those who yielded to their discretions, made but a bad bargain of it. Take a few examples: *Miletus*, which was tributary to *Athens*, rebelled, the Inhabitants, after a long resistance, yielded to mercy; the first Sentence of that popular State was, that all the men above fourteen years of age, should dye, and all under it, with all the women, should be sold for Slaves: The next days Verdict was more favourable, which gave life and liberty to all, except the Ring-leaders of the Sedition, but these the *Athenians* made not to be so few as a thousand. The *Placians*, a free people of *Greece*, after a long Siege, yielded to the mercy of the *Lacedemonians*, who put every one of them to death, and sold the Women for Slaves. The Inhabitants of the Isle of *Malta*, of whom I spoke a little before, after a long Siege, yielded to the mercy of the *Athenians*; but they exercised that perpetual Law of the Conquerour over the Vanquished, (whereof their Embassadors had told them) and though they had no pretext of other power over them, but that of the sharpest Sword, yet they killed all the men that were above fourteen years old, and sold all the Women and Male children for Slaves.

But the *Romans* were the most merciless Conquerours of any Nation, (except the *Cannibals*, who feed their Prisoners to kill and eat them) for those Prisoners whom they killed not, they reserved for worse uses than drudgery and slavery: Some were kept to adorn their Pompous Triumphs, and when the Triumphers Chariot turned towards the Capitol, then the woful Captives were taken to the place of Execution, and there butchered to death; and if any of them had their lives spared at that time, it was a cruel mercy, to make them dye a worse death afterward; which was the fortune of *Perseus*, the last King of *Macedon*; for after he, with his Children all in Chains, had been made spectacles at *Romulus* his Triumphant Chariot, they were left to dye in prison for want of either Food, or Sleep, the two great supporters of mans life. Others of their Prisoners were forced to fight hand fence at Sharps on the Amphitheatres, till they killed one another, and all to make sport to that inhuman people: And which was worse, they were forced many times to fatigue the cruelty of the Spectators by fighting for their lives with Lyons, Bears, and Tygers, kept purposely from Meat, to make them more eager to devour those miserable wretches: And thus they used women as well as men. I told you also how *Titus* (who was so meek a Prince, that he was called *The Delight of Mankind*) used the Insatuated *Jews*, after the destruction of *Jerusalem*. So unlimited a power did those Ancient Conquerours assume to themselves over the persons and lives of their Prisoners, which by the Law of War; and the Law of Nations they had acquired.

Yet the *Roman* Senate very often either really were, or seemed to be dissatisfied with some of their Consuls, and other Supreme Commanders of their Armies, who were cruel to those who yielded to mercy. So when *Sergius Galba* had sold in *Spain* all those *Periageses* who had submitted themselves, a Law was made at *Rome* to restore them to their liberty, but it had no effect; and this imported juggling. But the Senate went further, for they punished some of their Generals for using cruelty to those who yielded to mercy, as the Proconsul *Phacellus*, *Craffus*, and two Admirals were judicially condemned at *Rome* for their inhumanities of that nature in *Greece*. The Consul *M. Popilius* having by sundry Victories well near ruined the *Ligurians*, ten thousand of them submitted to his Discretion, and observe what that was; he first disarm'd them, next he razed their Town; thirdly, he sold all their goods and substance; and fourthly, he sold themselves for Slaves. A most detestable action, and as such, reſented by the Senate, who ordered the Consul to pay back the price to the Buyers, restore the poor *Ligurians* to their liberty, and return to them, as much of their goods, and as many of their Arms as could be recovered: But the half of this was not performed by the Consul; yet the reason on which the Senate grounded this order, is very observable: Because, said they, Victory doth not consist in exercising Cruelty on those who yield to Mercy, but in vanquishing the obsti-

The *Greeks* generally gave bad quarter.

The *Romans* generally most merciless to Prisoners.

*Roman* Cruelty to Prisoners often reſtrained by the Senate.



nate and Contumacious. Most of the *Capani* (who stood for *Hannibal*) after a long Siege, yielded themselves and City to the mercy of the two *Roman* Consuls; one whereof was wounded, and inclined to be merciful, but the other, *Q. Fulvius*, caused eighty of the principal Citizens, first to be whipt with Rods, and then beheaded with Axes, and he used all the rest very inhumanely.

And assuredly the fear of merciless usage, and bad quarter, hath forced many to make an unlooked for resistance, to the great prejudice of the prevailing party; for Despair produceth the most horrid and desperate effects. Most of the *Saguntines* saved *Hannibal* a labour to kill them, by killing themselves. The Citizens of *Assapa* in Spain, detesting the *Roman* Cruelty, made a great pile of Wood within their Town, set it on fire, threw first their Wives and Children into it, and then themselves. When *Philip*, the last King of *Macedon* except one, would grant no other conditions to the Inhabitants of *Abdol*, but to yield to his Mercy, which they knew was the extremest of Cruelties; after many desperate resolutions, and vigorous oppositions, when the *Macedonians* entered, it was a fearful sight to see the poor *Abdols* destroying one another promiscuously, men and women, young and old, some hanging their Wives first, and then themselves; others cutting the Throats of their Children, and then their own; others casting their nearest relations in Wells, and over the tops of Houses, and themselves after them. *Philip* being astonished and appalled at so terrible a sight, by Proclamation gave them three days to live, before their death should be resolved on by him: But in vain, for all of them dispatched themselves, except such as were by force, bonds, and chains compelled to live. You may read their lamentable Tragedy in *Polybius* his sixteenth Book, and in the thirty first of *Titus Livius*.

Nor did the *Romans* in their Civil Wars give better quarter one to another (except *Caesar*) than they did to Strangers: *Pompey* killed those Souldiers of *Caesar's* whom he found in his Camp, though *Caesar* spared those of *Pompey*, and sent them back to him. *Scipio*, *Pompey's* Father-in-law, put all those of *Caesar's* party to death, whom he took Prisoners: *Sylla*, after all his Victories, very cruelly put eight thousand *Romans* to the Sword in the great Bullery, near the City, after they had yielded to his Mercy. Not did *Antipater* keep himself within the limits of Mercy, when he thought it fit at one time to sacrifice three hundred *Roman* Knights to appease the incensed Ghost of his Great Uncle *Pillius Caesar*. But it may be said, these had that presence which all Civil War carries along with it, and that is, that all who oppose either of the two parties, are Rebels to the State; whether the party be for the lawful and supreme authority, or against it. And therefore, to say no more of their Civil Wars, I find them extremest cruel in their Wars with *Hannibal*, to their own Souldiers, which that great *Carthaginian* had taken Prisoners. *Fabius* the Dictator (who saved the *Roman* State) made an agreement with *Hannibal* for the exchange and ransom of Prisoners of a like quality, and for every one of those who (after the exchange was made) were Superfluous; they were to pay near eight pounds, Sterling. At one exchange there were two hundred forty seven more *Romans* than *Carthaginians*; *Hannibal* demands their ransom; *Fabius* sent to the Senate for it, who basely refused the money, and disowned the agreement; what could the good old man *Fabius* do, but send his Son to *Rome*, and sell a part of his Patrimony, and pay the money to *Hannibal*, which was near two thousand pound Sterling? A vast sum in those days. But they dealt worse with those of their own men who were taken Prisoners at *Cannæ*, whom they would neither ransom out of the publick Purse, nor suffer the Prisoners themselves, or their Friends to ransom out of their private fortunes and estates. And though the Senate flattered themselves, by calling this act of their own, Magnanimous; yet since there was no Justice in it, it could carry no generosity along with it; for if these Captive *Romans* misbehaved themselves in the Battle, the Senate was bound in honour to ransom them, and punish them themselves, and not suffer them to rot in prison with their capital Enemy. Assuredly this Action wanted for neither Avarice nor Cruelty; for strange it was thus to punish common Souldiers, and yet to send out some principal Senators to meet and complement their half-brain'd Council, *Tarentin Vire*, and thank him,

Fear of bad quarter produceth desperate effects.

Romans cruel to Prisoners in their Civil Wars.

Roman Senates Avarice.

Its Cruelty and Injustice.

him, that he had not despaired of the Common-wealth; and yet by his obstinate and inexcusable folly he had brought the Common-wealth to the very brink of Destruction.

And why might not *Hannibal* have used these *Roman* Prisoners, as *Livy* in his seventh Book tells us, the *Romans* used some thousands of the *Tarquinius* Prisoners, of whom they chose 358 of the prime Noblemen and Gentlemen, all these they first whipped well with Rods, and then struck off their Heads in the great Market-place of *Rome*, and presently after put all the rest of the Prisoners to the Sword in cold blood? Though this was a very merciless act, yet by the law of War they might do, and so might *Hannibal* have done to their Prisoners; and truly, I do not see how he could be obliged to feed those whom their own Masters would not ransom.

Let us hear what opinion *Polybius* had of Prisoners of War, who was a grave Historian, a great States-man, and a good Captain. In his second Book, speaking of *Arifomachus*, who being a Prisoner of War, was tortured to death: He saith on that subject, that neither *Antigonus* King of *Macedon*, nor *Aratus* Pretor of the *Acheans*, could be called cruel, for putting a Captive to death with torments; for, though *Arifomachus* had not deserved that usage otherwise, yet they might have done all to him that was done. *Jure Belli*; for the Law of Nations and War give the Conqueror power to use his Prisoners at his pleasure. And the same Author speaking of the *Mantineans*, who were justly punished for their abominable perfidy and ingratitude, in slaughtering those *Acheans* who were sent to preserve them; he saith expressly, That though they had committed no such wickedness, nor any other crime at all, yet the Victor in War, *Jure Belli*, might have either killed them, their Wives, and Children, or sold them for Slaves at his pleasure. Thus far he.

But this power of Victorious Princes or Generals over the Goods, Persons, and Lives of their Prisoners, is limited and restrained by Treaties, Parleys, Capitulations, and Articles; to the strict observance whereof simply, and without fraud or ambiguity, all men of what Station, Rank, or Quality whatsoever, or of what Religion or Persuasion soever, be he Jew or *Gentile*, *Christian* or *Barbarian*, *Christians* or *Mahometans*, are tyed; because Faith and Promises are the Sacred and Indissoluble Bonds, which maintain Humane Society, and whoever breaks them on any pretence, should be look'd on as a Monster, and not as a Man.

In the time of Treaty, both parties who treat, ought to be careful, that a Cessation of Arms be agreed on, and sign'd by the Commanders in Chief, of both Forces, whether it be in Field, Town, Castle, or Garrison; and not only so, but they ought to be on their guard, for fear of foul play, or some unexpected rupture of the Treaty: For both in Ancient and Modern times, Cities and Forts have been surpriz'd, when those within thought themselves secure by a Treaty and Cessation, as Histories of all ages bear witness: And many times these Surprizes have been made without either the consent or connivence of either the Commander in chief, or his Subordinate Officers, merely by the common Souldiers, who frequently think themselves defrauded by Treaties, of that which they conceive is the price of their Sweat and Blood; to wit, the spoil and booty of the place beleagued, or of the persons of those at most beaten and overcome in the Field. Nor should any Treaty give the least interruption to the constant keeping of strict Guards, and careful Watches; nor should those who treat, have liberty to view Guards, Camps, Magazines, or Parades, unless they be so strong, and in so good order and posture, that the sight of them may serve to terrify an Enemy. *Scipio the African*, in time of a Treaty with *Syphax* and *Asdrubalus*, having by his Commission sufficiently spy'd the posture of their Guards, and weakness of their Camps, suddenly breaks off the Treaty, sets upon them, burns their Leaguer, and destroys forty thousand of their men. In this the *Roman* General made no breach of Faith nor Promise, but made a more prudent use of the Treaty than the Enemy did. Treaties, Promises, and Articles should be religiously observ'd, but yet there is a prudent mistrust often necessary, for the heart of man is desperately wicked, and deceitful above all things; who can know it? And here the old lesson, *Disce diffidere*, is very often necessary to be remember'd. *The*

A merciless act of the Romans, yet not unjust.

Polybius his opinion how Prisoners of War may be used.

Treaties.

Articles and Promises should be faithfully kept.

No Enemy to be trusted in time of Treaty.

bookings

Cæsar Legate  
cheated by a  
Treaty at  
Marsilles.

Cæsar's repu-  
tation ques-  
tioned by Cato.

Articles  
broke.

Perfidious  
and cruel  
usage.

No quarrel to  
be pick'd out  
of Articles.

Trocydides.

Livius.

bonists, Cæsar Legate, had very long, besieged *Marsilles*, and had granted the Defendants truce till Cæsar coming; this rendered the Besiegers negligent; which the *Marsillians* perceiving, and having a high and fair wind for their purpose, sallied, and in a moment burnt his Ambulatory Tower, his Rams, Mules, and other Machines of War, which had been the works of many months. In one of my Discourses of the Modern Art of War, I shall speak more fully of the sad effects of negligence in time of Parleys and Treaties. Some of the Ancient *Gaules* were in Treaty with Cæsar, and had a Cessation of Arms with him, they perfidiously break it, and kill many of his people; he marches against them, they send Embassadors to him, without any previous liberty demand'd, or granted by him for those Embassadors, and therefore he keeps them in restraint, till his had utterly undone their Army: Here they broke with Cæsar, not Cæsar with them, for after their breach, he neither granted them Treaty nor Cessation, nor Passports for their Embassadors; yet Cato, in full Senate, avouched this act of his to be Perfidy, and a breach of the Law of Nations, and pleaded that he ought to be delivered up to the *Gauls*, whom he had offended, as a Sacrifice, to appease the wrath of the Immortal Gods.

The Ancient *Greeks*, who accounted all other Nations *Barbarians*, broke frequently their *Treaties*, Conventions, and Articles very barbarously. Those who commanded the *Corcyrian* Army artick'd with the Inhabitants of *Epidamnus*, that they should deliver up their Town, and that till the pleasure of the populace of *Corcyra* were known, all the *Corinthians* should be kept in Chains, and all strangers sold for Slaves: A bad enough agreement at best, and yet the half of it was but kept by the *Corcyrians*, for all the *Corinthians* were indeed kept in Fetters, but the strangers were all put to death. In that total rout given to the *Athenians* in the Isle of *Sicily*, by the *Syracussians*, assisted by *Gilippus* a *Lacedæmonian* Captain, *Demosthenes*, one of the Generals for *Athens*, had Articles granted him for his own life, and six thousand men that were with him, and so they yielded themselves Prisoners; and shortly after *Nicias*, the other *Athenian* General, submitted himself without conditions, to *Gilippus* his discretion: Both of them were put to death. And though no Articles were broke to *Nicias*, yet it was inhumanity to kill him in cold blood; but in the death of *Demosthenes*, Perfidy was added to Cruelty. The bloody Dictator *Sylla* made Articles with three thousand *Romans* at *Antenna*, and gave them their lives, on condition that they should kill some of their own party within the Town, who were his Enemies: They performed their part, but he did not he, for he put them all to the Sword; a perfidious act of his part, though indeed they met with that which they well deserved.

Treaties ought to be concluded, and Agreements and Articles subscribed, without any design to pick quarrels, or to lay hold on any small emergent that may seem to give the contracting parties any ombrage or occasion of breaking: This hath been too often practis'd in our Modern Wars, nor did some of the Ancients fail to help themselves with base fetches. Take two or three instances: At *Pilos*, the *Lacedæmonians* are beaten at Sea by the *Athenians*, and four hundred of them shut up in a barren Island, likely to be starved: An agreement is made, the *Lacedæmonians* are to deliver up their Ships, a final Peace is to be concluded, and those in the Island were to be set at liberty, but if any one Article happened to be infringed, then all of them were to be void; and if the people of *Athens* (who had the Sovereignty) did not ratify this agreement, the Truce was to end, the war to begin, and all the Gallies were to be restored. The *Athenian* State rejects the Treaty, the Cessation is given up, the War is commenced, but the Fleet was not restored, because, said the *Athenian* Captains, in time of the Truce, some of the *Lacedæmonians* endeavour'd to get out of the barren Isle into *Pilos*: A most detestable Perfidy. And what better was the usage the *Samnites* got from the *Romans* in that Treaty, wherein they gave the *Roman* Army liberty to depart and go home, after they had made every man of them pals under the Gallows at *Caudium*? The Senate refused to ratify the Treaty, prepared for War, and sent the Consuls who had sign'd the Articles, prisoners to the *Samnites*; a subterfuge, which did not quadrate with the Justice to which they pretended. Yet

it was such usage as was foretold to the *Samnites* by their old General *Hannibal*. A considerable number of *Corcyrians* (who seditionally had left the Town, taken arms, and spoil'd the adjacent Country) are routed by the *Athenians*, they come to a Parley, and it is agreed first they should deliver up all their Arms: Secondly, all their Auxiliaries: and thirdly they should remain faithful Prisoners till the people of *Athens* gave judgment, what should be done with them, but still provided they should not be deliver'd to their mercilefs Countrymen the *Corcyrians*; but this was the *Athenians* grand design, and therefore an article is insinuated in, that if any one of these conditions were broke, all of them should be void. Then were some *Corcyrians* sent to the Prisoners, who counterfeited themselves friends, advise them to escape, and to that purpose offer them a Ship; the infatuated people lays hold on the offer, and sails away, but being way-laid, are easily retaken, and then delivered to their capital enemies, who put them all to cruel deaths. An execrable act of the *Athenians*, and that the rather because their City was famous for Schools, wherein were taught the Moral Vertues. I will not speak here of *Hannibals* breaking *Maharbals* Capitulation with six thousand *Romans* at *Thrasimene*, but shall reserve it till I speak of the Power that subordinate Officers have to give Conditions and Articles, which you may find in the Twenty-sixth Chapter of the *Modern Art of War*.

I know not whether *Amilcar*, *Hannibals* father dealt candidly when he Treated and Capitulated with *Spendius* and *Antarius*, the Ring-leaders of the *Carthaginian* revolted Mercenaries, and made it an Article that it should be in the power of the Senate of *Carthage* to chuse any ten of the Rebels they pleased, and to dispose of them as they thought good; and when this was agreed to, he immediately seized on them two as two of these ten. Sure if they had thought they had been in that danger, they had never sign'd a paper tending so directly to their own destruction, and therefore that Article was sign'd against the intention of the Capitulators, and so perhaps was void in Law. *Amilcar* made also choice of the Ten himself, and not the Senate which was against the Letter of the Capitulation. The *Athenian* General *Paches* had besieged *Neium*, and invited *Hippias* (who was Commander in chief within the Town) to come out and speak with him, promising faithfully (if they did not agree at the Treaty) to send him back in safety, but did not tell him when. The foolish Governor came out, *Paches* immediately storms the secure City, takes it, and puts most that were within it to the sword, but would needs keep his word to *Hippias*, and therefore sends him back to the Town, where he was no sooner arrived but by order of the execrable *Paches* he is shot to death with Arrows. This treachery in feckling and laying hold on occasion to break Treaties and Articles was, is, and ever will be a monstrous crime crying to Heaven for vengeance. The Sons of *Saul* paid dear for their fathers breach to the *Gibsonites*, who with mouldy bread and clouted shoues had cunningly cheated *Jesse* to treat with them, and given them conditions, which notwithstanding he resolved for his Oaths sake Religiously to observe.

But these examples of *Spendius*, and *Antarius* of *Carthage*, and *Hippias* of *Neium*, should teach all Generals and Commanders in chief of whatever quality they are, whether in field or Town, not to parley in person; for if contrary to Parol, promise, faith, Oath, or Hostages, they be either kill'd or made Prisoners; then the Army, Town, or Castle which they commanded, stand for a time amazed, which gives a fair opportunity to the deceitful enemy (who hath prepar'd himself for it) to fall upon them, and put them in a fearful confusion, if not totally to rout them before they can recollect themselves. *Julius Cæsar*, I confess, had an advantage in his personal parley in *Spain*, with *Assanius* and *Perreus*, because by his presence, and the justifying his cause in his own excellent language, and his promises not only of fair quarter, but of entertainment, he debauched most of their Army. But these very reasons which made his parley with them justifiable, render'd their meeting with him, in presence of the Soldiers of both Armies (which *Cæsar* would needs have) altogether inexculpable. And indeed *Pamphy* refused on good grounds all parley with *Cæsar* at *Dirrachium*. But there was no such cause of *Cæsar's* Personal parley with *Arriovistus* King of *Germany*, at which I suppose he was made sensible of his error; for though he thought he had made the meeting cock-sure, on a little hill situated in the midst of a large Plain,

Perfidy of the  
Athenians.

*Amilcar* tak-  
ed.

An execrable  
Villany.

*Jesse* sub his  
Pitcy.

No Comman-  
ders in chief  
should Parley  
in person.

Certain danger  
by it.

His great loss  
by it.

Perfidy of a  
Roman Legat.

Gracchus  
kill'd at a  
Parley.  
Scipio the  
African ques-  
tion'd for his  
Parley with  
Syphax.

Desperate  
ways to pre-  
vent bad  
Quarter.

Vittoria con-  
fess placuit,  
sed Vittia Ca-  
tani.

Plain, (where no ambushes could be laid) and none were to approach that Plain, but himself and the barbarous King, each of them accompanied with ten Horsemen, and he had made choice of ten of the gallantest of his Legionaries to be with himself all mounted on good Gallick Horses; but notwithstanding all these cautions, the Treaty and parley was broke of, not without visible signs of treachery. And the same *Cassius* gives a Caveat to all Commanders in chief, either of Armies, or parts of Armies, or of Cities, or Castles, not to parley in person, when he tells us the sad story how he lost one full Legion, and five Cohorts of another, by the simple folly of his Legate *Sabinus*, first in believing the Intelligence of *Ambiorix* a profest enemy; and next in going in person with his principal Officers, to treat and parley with the same *Ambiorix*, upon the bare word or parol of a faithless Barbarian, by whom he and his Officers were immediately kill'd, and then their forces presently after put to the Sword. And take here a perfidious trick of a Roman at a Parley. *Comius* a Gallick Prince had not been very faithful to *Rome*, *Cassius* Legate *Labinus* appoints one *Volsenus* to Parley with *Comius*; the Gaul having got the accustomed assurances, came to the place where *Volsenus* (by order from *Labinus*) as out of friendship took him by the hand, but held it fast till one of his Centurions gave him a deep wound on the head; but it not proving mortal, *Comius* escaped, and swore thereafter never to trust a Roman. If *Cassius* had either cut off his Legates head, or (according to the Roman custom used in such cases) deliver'd him over to the incensed Gauls for this treacherous act, then the same *Labinus* had not afterward perfidiously deserted himself, and run over to *Pompey*. *Sempronius Gracchus* being betray'd by his Host, left his command, and being Proconsul, went in person to Parley with some *Carthaginians*, from the result whereof he expected great matters, but he never return'd, for he was environ'd and kill'd with all his retinue. *Scipio* the African, though an accomplished Captain, no doubt, for got his duty when he left his charge in Spain, and went to *Africa* to treat with *Syphax* in the midst of an Army, and at that time accompanied by *Attibal* a profest enemy to the Roman name and Nation, having no assurance for his safety but the word of a Prince, whom *Scipio* himself accounted barbarous. And though he escaped that hazard, yet did he not escape the severe reproof of Great *Fabius*, who to his face, and in full Senate charged him with this inexcusable oversight in very rough and bitter language, as you may read in *Livies* Thirtieth Book. Nor do I look on the personal Parley between the same *Scipio*, and the famous *Hannibal* before their last Battel at *Zama*, but as an extravagant action of two such renowned Chieftains. The Interviews of Kings and Sovereign Princes have seldom prov'd fortunate, or gain'd those advantages to either party that were expected. But this Discourse belongs to another Chapter.

To conclude, the apprehension of bad quarter, and the fear of the breach of Promises and Articles, and the suspicion of ill usage, hath made many refuse all quarter, reject all Treaties, and distrust all Articles and Agreements, and by a voluntary death rid themselves from all fears and dangers, and rob their enemies of the glory of their Captivity. Thus *Saul* King of *Israel* desired his Armour-bearer to kill him; and because he would not, he did it himself, that he might not fall into the hands of the uncircumcised. Thus *Virius Vibius* persuaded seventy *Capuan* Senators to sup with him, and every one of them to drink a draught of Poyson to flun the Rods and Axes of the Roman Conquerours. Thus the Great *Hannibal* poysoned himself, that the Treacherous King of *Prussia* might not deliver him into the hands of his implacable enemies the Romans. Thus *Brutus* and *Cassius* dispatched themselves, that they might not be grateful and welcome spectacles to *Anthony* and *Octavius Caesar*. Thus *Cato* made *Utica* famous by pulling out his own Bowels, that he might not be beholding for his life to merciful *Caesar*. Thus *Scapula* to flun the same *Caesars* just resentment, for his sedition, caused a huge pile of burnt-wood to be heaped up, supped plentifully, took Nard, or Spikenard, and Rosin inwardly, and then commanded a slave to kindle the fire, and to throw him in it, after his freed servant had at his intreaty cut his Throat. Thus *Mark Anthony* and his beautiful and beloved *Cleopatra*, opened to themselves two several doors of death, that they might not assist at *Augustus* his Triumphal Entrance into *Rome*. Thus *Vaudica*, Queen of the *Britons* chose rather to poyson her self, than be the ob-

ject

ject of the Romans contempt, to whom in restoring to liberty her oppressed Country, she had done much mischief. What some others, who were not Heathens, have done like this in latter times, moved by the fearful examples of the calamities and inhumane usage of those who have been Prisoners of War before them, shall be spoken to in its own place.

## CHAP. XXIV.

Of the Military Punishments, and Rewards of the Romans, and other Ancients.

AS in all well order'd Commonwealths the Vertuous should be cherish'd, and the wicked chastis'd, so in Armies, (which both in Oeconomy and Policy, do not only represent, but are indeed either well or ill govern'd Republicks) those who in ancient times did signal services, were rewarded, and those who transgress'd Military Laws were punished. And if Martial Animadversions be more severe than the Civil ones, there is reason for it, because on the right or wrong managing the War, depends the safety or ruin of the State, and upon the least mistake of one Military order, may follow the loss of that Army, to which is intrusted the management of that War. The great Master of War, *Caesar* says, *Fortuna quoniam in reliquis rebus, non principis in bello, parvi momenti magnas commutationes efficit*: "Fortune, faith he, as in other affairs, so more especially in War, makes inconsiderable accidents produce vast changes and alterations."

That which *Lamachus* in *Plutarch* says is now common, *Non licet bis in bello peccare*. In War one cannot do wrong twice; that is, in summa rei, in the principal points of War; as in the loss of an army, the ill Marshalling of it, the ill fighting a Battel, the loss of a considerable Town or Pass, by negligence, sloth, treachery, or cowardise. *Vegetius* in the Thirteenth Chapter of his first Book, says, *Prætorum delicta emendationem non recipiunt*. The errors committed in fighting Battels are not capable of amendment. And in the fifth Chapter of his Third Book he tells us, *Siquidem nulla sit negligentia venia, ubi de salute certatur*: "There is no pardon for a neglect, where men fight for the common safety."

Now though it be an unquestionable truth, that when subjects do their Prince and Country service, they do but their duty; and when they do either of them disservice, or transgress Laws, they deserve punishment; yet it is as true, that men naturally are much encouraged to vertue, by seeing rewards liberally bestow'd on those who are faithful and loyal, as they are frighted or terrified from vice by the punishments they see inflicted on the wicked and disloyal. I think it was no small, but a remarkable saying of a Noble English General, who by an exemplary hanging of some Plunderers in his Army, did encourage the Country Gentlemen to intreat him to hang some more for taking Geese and Hens, and yet they were making no great haste to bring in either meat or money for the entertainment of the Army: Nay, Gentlemen, (said the General) all hanging, and no money will not keep any Army together, a little hanging, and a little money will do better. And indeed it is so, all punishment, and no reward, proves but one support, instead of two to the continuance of either Commonwealth or Armies.

Many of the ancient Governours of Republicks, and Commanders of Armies knew very well how to dispence both rewards and punishments. Some Nations whom both *Greeks* and *Romans* qualified with the title of Barbarous, were extremely

Military Laws should be severe, and severely executed.

Rewards encourage as well as punishments deter.

Some ancient Nations inhumane in their punishments.

extremely inhumane in their punishments. So we read that he who came left to the Rendezvous of the ancient Gauls, was either cut in pieces, or thrown quick into a fire. And Caesar in his Seventh Book of the Gallick War, says, that for petty faults, *Parentibus* caused noses, ears and hands to be cut off, and the eyes of Delinquents to be put out, and in that manner sent them home to their friends; but for greater crimes he caused them to be burnt quick, or put them to death by some more lingering torture.

Grecian punishments.

Though the Grecians were severe in their punishments, yet we find them not ordinarily cruel in them; their Animadversions being for most part rather Ignominious than Capital. It is said of the *Lacedaemonians* (from whom others had their breeding in the Military Art) that they punish a Coward by clothing him in a Womans apparel, and making him stand every third day in their Markets; or other publick places, which was looked on by men of spirit as worse than death. We find the ordinary death to which the Grecian Delinquents in Armies were put, was that of stoning, which perhaps they learned from a more ancient people than themselves; the *Phrygians*, it being a custom with them to take their Malefactors without the Camp, and there stone them to death. This punishment was no new invented one in the time of Alexander, for *Q. Curtius* speaking of the Conspiracy against the King, says, all that were named by *Nicomachus*, so soon as the sign was given, were stoned to death, *Mores patrii*, after the custom of the Country. Punishments of another sort were inflicted by the Great Alexander, after his great Soul began to deviate from the path of Vertue; such was his inhumane torturing to death the noble *Philotas*, perhaps with that same justice that he caused his father *Pergamus* to be murdered, whose Conduct had so much contributed to most of his Conquests.

I much wonder why *Stenophorus* will reckon stoning to be a Roman punishment, for we find nothing of it so far as I know in History. He tells us, as he saith, out of *Florus*, he might have said out of *Livy*, that *Posthumus* a Roman General was kill'd with Stones by his own Soldiers. But that which was done by a Mutinous Army to their Commander in chief, is not to be reckoned a punishment authorized by Law, for he confesseth it was done in a Mutiny, *Seditio* *facta*. I have spoken of this Mutiny in another place.

Roman punishments.

What punishments were legally inflicted on the Roman Officers and Soldiers, we are left to glean out of History, for *Polybius* speaks but of few, and *Vegetius* of none that I remember, except in the Fourteenth Chapter of his first Book, where he saith, the *Tirones* who either did not willingly learn their Exercises, or made no great proficiency in them, were fed with Barley instead of Wheat. But we find that manner of punishment imposed on the *Futurati* as well as the *Novitiates*, and for other faults. *Livy* in his Thirty seventh Book, says, that some Companies who had lost their Colours were appointed to be fed with Barley. *Polybius* tells us that the Tribunes had power to Fine, to take Pledge, and to whip with Rods; and a Centurion had power to whip with Vines, for a twig of a Vine was his badge, whereby he was known. *Tacitus* says, that one *Lucilius* a Centurion was nick nam'd, *Cado alterum*, because when he had broke one twig on the back of a Soldier, he called for a second, and a third. Observe by the way that a Soldier might not resist his Centurion when he was chastising him, for if he but held the Rod, he was cashiered, and if he broke it, he died for it; and this will prove what I asserted in another place, that the Roman Centurions were sometimes Hangmen; yet in these days they were looked upon as such no more, than *Benjamin*, *Solomon* Captain General, was thought a Hangman, for killing his Predecessor *Joah*, *Adonijah*, and *Shimei*, with his own hand, at his great Masters command. *Scipio* the *Numanianus*, caused every Soldier to be whipt severely that went ever so little out of his rank, or fell behind; if he was a Roman Soldier he was whipt with Vines, if one of the Allies with Birches. The Tribunes, says *Polybius*, for neglect of Guards, had power to punish with death; but he adds, not without the Council; but there is no doubt the Consul had power without advice or counsel of any whatsoever, to put any under his command to death, either for crimes forbidden by the Laws, Constitutions and Customs of their former Discipline, or for transgressing any new Commands or Edicts. As *Manlius* struck the head from his own Son, for combating with one of the *Lutines* contrary to a late order; and for some such emergent

Beheading their own Sons.

gent transgression, some think *Posthumus* did as much to his Son, as I told you before. *Caius Marius* for deserting his Army in *Spain*, was first cruelly whipped with Rods, and then sold for a Slave in open Market for a piece of money, not worth an English Groat.

Desertion of a Post was death, but the punishment I last spoke of was worse than death. By their Law it was death to leave their Officers or Colours in the Field; to lose Arms, or go from their Guards, to commit theft, to bear false witness, or commit any one crime, how small so ever, three several times; yet this was not always, yea but seldom put in execution. Some Cohorts that were chased into their Camp by the *Tuscani*, and with loss of their Colours, did not die for it, but were ordered only to fly without the Camp, without shelter of either Hut or Tent, till they recovered their reputation. Those that fled from *Cama* were ordered by the Senate to be carried to *Sicily*, and to remain there till the end of the Punick War, though most of them had served out their time. At *Cannissum*, *Marcellus* ordered those *Maniples* that had lost their Ensigns to be fed with Barley instead of Wheat, and the Centurions to have their Swords taken from them, and turned out of the Camp.

Sodomy was a capital crime when publicly known. A young Soldier not only refused to suffer one of his Tribunes to abuse him, but in defending himself from force, killed the Tribune, and was acquitted by the Consul. The manner of death inflicted by the Romans on Criminals was ordinarily twofold, Beheading, and Battening, both very cruel as they made them, for heads were seldom struck off; but after a severe scourging with Rods. Battening, or the *Equestrium*, is thus described by *Polybius* in his Sixth Book, The party who was to suffer, was brought publicly, (he tells us not to what place of the Camp) and then the Tribune touched him with his Battoon, immediately after (he having liberty to run, as at our *Gallops*) he was cudgell'd and sold'd to death by the Soldiers in any place of the Camp he fortun'd to come and if he had the luck to escape, he was nothing the better for it, home he durst not go, none of his friends or acquaintances durst harbour him, and it was lawful for any man to kill him. Sometimes the Delinquents were punish'd after death, as much as men could punish, for we read of some who after they had been cruelly whipped, and their heads cut off, had burial denied them, yea their friends were forbid to mourn for them. But though I confess that for giving terror, horrid crimes deserve horrid punishments, yet I think the consideration of humane frailty should teach man to be shy in inflicting inhumane pains on the living, and be very sparing to meddle with the dead; for *Savere in morte*, is an assured token of a monstrously cruel nature.

Crimes punishable alike by death.

Sodomy a capital crime.

Beheading after severe whipping. Battening or *Equestrium*.

Punishment after death.

Several transgressions were punished by diminishing the offenders wages, by making them march with the Baggage, winter in the field, both out of Town and Camp, to dig Ditches, more than their Companions did, to stand a while day before the Generals Pavilion, and sometimes with turfs on their heads; and as I observed before, it was no small punishment for a Horseman to have his Horse taken from him, and be made to serve on foot, and this was called *Adilia mutatio*.

Lesser punishments.

After the Emperours had invested themselves with the Sovereignty of Rome, many of them inflicted punishments, not *pro ratione delicti*, or according to the quality of the crime, but according to their own boundless power, more to satisfy their cruel and inhumane natures than to give Justice its due course. Among none of the most unjust you may reckon this, that the Emperour Alexander (who did well deserve the Surname that was given him of *Servus*) hearing that a young Soldier had injured a poor old woman in spoiling her of some goods, disarmed him, declared him a slave, and gave him to the woman, that by his work and drudgery he might gain her a livelihood. But these I will speak of, had not so much of justice in them. *Amulian* put one of his Soldiers to a horrible death for Adultery, by casting his feet to be tread on the tops of two Trees branches, bowed down, which being let suddenly fly up, tore the woful wretch in two pieces. The Emperour *Macrinus* caused a Tribune to be tryed (who had suffered his Guards to desert a Post) to the wheel of a Cart, and carried him so a days march. The same Monster of an Emperour being told that two Soldiers had deflowered their Hosts serving Maid, caused immediately the bellies of two

Abominable cruelties.

Cows to be open'd, out of which the Tripes were taken, and then the Soldiers were sowed alive in them, but the heads of the Cows were cut off, that so the woful couple might speak one to another so long as their cruel agony suffered them to breath. The Emperour *Avidius Cassius* cauled a Pole of the height of one hundred foot to be erected, and cauled Delinquent Soldiers to be tyed all along to it from the top to the foot of it, and then set fire to the lowest part, in that manner consuming the miserable wretches with fire and smoke. In our Modern Discipline of War, there have been and are yet some Nations, who for the subtle inventions of atrocious punishments, need borrow nothing from the ancient Tyrants, having not only equalized, but far out-reach'd them, as shall be told you in its proper place.

To return to the ancient *Romans* before the times of the Emperours, when many were found guilty of one Capital crime, all were not put to death, but sometimes one of five, one of eight, for most part one of ten, as *Polybius* tells us in his Sixth Book; and this was called Decimation: he on whom the lot fell, died certainly by Battoning, as the same Author informs us; the rest had some small punishment inflicted upon them, that so as the Historian says, there might be *Pena ad paucos, terror ad omnes*. This Decimation is used in the Modern Wars, the Soldiers casting the Dice, upon which one is hang'd, and the rest are sometimes whipt, and sometimes pardon'd.

An Ignominious Dismission was also a *Roman* punishment, for with them there were four kinds of Cahiering or Dismission: The first was when Soldiers had served out their time appointed by Law, and this was called *Iusta missio*, a Legal dismission. The second was for just and sufficient reasons, as when the party was lame, mutilated, or so infirm that he could not serve longer, and this they called *Missio causaria*, an occasion'd dismission. The third was when a General or a Tribune (for sometimes he had the power to do it) gave a Soldier his Dismission out of grace and favour, and too often for money, and this was termed *Missio gratuita*. The fourth was, when men were put out of the Armies for crimes, and this they called *Missio Ignominiosa*, a shameful Dismission, by which *Cæsar* used two of his Tribunes in *Africk*, *Avienus* and *Festinus*, to which severity they had too much provoked him.

The Ancients propoled and gave rewards to those who carried themselves signally and valorously in any Military occasion; and to invite them to these, the Harangues and publick Oration of their Generals contributed much. *Agesslaus* rewarded those who in their Drillings or Exercises carried themselves better than their Neighbours. The *Athenians* and several other *Grecians* gave Golden Chains, and other testimonies of honour and respect to those who had done any notable exploit. And so did the *Carthaginians* as well as the *Romans*; for *Livius* faith in his Twenty third Book, that *Hannibal* at the siege of *Casium*, offered a Mural Crown to him, who at the assault should first get to the top of the wall.

Though *Polybius* in his Sixth Book, speaks more largely of the *Roman* Rewards, than of their Punishments, yet he is not full enough in them. But in the first place (as indeed it deserves the first place) he tells us, that after the performance of any gallant action, the actors were publickly thanked and praised by the General in a publick Harangue; and assuredly this commendation in such an Audience did not only hugely satisfy him or them, in whose praise it was spoke, but stirred up in others a virtuous emulation to do, or endeavour to do such things as might deserve the like honour. After thanks, faith our Author, the Consul gave a Spear, a Lance, or a Javelin to him who had overthrown an enemy in a private Encounter or Combat, fighting man to man, for so he restricts the gift. And to him, says he, who had overcome and spoil'd an enemy, was given (if he were a Horseman) a Phalara, or some Caparillon for a Horse; and if a Footman, a Dili, a Platter, or a Viol, for the Interpreter calls it *Phala*, which *Lipius* conjectures very rationally to be a mistake, and thinks it should be *Armilla*, Bracelets, for we read in several Authors of these gifts, but not of the other.

It is strange that *Polybius* speaks not one word of Triumphs and Ovations, the first being the greatest reward of Valour and Conduct, both for the honour, magnificence and quality of it, and the last next to it. I shall speak

speak a little of both. The manner of the Triumph was, that he to whom Triumph it was granted, was carried into the City in a Chariot richly accoutred, drawn ordinarily with white Steeds; and when the *Romans* had over-masted *Affra* and *Africk*, with Lions, Tygers, and other wild beasts that were tamed. He was convoy'd by his Army, who follow'd the Chariot, singing Verses and Rhimes of their own making to the praise of the Triumphant. Upon his head he wore a garland of Laurel, the Symbol of Victory; the Soldiers and people cried with loud acclamations, *Io Triumpha*. Before him were carried the rich Spoils, Money and Gold, coined or uncoined, destined for the publick Treasury. At first the Triumphs were granted by the Senate, thereafter by the people, and then refused by the Senate, and sometimes the Consuls Triumphed in spite of both Senate and people; which might have taught them to fear that some time or other that hodge podg of their State divided between Senate and Commons would be eaten up by some daring Consul. *Livy* in his Fourth Book says, that Triumphs were only granted to Dictators and Consuls; and yet in his Twenty eight Book he tells us, that *Scipio the African* had the most magnificent Triumph that ever was seen in *Rome*, and he was but Proconsul; and indeed after him, Proconsuls, Prætors and Propretors had Triumphs granted them. In that same place he tells us of the Conditions on which a Triumph was granted, which were these, He must have kill'd five thousand Enemies at least, won much spoil, and augmented the *Roman* Dominions and Estates. Yet the same *Livy* tells us in his Fortieth Book, that *P. Cornelius*, and *M. Bibulus* Triumphed over the *Ligurians*, who had yielded themselves without fighting; so here was Triumph without bloodshed. Triumphs were not granted to those who had prevail'd over a *Roman* Army; this render'd *Cæsar* odious to the Populace, because he would needs Triumph for his Victory in *Spain* over young *Pompey*; neither did that Invincible Captain out-live that Triumph six Months.

Ovations were granted to meaner persons, and for lesser Victories; he who entered ovant, either went on foot, or on Horseback, but had not his Army to follow him, he carried a branch of Mistle in his hand, and the people in their Acclamations cried, *Ohe, or Oho*; and by this it would seem it was *Ovation*, and not *Ovatio*; some think it had its denomination *ab ovæ*, because the Victor Sacrificed a sheep. The Prisoners were led before the Triumphant Chariot, and so soon as it turned towards the Capitol, they were taken to the place of execution, and put to death; so you may be sure that all were not merry in that day of joy. This certainly was a most barbarous and inhumane custom, where-with the Enemy of Mankind inspir'd that Warlike Nation. Chains of Gold were likewise given to deserving persons by most of the Ancients, and were looked upon as rewards proper to Military persons, as in some places they are used yet.

To him, faith *Polybius*, who first mounted to the Wall of an assaulted City, was given a Crown of Gold, as also to him who saved a *Roman* Citizen, or Ally from being kill'd by an enemy, upon whom the party who was saved, was obliged to look as his Saviour, and was compell'd to set the Crown on his head if he did not do it willingly. The first Crown was called *Corona Muralis*, or a Wall-Crown; the second, *Corona Civicæ*, or the Citizen-Crown. This is all that we have from *Polybius* of Rewards, except that he tells us that those who received these gifts when they returned to *Rome*, might make shew of them at solemn Games and Assemblies, which indeed was no small honour for them, since none were permitted to wear them, but those who had deserved them; and these badges of honour they had liberty to place at the posts of the doors of their houses, or in the most conspicuous places of their dwellings, to be seen by all who pass by, or came in to visit them, *In conspectu adium parte*, faith our Author.

But I find in other stories that the Crown which was given to him who sav'd a *Roman*, was of Oak, it may be the Golden one was given to him who saved a Citizen without the death of the enemy, and the Oaken Crown to him who both saved him and kill'd the enemy, who had endanger'd the *Roman*. A Crown of Gold was given to him who first entered the enemies Camp, and was called *Corona Castrensis*. A Crown of Gold was given to him who in a Naval Battle first entered an enemies Ship, and was called *Corona Navalis*. A Crown of Gold was

By whom granted;

To whom granted.

Ovation;

Chains of Gold.

Mural Crown; Citizen-Crown.

Oakle Crown.

Campal Crown; Naval-Crown.

OLIVE  
Crown.  
  
Obdisional  
Crown.

was given to any Commander for doing any gallant piece of service. An Olive-Crown was given to him who carried himself eminently in Battle. But the most honorable Crown of all was the Obdisional one, which was given to him who succoured, or relieved a besieged City, Castle, or Camp; for if he who saved the Citizens life deserved a Crown, much more he who saved a City, wherein the lives of so many Citizens were concerned. This Crown of relieving the besieged was of grass or flowers, because in these times it was a custom, that those who were vanquished and reduced to obedience, presented their Conquerors with grass, herbs, or flowers. Neither do I think it was bad policy (besides the humanity of it) after the loss of a Battle, or some other disaster, to comfort the Soldiers, by laying the blame on fortune, some mistake, or accident; imputing no blame to the Soldiers, thereby encouraging them to wipe away the stain of their mishap by some gallant and glorious achievement. This was excellently practised by *Cæsar* after his Army was batted at the storm of *Pompey's* Camp; and to the proposal of rewards to those who fought well, and comfort to those who were overcome, doth *Virgil* allude in the fifth of his *Æneids*:

*Sic ait, & geminum pugna proponit honorem  
Victori, velatum auro vittisque juvenum,  
Euxum, atque insignem galeam, solatia victo.*

A Combats twofold prize he doth propound,  
A BUI with gilded horns he gives to one,  
To others he presents fair Helms and Swords,  
And to the vanquish'd comfortable words.

Thus you see the *Romans* at best were severe enough in their punishments, and in their rewards frugal, many times exorbitant in the first, and parsimonious in the second; yet as the Proverb goes, *Better half a loaf than no bread*: Better small rewards than no rewards at all.

## CHAP. XXV.

*Polybius his Comparison of the Macedonian Phalanx, and the Roman Legion, review'd.*

IT is a common saying, he who wins, plays best; yet it is not universally true, for very often the expertest Gamesters are losers, and so we find in all ages that great Captains, and well train'd Armies, have not always been victorious: yet I am not of the opinion that the success of the *Roman* Armies under the Conduct of *Flaminius* and *Æmilius*, against the two *Macedonian* Kings, *Philip* and *Perseus*, moved *Polybius* to give the Palm and Garland to the Legion, which he compared it with the Phalange towards the end of the Seventeenth Book of his excellent History; for to attribute either the justness of a cause, or yet the good or bad order of an Army to contingent events, were to stint the power of Heaven, (which both the Author and all Pagans then did acknowledge to be in their gods) and leave nothing to that Eternal Providence which we adore, by the direction whereof the actions of Mortals are govern'd, and is to nothing more visible than in the successes and routs of Armies. And therefore the Sovereign Lord of the World takes to himself the Title of *Lord of Hosts*, the smallest and most inconsiderable accidents in War, (which are all appointed by the finger of the Almighty) being able to produce most unexpected changes, as *Cæsar* well observed. There hath been therefore other reasons that

Current Success  
sibus opto,  
Quisquis ab  
eventu salta  
notanda quærit.

that mov'd so rational and judicious an Author as *Polybius* was both fam'd and known to be, to prefer the Legion to the Phalange; other reasons, I say, than success; and if I guess right at his meaning, you may take them to be these which follow, in his observation of the advantages and disadvantages of both.

The Phalanx being compos'd of sixteen Ranks, and of one thousand twenty four Files of lusty well armed men, and at its closest Order or Conspiration, so long as it is able to preserve its force, it bears down all before it; for at that posture every Combatant takes up but one foot and a half of ground; and suppose their Pikes but eighteen foot long (whereas the *Sarissæ* were twenty one of length) you may easily compute the points of the fifth Rank (or if you will of the sixth Rank) to extend three foot before the first Rank; of all which I have spoken enough in my Discourses of the *Græcian* Militia. Now though all the Ranks behind the sixth are useless as to the presenting their Pikes, or wounding an Enemy, yet by the weight and strength of their Bodies they assist the impression of the first six Ranks, help the charge to be more forcible, and take away all possibility from those that are before them, to turn their backs upon the Enemy. But this Phalange must have such a ground, that it may open and close at pleasure, and that ground must be plain and even, without the encumbrances of Woods, Trees, Bushes, Hedges, Ditches, Enclosures, rising Hills, and hollow grounds; for any of these is sufficient to disorder it in its parts, and that being once done, an Enemy with little or no danger, may enter at the void places of that great Body, when it is disjunct, and Sword-men being once within the points of the Pikes, the Pike-men are at prey to them, especially to the *Roman* Legionaries, who besides short Swords, carried likewise *Semipithæ*, which I *English* Daggers. Now, saith *Polybius*, such a Champaign, such a Field, as we have described, not being to be found every where, the Phalange must of necessity stay where it hath met with such a ground, and march from it, and accept of such as time, place, or occasion offers, as all Armies must do. If the first, then hath an Enemy free liberty to make himself Master of the Countrey, to besiege and force Towns, and take all other manner of advantages. If the second, and that the Field prove improper for the Phalange, then the Enemy takes the advantage of the ground; enters at the void places, and having so disarray'd it, quickly overthroweth it. Next *Polybius* grants, that the Phalange hath the advantage of the Legion in this, that three foot being allowed between two Legionaries (whereof I have spoke in my discourse of Intervals) and but half so much to two Phalangites: When they are both to fight, it follows, that every Legionary had two Phalangites in front of him, and consequently twelve Pikes presented to him; for it is already granted, that the points of the Pikes of the sixth Rank might be extended before the first Rank; so by this account, there were twelve men against one; an advantage in nature irresistible. But on the other part, the Phalangites could not fight in Maniples, Cohorts, or small Bodies, for being separated or divided, they were quickly broken. The Legionaries were so armed and trained, that they could fight any way, either in a great or small Body, or Man to Man, at any time, or in any place, let the incumbrances be what they will.

Let us resume all this, and say in one word *Polybius* prefers the Legion to the Phalange; because the essential propriety of the Phalange was to fight close together, and so long as it was able to keep so, it was able to bear down the Legion; but sure it could but seldom keep in one entire body, the Legion, by its order and constitution, being apt to fight in small or little Bodies, and to divide according to opportunities and emergencies, could readily enter at the void places of the Phalange, whether there were in the Van, Rear or Flanks, and overthrow it, as often it did.

I shall presume to add two other advantages that I think the Legion had of the Phalange, which *Polybius* hath not mentioned. The first: The Phalange fought all in one Body, the Legion in three Bodies successively, one after another; so that if the *Majors* charged briskly, they might put the great Body of the Phalange in some disorder; and they retiring, the *Principes* find-

First advantage of the Phalange.

In first disadvantage.

Its second advantage.

Its second disadvantage.

A Legion's third advantage over the Phalange.



ing it in some difcomposure, might disorder it so, that the *Triarii* coming fresh to the charge, might have a very cheap market of it.

A Legion  
fourth advan-  
tage.

The second advantage which I conceive the Legion had of the Phalange, was in its larger Front, which I offer to make appear thus: The great Phalange consisted of sixteen thousand three hundred eighty four heavy armed, these marshall'd sixteen deep, and so their Front consisted of one thousand twenty four men, to whom you are to allow one thousand twenty four foot, for them to stand on, when they were to fight; they had no more but one foot and a half allow'd between Files, and therefore for the thousand twenty four Files, allow one thousand twenty three distances, and for these fifteen hundred thirty four foot and a half, add these, the aggregate is two thousand five hundred fifty eight foot and a half; thus much ground, and no more, did the Phalange take up in its Longitude, when it was to fight. The Legion was composed of three Bodies, who were marshall'd one behind another: The *Hastati* had the first Battalion, and were divided into ten Maniples, in every one of which were one hundred and twenty men, these were marshall'd ten deep, and so each Manipule was twelve men in Front; for whom allow twelve foot to stand on, and, as both *Polybius* and *Vegetius* do, allow three foot between Files, twelve Files have eleven distances, and for them you must have thirty three foot, add thirty three to twelve, makes forty five; so much ground did every Manipule possess in Front: In every Battalion were ten Maniples, multiply then forty five by ten, the product will be four hundred and fifty. You may remember that I have elsewhere demonstrated, that these ten Maniples had nine intervals, and every interval must have as much ground allowed to it as the Manipule, that was forty five foot; multiply forty five by nine, the product is four hundred and five, add four hundred and five to four hundred and fifty, the aggregate is eight hundred fifty five foot; and so much ground did the *Hastati* of one Legion possess. In a Consular Army there were four Legions, then you are to multiply eight hundred fifty five by four, and the product will prove to be three thousand four hundred and twenty; and so much ground did the *Hastati* of a Consular Army take up in Front. Now here the *Hastati* are reckon'd to be but twelve hundred, the Legion according to *Polybius* being suppos'd to be but four thousand two hundred. But in *Amilius* his Army against the *Macedonian* Phalanx, the Legions were of six thousand, whereof the *Triarii* (according to *Polybius*) being only six hundred, the *Hastati* and *Principes* must have consisted each of two thousand; and the *Vlites* must have been fourteen hundred. And by this account, *Amilius* his *Hastati* would have possess'd in Front above five thousand foot of ground; so it is clear, that the *Hastati* of the weakest Consular Army out-wing'd the *Macedonian* Phalange, and thereby was able to fall upon its Flanks; supposing still, which cannot be deny'd me, that the *Roman* Cavalry gave the *Grecian* Horse work enough; and they carrying short managable Arms, might easily disorder the Phalangites, being once enter'd within their great Body, so that the *Principes* and *Triarii* coming up fresh to the medley, would not find much difficulty to make that great bulk a prey. Observe likewise, if you consider the great intervals of the *Roman* Maniples, all the Phalangites who in Battel met with these intervals were useless, for they had no Enemy to fight with. These conjectures of mine I have presum'd to add to *Polybius* his weightier considerations.

Reasons why  
a Phalanx  
rightly or-  
der'd, had  
the advantage  
of a Legion.

But notwithstanding all that is said for the Legions advantage over the Phalange, I am bold (with submission to *Polybius*) to say, If the Phalange be order'd, as I spoke of in my Discourses of the *Grecian* Art of War, that is, not so deep as sixteen, and consequently of a larger Front, and thereby not so apt to be surrounded or out-wing'd, and with Reserves, I conceive, not only those conjectures of mine, but all *Polybius* his reasons will come to nothing, or signify little. Neither indeed can I at all be persuaded to believe, that so soon as the Legionaries were enter'd at the void places within the Ranks of the Phalanx, that presently they were Masters of it; for though the points of those Pikes within which the *Romans* were come, were indeed useless, yet so were not the points of all those Pikes that were at a convenient distance from them; besides, I hope it will be granted, that a Legionaries offensive weapon, the Sword,

Sword was no more servicable to him at that close fight, than the Sword of a Phalangite was to him that carried it; for it is not imaginable, that he was bound to keep his Pike longer in his hand than it was useful for him, nor his Sword in its sheath, longer than it was time to draw it, in defence of his life. And what I now speak of a Phalange not so deep as sixteen, and consequently of a greater Front, among the *Grecians*, and of Reserves, which the *Romans* call'd *Subsidia*, is no vain speculation of mine; for I have formerly demonstrated the truth of it out of good Authors, though I confess, I am convinced such Phalanges were not at *Cincephala*, where *Q. Flaminius* beat *Philip* the Father, nor at *Pidna*, where *L. Amilius* beat *Perseus* the Son, both Kings of *Macedon*.

To confirm my opinion that the Legion by its constitution, had no advantage over a Phalange rightly order'd, I shall use the authority of *Polybius* against *Polybius*; for he in his first Book relates to us, how the *Carthaginians* against the first Punick War were brought so low, that they were ready to accept any reasonable conditions of Peace, till they gave the command of their forces to *Zantippus*, a *Lacedemonian*, that had come out of *Greece* with some mercenary *Laconians*, and was one of those, who in this age are called Souldiers of Fortune, who making use of the *Grecian* Rules, which he had learn'd in his own Countrey, marshall'd the *Carthaginian* Army in several Bodies of Horse and Foot, each to second another; adding the help of his Elephants, and chusing the most Champaign grounds he could, extended his Front to so great a length, that the *Romans* using their accustom'd order, were out-wing'd, surrounded, and totally routed by him; and the Consul, *Attillus Regulus*, with five hundred more *Romans*, were led Captive into *Carthage*. Here *Xantippus* merely by the *Grecian* Art of War, worsted the *Romans*, who made use of their own Art.

Roman Army  
beat by Xan-  
tippus a Gre-  
cian,

But I will go a greater length, may not we imagine, that *Amilcar* in the pursuit of that first Punick War, and his Son *Hannibal* in the beginning of the second, imitated *Xantippus*, and manag'd the War according to that pattern he had left behind him? I suppose we may believe it. If this do not prove that the difference between the *Grecian* and *Roman* Art of War did not always make the one Nation victorious over the other, then take more instances.

And by Anil-  
car and Han-  
nibal, who fol-  
lowed Xan-  
tippus his Art,

*Pyrrhus* King of *Epirus*, at his first coming into *Italy* with a *Grecian* Army, against all his *Carthaginians* after the *Roman* manner, no doubt, with those Arms that he had taken from them; now as he had beaten them formerly with *Carthaginian* and *Grecian* Arms, so he beat them frequently afterward with *Roman* Arms. Therefore this noble Historian in that place doth not attribute *Hannibal's* Victories to any advantage his Souldiers had, either in Arms or Art over the *Romans*, but to his own singular Prudence, his Courage and Conduct, and extraordinary Qualifications, and to use *Polybius* his own expression, *His Capital Engine*. But when, saith he, a *Roman* General, equal in abilities to him, came to command the *Roman* Armies, then Victory flew from *Hannibal* over to *Scipio*. But let us ask the question, Why so? Since both Captains were equal in Valour and Conduct, and if there was any odds, the *Carthaginian* no question, had it, because of his long experience, and almost marchless policy in feats of Arms, and that there was but little difference in their Arms, or manner of Militia. Here *Polybius* is at a stand, and gives no reason for it, but that Fortune would have it so. What Fortune was to him, that is Providence to us. He was ignorant of what the wisest of men said long before the foundation of *Rome* was laid, *That there is a time for every purpose under Heaven, a time to kill, and a time to heal, a time to gain, and a time to lose*. And in another place, *That the race is not to the swift, nor the battel to the strong, nor favour to the men of skill, but time and chance happeneth to them*

And by Py-  
rrhus.

To what *Poly-  
bius* acru-  
bates Victory

Eccl. Ch. 3;  
and Ch. 9.



Daniel Ch. 2.

them all. And indeed that happeneth to all, and to every one, what the eternal hath ordain'd for them. Nor did Polybius know what was reveal'd to Nebuchadnezzar in that dream which Daniel interpreted to him; that the Persians should subdue the Assyrians, the Grecians should ruine the Persians, and the Romans should put a period to the Macedonian Monarchy. There was no stop to be made to the current of the Victories of the Romans whom the Almighty had pre-ordain'd to become Masters of the World. That there is such an All-ruling Providence was not unknown to the wiser Heathens, though they, being in a mist, did not see with so clear eyes, as we who are illuminated by the brighter rays of Gods own word; and for all that, I think few Divines can express in fewer words the omnipotency and unbounded power of the most high, than a Pagan Poet did, when he wrote,

Ovid's Met.

*Sic ait, immensa est, finemque potentia celsi  
Non habet, & quicquid superi voluerit, peractum est.*

Heav'n as power hath no limits, hence we see  
All done infallibly, what Gods decree.

King Charles the First.

If Polybius had liv'd in our days, he might have seen the hand of Heaven distributing Victory (to speak with reverence and submission to the Almighty's pleasure) more partially, than he either heard it was awarded in the Hannibalian, or saw it given in the third Punick War: of the first whereof he writes, when he falls upon this discourse with us, He might have seen men of one Nation, arm'd alike, following one and the same method of War, and for any thing I know, of equal Courage, both parties inflam'd, the one with Loyall zeal, the other with rebellious rage, acting their parts very highly on the bloody stage of War: he might have seen, I say, the best of Sovereign Kings lose his Crown and Life, and have his head chopp'd off with an Ax, when the worst of Subjects and greatest of Rebels had his deck'd with Bays.

Cesar and Pompey.

Or if Polybius had liv'd but one age longer than he did, he might have seen the Roman Legions, (which he so much commends) cutting one anothers Throats, all Country-men, all men of equal Courage and Conduct, arm'd alike, using one and the same Art and Discipline of War, embreuing their hands in one anothers blood; and those who fought for the State and Liberty of their Country, overthrowing, kill'd, murder'd, and massacred, and their Enemies almost ador'd for their success in a bad cause: and he might have either seen or heard of Pompeys Head ignominiously struck off, and Cæsars crown'd with Laurels.

Emperour Ferdinand the Second.

And if Polybius had been an eye-witness of the prodigious success Gustavus Adolphus the Great King of Sweden had in Germany in the year 1630. when he invaded the Roman Empire, and how he took Cities, Forts and Castles, more for their number, and more considerable for their Strength, Beauty, and Riches, in the space of six months; and made a greater progress in his Conquests in less than two years time, than Hannibal did in Italy the whole eighteen years he stay'd in it: If, I say, he had seen this, he had never attributed Victory to the goodness of Arms, the cunning of the Art or exactness of the Discipline of War, for he would have seen the Emperour Ferdinand the Seconds Generals, wife, courageous, experienced, vigilant as well, and as much as either the King himself, or any of his great Captains. Besides, both Wallenstein Duke of Friedland, and Count Tili, had that which Polybius himself requires in a General, that was, they were fortunate: Their great Victories over the Kings of Bohemia and Denmark, Beislem Gabor, the Duke of Brunswick, the Marquesses of Baden and Durlach, and the famous Earl of Mansfield, being yet fresh in memory. And if Polybius had seen any disparity of Arms, or Armour, or of Horses, either for their number or their goodness, in this German War, he had seen the Emperours Armies have the odds by much; neither was the difference of the manner of their War, or Ratio Belli, so considerable, as to cast the Scales so far, as that Martial King did in so short a time. Nor was Hannibal's descent into Italy with few more than twenty thousand men, more hazardous than the Kings landing in Germany with eight or ten thousand at most, was justly thought to be. What was it then, would

Polybius

Polybius have said, that carried Victory (whose wings Ferdinands Generals and Armies thought they had clipp'd) over to the Swedish, what else but the hand of the Almighty, who when that Emperour was very fair to have reduced Germany to an absolute Monarchy, said to him and the whole house of Austria, *Non plus ultra, Go no further.*

Titus Livius had read without all question, this comparison of Polybius, whereof I have spoken enough, and it may be, hath taken from it a hint to start another question, which is this: If the great Alexander after his return from India, and his subduing so many Nations in little more than ten years time, had made a step over to Italy, what the issue of the War between him and the Romans would have been? And gives his Sentence, that infallibly his Country men would have beaten that Great Conquerour. Paula Paruta, a Noble Venetian, and a Procurator of St. Mark, refutes Livius his arguments, and concludes, that the Macedonian would have over-master'd the Romans. But in steps a third, an Author of no small reputation, the renown'd Sir Walter Raleigh, who will give the prize to neither Macedonian nor Roman, but to his own English. It will not be denied, but the English Nation did admirable feats in France (which was indeed the Stage on which Caesar acted his most martial exploits) under Edward the Third, King of England, and his Son the Black Prince, as also under Henry the Fifth while he liv'd, and after his death, under his Valiant Brothers. But Paruta refutes Livius, yet I have seen none that opposeth Sir Walter, and I am sure I shall not, because I am not so much beholding to the Grecians and Romans, as to the English. But those who are curious to read the reasons of all the three, may find those of Livy in his ninth Book of his first Decad; those of Paruta in the second Chapter of his Political Discourses; and those of Raleigh in the first Chapter of the fifth Book of the first part of his History of the World.

But to return to Livy's question, I shall tell my opinion, and that is lawful enough for me to do, and it is this: Since Hannibal, as Polybius confesseth, carried not much above twenty thousand men over the Alps, of all that great Army that he brought out of Spain, and with them durst invade the Roman Seignories in Italy it self, when Rome was Mistress of Sicily and Sardinia, and of the Sea too; when Hannibal, I say, notwithstanding the Roman power, and all the obstructions that Hanno and his party made against him within Carthage, durst fight, and did beat the Romans so often, that if he had pursued one of his Victories, he had gone fair to have set up his Trophies in the Capitol. When with such a stock Hannibal could do so great things, I think, in all humane probability, Alexander, who was master of the best and richest places of the World, who was an absolute Sovereign Monarch (and so not liable or accountable to a Senate) not in fear or jealousy of any Competitor, a great and an experienced Warriour, of an invincible Courage, Master of prodigious Forces both at Sea and Land, his power almost boundless, and yet his Ambition more unlimited than his Power; If he, I say, had enter'd Italy, and invaded the Roman State (then but in its Infancy, and shouldering for more room with its neighbour Cities) he had made it submit to his uncontrollable pleasure, or drown'd the very Roman name in the pit of eternal Oblivion.

Another comparison of Titus Livius.

Voided by himself.

Paruta not dissatisfied with Livius.

Nor Sir Walter Raleigh.

Strong presumptions against Livius his opinion.



lybius, and Vegetius) it was possible for me to reach. But coming now to speak of the *Modern Art of War*, I find my self more embarrassed than in the delineation of the rest; for besides the differences of the manner of War used by several Nations (which perhaps might all be digested in one form with some exceptions not very essential) I know not of what date, age, years, or Centuries of years, I shall make the Modern Militia. If I shall date its Birth from the time the *Roman Art of War* began to be corrupted, I should perhaps make it too old; for Vegetius complains that the substance of that was well near spent, and no more but a shadow of it left long before his time; which mov'd the Emperor *Valentinian* to command him to compose a *Systeme* of the ancient *Roman Constitutions* of War, which had been needlessly if they had been then in vigor: and how Vegetius hath acquitted himself of that undertaking, I have already told you. But if I should date the age of the Modern Art of War from the time that Gunpowder was invented, I might perhaps hit right enough at its age, because no doubt Gunpowder made a great alteration on the whole face and body of War. But I am sure I have but few, or rather no helps to write the Series of its History, either from the decay of the *Roman Militia*, or from the time that Gunpowder was heard to make so loud and so fearful a noise in the World:

Though we are told that the ancient *Roman* customs of War were worn out of use, yet none tell us when either they were restor'd, or yet what others were brought in their room. Neither do we find that those who wrote Histories after the decay of the *Roman* Empire give us light in it; or yet what kind of Militia was used by those Nations who had the confidence with their sharp swords to cut out to themselves very large portions of the great bulk of that almost Universal Monarchy. From History we know that the *Goths*, the *Vandals*, the *Huns*, and the *Lombards*, invaded the Empire, and fought many successful Battels with some *Roman* Emperors, and their Lieutenants, and that they conquer'd Kingdoms by feats of War, and got them confirm'd to them by articles of peace. But what order these Nations kept in Modelling their Armies, what Discipline to preserve them, how they arm'd them, what art they us'd in Embattelling, fighting, or taking Towns, none of the *Roman* Writers that I know of, hath either told us, or given us ground to conjecture, except a few things of one of the *Theodorick's* King of the *Goths*. And from those Nations who were Barbarians, who it may be knew not what it was to read or write, we are not in reason to expect any significant account.

As little do we know what manner of Militia was used in *France*, *Germany*, *Bavaria*, and *England*, when they first emancipated themselves from the subjection of the *Roman* Empire. The Victories the *Saracens* had in all the three known parts of the World, the whole power of the Emperors of *Greece* in the East, with almost innumerable Armies from the West to recover the Holy Land from those *Saracens* (long before the name of a *Turk* was heard of) not being able to keep *Jerusalem* long from them, demonstrate that they were well arm'd, well train'd, and had a Discipline of War, and that a very exquisite one; but what it was, we are yet to seek for any thing we find in History, and yet those Expeditions are very famous, and stand authentically recorded. We read that *Charles Martel* Major of the Palace in *France*, made War with the *Saracens*, and in one Battel which he fought in *Provence*, laid one hundred thousand of them in the dust. His Son *Peppin* made a successful War against the *Lombards* in *Italy* at the instance of *Pope Zachary*; so did his Son *Charles* the Great, against both them, the *Pagan Saxons* in *Germany*, and the *Moor* in *Spain*; but how the Armies of either the one party or the other were arm'd, model'd, marshall'd, or Embattel'd, is wrapt up in the abyss of dark oblivion.

What shall we say since Fire-guns alter'd many of the ancient customs of War, and by piecemeal hath obtained the pre-eminence over almost all offensive weapons, and challenges the Prerogative even before and over the Sword, the Lance, and the Pike, much more over the Bow, the Arrow, Dart, Javelin and Sling: and yet from History we are no more acquainted with the manner of War since they came in use, than we were before their invention; of the truth whereof take a short view.

What vast Provinces and goodly Countries the *Turk* since the birth of Gunpowder, hath acquired in *Asia*, *Africa*, and *Europe*, is obvious to our sight, though the

Modern Militia of an uncertain date.

The Militia of several ages forgot;

As that of the Goths, Vandals and Huns.

That of the ancient Germans and Bavarians.

That of the Saracens.

That of Charles Martel, Peppin and Charles the Great.

the Histories of all Nations were silent. And though in the general we are told that his order is good; the Government and Discipline observ'd in his numerous Armies is strict and excellent, yet the particulars have been hitherto related to us but very confusedly: neither doth Mr. *Rycau* in his Book of the present state of the *Ottoman* Empire, Printed a few years ago, help us much, but rather gives us occasion to think that the *Turks* have lost their ancient Art of War; or if they still retain it, we must wonder how these Unbelievers have triumph'd over so many both Christian and *Mahometan* people, with so undisciplin'd and disorderly multitudes, as his relation makes them to be; for he saith, their principal Foot which are the *Janizaries* (reputed to have been the strength and support of that great Monarchy) fight confusedly; and the *Spahies* (who are the best of their Cavalry) fight likewise in little good order; he says, that sometimes they charge thrice, and if they then break not the enemy, they fly; and withal he makes their Artillery very insignificant, in regard that as he writes, they have no Gunners but such as either they take Prisoners, or are sold to them for Slaves, who stay no longer with them than any fair opportunity is offer'd them to run away.

Though perhaps the Victories which the great *Tambaran* obtain'd, and the celerity he used in making these Conquests, which have render'd him so famous, be not so vast as Stories make them; yet we may believe his Achievements to have been extraordinary, in regard the Great *Mogul* of *India* derives his Pedigree in a lineal descent from him, and at this day possesseth a vast and a Great Empire, which is but a remnant of a far greater acquir'd by *Tambaran*, whose Discipline is cry'd up to have been exceeding strict, his Art of War so exact and orderly, that he never went out of the Field without Victory, or from a besieged Town without either its submission or destruction. It is written of him that the day he fought with *Bejazer* at Mount *Stella*, his Army consisted of a Million of men, and yet he made use of them all in the time of the Battel. If this be all true, is it not pity that the manner of his Encamping, Besieging, Embattelling, and fighting is, not left on record to posterity?

And to come home, the *Scottish*, the *English*, and the *French* Histories tell us, what bloody Engagements have been among them; and what Battels have been fought with various success: but except that we are told that the *French* *Gens de Armes* were numerous, besides their other Cavalry; that the *English* used the Bow and the Bill, and had men of Arms likewise; and that the *Scots* fought on Horseback with Lances and Jacks of Mail, and on foot with long Pikes, Battel-axes, Bows, and two-handed Swords; what know we more of the Art of War than any of all the three practis'd, of the order they kept, how strong their several Bodies and Battalions were, or what names they gave them, how deep they Marshal'd either their Horse or Foot, how they Embattel'd, how they Encamped, and how they form'd their Sieges? for all these we have nothing but ill grounded conjectures, and very confused notions.

I know not whom we shall justly blame for this great defect, but the several Generals of several Armies, belonging to several Nations, and in several ages, who if either they could not, or would not write the History of their own or others actions, (as *Xenophon* and *Thucydides* among the *Grecians*, *Julius Caesar* and *Cato* among the *Romans*, *Momius*, and a few others in our Modern times), yet I think they were obliged to cause their Secretaries to keep exact accounts of the manner of these Sieges, and those Battels which under their Command were either form'd or fought, that so they might have been transmitted to posterity. Some have done so, but most have neglected it, thinking it enough if their actions were generally remember'd, recommending the particulars to the information of Historians, which many times is such that it looks rather like a Romance than a true Story. But I had rather you should hear *Momius* that famous Marshal of *France* upon this Subject, who in the Third Book of his first Tome, says, That Historians who write the feats of War, describe seldom or never the Particularities of the action, as how such a Castle was surpris'd, in what order such a Town was assaulted, or in what manner defended, how such two Armies were Marshal'd before they join'd in Battel, how the Horsemen were arm'd, and how the Foot, with many more circumstances necessary to be known by those who in time coming desire to be instructed, and especially such as intend

We have but confused notions of the Turkish Militia.

And of Tambaran's order of War;

As also of the Scottish, French and English.

Many Historiographers defective.

Momius his Complaint of them.

to serve their Prince and Country in Military Employments, that from thence they may learn how to demean themselves in the like occasions. But, says he, the whole multitude of Historiographers conceive they do enough if they tell us such a Battel was fought, such a Prince or General gain'd the Victory, such a City was besieged and yielded, and such a one was taken by assault. For himself, he professeth he wrote his Commentaries to be registers of the actions of his time; the particulars whereof might serve to inform those who were to come after him, how to carry themselves either in Sieges, Assaults, Skirmishes, Rancounter, or Battel; for those, saith he, who think they know not so much as I, will be glad to learn of me, but those who fancy they know enough already, need no Master. In another place he says, Historians are to be blam'd for not writing particular things, and of particular men: they think, says he, they do enough if they name Princes, or Captain-Generals, and pass over with silence all other persons that are not of so large a Stature. Thus far *Molin* Marshal of France.

To this same purpose you may see *Polybius* his complaint in his Twelfth Book, where he says, Historians first err, in not writing things truly, and as they were done; and next that they give no particular account of the manner of Battels, Skirmishes, Surprisals, and Sieges: and this he attributeth to their want of skill, and therefore wisheth that all great Captains would write the Histories of their own actions themselves.

These Complaints of *Polybius* and *Molin* are just: but I complain of another kind of Historians, who take upon them to give us descriptions of all those Particularities without having receiv'd particular relations from the principal actors, and thus they do either upon hear say, registering the fables of vain and ignorant Soldiers (who either have been, or pretend to have been in the action) for truths; or write according to their own apprehensions of things, which many times are so pitifully weak, that their extravagancies put knowing Readers on the rack, and force them to cast their Books away from them. And indeed I have read the descriptions of some Battels in Books writ by no mean Authors, wherein both Armies were marshall'd in such order that I could not fancy it could be done by any except *Annas de Gaul*, or the Knight of the Sun.

Let us except from these, of Modern Historians, *Paolo Giovio*, d' *Avila*, and the other unknown Author of the History of the Civil Wars of France, *Philip de Comines*, Cardinal *Bentivoglio*, *Strada*, *John Petit*, *Edward Philips* his late History of England, *Chenontius* his History of the Swedish Expedition, *Theatrum Europaeum*, these two last written in high Dutch, and *De Sij* who hath written the History of these times very Voluminously in Italian. These having either been Actors themselves, or having got their relations from those Emperours, Kings, Princes, or Generals who manag'd the Wars, have given us Histories well worth the reading. To these we may add *Guicciardini*, though for his prolixity he be used very scornfully by *Boccalini*, who tells us that in *Paradise* a *Lacanian* (who had express'd his thoughts in three words which he might have done in two) was order'd for his punishment to read *Guicciardini*. The poor fellow beg'd rather to be slay'd alive, than be tortur'd with reading an Historian who in the relation of the War between the *Flamines* and *Pisanes*, made longer discourses of the taking a Pigeon-house than he need'd to have made of the best fortified Castle.

Yet thus much most, if not all Historians agree on, when they speak of Armies, they mention Van, Battel, and Reer; which shews that the *Roman* method of Marshalling their Armies in three Bodies, one behind another, was observed by most Nations, till of later years some Masters of the Military Art, for some good reasons, thought it convenient to reduce them to two.

It is pity so few since *Perginus* his time have shewn themselves Tactics, that is to teach us the Art of War used in their own time; for so we should have known the Military Customs of several Nations, and of several ages. I have heard that *Gaspar de Cordoba* (who by his gallant Conduct recover'd the Kingdom of Naples from the French for the House of Arragon) wrote in Spanish, *Trattado de re Milltari*; if it be extant, it must be well worth the perusal, as the work of one who by his great actions had acquir'd to himself the Title of *El Gran Capitan*, the Great Captain.

In

In the last year of the Reign of *Henry the Fourth of France*, about sixty years ago, *Louis de Montgomerie Lord of Carbusse*, wrote a little Book, *De la Maniere de se servir de la Milice Françoise*, of the French Militia; it shews him to have been very much a Soldier, but the marrow of that piece lyeth in his descriptions of some Artificial Fire-works, the knowledge whereof lyeth not in every mans way, nor is it necessary for every Soldier, though it add to his perfection. The *Sieur de Praslin* wrote a little Treatise in French of Military Questions and Resolves, very well Enriched by Mr. *Crufo*, an understanding Captain, who I suppose wrote himself in English a Book of Cavalry, well worth the reading. *Becher* a German Engineer, hath not many years ago written in his own language a piece where, in he gives us a pretty good account of the Military Customs of his own Country in his own time, which may be from the year 1630, till the year 1654, or thereabout. Lieutenant Colonel *Elton*, his Compleat Body of the Military Art, with the Supplement added to it by Captain *Rud*, (without which it is not a Compleat Body) is a piece well worth the perusal. There are certainly others who have writ of this Subject, whom I have neither seen nor read.

Some again there are who instead of informing us what method or ordinances of War, Princes and States used in their time, (the want whereof I so much lament) give us Models of their own framings, either in whole, or in part; for my part I think any new mould of a Militia, or the reformation of an old one, is the work of a Prince or State, who are able to bring together persons experienced in all kind of Military affairs to give their advices, out of which the Prince or State may frame such Constitutions as are thought most conducing to carry on a War, and then by their authority impose a necessity of obedience to those Constitutions; and therefore they should not be the work of any private person. *Brancas* an Italian peremptorily condemns the use of the Pike; and in imitation of him Mr. *Laplan* an English man writes a Book, wherein he endeavours to prove the uselessness of that ancient weapon, but I shall meet with his arguments in another place.

*Machiavelli* goes a greater length, and presents the world with a Militia of his own, the birth of his own brain, a hodge podge of some of the Ancient, and some of the Modern Militia, with a mixture of many of his own inventions. In his Books of that Subject, he fathers most of his notions on *Fabrizio Colonna*, an excellent Captain, who no doubt, if ever he had seen them, had rejected them as spurious. Some of his mistakes I have touch'd in my Discourses of the Roman Art of War, I shall only in this place trouble my Reader with two of three Animadversions that will shew his skill in Martial affairs.

In his fourth Book, he makes it one of his Maxims, that all good Captains should rather receive than give the charge; of this I spoke in the Nineteenth Chapter of my Essays of the Roman Art of War, here I shall tell you the reason he gives for his opinion. The first fury, saith he, is easily sustained by firm and experienced Soldiers, and then it vanisheth in smoke. But I ask first, what if they who are charged be neither firm nor experienced, for all Armies are not composed of Veterans? next I ask, what if they be both firm and experienced, and yet do not sustain the charge in those two cases, the first charge vanisheth not in smoke? Pompey his Soldiers were firm and experienced, yet did not sustain *Caesars* Charge at *Pharsalia*: but of this I spoke enough in another place.

In that same Fourth Book this Author shews us how an enemy may be surrounded in time of Battel, and I pray you observe the Lesson he gives how to do it: First, saith he, let the front of your Army be Marshall'd equal with that of your enemy; then, says he, let your front retire by little and little, and your flanks standing still shall environ your enemy. I doubt not but *Machiavelli* thought this a sly device, but it is a fancy only befitting a Gentleman of the long robe. If he had said, let your Battel stand, and your wings extend themselves, he had spoke some sense; but a front to retire is an improper speech, and unintelligible in the Art of War: for in strict and proper language a Front and a Reer consists but each of them of one rank, whether that be of ten, a hundred, a thousand, ten thousand, or twenty thousand Men, or Horse; so the first rank which is the Front, cannot retire further than six or three foot allowed to be between it and the second rank, unless all the ranks, and consequently the whole Battalion retire.

Y

tire.

Polybius his complaint of them.

The Authors' complaint of some of them.

Noble Historians.

Guicciardini taxed by Boccalini.

We have but few Tactics.

El Gran Capitan.

Prisfac.

Captain Crufo.

Lieutenant Colonel Elton.

Princes and States only to mould new Militia.

Machiavelli's War.

First observation of them.

Second.

Third. tire. I grant there be some who will have the half of the ranks to be the Front, and the other half the Rear, as in our Foot Battalions, which are six deep, the three first ranks make the Front, the other three the Rear; but this, as I think, is not proper language, neither will it help *Machiavel*; for his Front of the three first ranks cannot retire till the three last ranks (that are behind them) retire first. Besides all this, I doubt if in *Machiavel*'s time, Captains might well hazard more than now, to command a Battalion of men to retire, for fear they could not get them to advance again, at least not so readily.

Fourth. *Justus Lipsius* had reason to accuse *Machiavel* of gross ignorance for denying the right ordering of a Militia to be an Art, and certainly his conceit to do so was very extravagant; besides he contradicts himself, for he calls his Treatise of War, *I sette libri del' arte della guerra di Nicolo Machiavelli*, Seven Books of the Art of War of *Nicolo Machiavelli*.

Indeed Soldiers are very little bound to him; for he says, neither Prince nor State should suffer any of those who profess to live by the Art of War, to dwell under them; nor doth, faith he, any virtuous or good man use it as an art; and adds, that those who do so, must of necessity be false, fraudulent, treacherous, and violent, for they must (saith this Doctor) either obstruct all peace, that the War continuing, they may thereby be maintained, or they must pill, plunder, and make spoil of other mens goods in the time of War, that thereby they may maintain themselves in the time of peace. This is bad enough if it be all true.

Fifth Objection. These are his goodly arguments which are but his own idle dreams, for it is no difficult matter to keep men who make profession of Arms within the bounds of their duty, even when they but seldom receive their wages; and this in this age is visible to the whole world. Nor can many Instances be given where men of War obstructed that peace which their Masters desir'd, or which both parties were contented to make. And if after the conclusion of a peace, and disbanding of Armies, any exorbitancies chance to be committed by the Soldiers (as seldom any such thing falls out) they have been occasion'd by too great a defalcation of their pay, with the half or moiety whereof all Modern Soldiers will be heartily well contented, so perfectly have they learn'd the *Baptist*'s Lesson in the Gospel, to be content with their wages.

Corollary. But to conclude, I know not whether I shall more cry up the lowliness of spirit of those great Statesmen who are pleas'd to descend from their high Spheres to learn their Politicks from *Machiavelli*, or commend the generosity of those Captains who disdain to stoop so low as to receive their Lessons of the Military Art from the Town Clerk of Florence.

I suppose all that can be expected from me in the following Discourses, is in some places to set down wherein the ordinances and customs of War in all or most of the several points or parts of it, in divers Countries agree or disagree, with the practice of the present times, and when I give my own opinion, it shall be sparingly, and with submission: neither shall I decline to go as far back in the Investigation of the Customs and Constitutions of War in former times, as I have either probable grounds for conjecture, or any glimpse of light to conduct me.

Since I wrote this Chapter, I have seen some *Frenchmen* who having been Soldiers themselves, have given us an account of the present *French* art and order of War, as *De la Valiere*, *Monsieur Louis de la Saxe*, and some others.

## CHAP. II.

Of Levies, the manner of several Nations in making them. Duties of Soldiers when they are levied, their age, and how long they are bound to serve.

Armies are properly the members of the great Body of War, and men are the sinews of Armies. The best choice, election, or levy of men is of the subjects of that Prince or State who maketh the War, where the Law of the Land imposeth a necessity on men fit for service, to enroll themselves according to their several ranks and qualities. And this Levy alters its nature according to the nature of the War, for if that be a Defensive one, the Levy is Voluntary; for ordinarily men rise willingly in arms for the defence of their Country, Lives, Wives and Children. But if the War be an Offensive one, intended to invade a stranger, and such as leads Natives from their Countries and Homes, and carries them to foreign lands; it is not universally voluntary, and very oft gets the name of a Press. In this kind of Levy most Nations followed the custom of Press. the *Grecians* and *Romans*, and chose most of their Cavalry out of the Gentlemen, or the better sort, and the Infantry out of the Commons; but the substance of that custom is now vanished, and we have scarce the shadow of it left with us.

The Emperours of the High Dutch Nation, the German Princes, and Imperial Towns, by the old Constitutions of the Empire, made an Election or Levy of their Subjects according to their Laws, sometimes the tenth, sometimes the sixth, or fifth man, or according to their Estates, in all their Wars, both since the *Turk* became their unwelcome neighbour, and before he had footing in Europe. It is not above fourscore and ten years since in the reign of *Maximilian* the Second, all that were Enrolled in the German Cavalry were by birth Gentlemen; it is true they brought some of them one, some two, and some three with them, who waited on them, well horsed and armed, for whom they receiv'd wages, and were subject to articles of War; but these were called in their language *Einspanneers*, to distinguish them from the Masters, who were of necessity to be all Gentlemen, a custom now clear out, most of German Troops being now composed of *Einspanneers*, without Gentlemen, unless it be the Officers, and not all of them neither.

The Commission of array in England is an excellent order, by which an Army Royal may be brought together either for defence, or invasion in a very short time.

The ancient custom of Levy in Scotland, as we are told, was to command all between sixteen and sixty years of age to appear in every Shire, and you need not doubt but out of these an Election was made of such a number as the Kings Lieutenants thought fit. But in latter times a far better and more expedient way was found out, and that was to impose the raising such a number of Horse and Foot on every Shire proportionably according to the true valuation of the Estates of the Heritors and Proprietaries. Aluredly a way very orderly, methodical, and just, provided it never be made use of in an unjust cause.

The Kings of Sweden have constantly standing forces within the Kingdom to prevent both Invasions and Insurrections; they consist of Regiments and Troops, which have their denominations from the Provinces where they are raised, and where they reside, they have their Officers and Colours, and are appointed at several times to meet, muster and exercise, but are not in pay, only some small thing is given to the Captain and the Ensign, who ordinarily are their Drill-masters, and upon that account get wages. But these Troops and Regiments are sometimes carried out of Sweden to foreign Wars, and that in great numbers, and

and others appointed to be raised in their rooms. As in the time of *Charles the Ninth* they were carried to *Liesland*, against both *Pole* and *Muscovy*; in the time of *Gustavus Adolphus*, and his Daughter *Queen Christina*, to *Livonia*, *Prussia*, and *Germany*, and more lately by *Charles Gustavus* to *Prussia*, *Livonia*, *Pole*, *Germany*, and *Denmark*.

In Denmark.

The Kings of *Denmark* have their Country Militia for defence of the Kingdom, but are neither so orderly nor so numerous as those of *Sweden*, neither do they take them so frequently to foreign expeditions as of old they did, when by their mighty Armies they invaded many places of *Germany*, *Scotland*, and *England*, and made an entire conquest of *Normandy*. But their were like the inundations of the *Huns*, *Lombards*, *Goths* and *Vandals* (which two last, both the *Sweedes* and *Danes* pretend to be their Ancestors) on the *Roman* Empire.

In Spain.

The like of such an Election or Levy hath been in former times used in *Spain*, and may be yet. But when we consider, that it hath been often drain'd of men, in the days of *Philip the Second*, for the maintenance of his Wars in *Italy*, and the *Low Countries*, but more especially for his Plantations in *America*, which began in his Father *Charles the Fifth's* time, and continued during the Reigns of *Philip the Third*, and the *Fourth*; we must conclude, that all the *Spanish* Levies made within that Kingdom, neither were, nor could be voluntary.

In France.

The *French* Levies of old were all made of the Natives, the Cavalry consisting of the Nobility, and in the number and strength of a Cavalry, *France* surpassed any other *European* Nation. *Charles the Seventh* took the assistance of *Scottish* Foot, who joy'd with his own in his long Wars with *England*. But his Son *Lewis the Eleventh*, beside the *Scots*, made use of the *Switzers*, who had at that time acquir'd the reputation of a stout and warlike people, not only in maintaining their liberties against the house of *Austria*, but in a bloody War against *Charles the Warlike Duke of Burgundy*, whom they defeated in three great Battels, in the last whereof they kill'd himself, if he be not yet on his Pilgrimage to *Jerusalem*. These *Switzers* were so much the more highly esteem'd of by *Lewis*, because they had routed and undone his capital Enemy; of them his Infantry was mostly compos'd; and he appointed some thousands of them to guard his person, as his Father had appointed the *Scots* to guard his; but *Lewis* kept the *Scots* likewise, and it was well for him that he did so, for they defended his life valiantly at the Siege of *Liege*, when the Inhabitants by a desperate Sally had pierced through the *Burgundian* Army even to his lodging, as *Philip of Comines* relates the story. Not only while he liv'd, but in the reigns of his Son *Charles the Eighth*, and of his successor *Lewis the Twelfth*, did the *French* Infantry consist of *Switzers*; but *Francis the first* having had some bloody trials of the Infidelity of these Mercenary Soldiers put on a resolution to stand thereafter on his own legs, and not on those of Strangers. In order to which in the year 1534, in imitation of the *Romans* he appointed to be levied and enrolled seven Legions of *French* Foot, which made up a gallant Infantry of two and forty thousand men; how these were arm'd, shall be told you in its own place. This Ordinance fell out to be made in the days of *Marshal Mouluc*, who seems in his Commentaries rather to disapprove than approve of it; but gives not his reasons. I suppose these Legions were kept up in the reigns of this *Francis*, who was the instituter of them, and of his Son *Henry the Second*. But if I have observed right, they began to wear out in the reigns of his Grandchildren, *Charles the Ninth*, and *Henry the Third*, who in the time of their Civil Wars, made use again of the *Switzers*, as also of *Germans*; and so did likewise the Protestants take the assistance of both Horse and Foot of the *German* Nation, as you may find them ordinarily design'd in the *French* Histories under the name of *Ruters*, and *Landsknechts*, the first in the *German* Language signifying Riders, or Horsemen, the second, Country fellows. For as I told you the *Germans* compos'd their Cavalry of Gentlemen, and their Infantry, except the Officers, of Peasants.

In the Low Countries.

In the Seventeen Provinces, both before they became all subject to the Dukes of *Burgundy*, (when they were under several Dukes and Earls) and after the Levy of their Foot was imposed on the Commons to be made of the sixth, fourth or tenth

tenth man, according to the danger of the Country, or for most part the pleasure of the Prince. The Cavalry was made up of the Nobility, according to their several qualities and abilities; and they were obliged to keep such a number of serviceable Horses and Arms in the time of peace on their own charges, having for that some exemptions and privileges, of no great consideration; and in time of War they were paid with some small wages, appointed at the first forming their Militia. Which Cavalry (saith *Bentivoglio*) used to be of a high repute and estimation: but now, faith he, not being compos'd of the Noblest, as formerly it was; but of common and ignoble persons it is fallen extremely from its ancient honour and dignity. And observe that this Cardinal wrote this long ago, to wit, in the year 1610. and therefore we may conclude that the whole Militia of these Provinces belonging to the King of *Spain*, is now much more degenerated, whereof our eyes can bear witness.

The Great *Turky* Levies are soon made, for the raising his Armies is but as in *Turky*. the Rendezvousing of ours, all the members of his forces by land being one way or other in his pay, before he wage War: his Foot, I mean the *Fanizaries*, being bred in their several Serails and Seminaries, and in his pay. His *Spahies* and *Timariots*, which compose his Cavalry, either possessing Lands, for which they are bound to serve; or receiving weekly wages in time of peace out of the several Treasuries through his Empire.

His Neighbour the *Sophi of Persia*, his Militia consists of Cavalry, most whereof, if not all, are Gentlemen, excellently well Horfed and Armed, with which he hath oft grappled with the *Turky* Armies, consisting of a more numerous Cavalry, besides vast numbers of Foot, and a great Train of Artillery, of the two last whereof the *Sophi* is destitute, unless it be of very late years.

In Persia.

The second kind of Levy is when Princes and States impose no necessity on their Subjects to rise, but for making up their Armies, invite by Trumpet and Drum all to take employment, whom either the desire of honour, riches, booty, pay or wages may encourage to undergo their service. And this is that kind of Election which now is universally and properly enough called a Levy. It is certainly the only Voluntary Election, because the parties elect themselves without the constraint of any Law, none being prest to the service but such who of their own inclinations engage themselves, and give their names to be Enrolled. By this kind of Levy have most foreign Princes and States in our days raised their Armies, the manner of it is shortly this: The Prince or State makes choice of Colonels both for Horse and Foot, to whom they give Commissions or Patents to raise Regiments of such a number of Companies, and such a number of men in each Company or Troop as the Prince or State thinks fit; to this purpose they give every Colonel a sum of money, so much for every Horseman, every Dragoon, and every Footman, as they and that Colonel can agree. And these sums vary oft according to the fewness of Soldiers, the numbers of Armies and Levies, and the danger of the War, or good or bad pay of him who wagem it; so that I have known ten Crowns not sufficient for a Foot soldier; where four would have serv'd the turn three or four years before. The Colonels are limited ordinarily to such a time to have their Regiments ready, and for that purpose have a place of Rendezvous appointed to them. The Colonels themselves give Patents to their Lieutenant-Colonels, Majors, Rittmasters, and Captains, and they to their Lieutenants, Ensigns, Cornets, Quarter masters, Sergeants, and Corporals, immediately after Trumpets are sounded, and Drums beaten, and those who present themselves, receive levy-moneys, and thereafter are entertain'd, and their names being Enrolled, they are no more free, but bound to serve. Observe here that the Prince or State make choice of such Colonels as they think most proper to raise men for their service, either in their own Countries, or foreign ones, where Levies are permitted to be made for them, by their friends, Confederates and Allies.

A Voluntary Levy described.

The Emperors *Ferdinand the Second* and the *Third*, and this Emperor *Leopold* levied all their great Armies in the time of their long and bloody Wars by sound of Trumpet, and beat of Drum. So have all the *German* Princes, and mostly the Kings of *France* and *Spain*. The great King of *Sweden*, *Gustavus Adolphus*, his Daughter *Christina*, and the late *Swedish* King *Charles Gustavus* made up most of their Armies, and so did *Christian* the fourth King of *Denmark* (except

Made use of by most of Princes in later times.

cept some Regiments of their native *Swedes* and *Danes*) of *Dutch*, *Scots*, and *English*, raised all by this manner of Levy. But hereby you may easily fancy that the ancient distinction and difference between the Cavalry and Infantry, as to their birth and breeding, is wholly taken away, mens qualities and extractions, being little or rather just nothing either regarded or inquired after; the most of the *Horlemen*, as well as of the *Foot*, being composed of the very scum of the Commons.

Abuses and Inconveniences of this Voluntary Levy. But there is worse than that, for where a War is of any long continuance, that Armies mouldring away, either new Regiments must be levied, or the old recruited; this kind of Levy is grossly abused, and many there are who make a trade of it, taking money from one, and presently running over to another. As I said before, scarceness of Soldiers is the cause why Princes are the more liberal of their Levy-moneys, he who carries the heaviest purse ordinarily being master of most men; and this procures another great inconvenience and mischief; the desire to be fingering a beneficial new Levy-money, inticeth many to run from their Colours, and desert their Masters service. In the long *German* War I have known in one Imperial Town six or seven Captains (whereof my self was one) all levying for several Masters, and some Rogues receive money from most of us, and yet go out of Town with none of us.

Safest way of Levy.

Levies of the Estates of the united Provinces.

What Souldiers should be elected.

If these and many other inconveniences be consider'd, we may conclude the surest and the safest way of Levy, is that a Prince or State makes of their own Subjects, or of those whom they receive as Auxiliaries from their Allies, as the great flock of the forces of the Estates of the United Provinces of the *Netherland*, was of Regiments of *Scots*, *English*, *Germans*, and *French*, most whereof continue in their service to this day, yet have these Estates been many times forced to make use of this Levy by Trumpet and Drum; and never more than in this year 1672, being necessitated to levy not so few as fifty thousand Foot and Horse.

In all kinds of Levies such Officers should be chosen as are men of understanding, and of some experience in Military matters. As to the Soldiers, whether they be to serve on Horse or Foot, the stature is not to be look'd to so much (whether it be tall, mean, or indifferent) as the proportionable and cleanly connection of all the members of the body, which must be compact and strong, a manly face, with lively, vigorous eyes, which denote the quickness and vivacity of the mind, apt to learn what belongs to his Art. If the Souldier be to serve on Foot, he ought to be such as hath been inur'd to toil and hardship; for which purpose, as the *Roman* custome was, choice should be made of such young fellows who have had their breeding rather in the Countrey, than in Towns, unless they be Mechanicks, that are not of a Sedentary Trade. If he be to serve on Horse, and that the Levy be not made by the Trumpet, but where a right Election may be got, only such should be chosen, as are of an honest birth, for their reputation will make them undergo any fatigue, and a little time will inure them to toil, though they have been bred with ease and plenty.

Souldiers age.

I have formerly shewn you what years made a man capable to be enroll'd a Souldier, among the Ancients. I shall tell you now, that though it be not generally look'd to by many, yet I find, that in our Modern Wars, most Captains conceive sixteen years to be too young, and if so, I swear sixty is too old; they need not be twenty, for if they be of such Bodies as I have describ'd, they may pass muster of eighteen; and if they be not infirm, wounded or mutilated, they may well enough continue Souldiers till they be fifty and upwards; though, some think, they should not serve after the forty sixth year of their age. So upon this account of mine, those who levy, may enrol such as are not under eighteen, nor above fifty: And this may be easily observed in Countrey Elections, where there is choice, yet very often it is not done, for which the Officers are to be blam'd. But in that other Voluntary Levy made by the Drum, where Souldiers are hired for Moneys, the age is seldom look'd to, old and young, being promiscuously enroll'd, which is an intrinsical defect of that kind of Levy. If men may not be enroll'd after the forty sixth or fiftieth year of their age, it follows, they should then have their dismissal, yet that is but seldom practis'd, Necessity (which is limited

limited by no Law) detaining them very often many years beyond that time, which is no new thing, having been often practis'd by the *Romans*, and other Ancients, as I have shewn before. Some limit the time of a Souldiers service from his Enrolling, which is just. The *Swedes* order their Foot Souldiers of their own Countrey to serve twenty five years, strangers fifteen; but if they followed the *Roman* way, the Horse-men should serve but half that time. The *French* King is more gracious to Souldiers, especially to strangers, whom he orders to get their Dismissions (if they require them) after they have served four or five years.

How long they should serve.

But for all I have said, I know not why all Kings, Princes, and Free States, in their Election and Levy of Souldiers, should not follow the example of the Great King of kings, and Lord of lords, who (as you may read in the first Chapter of *Numbers*) order'd his Servant *Moses* to muster all Males fit for the War, of twenty years old and upwards, and therefore we may conclude, he thought all under that age unfit to go to the Wars.

As to the duties and qualifications of Souldiers, whether of Horse or Foot, there be some who make so many of them, that if Princes keep none in their service but such as quadrate with all their properties, they will make but very thin musters. But you may take all the duties of a Souldier (as the *Lacedaemonians* did) to be three. First, To give exact and perfect obedience to all the lawful commands of Superiours. Secondly, To endure the fatigue, travel, and discommodities of War, whether it be in Marching, or working at Trenches, Approaches, and Sieges, Hunger, thirst, and cold, with an exemplary patience. Thirdly, In time of Battel, Skirmish or Assault, to resolve either to overcome, or dye. But Reader, do not you seek all these in every Souldier, do not seek any of these exactly in every Souldier, nay not in any Souldier, for you will not find them; let it be enough, if they have some of them in some degree, though not in perfection. And why may you not comprehend the two last Duties under the first of Obedience? For he who can obey his Superiour exactly, will, when he is commanded, endure any fatigue, and in any rencounter resolve to be victorious, or perish. And indeed, Obedience is the very life of an Army. A *Lacedaemonian* in a Skirmish, having overthrown an Enemy, was ready to have run him through with his Sword; but hearing the Trumpet sound a Retreat, he left him lying, and alive. Being ask'd, Why he did not dispatch him? Answer'd, He was more serviceable to his Countrey by his Obedience, than by either his Valour, or his Revenge. The Sacred Oracles tell us, that Obedience is better than Sacrifice.

Duties of Souldiers.

Not to be expected to be perfectly in any one.

All comprehended under Obedience.



CHAP. III.

*Of Armour, or Defensive Arms, used by several Nations, both for their Cavalry; and their Infantry.*

What odds there is between a Man, arm'd both for Offence and Defence; and him who only hath Offensive Weapons, may soon be understood, though the practice had never been seen. Why the same care is not taken now to defend mens Bodies in the time of fight, as well, and as much as 'of old there was; since the Offensive Weapons of later times, by the help of Fire, pierce more deeply and more deadly, than any of the former ages did, before Gun-powder, I suppose cannot well be told. If the neglect be imputed to Great Commanders, it were well done of Sovereign Princes and States, by their authority to order the reformation of so hurtful an oversight. But perhaps this reason will be given for it, because the long and continued marches of our Modern Armies, not only for many days, but for many weeks and months, both in the extreme heat of Summer, and rainy and tempestuous weather of winter, require that the Souldiers should be eased of the weight and trouble of their Defensive Arms, that with less toil they may endure and undergo those marches. To which I shall answer, first, that we have no such Marches now, as the Ancients, especially the Romans had, and if we consider that they in their Ambulatory March, walk'd twenty miles in five hours; and in their cursory one, twenty five; and that a vast deal of ground, what large and long Countreys and Regions, they traced in compleat Armys, and burthen'd otherwise, as if they had been Beasts of Carriage, we must either blame our selves for not imitating them, or look upon most of their stories as pure Fables. And if our Souldiers from the time of their first Levy were habituated to wear at their Exercises and Drillings constantly their Armour, and accusom'd twice a week to march a good many miles in Armys, I mean Defensive as well as Offensive; suppose the first week five or six, the second seven, and so continue till they can march fifteen or sixteen miles in one day, they would find it then an easie matter to march every day in Armour, for custom is another nature; but this point of Exercising is generally neglected: But Secondly, I say, if *Ratio belli*, or the present necessity of affairs requires such a speedy and continuat March, then such an Army, as ordinarily we call a flying one, should be made use of, consisting of light Horle, Dragons, and Musqueteers; and the heavy armed Horle and Foot should be left to march after, with as much haste as conveniently they can; to whom the light armed in case of necessity, may easily make their Retreat; for to bring these heavy armed forward (as I told you the Romans, and Greeks did) and then permit them to cast away their Defensive Arms, is to denude your self of the strength of your Forces and Army.

Our Modern Armies, as the ancient ones, consist of heavy and light armed, as well Horle as Foot. In the Cavalry, the Cuirassier is the heavy armed, and the Pike-man in the Infantry. The strength of all Armies ever was, and is the Infantry, and the strength of it is the heavy armed. He who is in good Armour fights with courage, as fearing no wounds, and frightens him with whom he fights, that is not so well armed. Pikemen then composing the Body of the Infantry, and the men of Arms the Body of the Cavalry, should be armed so that they may appear to an Enemy (when they come to the shock) as a Brazen or Iron Wall. It is true, a Battalion of Pikes, without Defensive Arms, may, being ferr'd together, hinder a Troop of Horle from getting in among them; but their Heads and Bodies being naked, and having nothing on either of them to resist the force of a Carabine or Pistol-ball, (except it be a Buff-coat, and for most part, not that) it is not to be fancied, but a Volley of shot from a Bo-

Defensive Arms neglected.

The Reasons why, answered.

Pike men the Body of the Infantry, and so of the Army.

dy of Horle standing without the danger of the points of Pikes, will make many of the Pikemen fall, which will so disorder their Body, that a sudden Charge of Horle will easily break it. This is a great defect of our Modern Militia, of which most Nations are now guilty; for though in all their Constitutions of War there is an appointment for heavy armed Horle and Foot, yet when we see Battalions of Pikes, we see them every where naked, unless it be in the Netherlands, where some, and but some Companies represent the ancient Militia; and we find an Universal defect in the Cavalry, as to the heavy armed, these being but few Cuirassiers in many Armies, and in very many none of them at all to be seen.

Since the invention of Guns we find till these latter times all Nations did allow defensive Arms to both Horle and Foot, according to the nature of the service that was to be required of them. The Cavalry was ordinarily divided into Cuirassiers, and Harquebusers, but I shall speak of that more fully afterward. The first was to be compleatly armed, Man and Horle, and those we call Men at Arms, and the French, *Cents d'Arms*, which is the same thing. The Harquebusers had a Head-piece, back and breast, their Horles no arms at all. But now for most part the case is alter'd, and instead of Cuirassiers we have Harquebusers, and instead of Harquebusers, we have Horsemen, only arm'd offensively. Here I must answer an Objection, which is this, if the armour for Horsemen be not Musket-proof, either the Bullet pierceth through, or beats the Iron into the Horsemans body, which is equally dangerous; and if it be proof, it is exceeding troublesome to both man and horle; but I answer that there hath been, and are at this day Arms made that are proof, and of no considerable weight, and it is supposed a Cuirassier should be of a strong body, and should ride a horle that for height and strength should be fit for that service, where in both he and his rider are to be employ'd, as I shall tell you afterward.

The heavy armed Foot-soldier, or Pikeman, should have a Head-piece, a Back and Breast, a Belly-piece, Tallets for their Thighs, and Greaves for their Arms, the Armour for their Heads, Breasts and Bellies, should be Carrabine-proof, and that for their Backs, Pistol-proof. But we shall rarely see a Battalion of Pikes in such harness, and no wonder, since the Pike it self is not now used so much as it hath been, and still should be, of which I shall speak at length in its proper place. But here it will be fit that I speak of the supine carelessness and inexcusable inadvertency of Officers and Commanders, in their Levies, who take no notice to make a difference of those who are to carry Muskets and Pikes, distributing them promiscuously to the stronger and the weaker; whereas, without all question, the tallest, biggest, and strongest should be order'd to carry Pikes, that they may the better endure the weight of their defensive Arms; nay, which is worse, I have known Muskets given to those of the biggest stature, and Pikes to the unworthiest and silliest of the Company, as if he who is not worthy to carry a Musket were sufficient to carry a Pike, neither have I seen this abuse redressed, though often complain'd of to Generals, so much have I seen a Pike, the Prince of Weapons, disparaged.

Many have thought it fit to give Musketeers some defensive Arms, as a Head, Back and Breast-piece, and truly I wish that custom were continued; for though most of the ordinary Armour that is given them be little better than Pistol-proof, if it be so good, yet it encourages them who wear it; and if, as I said before, they be exercis'd, train'd, and accusom'd with it, it will not at all be troublesome to them, either in their march, or on service; for we find the ancient light armed, especially among the Romans, pretty well arm'd for defence, and from thence they had the name of light armed to distinguish them from the heavy armed Legionaries.

I think I may in this place reckon the Swedish Feather among the defensive Arms, though it doth participate of both defence and offence: It is a Stake five or six foot long, and about four finger thick, with a piece of sharp Iron nail'd to each end of it; by the one it is made fast in the ground in such a manner that the other end lyeth out so that it may meet with the breast of a Horle, whereby a Body of Musketeers is defended as with a Pallisado, against the rude charge of a Squad.

Defensive Arms for Horsemen.

For Pikemen.

For Musketeers.

Swedish Feather.

a Squadron of Horse, which in the mean time they gall and disorder with their shot. I have seen them made use of in *Germany*, and before I left that War, saw them likewise worn out of use. When the Infantry by several Regiments or Brigades are drawn up in Battel, and the Pikes and those Stakes fixed in the ground, they make a delightful flow, representing a Wood, the Pikes resembling the tall trees, and the Stakes the shrubs. *Gustavus Adolphus* was the first *Swedish* King that used them; and it is said he invented them in his Wars in *Lithuania* against the *Polonians*, who far overpowered him in Horse. I believe he used them first there, but the invention of them is of a far older date than the *Swedes* would have them to be; for *Henry the Fifth*, King of *England*, the night before the Battel of *Agincourt* seeing to be born down by the *French* Kings numerous Cavalry, caused each of his Bowmen to provide one of these Stakes (whereof the Vines there afforded him plenty) and being made sharp at both ends, though they were not pointed with Iron, they did his business well enough, and contributed not a little to the gaining of that Victory which gave him so great footing in *France*.

Used by *Henry the Fifth* at *Agincourt*.

*Rangon* frame of Defence.

To this kind of defensive Arms may be reduced that invention of *Rangon* in the *French* Army, in the Reign of *Francis* the first, which was a great frame of Timber that could be taken in pieces, and carried on Carts, and easily join'd together, whereby Battalions were barricado'd, and serv'd but to little purpose. As also that frame which (as I have heard from some Commanders) the Great Duke of *Muscovia* used, with which the *Russians* are so well acquainted, that they can very suddenly piece it together, and shroud themselves within it, from the charge of Horse, and as nimbly take it down and march away with it.

*Muscovian* Barricado.

*French* Defensive Arms.

In my last Chapter of the *Grecian* Militia, I spoke of the *French* defensive Arms, both for their Horse and Foot in the Reign of *Henry* the Second, far different from those that are used now.

*Turks*.

The *Turk* useth defensive Arms, but neither so good or so many as other Nations do.

*Persian*.

The *Persian* Curliassiers are arm'd all over their Bodies, men and horse, and this perhaps helps them to over-master the *Turk* in Cavalry. Their Head-pieces are deckt with fair and large Plumes of Feathers, and their Targets (which they likewise use) are gilded, they have likewise light Horsemen, who carry Head-pieces and Corsets.

*Mamelucks*.

When the *Mamelucks* had the Sovereignty of *Egypt*, *Syria*, and *Palestine*, the better sort of them (for all were Horsemen) were arm'd for the Defensive, from head to foot, man and horse; the second sort carried large Targets wherewith they defend'd their Bodies in the shock, but before they came to it, they threw these Targets over their backs, till they made use of their Bows and Arrows.

*Abyssins*.

The *Abyssins* or *Ethiopians* one hundred and forty years ago, arm'd their Horsemen with Coats of Mail, which cover'd their whole bodies to their knees; Morions for their heads, and in their hands round Targets.

*Bohemians*.

In the days of *Charles* the Fifth the *Bohemians* had great Targets or Shields, wherewith they cover'd their whole bodies. Before that time, and since too, the *Hungarians*, *Walachians*, and *Transylvanians* used Head-pieces, Corsets, and Targets.

*English*.

Since Gunpowder, the *Englishmen* at Arms, or Curliassiers, were arm'd at all pieces, their light Horsemen with Morions, Jacks, and Sleeves of Mail.

*Scottish*.

So were our *Scots*, who used also Steel-caps, or Bonnets.

*Hollanders*.

*John Pory* in his History of the *Netherlands* tells us, that in the year 1599, when the Estates of the *United Provinces* were making vast preparations for the prosecution of the War against *Spain*, and to that purpose were levying both Foot and Horse, they made an Ordinance for the Arms that both their Horsemen and Footmen should carry: of the Defensive he gives us this account, *The Reuter* or Horsemen (suppose Curliassiers) were to have a Head-piece, a Gorget, a Breast and a Back, two Poldrons, a Gantlet for his left hand, belly and thigh, and Knee-pieces, and Culots, (which, faith he, were pieces of Armour to defend the reins.) The Carabiners were to have a Head-piece, a Gorget, a Back and a Breast. The Pikemen, Head-pieces, Gorgets, Backs and Breasts. The Musket-

teers,

tiers, Head-pieces. What Offensive Arms, or Weapons all these Nations used I am to tell you just now.

## CHAP. IV.

### Of Offensive Arms, or Weapons used by the Cavalry of several Nations.

THAT there is no new thing under the Sun, and that what is, hath been, may admit of a favourable Interpretation; for time was when neither Pistol nor Carrabine were known in the world; neither did Antiquity know Gunpowder, which is the Mother of them both, and many other Engines of fire. The Sword is a weapon that is never out of fashion, used in all ages, and by all Nations of the world; though the difference be that some Horsemen use long, and some short Swords. But this should not be left to the choice of the Horsemen, for the length of their Swords should be limited to them by the Prince or State they serve. Few tell us whether the Swords of the Horsemen they write of, were for cutting, or for thrusting, or for both, as the *Roman* Swords were. The *Persians*, *Turks*, *Russians*, *Polonians*, and *Hungarians*, for most part wear Scimiters and Shabals, which being crooked, serve only for hearing, and not at all for stabbing.

*Martial* in the first Book of his first Tome, says, that in the Reign of *Francis* the first, about a hundred and forty years ago, the *French* *Gens d'Arms* carried broad Swords, which were so well edged, that they could cut through Sleeves and Caps of Mail. The *Scots* and *English* used constantly broad Swords, for if we believe some of the *English* Histories, a Rapier is so new a Weapon in *England*, that it is not yet above one hundred years old. In the time of the late Troubles in *England* long Rapiers were used for a while, and then laid aside. The *German* Horsemen use Swords fit both to slash and thrust. *John Pory* in that place mention'd in the last Chapter, says, The Estates of *Holland* order'd their Horsemen to carry short Swords according to such a length appointed for that purpose. It were to be wish'd that if Horsemen be obliged by their capitulation to furnish themselves with Swords, that their Officers would see them provided of better than ordinarily most of them carry, which are such as may be well enough resisted by either a good Felt, or a Buff-coat.

A Mace is an ancient weapon for a Horseman, neither was it out of use long after the invention of Hand-guns for we read of them frequently used by most Nations an hundred years ago. And certainly in a Medley they may be more serviceable than Swords; for when they were guided by a strong arm, we find the party struck with them, was either fell'd from his horse, or having his Head-piece beat close to his head, was made reel in his Saddle, with his blood running plentifully out of his nose.

The Lance was the Horseman's weapon, wherewith he charged; neither do I find that any Nation wanted it, long after the invention of the Pistol. Whether the Lance be laid aside as useless in *Germany*, *England*, *Scotland*, *France*, *Denmark*, and *Sweden*, by the command of several Princes, or only worn out by time, I know not; but that it is not used in these places, is certain enough. And truly I wonder why it should not now rather be used when the nakedness of mens breasts without defensive Arms, renders them more obnoxious to the stroke or push of a Lance than in former times, when few or no Horsemen were to be seen without a Corset. I shall not doubt but there be strong reasons (though I know them not) why our *European* Generals for most part have abandon'd the use of the Lance, yet it will not be deny'd but it hath been a serviceable weapon heretofore,

Z 2

The Lance  
made useless  
by many Na-  
tions.

fore, even since Gun-powder, and all manner of Gups were found out. I shall give but one instance of that memorable Battle of *Dreux*, fought about an hundred years ago, the Prince of *Conde*, and Admiral *Chastillon*, who conducted the Protestant Army by the reiterated Charges of their men of Arms with Lances, after strong opposition broke the great Battalion of the *Switzers*, which was composed of Pikemen, and was thought invincible, and kill'd on the place seventeen of their Captains. After the death of the Marshal St. *Andre*, and the taking of the great Constable *Montmorency*, two of the French Kings Generals; the Prince of *Conde* was likewise made Prisoner by the Royal party, and the Admiral forced out of the field by the Duke of *Guse* and his Cavalry.

The Admiral rallies, and that night propoed to his *German* Retainers, (who had each of them a Case of Pistols, and many of them Carrabines) to march back and fall on the Duke of *Guse*, then both weary and secure. But though that *German* Body of Horse was whole and intire, yet did the Commanders of it remonstrate to the Admiral, that it was impossible for them to break the French Battalion of Foot which had kept the Field with the Duke; and I pray you observe the reason they gave for it. Because, said they, we have no Lances, which are only proper for that, for the French men at Arms who had with Lances broke the *Switzers*, were then dissipated, or over-wearied, and all their Lances broken. If this be true, it would seem that the manner of the Milice then, and the Milice now, are very different, though both Modern. A Cavalry then arm'd with Lances acknowledged to be able to break an arm'd Battalion of Foot; whereof it gave a perfect demonstration; and a Cavalry then arm'd offensively with Carrabine, Pistol and Sword, and not without defensive Arms, declares it self incapable for it. And now the Carrabiners or Harquebussiers are thought only proper for Rencontres, and the Lancers are laid aside as useless.

But the Lance meets with better usage from other Nations, even to this hour. The *Polonians* and *Hungarians* use it; and so doth the *Turk*. The *Abyssins* on horseback use strong Lances, pointed at both ends, and great Maces of Iron. The *Persians* (accounted the best Horsemen in the world) carry Lances very strong, they are pointed at both ends, they carry them in the middle, and manage them with great strength and dexterity. *Giovio* tells us that at *Soyus*, a great City of *Mesopotamia*, the *Persians* had many Shops, wherein the best Arms of the World were to be sold, and that not far from it at *Charmaun*, were Swords and Points of Lances made of so well temper'd Steel, that our *European* Corslets and Head-pieces could hardly resist the stroke of the first, and push of the other; and that all Arms either for man or horse, whether offensive or defensive were of Steel and Iron, well boild with the juice of certain herbs only known to the forgers, which made them so excellent. He adds, that these Arms are bought by the *Turks* at exellive rates: but truly I think it was no good policy to suffer them to be sold at any rate to so dangerous an enemy, and so malignant a neighbour; but perhaps no inhibition would serve the turn, for *Auri sacra fames* hearkens to no Law.

*John Perys* tells us in the foremention'd place that the General Estates of the United Provinces in the year 1599, forbad their Cavalry to make use any more of the Lance; but I find in *Bentivoglio*, the use of it was retain'd in the Spanish Armies by Archduke *Albert*, and Marquis *Spinola*, in the year 1612, after the Truce with the *Hollanders*. But the States commanded their Horsemen to wear Coats above their Armour, these Coats according to the quality of him or them who wore them, were fine, rich, and glittering, and are ordinarily called Coats of Arms. The *Grecians* call'd them *Ephrastris*, and the *Romans*, *Chlamides*. But now since few men are armed for the Defensive, few need Coats of Arms.

The Ancients made use of Bow and Arrow on horseback, and so in later times have the *Wallachians* and *Transylvanians*, and so did the French till the practice of Hand guns made them useless, and yet with them Horsemen arm'd with Pistols, are still called Archers.

An hundred years ago the French Archers who attended the *Gens d'Armes*, carried in their hand a half Lance, and one Pistol at their Saddle, and a Sword at their side; the Arms of the light Horsemen differ'd little from these. The Harquebussiers had Swords at their sides, and Harquebusses at their Saddles, the Barrels

A very remarkable passage.

Hungarians use the Lance. And the Abyssins, as also the Persians. Persian Arms excellent.

The Hollanders reject the Lance.

Archers on Horseback.

French Arms.

Barrels whereof were three foot long. About seventy years ago the Estates of *Holland* order'd these Horse-men, whom they called Carabiners, to carry each of them a Piece three foot long, and their other Horse-men Pistols at their Saddles; the Barrels whereof were two foot long. Generally now all Horse-men, whether Cultivallers or Harquebussiers, carry Swords at their sides, and a case of Pistols at their Saddles; and these are mostly all their Offensive Weapons, except that some carry Carabines, some whereof have Barrels of four foot long, but ordinarily only three.

The Pistol was invented first by *Camillo Paselli*, an Italian, when *Ferdinand* of *Aragon* reign'd in Spain; *Charles* the Eighth, and *Lewis* the Twelfth in France, *Henry* the Eighth in England, and *James* the Fifth in Scotland, not above one hundred and fifty years ago, and consequently more than two hundred years after the *German* Monk had found out Gun-powder. The Harquebuss is of an older date. The bore of the Pistol long ago was made for twenty Bullets in one pound of Lead, but it being found that the Ball enter'd not easily, generally they cast one pound of Lead in four, and twenty Pistol-ball: The half of the weight of powder serves, if it be good; if not, they take two thirds; as for one pound and a half of Lead, one pound of Powder; but if it be fine, half will serve, as for two pounds of Lead, one pound of Powder. The Barrel of the Pistol may be two foot for the longest, sixteen inches for the shortest. The French use Locks with half-bends, and so do for most part the English and the Scots; the Germans, Rore or Wheel-works: The *Hollander* makes use of both. If the Chamber of a Pistol be loaden three times the Diameter of her bore with Powder (which is easily measur'd by her Rammer) she hath her due charge. But all Horse-men should always have the charges of their Pistols ready in Patrons, the Powder made up compactly in Paper, and the Ball tyed to it with a piece of Packthread.

The Carabiners carry their Carabines in Bannisters of Leather about their neck, a far easier way than long ago, when they hung them at their Saddles. Some instead of Carabines carry Blunderbusses, which are short Hand-guns of a great bore, wherein they may put several Pistol or Carabine-Balls, or small Slugs of Iron. I do believe the word is corrupted, for I guess it is a *German* term, and should be *Donnerbüchse*; and that is, Thundering Guns; *Donner* signifying Thunder, and *Buchse* a Gun.

Hollanders Arms for Horse.

Its Bore.

Its Barrel.

Its charge of Powder.

Blunderbuss.

## CHAP. V.

### Of Offensive Arms or Weapons, used by the Infantry of several Nations.

I Have said before, that the Foot is the body and strength of an Army; the Horse being placed on its sides or flanks, are called Wings. The Infantry was by all the Ancient, and is still by all Modern Warriours divided into heavy and light armed. In former times, as I have told you, the *Pedites*, or light armed, were sometimes order'd to fight in the Rear, sometimes on the Flanks, but for most part in the Van of the heavy armed. Now they are almost constantly embattel'd on the Flanks. Both of them have their denominations from the Arms they carry. The Defensive Arms of the Foot, since the invention of Guns, and long before it, were near upon the matter the same among most Nations, but the Offensive hath not been constantly alike, since the noise of Powder, scarce in any Nation.

The

Long Wea-  
Pons.

The heavy armed carried universally in all Modern Armies, besides Swords and Daggers, long Weapons, such as Pikes, Half-Pikes, long Javelins, Partizans and Halberds, all comprehended by the *French* under the name of long *Bais*, or long Staves. And, as I have told you in another place, with all these were the Foot Battalions of *Henry* the Second of *France* provided, when he march'd into *Germany* against *Charles* the Fifth, one hundred and twenty years ago, most of all which had Pistols at their girdles. His Predecessor *Charles* the Seventh, having had a sad experience how pitifully the *English* Bow-men had disorder'd both his Foot and his Horse, instituted also Archers; but those, after the use of the Harquebuses came to be known, threw away their Bows and Arrows.

Bow.

But the *English* retain'd the use of the Bow much longer; and no wonder, they were loth to part with a Weapon, which had done them so great service. For we find that *Henry* the Eighth made good use of his Bow-men in his Wars in *France*, when he beleagued first *Tersuigne*, and thereafter *Bulleigne*; and though *Marshall Monluc*, speaking of this last Siege, in his Commentaries, seems to make a small account of the Bow, yet he might have remember'd, how much mischief his Country-men had received in former times from it.

The long  
Bow.

The Bow is distinguished in the Long-bow, and the Crois-bow, the first requireth a strong arm either by nature, or made so by habit, and long practice. It is, without doubt, a very ancient Weapon, and universally used by most, if not all Nations. *Master Norton* in his practice of Artillery thinks it was used before the general Deluge; his reason is, because the Almighty gave the Rain-bow as a sign, that he would not destroy mankind again with Rain, and he calls it his Bow, to distinguish it from that of Men. Since the Flood, we read of it in all Histories, both Sacred and Profane: The Romans of all Nations used it, least, for it came not in request with them, till the reigns of the Emperours, and before that time Bows were used only by their Auxiliaries, and not by themselves, or their Allies, whatever *Vergilius* seems to say to the contrary, whereof I have spoken in another place. The Bow is now in *Europe* useless, and why I cannot tell, since it is certain enough, Arrows would do more mischief now, than formerly they did; since neither Men nor Horses are so well arm'd now to resist them, as in former ages they used to be. There are some who bring reasons, for bringing the Bow again into use, such as these. First, Arrows exceedingly gall Horses, and consequently disorder their Squadrons, because being so hurt, they will not be manag'd by their Riders. Secondly, A Bow-man can shoot many more Arrows than a Musketeeer Bullets. Thirdly, All the Ranks of Archers, though twenty, may shoot their Arrows over their Leaders heads, with equal mischief to an Enemy, whereas Musketeeers can conveniently but deliver their shot by one Rank after another, or by three Ranks at most, by kneeling, stooping, and standing, seldom practis'd, and only at a dead lift. These reasons to me are unanswerable, and I think might weigh much with Princes, to make the half, or at least a third of their *Velites* to be Archers, and by the bargain they might have much money expended on Powder and Lead: but to them and free States belongs only the Reformation of abuses in the Militia. And therefore I shall say no more of the Long-bow, than that it hath been an Offensive Weapon since Hand-guns were used, as well as before.

The Crois-  
bow.

The Crois-bow requireth but little strength to manage it, a Weapon much used in *France*, when Fire-guns were rare. *Monluc* (whom I look upon as an unquestionable Author) informs us, that in the beginning of the reign of *Francis* the First, in a Company of two hundred *French* Foot, most of the light armed were Crois-bow-men, and there were not above six or seven Harquebuses among them all, and all along in his Commentaries he frequently mentions Crois-bows: In his first Book he tells us, how he made a Retreat, when he was but a private Captain, from some *Imperialists*; and he says, when his Crois Bow-men had spent all their missiles, he caus'd them to draw their Swords, and hold them in their right hands, and their Crois-bows in their left, to use them as Targets, and in that posture of defence, he says, he got off, though with some loss; whereat we need not wonder.

I do

I do not directly find the time of the Harquebuses invention, but you may suppose (since they were so rare in *France* a hundred and fifty years ago, as appears by *Monluc's* relation, they were not known a hundred and sixty years after their mother Gunpowders birth. But long before the death of that same King *Francis* the first, mention'd by *Monluc*, the Harquebus was become more common in *France*, and the number of the Harquebuses was mightily increased; for of those seven *French* Legions which I told you were instituted by that King, and which consisted of forty and two thousand Combatants, twelve thousand were appointed to be Harquebuses, and so in process of time the Harquebus encroach'd so fast on both the Long and Crois-bow, that it chas'd them both out of all our *European* Armies.

The Harque-  
bus.

Banish'd  
Bows.

About that time when the Emperor *Charles* the Fifth and his Brother *Ferdinand* Encamped with a numerous Army of Christians near *Vienna* in *Austria* on the banks of the River *Danube*, expecting the coming of *Sultan Seliman*, the Christian Infantry consisted of eighty thousand, sixty thousand whereof were Pikemen, or those who carried long Staves, and twenty thousand were Harquebuses.

Among the heavy armed, the *Bohemians* were observ'd to carry Javelins, at the one end of which was tyed fast a Mace of Iron (it was tyed with a short chain of Iron) the Mace was one foot and a half long, wherewith (saith *Paolo Giovio*) these *Bohemians* could give so strong blows that they could fell men (though in never so strong Armour) stark dead. Our Author was an eye-witness, but the *Turks* were wiser at that time than to come within their reach, for *Seliman* march'd back.

Bohemians Of-  
fensive Arms.

Now room for the Musket, and room it hath largely gotten; for it hath banish'd from the light armed Foot, Darts, Slings, Long-bows, Crois-bows, and the Harquebuses too: Our present Militia acknowledging no other Weapon for the light armed Infantry, but the Musket and the Sword; and this last I have seen sometimes laid aside for a time, that it might not impede the managing the Musket by its Embarras. And indeed when Musketeeers have spent their Powder, and come to blows, the Butt-end of their Musket may do an enemy more hurt than these despicable Swords, which most Musketeeers wear at their sides. In such Medleys Knives whose blades are one foot long, made both for cutting and thrusting, (the haft being made to fill the bore of the Musket) will do more execution than either Sword, or Butt of Musket.

Musket ba-  
nished the  
Harquebuses;

Most think that this Hand-gun of a Musket was never used till the Siege of *Rhegium*, in the year 1520, little more than a hundred and fifty years ago, and used. I doubt much, if it be so old, and assuredly if it be, it hath spent forty years of its age before it learned to speak, for about the year 1560, some Muskets were mixed with Harquebuses, and but a few of them too, till practice made them so numerous, that no other Guns were used by the Foot. The longer a Musket is (so it be manageable) the better, for she shoots the further, and the stronger, her Chamber being able to contain the more Powder; and experience daily teacheth what advantage a long Musket hath of a short one. Fifty years ago the Calibre of the Musket was ordain'd by most Princes, particularly by the Estates of *Holland* to receive a Bullet, whereof ten were to be cast of one pound of Lead; that hath not been thought convenient since, and therefore most allow twelve balls of one pound of Lead for a Musket. In the year 1657, the King of *Denmark* agreed with five Colonels of us to furnish our Regiments with Muskets of a bore to receive a ball, whereof fourteen should go to its Bore. I confess this bore was too small for a Musket. A Musket requires the half weight of her ball in fine Powder, and two thirds of common Powder, that is one pound of fine Powder to two pounds of Lead, and two pounds of ordinary powder for three pounds of Lead.

Its length.

Its Bore.

Its Charge of  
Powder.

Musket-Refills were used a long time, and in some places are yet, to ease the Musketeeers in discharging their Guns, and when they flood Centinel. But in the late Expeditions in most places of *Christendom*, they have been found more troublesome than helpful, a Musketeeer in any sudden occasion not being well able to do his duty with Musket, Sword, and Rest, especially if you give him a Swedish Feather to manage with them. *Bockler* the Engineer speaks of an Instrument that might serve for both Rest and Feather, and such perhaps would be very useful.

Musket-Refills  
are worn out.

As Instru-  
ment both a  
Rest and a  
Pallado.

Powder-flasks  
inconve-  
nient.

Musket-Pa-  
trons better.

Burning Mat-  
ches bewray  
Enterprizes

Inflamed.

Other Wea-  
pons for Foot.

A Pike

useful and convenient. He would have it at the top, as all Rests are, like a Fork, on the one side whereof, he would have an Iron of one foot and a half long sticking out sharply pointed; these planted in the Van or Flanks, where you expect the Charge, as the *Swedish* Feathers use to be, will sufficiently Pallado and defend a Body of Musketiers from Horse, and upon them they may lean their Muskets when they give fire. To a Musketier belongs also a Bandler of Leather, at which he should have hanging eleven or twelve shot of Powder, a bag for his ball, a primer, and a cleaner. But it is thirty years ago since I saw these laid aside in some *German* Armies; for it is impossible for Soldiers, especially wanting Cloaks (and more want Cloaks than have any) to keep these flasks (though well and strongly made) from snow and rain, which soon spoils them, and so makes the Powder altogether useless. Besides, the noise of them betray those who carry them in all Surprizes, Assaults, and sudden enterprizes. Instead of those let Patrons be made, such as Horsemen use, whereof each Musketier should be provided of a dozen; these should be kept in a bag of strong leather, or the skin of some beast well sowed, that it be proof against rain, this bag he may carry about his neck in a Bandler, or if the weather be extremely rainy, in one of his Rockets, and in the other a horn with Priming Powder, and his Cleaner eyed to it. By this a Musketier hath these advantages, he shall be sure to charge with dry Powder, and that is no small advantage; next, it is a more ready way to charge than the other, for he hath no more to do but to bite off a little of the Paper of his Patron, and put his Charge of Powder and Ball in at once, and then ram both home. Thirdly, his Musket shall have her full Charge, for it is impossible to lose any of the Powder, unless he lose it all, and a full Charge makes a strong and a sure shot. If this were try'd at home with us, as it is by some abroad, our Powder flasks would be sold cheap.

It is impossible to hide burning Matches so well in the night-time, especially if there is any wind, (though there be covers made of white Iron, like extinguishers purposely for that end) but that some of them will be seen by a vigilant enemy, and thereby many secret enterprizes are lost. It were therefore good, that for the half of the Muskets (if not for them all) flint-locks were made and kept carefully by the Captain of Arms of each Company, that upon any such occasion or party, the half or more of the other Locks might be immediately taken off, and the flint-ones clapt on by the Gunsmith of the Company, and then there would be no danger of seeing burning Matches, the sight whereof hath ruin'd many good designs: I shall give you but one instance for all. Not long after the invention of the Musket, some *Spaniards* were almost starved to death in *Coron*, by a Blockade of the *Turks*, they hazarded desperately and failed out, and though they had some miles to march, yet they did it with great courage, and all imaginable industry and silence, and had assuredly taken the Infidels napping if their burning Matches had not bewray'd their approach, and this only marr'd the achievement of a noble exploit. It is true, they made a handsome retreat, but with great loss, and with the death of their chief Commander, one *Macchieus*, a Noble and stout Gentleman. I should have told you that all the Muskets of one Army, yea under one Prince or State should be of one Calibre, or bore.

There are besides these I have mention'd, other Weapons for the Foot, such as long Rapiers and Touks, Shabres, two handed Swords, Hangmens Swords, Javelins, Morning stars, but most of these are rather for the defence of Towns, Forts, Trenches, Batteries and Approaches, than for the Field. And as our light armed Foot are now for most part armed with Sword and Musket, so our heavy arm'd offensively are with Sword and Pike.

As I told you of the Musket, so I tell you of the Pike, the longer it is (so it be manageable) the more advantage it hath. In our Modern Wars it is order'd by most Princes and States to be eighteen foot long, yet few exceed fifteen, and if Officers be not careful to prevent it, many hale Soldiers will cut some off the length of that, as I have oft seen it done: It were fit therefore that every Pike had the Captains name or mark at each end of it. The *Grecians* knew very well what advantage the longest Pike had: the *Macedonians* (as I said before) made their Pikes three foot longer than the other *Grecians* did. Nor hath this advantage been unknown in our Modern Wars, whereof *Giovio* gives us a remarkable

markable instance: Pope *Alexander* the Sixth waged a War with a Veteran Army conducted by experienced Captains, his Foot consisted of *German* arm'd offensively with Pikes. The *Vysins* levy new and raw Soldiers, most consisting of their own Vassals and Peasants, these they arm with Pikes, but each of them two Foot at least longer than those the Popes *German* carried. The two Armies meet in a plain Field at *Suriano* in the Papacy, and fight; the *Vysins* Peasants led by stout Commanders, kill'd most of the first ranks of the Popish Pikemen by the length of their Pikes, and immediately after routed the whole Body, not suffering one *German* to escape; upon this the Popes Cavalry fled, and the *Vysins* keeping the Field, forc'd his Holiness to grant them against his will, an advantageous Peace.

I shall not here speak of the number of Pikemen allow'd to each Company, I shall do that in its due place, but it seems strange to me there should be so little esteem made of the Pike in most places, it being so useful and so necessary a weapon. Thirty years ago when the War was very hot in the *German* Empire, between the Emperour *Ferdinand* and the Catholick League (as it was called) on the one part, and the *Swedes* and the Evangelick Union (as they call'd it) on the other, I saw such an universal contempt of the Pike that I could not admire it enough; for though after *Gustavus Adolphus* King of *Sweden* entered *Germany*, Squadrons and Battalions of Pikes were to be seen in all Regiments and Brigades of both parties, and that Pikemen were still accounted the Body of the Infantry yet after his Victory at *Leipzick* over the Imperial forces under *Tilly*, the Kings Marches were so quick in pursuance of his successes, which followed one on the heels of another, and the retreats also of other Armies from him, were so speedy, that first the Pikemens defensive Arms were cast away, and after them the Pike it self, inasmuch that all who hereafter were levied and enrolled, called for Muskets. But notwithstanding this, when new Regiments were levied after that great Kings death, Colonels and Captains were ever order'd to levy and arm Pikemen proportionably to the Musquetiers; yet after they had endur'd some fatigue, the Pike was again cast away, and no Soldiers but Musquetiers were to be seen. Whether this was done by the supine negligence of the Officers, especially the Colonels, or for the contempt they had of the Pike, I know not. But I am sure that for some years together I have seen many weak Regiments composed meerly of Musquetiers, without one Pikeman in any of them, and surely they were so much the weaker for that. Nor did I find long after that, that the Pike got better entertainment in other places than in *Germany*; for in the year 1657, after the late King of *Denmark* had lost his best Army, he gave as I said in this same Chapter, Commissions to five of us to raise each of us a Regiment of men of one thousand apiece, all strangers. We were bound by the Capitulation to arm our Regiments our selves out of the moneys we had agreed for, and expressly with Musquets, neither would those of the Privy Council, who were order'd to treat with us, suffer one word to be mention'd of a Pike in our Commissions, though the convenience, and sometimes the necessity of that weapon was sufficiently remonstrated by us.

But there are two who write down right against the use of the Pike, these are *Brancazio* an *Italian* Commander, and one *Daniel Lepton* an *Englishman*, who I think traceth *Brancazio* his steps; for though I have not seen that *Italian* piece, yet I have seen a Countryman of the Authors, *Achilles Terduzz*, who tells me he hath read it every word. Master *Leptons* Book I have seen, and will presume by his leave in the next Chapter to examine his arguments and reasons.

The longer,  
the better.

The Pike very  
much  
neglected,

In Germany

In Denmark

Declared use-  
less by Two,  
an *Italian*,  
and an *Eng-  
lishman*.

## CHAP. VI.

## Master Lupton's Book against the use of the Pike examined.

The Book  
Dedicated to  
the Earl of  
Essex.

THIS Gentleman printed his Book in the year 1642, and presented it to the Earl of Essex, who was declar'd General of the Parliaments forces that very year; but it seems he had not got his Commission when this Book was writ, for the Author gives him not that Title in his Epistle Dedicatory.

This Author doth not seem to condemn the use of the Pike before the invention of Fire guns, but only since, and magisterially takes upon him to pass sentence against all Princes or States who in later times have composed the Bodies of their Infantries of Pikemen. I shall relate to you the strongest of his Arguments (as they lye in order) whereby he endeavours to get Proselytes to this new fancy, and shall give such answers to them as I conceive to be pertinent; but shall not flatter my self with an opinion, that they will be satisfactory to all.

His first Ar-  
gument,

In the first place he says, Officers chuse the tallest and ablest men to carry Pikes, because they must be strong to carry both them and their defensive Arms; and this, says he, is a loss to the Army to give useless Arms to men, who could use the Musket with more advantage; for Pikemen, says he, can only receive the messengers of death (Bullets he means) but Musqueteers can fend them.

Answered.

First, I answer, he begs the question, he declares the Pike useless, and that was the thing he undertook to prove. Secondly, I have already complain'd that Officers chuse not so oft as they should, the ablest men for Pikes, and so they are very ill us'd by Mr. Lupton and me, for he complains of them for doing it, and I complain of them for omitting it. Thirdly, whereas he says, Pikemen can only receive but not fend the messengers of Death, it seems he thinks when Pikemen fight, they are to stand fixed in one place; but he should have remember'd that in time of action they are no more obliged to stand still than Musqueteers, who are ever in action and motion; for let us suppose that in Battel a Body of Musqueteers is to fight with a Battalion of Pikes, he will grant me that both the one and the other advanceth. Now he saith, a Musquet kills at the distance of four hundred yards, so doth not the Pike; let it be so, what then, I will grant him more, that in the advance many Pikemen fall, and no Musqueteers; yet I hope he will grant me that these four hundred yards (if so many) may be foorthraced by men who make haste to come to the Charge, and even before ten ranks can orderly and successively one after another give fire, and after that I aver, if the Musqueteers stand to endure the pull of the Pike, they are inevitably ruin'd; and if they fly, then the Pikemen have the victory. I still suppose that which cannot be deny'd me, that is, that the Pikemen and Musqueteers are of equal courage; now in a close encounter what can a Musquet do against a Pike, or a naked man with a Sword against one in Armour? If then the Pikemen fly before they come up to the Musqueteers, they are Cowards, and the fault is in their courage, not their weapons, if they lose the Field; and if the Musqueteers stay till the Pikemen come to them, they will find that points of Pikes bring as inexorable messengers of Death as Bullets do.

Second Ar-  
gument,

Secondly, he tells us that nothing more disheartens Soldiers than the certain knowledge of disproportionable and unequal Arms; this I grant to be true, but from hence he and I draw two very different Inferences; mine is, that Musqueteers will be fore afraid to buckle with armed Pikemen, if the Pikemen have the courage to stand out a Volley or two, and it is like the Musqueteers will be afraid that the Pikemen will stand it out. But he makes another Inference, and it is this, that the Pikemen will be afraid, because they know their Pikes are of no effect, and can do no execution.

Cer-

Certainly he tells me news, for I thought the *Grecian*, *German*, and *Switz* Answered. Battalions of Pikes had very frequently born down all before them, and so had done execution; and is not this again to beg the question, for he is bound to prove that the Pike can do no execution? I assure him I will not take his word for it. But if he mean when an enemy is put to the rout, the Pikemen being heavily armed, cannot follow the execution, I shall readily grant it to him; and *Verginius* will tell him, that the heavy armed are like an Iron wall, which can neither run away from a Victorious enemy, nor pursue a flying one, for that is left to the Horse and light armed Foot. But he offers to prove that Pikes can do no execution by an instance, which I pray you hear and observe. There happen'd a tumult between the *English* and *Switzers* in the Prince of *Orange* his Leaguer, when he lay before *Schenckensce*, the *Switzers* went to arms, and being in Battel presented their Pikes; here our Author is not asham'd to say, that two *English* men with Swords only, enter'd among the *Switzers* Pikes, and cut off (saith he) several of their heads (of the Pikes, I hope, not of the *Switzers*) and brought them away with them, the two *English* unhurt. If this be all true, what will it evince, but the great modesty and patience of the *Switzers*, and the prudence of the Officers of both Nations in appeasing the tumult, for our Author was mad if he thought that any rational Creature would be perfwaded by him to believe, that two men with Swords could affront a Body of Pikemen in such a manner, and go away so easily if the others had been pleased to resent it.

Thirdly, he says only three ranks of Pikes can do hurt, the rest are useless; then he adds, that what with the terror of the alarm, the confusion of ranks by the death of some of their number, the time of night when the enemy may fall on the hazard of wounding their own Commanders and Camerades, it appears sufficiently that the Pike can do no feats. I must take this argument in pieces, and answer it so. And first I say, if only three ranks of Pikes can do hurt, then Pikes can do hurt, and this contradicts his second argument.

Third Ar-  
gument,

Next his assertion cannot be true, if what I have said at length in another place be true, that six ranks of Pikes can do hurt, or as he call it, execution. His argument, if true, would be strong against the *Grecian* Embattelling sixteen deep, and against his Masters too, for I find by his Book he hath had his breeding in *Holland* and *Denmark*, where in his time the Foot were Marshal'd ten deep. As to what he speaks of the terror of an Alarm, I ask if that must frighten a Pikeman more than either a Horseman or a Musqueteer; I think less, because he is better arm'd, but he speaks still of Pikemen as of Cowards, for what reason I cannot imagin. For his confusion of ranks occasion'd by those who fall dead, he knows those behind them should fill up their places, and this Musqueteers are bound to do likewise. Fear indeed occasions confusion, and he will still have Pikemen more fearful than other men. Besides, he will have them to be ill train'd, as if they durst not hazard to charge with their Pikes, for fear of hurting either their Commanders, or their Companions. As to the time of night, when the enemy may fall on, I know not well what he means by it, unless it be that he thinks the darkness or horror of the night should put a Pikeman in greater danger than a Musqueteer, and this I would gladly hear him or any other for him demonstrate.

Answered.

His fourth argument is, that Pikes are unfit and unserviceable for Convoys.

Fourth Ar-  
gument,

In answer to this, I ask, admit it were so, is it therefore not useful at all? Next I say he is mistaken, for many Convoys have made use of them, and many Convoys must make use of Pikes, according to the nature of the ground they are to traverse, open Heath, and Champaign Country, or as the enemies strength is fancied to be either in Foot or Horse. Many great Convoys are composed only of Firelocks, or Fufees, I hope Master Lupton will not thence infer that Musqueteers are useless.

Answered.

Fifthly, he says, The Musqueteer is overtold and discourag'd when he sees he must do the whole duty in Salies, Skirmishes, Convoys, and Onslaches (as he calls them) suppose Insals or Surprisals, from all which the Pikeman is exempted. In answer to which I ask who exempted him? Truly none that I know but *Brancaccio*, and Master Lupton, who exempts him from all other duties, and makes him unnecessary, nor can I divine where our Author hath learn'd this

Fifth Ar-  
gument,

Answered.

A a 2

Dis

Discipline, that he offers to teach us. I have shown the Pikeman is necessary for some Convoys, in all Salles he is serviceable, sometimes with his Pike, or sometimes with a half Pike, or a Halbert, sometimes a Morning Star, and sometimes Hand granado's, with all which the Musqueteer many times must do service; for in the medley of a Salley his Musquet is often an unnecessary Weapon, unless he be within a Parapet. As for Surprizals and Anilights, the Pikeman many times may be very useful, and more than the Musqueteer, unless he change the Lock of his Musquet, as I told you in the last Chapter. As to Skirmishes it will be easily granted him, that neither the heavy armed Footman, who should be the Pikeman, nor the heavy armed Horseman, who is the Curialier, are proper for them. These services were performed in ancient times by the *Vallies*, and now by Musquets, Fufees, Fire-locks, and light Horsemen; the heavy armed standing ready to sustain them, and either to give or receive the Charge. Nor did I ever hear Musqueteers make any such complaints as these our Author is pleased to charge them with.

Sixth Argument,

Sixthly, he tells us, That in Outworks before or besides an enemy, the Pikeman is useless, unless it be to stand Centinel; for, says he, the Musqueteers defend the works, and while they are furiously giving fire, the Pikeman is sitting in the Trenches taking Tabaco, or telling Tales.

Subdivided,  
And answer-  
ed.

For answer, I do not remember that ever I heard a Soldier tell such a tale as this of Mr. *Lupton*; but I know not where this man is, he is just now in Outworks, and immediately in Trenches. It seems they are all one with him; but because they are not so, I must divide his argument into two parts, and give an answer to both. If it be in Trenches or Approaches to a besieged Fort, that the Musqueteers are giving fire furiously, it must be either at a Sally of the enemy, and then sure the Pikeman is neither sitting, nor idle; or it is when a Battery is making near the Counterescarp, or that the Zap is begun there, and then indeed both Cannon and Musquet should fire furiously upon both Curtains and flanks of the Wall, that from thence those who work may be as little disturbed as may be, and at that time the Pikeman is busie working with a Spade, Shovel, or Mattock in his hand, or is carefully attending to give obedience to what else he is commanded to do; perhaps to receive the Sally of an enemy.

In the next place I come to Mr. *Lupton*'s Outworks, and he must mean the Pike is useless, either when an Outwork is storm'd, or when it is defended from a Storm. If the first, the Pike is more necessary than any Fire-gun, after those who carry them, come to the ascending or mounting the work, and this is obvious to sense. If the second, when an enemy is coming on to the Storm, it is the Musqueteers part to give fire to keep him off, and chase him away, but the enemy being already at the foot of the work, and inbounding, the Musquet is useless except from flanks, and the Pikeman then with stones, and Hand-granado's doth the service till the enemy be within push of Pike, and then sure the Pike is not useless. But he says a Pike is too long a weapon for this service. To answer which I shall tell you, that Outworks (whereof Mr. *Lupton* speaks confusedly) are Tenailles, Ravelines, Half-moons, Crown-works, and Horn-works, and for the defence of these, ordinarily there are other weapons than either Pike or Musquet, such as Hand-granado's, Stones, Halberts, Partisans, Morning Stars, two handed and hangmans Swords, which are standing ready within the work, that when the Pike cannot be made use of, the Pikeman and Musqueteer both may make use of them, or any of them. And if none of these weapons be in the work, a Pikeman may very soon make a Half-Pike of his long Pike, which is a weapon much commended by Mr. *Lupton*. But there is no necessity for that either, for in these Outworks I have spoke of, a Pikeman may with much ease stand on the Rampart, and griping his Pike either at half or quarter-length, tumble down an enemy dead or alive from the top of the Parapet, and not cut his Pike at all. And because our Author may mean Redoubts and Batteries which are made at Sieges, (for truly I do not well know where to find him) I say the Musqueteers standing on the foot banks of these, and doing their work, the Pikemen may stand in the body of the Redoubt or Battery, and kill or throw over any enemy that is on the head of the Parapet. As a Corollary to this sixth argument, our Author tells us of a Scout that was lost at the Siege of *Stond*, where the half of the Soldiers were Pikemen, to whom he attributes the

the loss, I suppose he means by Scout, some Post, and why may not I say, the other half of the Defendants, who were Musqueteers occasion'd the loss, and not the Pike-men; but because I know not what he means, I shall grant him all he says, and yet aver, that the particular oversight of Pike-men, will never conclude the Pike universally useless.

Seventhly, he says, Pike-men cannot make a Retreat, for, saith he, an Enemy will send Horse-men and Musqueteers against them, who will kill them all, and never come near them. To answer this I must tell him, that here, and in most of his arguments he presupposeth still a Body of Pikes subsisting of it self, without either Horse-men or Fire-men, which alters the question, and this is a speculative notion of his; for that which I defend is, that Pike-men are necessary in an Army, and the strength and body of an Army, not that they are the only necessary members of an Army; I never meant that, and that which he undertook to prove is, that they are not at all necessary. And here he mentions General *Morgan*'s Retreat with some English Regiments, from the long line in the Bishoprick of *Verdun*, in which, he informs us, that the business was not perform'd by the Pikes. I shall not here speak of the nature of Retreats, reserving that Discourse to another place; but because I have travers'd most of that ground often than once, I shall tell my Reader, that *Christian* the Fourth, King of *Denmark*, having made an unprosperous War against *Ferdinand* the Second, retir'd himself to his Dutchy of *Holstein*. General *Morgan* was forc'd by the Imperial Lieutenant General *Tili*, to retire from the long line, to a place called *Burg*, within four English miles of *Bremen*; this place being but pitifully fortified, gave him only time to breathe, and leaving some men in it, (who were given for lost) the English General march'd towards *Brimeford*, a strong Castle, and a Pass, twelve English miles from *Burg*. *Tili* pursues, and in the pursuit kills and takes many English. At *Brimeford*, *Morgan* retires but little, yet it being a Pass, it cost *Tili* so far behind, that *Morgan* with some more loss got into the Town of *Stond*, with the gross of his Army. Here he is besieg'd by *Tili*, which he gallantly defended, till for want of succours, he yielded the place on honourable conditions. Now what doth all this militate against the use of the Pike? Nothing that I know of. Mr. *Lupton* says, the Pikes perform'd not the Retreat; I grant, not alone; neither did the Musqueteers, but both did together; and in most of that ground the Pikes could not but be very serviceable against the Imperial Horse. He says, many Musqueteers were lost, I believe him; and so were many Pike-men, and who knows not, that in Retreats, both Pike-men and Musqueteers must be left behind, and given for lost; for they are the true *Enfants perdus*? There is no wise Patient, but will chuse rather to suffer his Arm or Leg to be cut off, rather than lose his whole Body, and better save a part of an Army than lose all. And in that place our Author takes occasion to instance some (as he thinks) disadvantages that *Morgan* had by his Pike-men; I shall not contradict him, but shall tell him for all that, that when that General return'd to *Holland*, to the service of his old Masters the Estates, I never heard that he offer'd to advise the then Prince of *Orange*, to banish the Pike, as an unnecessary Weapon out of his Army; or if he did, he prevail'd as little with him, as Mr. *Lupton* did with the Earl of *Essex* to do the like, to whom he dedicated this Book, which I now endeavour to examine.

Eighthly, he says, Pike-men are not able to resist a charge of Horse. And why so? Truly, if they cannot do that, I agree they are useless. Because, saith he, the Horse-men may stand one hundred and twenty yards distance from them, and bestow both their Pistol and Carabine shot upon them, and be in no danger of their Pikes: I answer, first, If Horse-men come no nearer Pike-men than one hundred and twenty yards, their Pistols will do them little hurt. Secondly, This argument presupposeth once more a Battalion of Pikes, without either Fire-men or Horse-men, and therefore it is of no force. Thirdly, I presupposeth that the Pike-men are obliged to stand still, and receive all the Horse-mens shot, and never move. But I must add, that while the Horse-men are firing, if the Pike-men advance upon them, it will undoubtedly produce one of these three effects, either it will necessitate the Horse-men to charge through the Foot, which they cannot do without loss, if they do it at

Seventh Argument,  
Answer'd.

*Morgan's Retreat;*

Eighth Argument,  
Answer'd.



all, and so they will neither kill, nor rout the Pike-men at one hundred and twenty yards distance; or it will force the Horse-men to stand still, which will be a greater danger and loss; or it will make them quit the field, the greatest loss of all. By quitting the Field, I mean, the Horse men must either fly or caracol, by either of which the Pike-men are masters of that ground the Horse stood on, till another Squadron of Horse advance against them, and endeavour to remove them from it, who perhaps may have the same success.

Ninth Argument.

Ninthly, he says, The arming a Pike-man (he supposeth with Defensive as well as Offensive Arms) is a great deal more expensive to the Prince or State, than the arming a Musketeer; for he saith, a Musketeer may be completely armed for twenty two or twenty four shilling Sterling, a Pike-man not under thirty five. But this is a superfluous argument, for if he once demonstrate the usefulness of the Pike, it shall be readily granted him, that neither Prince, nor State should bestow any thing for arming a Pike-man. But if a Pike be still found necessary, then it will be an ill piece of frugality in either Prince or State to save that money that should arm Pike-men.

Tenth Argument.

His tenth argument he frames, by telling us how exceedingly troublesome and burthenfome a Pike with Defensive Arms are, and how in time of excessive heat, a Pike-man on a march, is imprison'd in his Arms, whereas a Musketeer with a great deal of liberty is free and open to the air. In answer to which, first observe, that the Musketeer hath not always reason to complain for doing all the duty (as Mr. Lupton maintain'd in his fifth argument) for here the Pike-man endureth the heat of the day. Secondly, If this Gentleman had liv'd with the Ancient Grecians and Romans, and with many Princes since their time, he had (if they would have been rul'd by him) sav'd them a great deal of money, and had given their best Souldiers a great deal of ease, for he had made all their Infantry to consist of *Pelites*, or light-armed.

Brancatio.

After all these arguments, Mr. Lupton sheweth, that one *Brancatio*, a famous Warriour (as he calls him) gives his Judgement for the usefulness of the Pike, which (says Lupton) with all wise Commanders should be of great Authority. But unless *Brancatio* give better reason for his opinion than Mr. Lupton hath done, his judgement shall be of no authority with me, and therefore, I must confess, that I am none of his wise Commanders. I told you before, that I have not seen *Brancatio*, but *Terduzzi* his Country-man, (for they were both *Italians*) in his Book of Machines, says, he hath read him. Now if he value neither his opinion, nor his reasons, I think none should, for *Terduzzi* himself was so little a friend to the Pike, that he writes, he would have it broken, if he knew what better Weapon to put in its room. Out of him I shall give you this short description of *Brancatio*, and his Book.

His Book described.

The Title of his Book is this, "Of the true Art of War, whereby any Prince may not only resist another in the field only with his own forces, and with little charge, but also overcome any Nation. A very glorious Title. I think, we need expect small performances from so vain promises. This man will prove an Alchimiſt, who promisseth to give us mountains of Gold, and hath not a six-pence to buy his own dinner. His Preface makes up the fourth part of his Book, wherein he tells of more than once, that he studied the Theory of the Military Art fifteen years, and practis'd it forty, so he hath been, no young man when he wrote his Book: But he concludes (and I pray you mark it) that in all these fifteen years he had read no Authors but *Casari's* Commentaries: And thereafter he laughs and scoffs at all those *Roman* Authors and Histories, which mention distich Maniples in the *Roman* Legions, because he had read no such thing in *Casari*. Not only in this Preface of his, but all along in his Book, he despiseth the Pike, and calls it the enervation, the weakening, and ruine of War. I shall for a while leave *Brancatio*, and return to Mr. Lupton's citations out of this great *Italian* Tactick, that I may answer them. And in the first place, as it was a reflection on *Brancatio*, first to cite Histories which he had either not read or not understood, and next not to be acquainted with the customs of War in his own time, so Mr. Lupton's credulity is inexcusable, for taking things on *Brancatio* his report, the truth whereof he might have found in Books, of which many private Gentlemen

Mr. Lupton's citations out of Brancatio.

Answered.

Gentlemen are Masters. I shall very briefly run through the quotations he cites out of this *Italian* man of War.

The King of *Portugal* (says he) was ruin'd and overthrow'n in *Africk*, because he had Squadrons of Pikes. But by his favour he was overthrow'n, because neither his Pike-men nor Harquebussiers were rightly Order'd; Train'd, nor Commanded.

Next, he says, *Charles* the Eighth of *France* was the first that brought Pikes into *Italy*. Indeed, there were Pikes in *Italy* before *France* was called *France*, and if that *French* King brought them first there, what lost he by it? He travers'd it, took and conquer'd the Kingdom of *Naples*, and return'd to *France*, and made his passage good at *Fernovo*, in spite of all *Italy* then bandied against him, and, no doubt, his *Switzers* did him good service, and *Brancatio* knew they were armed with Pikes, as to their Offensive Arms.

Thirdly, he says, The *Turks* these forty years by past (reckon them to begin at the year 1540, and to continue till 1580) hath been Victorious over the *Christians*, *Sempre in Ungaria* (so writes Mr. Lupton) only because great Battalions of Pikes, both of the *Switzer* and *High Dutch* Nation were oppos'd to the *Turkish* Troops of Horse, well arm'd with Pistol and Harquebuss. I answer, first *Brancatio* his assertion is false, for the *Turks* was sometimes beaten in *Hungary* in the time of these forty years, and this Mr. Lupton might have learned, by perusing *Knoller* his History, if he could light upon no better. Next I say, If Pikes could not resist the *Turks* Cavalry, Harquebussiers on foot (of which *Brancatio* would have all his Infantry to consist) would have done it much less. But what a ridiculous thing is it to impute the loss of all Battels to one cause, since Armies may be undone and overthrow'n by a thousand several occasions? What can either *Brancatio* or Mr. Lupton say against it, if I aver, that when ever the *Turks* were beaten (and beaten sometimes they were) it was, because they had no Pike men to resist the charge of a stout and hardy Cavalry?

Fourthly, he avers, That *John Frederick* Duke of *Saxe* in *Germany*, and *Peter Strozzi* in *Tuscany*, were both beaten, because of the multitude of their Pike-men. To the first I answer, I do not remember that *Seidan* gives any such reason for his misfortune, neither did ever that Prince fight a just Battel with the Emperour *Charles* the fifth, most of whose Infantry consisted of Pike-men, as well as that of the Elector of *Saxe* did. To the second of *Strozzi*, I say, he was routed, because he made his Retreat in the day time, in view of a powerful Enemy, contrary to the advice given him by *Marshall Montuc*.

Finally, he says, The Battel of *Ceresole* gives a good proof of the weakness of the Pike-mens service, and the Battels of *Dreux* and *Moncoumer* prov'd fatal (says he) to their Leaders, who were deserv'd by their Enemies, because their Foot consisted most of Pikes. Here Mr. Lupton does himself an injury, to insert such three ignorant and unadvised citations out of *Brancatio*, which I will clear.

At *Ceresole*, the famous *Alphonso Davala*, Marquis of *Guaſt*, commanded the Imperial Army, and the Duke of *Anguien* the French. The Imperialists were beaten by the cowardice of a Battalion of their own Horse, which fled without fighting, which a great Battalion of Imperial Pikes seeing, open'd, and gave them way, the French follow the chase through that same line, they being past, the Pikes (who were no fewer than five thousand) closed again and kept their ground. Another Imperial Battalion of Pikes, some *Spaniards*, some *Germans*, fought with a great Body of *Grisons* belonging to the French, and beat it out of the field, and thereafter fought with the *Gascons* Battalion of Pikes, where both parties stood to it valiantly, inſomuch that the Duke of *Anguien*, the French General, seeing his *Grisons* overthrow'n, and his *Gascons* so shrewdly put to it, despair'd of the Victory. In this charge of the Imperial Pikes and the *Gascons*, almost all the Leaders fell at the first shock, but in the mean time there came a Battalion of *Switzer* Pikes, and charged the Imperial Pikes in the flank, and notwithstanding they had to do with two stout and redoubted Enemies; one in the Van, and another in the Flank, yet did they keep their Ranks, and the Field too, after all the Harquebussiers on foot, and all their Cavalry, with *Guaſt* himself (wounded as he was) had fled.

fled.

fled; and then, (and not till then) they cast down their Arms, and cry'd for Quarter, which the *Switzers* gave them sparingly enough. At this Charge was Marshal *Moulic* on foot in the Head of the *Gaskons* with a Pike in his hand, and he it is that gives us this relation. Will any man say that the Imperial Pikemen lost this Battel to the Emperor? I suppose none but *Brancatio* and Master *Lupton*.

*Aloncounter* was lost for many reasons too tedious to insert here, whereof the great number of Pikes was none. And what a madness is it in these two Antipike-men to speak of *Dreux*, for there they who lost the honour of the day, that is the Prince of *Conde*, and the Admiral of *France*, had few or no Pikes at all, and succeeded accordingly; for the Duke of *Guise* after a long and doubtful fight, (Marshal *St. Andre* being kill'd, and the Constable taken) routed their Foot with his Cavalry, so the having Pikes gain'd the Royalists the honour of the day, (for the *Switzers*, though with huge loss kept the field) and the want of Pikes lost it to the Protestants.

These are *Brancatio* his Influences to prove the insufficiency of the Pike, and what little reason Mr. *Lupton* had to make use of them upon the others authority, is cleared, I hope by my answers, which I thought fit to give, lest I might have seem'd to have undervalued Mr. *Lupton*, as *Terduzzi* hath done his Countryman *Brancatio*, who deigns not almost to afford one of his Arguments a reply.

It rests now that I give an answer to both of them, who draw an argument against the Pike, because the *Turk* useth it not, but rejecteth it as unservicable. To this first I say, that the *Turk* glories that his Battalions resemble the *Macedonian* Phalanges; and therefore by this assertion he approves of the Pike, which was the *Macedonian* weapon. But I confess it is his vanity to say so, for the staff which many of his men carry is rather a Javelin than a Pike. But next I aver, that the Grand Signiors want of Pikes is a defect in his Militia, which no Prince or State is bound to imitate. And assuredly if *Selimus* his Cannon had not terrified the *Persian* Horses in the *Calderan* Plains, he would have repented that he had no Battalions of Pikes to withstand the furious and reiterated Charges of *Sophi Ismael*, and his resolute Cavalry. And if the Treason of some *Mahmud* Captains had not assisted that same *Turk* against *Campson Gaurin* Sultan of *Egypt*, where he was almost born down by the fury of the *Mamabuck* Horsemen; the want of Pikes had lost him his Army, and it may be a great part of his Empire. But I will let these two Gentlemen see, the *Turk* beaten with Pikemen in *Asia*, two several times. *Techel*, surnamed *Custilias*, or Redhead, by Nation a *Persian*, having but very few Horses, armed all his Foot (who were but Country-people, and newly levied) with long Pikes. One of *Bajazet's* Beglerbegs, *Balsa Taragio* meets him at the River *Sangar*, where *Techel* beat back and broke the *Turk* Horse with his long Pikes, and obtain'd the victory. Not long after that *Techel* meets with *Hali Balsa* at Mount *Olisa*, with whom he fought long, and at length by the courageous managing of his long Pikes, he forced the *Turkish* Horse to run out of the field, in which skuffle the *Balsa* himself was kill'd.

I am afraid it hath been pure malice in these two Gentlemen to conceive the great Victories obtain'd by the *Switzers* by no other weapon than the Pike. Ignorance it could not be in *Brancatio*, since some of them were the actions of his own time, nor in *Lupton*, who might have read them in Modern History. They overthrew *Charles of Burgundy* in three several Battels, and he was a very Warlike Prince. They marched three miles out of *Millain* to attack a Martial King, *Francis* the first, lodg'd in a well fortified Camp, environ'd with a well order'd Infantry, a numerous Cavalry, and a huge Train of Artillery, they storm'd his Retrenchment, took some of his Cannon, fought till night parted them, renewed the Battel next morning very beimes, fought long with doubtful success, the event whereof might have prov'd fatal to the *French* King, if the stout *Venetian* General *Aviano* had not come upon the Spur with three thousand Horse to the rescue, and then the *Switzers* retir'd in good order back to *Millain* in spite of both *French* and *Venetians*. At *Novara* they forc'd the *French* to retire two miles from the Town, ten thousand of them follow the next day, and fight with the *French* two hours; and observe it, that they were principally resisted by

Battel of  
*Dreux*.

Want of  
Pikes in the  
*Turk* Army a  
defect.

Influenced.

*Turk* beaten  
with Pike-  
men.

Great Actions  
of the  
*Switzers*  
arm'd with  
Pikes.  
*Charles* Duke  
of *Burgundy*.  
*Helide*  
*Millain*.

At *Novara*.

by the *German* Battalions of Pikes, who stoutly fighting, were kill'd every man of them; the *Switzers* obtain'd an absolute Victory, they kill'd many of the *French* and *Gaskon* Foot in their flight, for they did not fight; they chased the *French* Cavalry out of the field; (who could not be detain'd by the Duke of *Trimoiville* and *Triunlio*, both of them great Captains) these the *Switzers* for want of Horse could not pursue, but they took two and twenty pieces of Artillery, with an infinite Booty, and so returned to *Novara*. An Action even in the Heroick times, almost beyond belief. You may read these stories at large both in *Guicciardini*, and *Giovio*.

At *Meaux* on the River *Marne*, the Prince of *Conde* and the Admiral of *France* had well near surpris'd *Charles* the Ninth King of *France*, and his Mother *Catherine de Medici*, great were the fears of the Court, where there were none to defend it, but eight or nine hundred Gentlemen, arm'd only with Swords. But there arriv'd in a good time six thousand *Switzers*, who had come from their own Country, and they after three hours refreshment courageously undertook to bring the King and Queen in safety to the *Lawre*, which was ten Leagues distant from thence, and performed it; in their march they chose the most open and Champain fields, presenting their Pikes on all Quarters, where ever the enemy offer'd to Charge, and came to *Paris*, with the loss only of thirty men, who being weary, had fallen behind.

Let now Master *Lupton* tell us out of *Brancatio*, that Pikemen cannot make way or pursue an enemy, that they cannot force a Guard, Street, or Passage, and cannot make an assault, or use diligence on a March, or do other feats of War. All these great and memorable actions were performed by the *Switzers*, arm'd offensively only with Pikes and Swords, without Harquebusses, Muskets, or any Fire-guns, without Cavalry or Artillery, which is enough, though nothing more could be said, to confute both *Brancatio* and *Lupton*.

They both knew that it is a capricious humour to take away a thing that hath been used, unless there be reasons given either against the thing it self, or the bad use of it, and this both of them think they have done, how sufficiently, let the Reader judg; yet they have not done all, unless they give us something in the room of the Pike, since they have taken it from us. And this both of them promise to do, and you shall see how they perform it.

*Brancatio* admits no Foot but Harquebussiers, Muskets being rare when he wrote, I doubt not but (if he were alive now) he would call them Musketeers, as Mr. *Lupton* doth, and by that name we shall call them hereafter. *Terduzzi* tells us that his Countryman *Brancatio* undertakes to teach Princes an invention how their Musketeers shall march in an open field, or a razed Champain, either in Squadrons, or man by man, without running any hazard to be routed or over-run by any Cavalry, be it never so strong, much less shall they be in danger of any Battalions of Pikes. But *Brancatio* tells us not in his whole Book what this invention is, but keeps it up as a secret, as that (to use his own words) which deserves only to be whisper'd in the ear of some great Prince. I am afraid he never met with that Prince in his life-time who courted him for that secret, and therefore it is more than probable, the secret hath dy'd with him. *Terduzzi* tells us that after he had read this in *Brancatio* his Book, he troubled his brain two or three nights in conjecturing what this invention or secret might be. At first he imagin'd it must be a Machine, made with flanks for defence of the Musketeer, and to move some way or other, as the Musketeers advanced or retired, and so to his thinking should be a moving, or ambulatory Citadel. But he found he had not hit right when he read in *Brancatio* that the invention is a most easie thing to make, but most difficult to imitate, unless the order of it be explain'd by the Author himself; and withal he calls it in the singular Number a piece of Armour; now *Brancatio* acknowledgeth no Arms but Sword or Harquebussie for Foot, hence *Terduzzi* concludes, the invention must be some kind of Defensive arms, and yet no great Engine or Machine. While *Terduzzi* is thus puzzled, an *Italian* Gentleman told him, that *Brancatio* had shew'd him one of them, and said it was a Pike with a certain Iron-triangle in the middle of it, which being cast on the ground any way, always one of the angles should stand up, but when the Pike was fix'd, all the three angles stood in the air; which when *Terduzzi* had learned, he look'd on it as so frivolous a piece of folly,

At *Meaux* on  
the River  
*Marne*.

*Brancatio* his  
Error instead  
of the Pike,

Cannot be  
well conce-  
lured.

B b

that

that he neither troubled himself nor us, with any further discourse about it. Could this Triangle (be it never so great) be any thing else than one of our Cal-throps; with these it seems *Brancazio* was to environ his Firemen, for he says his invention was only to defend the circumference: whether the Musqueteers were to carry it, or some other appointed for it, we know not, and many more Particularities of that great secret must we want.

Master *Lupton* is not altogether so squeamish as *Brancazio*, (though we shall presently find him refer'd enough) for he tells us that instead of both Musquet and Pike he would have a thing which is both a Musquet and half Pike serve the Infantry. He much commends this piece, and praiseth the Inventor of it excessively, but he gives us no perfect description of it, at least not such a one as can make one who never saw it, apprehend it aright. He calls it a Musquet and Half-pike; if so, then two weapons: but for most part he calls it a weapon in the singular number, and therefore not two weapons. He tells us, by this weapon the Musqueteers are safe within the Barricado of their Steel-Pallisado's, for so he calls it. By this the weapon should be sharp at both ends, and should be used as the *Swedish* Feather; and if so, it will make but one weapon, and the Musquet will make another. He says, this weapon may be used as a Musquet, Rest; but if it have no more use than that, experience will make it useless. And at length he assures us that this weapon, the Musquet-half-Pike, will save a great deal of Treasure spent by Princes on Pikes, Head-pieces, Backs and Breasts. He told us of such stuff before. But good God! can a Barricado of Half-pikes defend a mans head and body so well from a shot, as a Head-piece, or a Corset can? And to conclude, he directs all who desire to know this new weapon to go to the Artillery-Garden at *London*, where they may be satisfied in all their Curiosities. But I humbly conceive the knowledge of a weapon, which he cries up to be of so general a good, and can bring so universal an advantage to Princes and States, should not have been confin'd within so narrow a plot of ground as the Artillery or Military-Garden. And truly I think that either the Author of that invention, or at least Master *Lupton* was oblig'd in charity to have communicated it to the *Hungarians*, *Transylvanians*, *Polonians*, and *Croatians*, to defend themselves by it from the Hereditary Enemy of *Christendom* and particularly to the *Germanis* to obviate thereby the inconveniences and disadvantages which follow the great number of their Pikes, the use whereof Master *Lupton* hath condemned.

Now, though all along this Chapter I have shewn but small inclination to agree with Mr. *Lupton*, for the laying aside the Pike, yet in the close of his Book, and this discourse, we shall be good friends; for he desires if the Pike be not altogether abandon'd, that all who carry it may be taught the use of the Musquet likewise: and this shall be my hearty desire likewise, provided, that all Musqueteers may be taught the use of the Pike also, for I conceive it to be very fit, that every Soldier be so train'd, that he may as occasion offers, be ready to make use of both weapons. And for this I hope no discreet Commander will fall out with either Master *Lupton*, or me.

Mr. Lupton's  
Musquet and  
Half-Pike,  
one weapon,

Should not  
be made a  
Secret.

Soldiers  
should be ex-  
ercised and  
train'd with  
both Musquet  
and Pike

## CHAP.

## CHAP. VII.

## Of Gunpowder, Artillery, its General, and Train.

IF the *Chinois* had the use of Guns twelve or thirteen hundred years before the *Europeans* knew what a thing a Gun was, as some fancy; then they had Gunpowder also at that time, for without this, Guns were useless. They talk of a King of *China*, who being a great Enchanter, had a familiar Spirit, by whose help he invented Gunpowder and Artillery, by the help of which he defeated the *Tartars*, who had grievously afflicted him; and this King, they say, liv'd not long after our Saviours Incarnation. If the use of Artillery in that Country be of so old a date, I think the Natives should long ere now have attain'd to such a perfection of Gunnery, that thereby they might have defended themselves in their late Wars with these same *Tartarians*, better than to have let them make a full conquest of their Kingdom; neither do I remember that the Jesuit who writes the History of that War, speaks much of Ordnance. *Curtius* in his History of the Great *Alexander*, gives occasion to some to imagine that in his time (and that was some ages before the days of the Enchanting King of *China*) some of the *Indians* knew the use of Fire-guns; for he says that that daring Prince was dissuaded from the Siege of a Town in *India*, because the Inhabitants of it defended themselves against their enemies with Thunder and Lightning from Heaven. And indeed nothing resembles these more than the fire and noise of Powder from a Gun. But how soon soever men had the knowledge of this Art in those remote Countries, it is the general opinion that in *Europe* it was neither known nor heard of till in the year of God 1300, a Monk in *Germany*, one *Barthold Swaris* (which in that language signifies Black) having for some use or other mixt some Sulphur and Niter together in a Mortar, a spark of fire falling accidentally in the mixture, blew it up with a crack immediately; the curious Friar searching narrowly into the cause thereof, by little and little found out Gunpowder, the Mother of all Fire-Engines and Works. To the Monks invention infinite additions have been made since.

I will not at all amuse myself here with the needless disputes of some, whether this invention be destructive to mankind or not, since we read of many more men kill'd in Battels and Sieges before the noise of it was heard, than have been since. I shall only say that never any thing was invented before it that offer'd so great violence to Nature, and yet is a ready servant and agent of Nature, it being able to make the heaviest Bodies, Stones, houses, and walls ascend in an instant, and waters suddenly to leave their habitations in the bowels of the earth, and appear on the surface of it; and all this perhaps to avoid something which nature doth more abhor. Those Fire-ships which the *Sieur d'Aldegonde* sent down from *Amwerp* to destroy the great and stupendious Bridge which the Duke of *Parma* had made over the River of the *Scheld*, to obstruct the *Hollanders* assistance to the besieged City, can witness the truth of Gunpowders force, tho' it wrought not the intended effect. Some of the Stockads of the Bridge (tho' fastned with all the art the wit of man could invent) were broke down in an instant, the River forc'd to forsake his Channel, yea to give an unwelcome visit to some of the *Spaniards* Sconces, out of which the stoutest of them run, being in such a consternation, that they thought the Elements were to be dissolved; and the day of Doom was come. At *Delft* in *Holland* in the year 1654 (if I mistake not) by some mischance or inadvertency (as was conjectur'd) of him who was intrusted with a Magazine of Ammunition in a Tower upon the wall, the Powder was fired, which in the twinkling of an eye blew the Tower into the air, from the very foundation, level'd all the houses of the nearest streets with the ground, kill'd many people, and mutilated more; the place where the Tower stood was not to be known, nor one stone to be seen of it, but in their

B b 2

Guns in China;

And in India;

The Inventor  
of Gunpow-  
der in Europe.Is admirable  
force.

Inflamed,

On the river  
of the Scheld.

At Delft.

At Mechlin.

Materials of Powder.

Natural Saltpeter.

Artificial Saltpeter.

Brimstone.

Charcoal.

Several kinds of Powder.

Three sorts of Guns.

room a Pool full of water suddenly summon'd from the bowels of the Earth. This blast made many houses at Rotterdam (where I then was) shake fearfully, and that is six English miles from Delft. But John Petyt in his History of the Netherlands, writes, that a Magazine of Powder having been blown up at Mechlin, in the time of the Duke of Alva's Government, made a whole Town shake, which was four Dutch Leagues, that is twelve English miles distant from Mechlin.

The materials of which Powder is compos'd, are three, Saltpeter, Coal, and Sulphur. The first is called by Gunners, the Soul; the second, the Body; and the third, the life of Powder. I shall not trouble my Reader with a Philosophical course of Saltpeter, or of its nature, which is the subject of some Philosophical contemplation, as having exactly the qualities of all the four Elements in it, and that it is the Quintessence of qualities. It is hot and dry, and so easy to be fired. It can be made up to a hard stone, so it is earth; yet dissolve it, (which is easily done) and put it in a vessel, it will cool Wine in the heat of Summer, so it is water. It grows in Subterraneous places, Caves, Caverns, Vaults, and old ruinous walls, so it seems a fullen, dull, and humid air is the father of it. But this natural Niter would not make so generally a loud noise over all the world, if it were not mightily helped by art, and therefore it is cultivated, nourished, and invited to grow in Mud-walls, Loom-floors, Cellars, Dove-houses, and Stables, the dung of Beasts, especially that of Hogs (if the floor be rightly water'd with Saltpeter, well order'd, produceth good Saltpeter. How these floors should be prepar'd, preserv'd, and used, and how oft pared, how the Saltpeter should be put in half tubs, one above another, the one (wherein the Saltpeter is) fill'd with water, the other without water, and after that how the Saltpeter is) fill'd with water, the other without water, and after that how it should be boil'd and skim'd, and put in Brass-pans and coolers till it congeals, and how thereafter it is refined, is superfluous here to set down; it is neither my work, nor is it necessary for every Soldier to learn, but those who will, may read it in several Authors. The second material of Powder is Brimstone, which must be well cleansed and purged; and the third is Charcoal, of wood made first clean from the bark and knots; and the wood that is laid to be properest for it, is that of young Hazel, Elder, Willow, and Birch. These three Materials must be thoroughly mixed and incorporated, for therein consists much of the essence and force of Powder. These three must be wrought together in a Horse or Water-mill, or in a Mortar with Pestles, and while it is a working, care must be taken to keep it moist.

Though all agree that the mixture and incorporation of these three Materials makes Powder, yet all agree not of the quantity of each of these Materials. And for these disagreeing opinions it is that Princes and States set down their own rules for the composition of Powder, and so it is fitting they should. This is a general rule that the Powder is the finest, quickest, and of greatest efficacy that hath most Saltpeter, and that Saltpeter which is most refined, gives the greatest perfection. Gunners generally divide Powder into three kinds; first, that which hath the allowance of one pound of Brimstone, and one pound of Coal for four or five pounds of Saltpeter, and that is ordinarily called Cannon-powder. The second hath one pound of Brimstone, and one pound of Coal for six pounds of Saltpeter, this they say is for Muskets. The third is the finest, and hath seven or eight pounds of Niter for one pound of Sulphur, and one pound of Charcoal, this is for birding, for fowling-pieces, or if you will for Pistols. Powder, for fear of its mischief must be kept in upper rooms, but in dry and warm places; for age and moisture corrupts it, and renders it improper for any use, but it may be again renewed by an addition of Saltpeter.

The Gunners Art is a necessary Appendix of the Modern Art of War, but not necessary for every Soldier to learn, yet the more he knoweth of it, the perfecter Soldier he is: I shall speak but of a few things of Artillery, which I think are convenient (for necessary I say they are not) for most Officers and Commanders in the War to know, leaving the Art in its intire compass to be taught by those ingenious persons, who profess it, wherein I have no skill, and profess as little.

Pieces of Ordnance that shoot in a direct line (for I speak not of Pot-pieces or Mortars which cast their shots in crooked and oblique lines) are Leather,

Leather, of Iron, or of Copper. These Guns which are called Leather-Cannon, have Copper under the Leather, and are made with great art, and are light to carry, which is the greatest advantage they have. Iron-Guns are accounted better than the Leather ones, but experience hath taught us that they are not so good for many uses as those of Copper. It is true, they are not so costly by far, neither do they burst so readily; and some think the firing them, makes them firmer and falter.

In the casting Copper-Guns the Founders differ in the quantity of Bell-metal with it, some allowing more, some less; and Bockler the Engineer informs us, that now the Germans allow no Bell-metal at all, but for every eight pound of Copper, one pound of rough Tin; their reason for this is, they have found by experience, that Bell-metal makes the Piece brittle, and subject to breaking, and Tin makes it hard. The English and French allow both Bell-metal and Tin. And some allow also a mixture of Latten and Lead.

Time and Art hath brought Powder to have a greater force than it had in its Infancy: The Saltpeter being more artificially refined, the Sulphur better purged, and the Coals of more proper wood, and better burnt, the Powder now being corned, which then it was not. This change of Powder hath occasion'd a very great alteration in the fortification of Ordnance, for Powder having now a double or a treble force more than when it was first found out, a Piece requires a proportionable fortification of her metal, to resist the violence of the Powder. As by example, an hundred and fifty years ago, and upward, or rather two hundred, Founders allowed for a Cannon, or Demi-Cannon, 86 pound of metal for every pound of their shot; by which account a Piece that shot a Bullet of 48 pound weight, did but weigh in metal 3840 pound, whereas now, and sixty years ago too, the weights with the Germans 9000 pound, which will be above 187 pound of metal for every pound of the Bullet. But in all the forts of Culverines there is a stronger fortification required than in Cannon, in regard they being of a greater length, they are able proportionably to receive in their Chambers more Powder than the Cannon, and therefore must be better fortified. After the first practice of Guns, a Culverine that shot 16 pound of Iron had but a 100 pound of metal allow'd for every pound of her shot, and so she weighed but then 1600 pound but now and long before this, she weighs 4300 pound, and consequently hath the allowance of near 270 pound of metal, for every pound of her shot for smaller Ordnance in times of old, 150 pound of metal was allowed for every pound of their shot, now above 300, or near 400.

How the Moulds for founding Cannon should be made, of what earth, what defects a Gun may receive from a faulty Mould, or from the melting the metal, and running it in the Moulds, what overplus of metal is allowed, which the German Founders call the Wolf; how a Gun in founding comes to be weaker of one side than the other; how she gets chinks, flaws, and honeycombs, and how Gunners ought to be careful to try their Guns, if they have either these or any other defects, and how they shall mend them, belongs properly to Gunners to discourse of, from whom the Courteous Reader may easily learn them.

There are three Fortifications of Ordnance, the ordinary fortified, the lessened, that is less than the ordinary, and the re-inforced, which is the double fortified. All Pieces are to be more strongly fortified at the Touch-hole and Muzzle and Trunions, than in the other parts of them. The Trunions equalize the Piece, and on them she is mounted and imbedded. The Bore which goeth from the Muzzle to the Touch-hole, is called the Cylinder or Concave, it is also called the Soul of the Piece. And hence, when a Piece is equally bored, and hath no more metal on one side than another, Gunners use to say, her Soul lyeth right in her Body. So much of the Concave as containeth Powder, Bullet, and Wad, is called the Charged Cylinder, or Chamber, the Rest, the vacant Cylinder, or guide of the shot. The Touch-hole at Sallies is often nail'd, and therefore Gunners ought to be skilful to know how to unnaill them, and there be several ways for it, yet often none of them prevails, and therefore they are forc'd to bore a new Touch-hole, which will cost them some hours labour. The rest of the parts of a Piece not yet nam'd, are the Pommel, call'd also the Calscabel, the Breech, the Visier, or Base-ring, the Trunion-ring, the re-inforced

Leather, iron,

Copper,

Bell-metal.

Powder better now than a 150 or 200 years ago.

Therefore the Fortification of Ordnance must be the stronger.

Gunners to look carefully to the defects of Guns.

Several Fortifications of Ordnance.

The names of the several parts of a Piece.

forced-ring, the Coronice ring, which is also call'd the Astragal; the Neck, and the Muffle ring, which is also called the Freeze: These denominations a Piece hath from a Column or Pillar, which a Piece resembles, as Mr. Norton tells us in his practice of Artillery, and can be more easily demonstrated by the Finger to the Reader, than intelligibly describ'd.

Great Guns, or pieces of Ordnance, take frequently their denominations from the Inventors, or from Beasts and Birds, whom for their swiftness, rapacity, and cruelty, they seem to represent. And though the word *Cannon*, be generally now taken for all manner of Ordnance, yet properly it is that Piece which is ordain'd for battering of Walls, Towers, and Castles, and Ships; the *French* call them *Battemurs*, and the *Germans*, *Mauwbrechern*, both which signify Batter-walls. But there is a difference of founding this piece, among the *French*, *Germans*, and *English*. The *Sieur de Preissac* allows no more weight of metal for a *French* whole Cannon, or *Battemur*, than five thousand six hundred pound, the Bullet to weigh about thirty four pound (that will be one hundred sixty four pound of Metal for every pound of the Bullet) the must have eighteen pound of Powder, and is more than ten foot long. The *Germans* divide their whole Cannon (which they call *Carthaus*) into the Heavier and the Lighter. The first weighs in Metal nine thousand pound, and shoots a Bullet of forty eight pound of Iron, for which it takes twenty four pound of fine, and thirty two pound of common Powder. The lighter *Carthaus* weighs six thousand four hundred in Metal, and shoots about forty two or forty three pound of Iron, the half of fine, and two thirds of common Powder. They both shoot alike far, to wit, one thousand ordinary paces point blank, and at random six thousand steps: Three *Italian* miles, says *Boekler*, which seems to be very far, especially the first. But the *Germans* of a long time have forborn the use of the heavier *Carthaus*, and have founded none of them, they being found too chargeable and expensive, too heavy and troublesome to draw, and more destructive to Batteries, Bulwarks, and Walls, on which they stand, than useful, being she breaks, tears, and shakes in pieces the strongest Vau-murs, Defences, and Embrasures, that can be made for her: And therefore they are now thought more fit to stand on Walls, or in Arsenals for ornament, than for use: The lighter *Carthaus* either for Offence or Defence, at Sieges doing as much service, and not so much hurt as the greater. And if this be true, we may easily observe, what great trouble and almost insurmountable difficulties the Great Turk's Gunners meet with in managing these excessively heavy pieces of his, the Metal whereof he carries about with him on Camels backs, or in his Souldiers Knapfacks. And though I believe many of his Cannon be of an extraordinary wide bore, yet I cannot be perswaded to believe, that at the Siege of *Scudra* he had two pieces which shot twelve hundred pound Bullets, and one whose Bullet weigh'd thirteen hundred pound of Iron; I suppose Mr. *Knolles* hath been too credulous both in that particular and many others, as many more Historians are. The *Germans* have their half *Carthaus*, which shoot twenty four pound of Bullets, their quarter *Carthaus* of twelve, and their Demi-quarter *Carthaus*, which shoot six pound of Iron, And for most part that Nation gives the denomination of their Guns from the weight of the Bullet they shoot, as a four and twentieth pounder, a twelfth, a sixth, and a three pounder: The Cannon, or Battering Ordnance, is divided by the *English* into Cannon Royal, whole Cannon, and Demi-Cannon. The first is likewise called the Double Cannon, she weighs eight thousand pound of Metal, shoots a Bullet of sixty, sixty two, or sixty three pound weight, The whole Cannon weighs seven thousand pound of Metal, and shoots a Bullet of thirty eight, thirty nine, or forty pound. The Demi-Cannon weighs about six thousand pound, and shoots a Bullet of twenty eight or thirty pound. All of them will take the half of the weight of their Bullet of fine, and two parts of ordinary Powder, and may take much more, if they be reinforced. These three several Guns are called Cannons of eight, Cannons of seven, and Cannons of six; I suppose Inches, as being so many Inches high of the Diameter of their Bores: For most part all Cannon, properly so called, are not above eighteen or nineteen Diameters of their bores in length.

The

Cannon, properly focal-  
led.The French  
Cannon.The German  
heavy whole  
Cannon laid  
aside.The Lighter  
still used.Turk's Can-  
nons.English Can-  
non.

The *English* Gunners do accurately divide all kind of Ordnance into four kinds. Each whereof is sub-divided into several sorts, according to their several bores. The four kinds are, the Cannon, the Culverine, the Pierrier, and the Mortar. Of the Cannon I have spoke already: Of the other three I shall speak a little.

The Culverin is longer in her chase than the Cannon, and therefore shoots further, because she is able to receive more Powder proportionably in her Chamber, I say, proportionably to her Bullet; as by example, a Cannon that shoots thirty two pound of Iron, will take but sixteen pound of fine Powder, and that is but half the weight of her Bullet: But a Culverin that shoots a Bullet of sixteen pound weight, will take eleven or twelve pound of fine Powder, and that is three parts of four of her shot: The reason is, because the Cannon (as I said before) is but about eighteen Diameters of her bore in her length, whereas the whole Culverin will be twenty eight, thirty, or thirty two diameters of her bore in length: And if a Culverin be reinforced, a Gunner may give her the full weight of her Bullet in fine Powder, and neither put himself nor her in hazard.

The Culverin is sub-divided; into whole, and half, or Demi-Culverin, Saker, Minion, Falconet, Rabinet, and Bafe Culverine. How high every one of these are in their bores, how many Diameters of their bores in length, of what weight their Bullets are, what each of themselves weigheth in Metal, belongs properly to Gunners, from whom those who are desirous, may learn these particulars, or may find them in several Authors. Only take these few general observations. First, That all those sorts of Culverins take proportionably more Powder than the Cannon, because their Chambers are proportionably longer; the reason whereof is, that their Chases are in length many more diameters of their bores, than the Cannon, and by that reason, shoot further. As by example, the Minion shoots but a Bullet of three pound and a half, she takes two pound and a half of Powder, and shoots her Ball at random seven thousand ordinary paces or steps, and that is one thousand steps further than the Cannon can cast her Bullet. Secondly observe, that no general rule can be given for the quantity of Powder for all Guns, but for all Guns of one sort there may; some requiring half, some two thirds, some three parts, and some the full, or near the full weight of their Bullet. Thirdly, observe, that all these sorts of Culverines must be more strongly fortified in their Metals, than the Cannon or Battering-pieces are, some of them having two hundred and fifty, some three hundred, and some of them three hundred and fifty pound of Metal for every pound weight of their Bullet. Whereas the Cannon takes but some one hundred and thirty, some one hundred and forty, some one hundred and sixty, or at most one hundred and eighty pound in their Metal for every pound of their shot; the reason is, because they proportionably take more Powder than the Cannon, and that is now double and treble of more strength and efficacy, than it was in the Infancy of Gunnery. Fourthly, observe, the more ponderous and heavy the Bullet is, so it be expell'd with a due proportion of Powder, it shakes the more the batter'd place, provided that place be within the range of the Piece, and therefore the Cannon shakes more than the Culverine, though it pierce not so deep, if the Culverine have her due loading: Hence it is, that in Batteries Culverins and Demi-Culverins are used to shoot cross wind, or to flank, to cut away that which the Cannon hath shaken.

The third kind of Ordnance is the Stone-caster, which the *French* call *Pierriers*, or *Pierrieras*, from *Pierre*, which in that language signifieth a Stone. The *Germans* call them *Steinbüchsen*, which is to say Stone-Guns. They are cast and ordain'd to shoot Stones, yet may shoot either Lead or iron, if sparingly charged with Powder. They are handsome Pieces, and very like Cannon, or Pieces of Battery, the longest of them will be but eight diameters of the height of their bore; they are not strongly fortified in their Metal, neither need they be, for they require not much Powder, and hence they are light to carry: Being duly loaded, they serve well enough to defend a breach, or the Port of a Town; they are good against Troops or Companies in the Field, and can commit Murder enough with small expence, for they have abundance of Iron, and very much Powder.

English Divi-  
sion of all  
Ordnance.The Culve-  
rine.Subdivided  
into several  
sorts.Observations  
concerning  
them all.  
First.

Second;

Third.

Fourth;

Stone-caster;

The

Mortar,

The fourth kind of Ordnance, is the Mortar, under which comprehend Pot-pieces, Square Murderers, Tortiles, and Petards. The Pot-piece shoots Granado's, Fireballs, and Stones. These Mortars are of several and very far different greatneſſes, for ſome of them ſhoot but five, ſome ſix, ſome eight pounds, others 300, 350, and 400 pound. They are only uſeful at Sieges, and at them they can ſerve both the Aſſailants and Defendants. The beſieged uſe them for ſhooting in the Batteries and Approaches of the Enemy, to ruin their Works, deſtroy their Men, burn their Ammunition; and by their Comet-like light, while they are in the air to diſcern where they are working. The Beſiegers uſe them to terrifie and annoy the Defendants, to burn their Houſes and Magazines with Granado's, or break them down with ſtones, which ſometimes will be of that huge weight that ſcarce a double Vault can reſiſt them. The operation of the Mortar is (as I ſaid before) altogether in oblique and crooked lines. Thoſe Gunners that are appointed to overſee them, had need to be ſkilful (the Art being difficult) for Granado's are very expensive, and therefore muſt not be caſt away, yet I have ſeen as many (yea a great deal more) miſſ, than hit the mark.

Its Uſe.

Silver Bullets.

Bullets for any kind of Ordnance or Fire-Guns, may be of any metal you pleaſe, yea of Gold or Silver; the firſt is too coſtly; the ſecond ſome fancy to be able to pierce ſuch as are (by ſome black art or other) hard, or Bullet-proof. But to charge a perſon that is Bullet-proof, with a Silver-ball, to me ſeems to be like the Aſſaulting an Enchanted Caſtle. The Bullets which are ordinarily uſed, are threefold, Stone, Lead, and Iron. Of the Stone I have ſpoke; Lead-Bullets are for all Hand-guns, but are not fit for Ordnance, except in caſe of neceſſity, which ſeldom arriveth. They weigh a third more than Iron, and ſo are coſtlier; they pierce not ſo far into an Earthen-wall as the Iron ones, and in ſtone-walls they batter themſelves out in breadth, without doing much hurt to the wall. Iron-Bullets are of two kinds, maſſie ones, and thoſe that are empty or hollow within. The empty are called Granado's, and are filled with ſuch ſtuff as the Engineer or Gunner thinks effectual for the buſineſs or errand on which he intends to ſend them. The maſſie Iron-bullet ſhould be exactly round, and Gunners ought to be ſure that they fit the bores of their ſeveral Pieces, for if the Bullet be too great, and ſtick in the vacant Cylinder, it hazards in the diſcharge, the burſting the Piece; and if too little, it is impoſſible for any Cannoneer to make a juſt ſhot with it, they uſe to help the ſmallneſs of the Bullet by tying Hemp, Flax, Hay, or Straw about it, for all Bullets muſt be a little leſs than the bore of the Piece, for which they are made. And therefore it was long a general rule to make all Bullets for Ordnance one fourth part of an inch lower in its Diameter, than the height of the bore of the Piece. But this is now condemned by Gunners as an error, becauſe they think for a Falcon, or other ſmall Pieces, the fourth part of an Inch is too great an abatement, and for either a Culverine or Cannon, it is too little. Bookler tells me that they agree now that the twentieth part of the Diameter of the bore of all Pieces, is a reaſonable abatement for their Bullets. There be alſo Chains, Chained Bullets, and Cartridges ſhot out of Pieces of Ordnance. The firſt at Sea-ſervice, and all of the other two in the fields againſt Troops, or Companies either of Horſe or Foot.

Lead Bullets.

Iron Bullets.

Hollow Iron Bullets, or Granado's.

Maſſie Bullets of Iron.

I ſhall forbear to ſay any more of great Ordnance, leaving the reſt to the Gunners art, which all Soldiers are not obliged to learn: Only I cannot omit to tell my Reader, that notwithstanding all I have ſaid, there is an Hiſtory extant of that Siege which the famous Marquis Spinola form'd and maintain'd at Breda in the years 1625, and 1626, written originally in *Latin*, and approv'd by the ſaid Marquis, and thereafter tranſlated into ſeveral Languages; in which we are told that during the time of the Siege, Philip Count of Mansfield went to *Bruiſels*, and there by his great art and induſtry founded forty Braſs-Guns, and twenty three Murderers, for ſo our Hiſtorian calls them; thirty of theſe ſhot Iron Bullets of ſix pound weight, all the reſt ſhot twenty five pound. The metal of every one of the ſix pounders weighed no more but a 180 pound, and thoſe of twenty five Bullet, weighed no more but 750 pound. If you will calculate this, you will find that theſe Pieces had juſt thirty pound of metal (and no more) allow'd for every pound of their Bullet: this was a weak fortification; for we muſt ſup-

Count Mansfield his rare Invention of Guns, at the Siege of Breda.

pole Spinola wanted not for Powder of the beſt fort. The Author adds that theſe new Pieces ſhot their Bullets further than the old ones did, and required but the third part of Powder formerly allowed for Pieces of their Bores. He adds alſo, which he needed not, that the leſſer new Guns were drawn by two Horſes, and the greater by four; for it is certain, the lighter the Piece is, the fewer Horſes, Men or Oxen it will need to draw it. This Invention of Count Mansfield hath been aſſuredly as to Ordnance, the beſt and moſt profitable theſe three by paſt ages could boaſt of, both to ſave expence, and to further expedition. But this good man tells us not how the Earl did all this, only he informs us, that he knew ſo well to boil the melted metal in the fire, that though it had leſs thickneſs, yet it had equal hardneſs with the greater Guns; but I thought that not only the hardneſs, but the thickneſs of the metal ſhould reſiſt the violence of the Powder, and therefore Pieces are more fortified at the Touch-hole, Trunnions, and Mulle, than at any place elſe. But not having heard that this rare Invention was praſticed afterward in all theſe long and bloody Wars, which have been in *Chriſtendom* ſince that famous Siege, nor read any thing of it in thoſe who write of that Art, I ſhall ſuſpend my belief of the thing till I hear that it is approv'd by Judicious Gunners.

An indifferent Train of Artillery, eſpecially if there be battering Guns in it, their Carriages, Powder and Bullets, with all fitting Inſtruments, will require very many Horſes to draw it, which may be more eaſily be conceived if we caſt up an account how many one Piece will need. Let us ſuppoſe this Piece to be a French Cannon, or an *Engliſh* Demi-Cannon; any of them weighing 6000 pound of metal, let her Bullet be thirty pound of Iron, for which he requires twenty pound of common Powder. This Piece may be diſcharged ſafely ten times in one hour, and conſequently in twelve hours 120 times; 120 being multiplied by thirty, (which is the weight of the Bullet) the product is 3600. You are to multiply again a 120 by 20, which (is the weight of one piece of the Powder) produceth 2400. Add 3600; and 2400 to 6000, the aggregate is 12000 pound. In the next place let every Horſe be bound to draw 272 pound weight, and divide 12000 by 272, you will find the Quotient 44, with a Fraction of 32; ſo you ſee forty four Horſes neceſſary to draw one Piece with Powder and Bullets needful for the ſervice of one day, without the addition of the Carriage, or of Waggon and Carts. Hence you may conclude, that a numerous Train muſt of neceſſity retard the march of an Army either in purſuing or retiring. In the firſt caſe all or moſt of it may be left with convenience to follow; but in the ſecond, there is very great difficulty, and many times the endeavouring to ſave it, hath occaſion'd the loſs of Armies.

There is no doubt but Artillery ſerves to good purpoſe, to make an Enemy either remove his Camp (if it be within the range of the Ordnance) or come out and fight. That it forceth Towns and Forts to yield we know; but we muſt confeſs (for all that) that few Battels have been won by Artillery; for as *Molinus* ſays of the Cannon, *Il fait plus de peur, que du mal*: It frightens more than it hurts. The loſs of a Train of Artillery is of exceeding great conſequence to a Prince or a State, therefore the leſs the Train is, the expence will be the leſs, and the expedition the greater. There are ſome who in their Writings of Trains of Artillery, and other eſſential members of Armies, inſtance the Princes of *Orange*. But I ſay other Princes and States are not to take up their meaſures either in their Trains of Artillery, or other points of War by the Eſtates of the *United Provinces*, in regard few or none of them (that I know) have ſuch advantages of the Situation of their Country, as thoſe Eſtates have, who by water for moſt part may tranſport their Ordnance, their Proviſions, their Munitions, their Inſtruments, and ſometimes their Soldiers, which other Princes muſt carry all by land with Horſes and Waggon, (except the men) unleſs they have the benefit of ſome Navigable River, which ſeldom falls out.

It is not every Army that either is or can be allowed either a full Train, or yet a General of Artillery. Many of theſe called flying Armies have no Guns at all with them, and many of them have only ſome Field-pieces, which being drawn with very few Horſes, need not much obſtruct the ſpeedy march of an Army. I have known divers Armies at one time in *Germany* under *Chriſtian* Queen of *Sweden*, each one whereof had but a petty Train, and that order'd by

The great trouble and retardment of a Train of Artillery brings to an Army,

Demonſtrated by what is requiſite for one piece of Cannon,

For one day only.

Artillery very expensive.

A great Train  
not necessary  
with every  
Army.

by a Colonel, or a Lieutenant-Colonel, but there was only one General of the Artillery, who had the supreme Command of all the Ordnance in all the Armies; and he staid constantly with the Field Marshal of the principal Army. I knew the late King of *Denmark* in the year 1657, have two brave Armies (tho' both unsuccessful) the one ordain'd for the defence of *Holftein and Juland*, the other for *Schenen*, the Train appointed for each of them was order'd by a Colonel, and there was neither General, nor Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance with either of them. Whether it be fit for a Prince or a free State to keep one General of the Artillery to have inspection over all the Ordnance, all the Munitions of War, and all the Armes within that Kingdom, or Republick, or rather to intrust several persons with the several Magazines, shall not be the subject of this Discourse. But that all Princes and States should have Store-houses, Arsenals, and Magazines, well stuf with all manner of Arms offensive and defensive, with great and small Ordnance, with Powder, Match, and Ball, and all the several Materials of their Composition, with Mortars, Pot-pieces, Petards and Granado's of all kinds, is, as I suppose a thing which will be granted as necessary beyond all Controversie.

Army Royal.

In such an Army as passeth under the name of an Army Royal (which some think should consist of eighteen thousand Foot, and six thousand Horse) that takes the Field with a design to fight with any that oppose it, and a resolution to do that for which it was levied, whether that be to fight Battels, pass Rivers, or take in Towns and Forts; in such an Army, I say, there should be so great a Train of Artillery, as is fittable with the greatness of the attempt, wherein nothing must be wanting, that can help to carry on the design. In it there should be Cannons for Battery, Culverines of all sorts, Field-pieces, Mortars, great abundance of Powder, Match, and Ball, and Granado's, with all Instruments and Necessaries for all manner of Ordnance; for this Train are required a great many expert and ready Gunners and Conitables, besides the Gentlemen, Captains and Conductors, as also a huge number of Horses and Oxen, Waggons and Carts to draw and transport it from place to place.

his Train.

The *Swedish* Trains of Artillery since their first footing in *Germany* have had the reputation to be the most exactly composed, and conducted by the most experimented Artifts of any in *Christendom*. And no doubt but their Artillery help them much to take so deep a footing in *Germany*, that they have not been since expell'd out of it, though that hath been much endeavour'd. When the late King of *Sweden* invaded *Poland* in the year 1655, the perfidy of the *Polonians* was such that they deliver'd almost that whole Kingdom into his hands. But after they had returned to their Duties, and that the *Swede* was at *Zamoiskie* in the year 1657. it was by the help of his Artillery (whereof *John Casimir* was destitute) that the *Swedish* King traversed much of the length of *Poland* in spite of eighty thousand *Polonians*; cross'd the *Weichsell*, and join'd with *Ragotski*; and after he was forc'd to part with the *Transylvanian* (being invited to come nearer home by the King of *Denmark*s unseasonable declaration of a War against him) he came out of *Poland* and *Prussia* too with a very inconsiderable, ill appointed, and hara'd Army, without any loss at all, merely by the advantage he had of his Train of Artillery.

Sweden a-  
bounds in all  
things neces-  
sary for a  
Train.

*Sweden* furnisheth abundance of both Copper and Iron, whereof great Guns and Hand-guns are made, and by art and industry that Country hath as much Saltpeter as any Kingdom can have; and it being full of Woods, it cannot want Coal for making Powder, whereof they make such abundance, as they are able not only to serve themselves, but to help their neighbours and friends. They also make within the Kingdom, greater store of Arms both for offence and defence, than they have use for. I have seen some little Towns in *Sweden*, wherein few other Artifts were to be found, but Armourers and Gunsmiths. These advantages encourage them to entertain full and well appointed Trains of Artillery.

He who commands in chief over the Artillery is called by the *English*, General, or Master of the Ordnance; by the *French*, *Grand Maître del Artillerie*, Great Master of the Artillery; by the *German*s, *General fetz*, *Engmeister*, which is General Overseer and Master of the Munitions for the Field, a term very proper, because he hath not only the inspection of the Ordnance, but of the

Muniti-

Munitions of War, such are the Guns, greater and lesser, all manner of Arms, A General of the Artillery, and Weapons, all Materials belonging to Smiths and Carpenters, Powder, Match, Bullets, Granado's for Pot-pieces, and to be cast by the hand, store of Instruments and Utensils for Artificers Shops, Bridges or Materials for them, Boats or Materials for them, to be made and join'd quickly, for passing unfordable waters, all kind of Instruments for working in Fortification or Approaches, such as Spades, Mattocks, Pickaxes, and Shovels. In *Scotland* we call this great Officer, the General of the Artillery. The Ancients, though they wanted Fire-guns, yet they had their great Artillery; those were their great Machines and Engines whereof I have formerly spoken; and they had likewise a Master of their Artillery, who had the inspection of it, which I have also made appear in the fourth Chapter of the *Roman* Militia. But since the Invention of Gunpowder, the Charge of General of the Artillery hath been look'd on as most honourable, as it indeed deserves to be, and with none more than with us in *Scotland*, and was always conferr'd by our Kings on persons of eminent note and quality. *James* the Fifth King of *Scotland*, made the Gentleman who had married his Mother *Margaret* Daughter to *Henry* the Seventh King of *England*, Lord of *Meffen*, and General of the Artillery of *Scotland*. As *Lesly* Bishop of *Rosse* (that active and loyal servant to his Mistress *Queen Mary*) tells us in the Ninth Book of his History, in these words, *In hisce Comitibus Rex Henricum Siliartum Regina Maritum confirmavit Dominum Meffensem, ac eundem omnium bellicorum Tormentorum prefectum (quod munus apud nos est longe honorificum) munifice confirmavit*. The King, saith he, in this Parliament confirmed *Henry Stuart* the Queens Husband, Lord *Meffen*, and bountifully made him General of the Artillery, which Charge with us is most honourable.

His Trust.

His Charge  
honourable  
in *Scotland*.

He who bears this Office in either Kingdom, Republick, or Army, ought to be a person of good Endowments; but if you take his description from some notional writers, you may justly conclude, there is not such a man below the Moon. Indeed I shall tell you there are two qualifications absolutely necessary for him, these are to be a good Mathematician, and to be something, if not right much, experimented in all the points of the Gunners Art, he must be of a good judgment, and a very ready dispatch. The rest of his parts and abilities (which some require in him alone) I think he may divide among those who are under his command and authority, who truly are right many; as the Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance, two Colonels, if not more, Lieutenant-Colonels, Captains, and Gentlemen of the Ordnance, Master Gunner, and all inferior Gunners; Conductors, and Comptrollers, Engineers, the Clerk of the Fortification, Master of the Mines, and Miners under him, Master of the Artificial Fires, and his Conductors and Petardeers, those who have a care of the Tools for Fortification, for intrenching and approaching, the Master of the Pioneers (in some Armies) and all his Pioneers; the Master of the Batteries, and all under him, for to the General of the Artilleries direction and inspection belongs the Entrenching the Camp, the making the Approaches, Redoubts, Batteries, Zaps, Galleries, and Mines, and other works at Sieges of Towns and Castles. He hath also his own Commissary, Quarter-master, Waggon-master, Minister, and Chyrurgeon. If then you will consider that he and all those under him are to have pay and wages, and what a vast sum of money is spent in maintenance of this Train, and how much Powder, match and Ball, may be spent in an active War; you may conclude that *Achilles Terminus* the Italian Engineer (whom I have often mention'd) spoke within bounds, and but modestly enough, when he said he conceiv'd the fourth part of the Treasure of an Army, was spent on the Train of Artillery.

His great  
Command.

The vast ex-  
pence of a  
Train.

I think it something strange to read in *Backler* the *German* Architect, that it is of late confederated on by the greatest Practitioners of Artillery in *Germany*, that for an Army of forty thousand men (whereof thirty two thousand should be foot, and eight thousand Horse) thirty Pieces of Ordnance are enough, either to besiege a strong place, or to attack an enemy, though never so advantageously lodged. For the last I shall be easily induced to believe it, but for the first part of his affirmative I know not how to reconcile it with the opinion of those knowing Gunners, and experienced Captains, who formerly thought eight Cannon, six Culverines, and four Demi-Culverines, no more than ne-

Thirty Pieces  
of Ordnance  
thought lately  
a sufficient  
Train for an  
Army of forty  
thousand  
men.

Cc 2

necessary



cessary to make one sufficient Brestch, whether in Courtine, or Bastion, whereof I shall have occasion to speak more in my Discourse of Sieges. His thirty Pieces of Artillery he divides thus: Eight whole Cannon (which he calls *Carrthans*) nine Demi-Cannon, six Quarter-Cannon, and seven Field pieces. The whole Cannon (for I suppose he means the lighter sort) shoots a Bullet of forty pound, the Demi-Cannon twenty four pound, the Quarter Cannon six pound, and I shall be contented, that each of the seven Field-Pieces shall shoot three pound. But if the former opinion hold, of eighteen Guns for one Brestch, and that the Town besieged have five Bastions or more, as mostly they have, *Backler* furnissheth us not with Guns enough to Braich two of them. But let us see what Powder and Iron his thirty Guns will spend in one artificial day, that is twelve hours time; you may allow his eight whole Cannon to fire eight times in one hour, and at every time twenty pound of Powder for the forty pound Buller of Iron. Multiply twelve (the number of the hours) by eight (the number of the whole Cannon) the Product is ninety six. Now every whole Cannon firing eight times in the hour, makes ninety six shot in twelve hours, and therefore spends three thousand eight hundred and forty pound of Iron; for ninety six multiplied by forty, produceth three thousand eight hundred and forty, for every pound of the Bullet, I allow but half Powder; to wit, for forty pound Bullet, twenty pound Powder. The whole Cannon then discharged eight times every hour spends a hundred and sixty pound, multiply a hundred and sixty by eight, (the number of the whole Cannon) the Product is a thousand two hundred and eighty. Thus much Powder eight Cannons spend in one hour; multiply a thousand two hundred and eighty by twelve (the number of the hours) the Product is fifteen thousand three hundred and sixty, so much Powder must be allowed for eight whole Cannon to play twelve hours, and twice as much Iron, to wit, thirty thousand seven hundred and twenty.

The nine Demi-Cannons shall fire ten times every hour, this will make ninety shot in one hour, multiply ninety by twelve (the number of the hours) the Product is one thousand and eighty. You may remember we allow twenty four pound of Iron for every shot of a Demi-Cannon, then for one thousand and eighty shot, twenty five thousand nine hundred and twenty pound of Iron, for multiply one thousand and eighty by twenty four, the Product is twenty five thousand nine hundred and twenty; so much Iron doth the Demi-Cannon spend in twelve hours, and the half so much Powder, is twelve thousand nine hundred and sixty.

The six Quarter-Cannon shoots seventy two pound of Iron, (to wit, each of them twelve) they may be discharged twelve times in one hour, and therefore the six are discharged seventy two times in twelve hours, and all six make in twelve hours time eight hundred sixty four shot, multiply eight hundred sixty four by twelve (the weight of the Bullet) the Product is ten thousand three hundred and sixty eight; so much Iron doth these six Quarter-Cannon shoot in twelve times, for that you are to reckon the moiety of Powder, which is five thousand one hundred and eighty four.

The seven Field Pieces (each of them shooting a Bullet of three pound) shoot at one time twenty one pound of Iron, this they may do safely fifteen times in one hour; multiply then twenty one by fifteen, the Product is three hundred and fifteen. Multiply three hundred & fifteen by twelve (the number of the hours they are to play) the Product is three thousand seven hundred and eighty, so much Iron do the seven Field Pieces shoot in twelve hours time, and the half of that in Powder, which is one thousand eight hundred and ninety.

By this account which will be granted to be rational enough, *Backlers* thirty Pieces (though far fewer than other Trains) in twelve hours time will spend seventy thousand seven hundred eighty eight pound of Iron, and of Powder thirty five thousand three hundred and ninety four. By this you may make a reasonable good conjecture of the expence of Ammunition for great Guns.

*Milton* in his Poetry plays with this matter, and makes the use of Cannon very old, as being practised by *Lucifer* against the Omnipotent. See his *Paradise Lost*.

CHAP.

## CHAP. VIII.

Of Musters, and Muster-masters; Pay, Proviant, and Service, of Treasurers, Commissaries, and Proviant-masters; and of the Military Oath.

AFTER Foot-Soldiers are levied and armed, and Horsemen arm'd and mounted, it is fit they be Muster'd, that it may be known whether the Colonels and Captains have raised their full numbers of sufficient men, according to the several Capitulations made with the Prince or State whom they serve. This word Muster, or *Monstre*, signifieth a Show which is made by those Officers who are appointed to view the Soldiery; those with us are called Muster-masters, and are either General or particular. The General Muster-master hath the inspection of the particular ones, and to him they are bound to give a particular account of their deportments, and from him they receive their directions. In all Musters the Colonels and Captains are bound to deal uprightly and honestly, and to make a show of none but such as are really in their Regiments and Companies. The Muster-masters duty is to take a strict account, and a particular view of every mans person and name, (having Lists and Rolls in his hand) of his age, of his Arms and Equipage; and if he muster Horsemen, he is to see that the Horse be serviceable, and of such a height, as is appointed by the Prince or States order, and such as the service requires, whether he be a Curiaffer, or Harquebussier. In some places, especially in Italy, the Muster-masters inquire the names of the Soldiers Parents, the Country and place of their birth, and write down the complections of their faces, and colours of their hair, and some private mark which the Muster-master observeth. It is, and indeed should be infamy to any Captain to make a false Muster either of borrowed men, Horses or Arms; and the same punishment doth the Muster-master deserve, if he either subscribe to, allow of, or connive at any such juggling, for thereby the Prince is not only cheated of his money, but grossly abused to his great disadvantage, when he is made believe that he hath either more men, or more sufficient men than really and effectively he hath. For this reason, and that the Captains may be hired to be honest, some allow *Passevolants*, that is, for such a number of real and visible men, such a number of invisible men, as the *Swedes* used to allow to every Company of Foot, *d'en Passevolants*, whereof six belong'd to the Captain, two for the Lieutenant, and two for the Ensign. Every one of these had the allowance of half a *Rix-dollar* every ten days, but this custom wore out, and there was reason for it, because many Captains notwithstanding that Indulgence, endeavour'd still to keep void places in their Companies, as a mean to make their Purfes full.

These Muster-masters by the *Dutch*, *Danes*, and *Swedes* are called Commissaries, over whom the Commissary General of the Army hath the superintendence. This difference there is, that those Commissaries keep the Purse, and so are Pay-masters; but our Muster-masters are not so, the paying belonging to our Treasurers, as among the *Romans* it belong'd to the Questors. They have power to muster as oft as they please, acquainting him first who commands in chief, either in Field or Garrison: And indeed in those Countreys they muster oftner than they pay.

After the first Muster, the Troops and Companies get their Standards and Ensigns, and then take the Military Oath, which we call to Swear to the Colours. I have spoken of the *Roman* Military Sacrament: This Oath we now speak of is the same for Officers. Troopers and Souldiers swear, with hands lifted up to Heaven, "To be faithful and loyal to their Prince, or his Generals, never to desert or leave the Service without permission of their Superiors,

Muster-masters.

Musters.

Passevolants, what.

Commissaries.

Military Oath.

"rriors, to be stout in time of Battel, Rencontre, Skirmish, or Assault, and rather to chuse to dye, than desert their Standards or Colours, never to turn their backs on an Enemy, and to reveal all Conspiracies, Treasons, and Mutinies, intended against the Prince or State, or their Generals, and other Commanders: So help them God in the great day. If this Oath were punctually kept, all Battels would be so well fought, that there would not be such a thing, as the flight of an Army to be seen or heard of in the World. After this Oath, the Articles and Laws of War should be publicly and distinctly read, that they may know what punishments (for most Articles speak more of them, than of rewards) they may expect, if they commit such crimes as are there mentioned. This is a thing most necessary to be done, that none may pretend Ignorance; for where there is no Law, there can be no Transgression: Of these Articles I shall speak in the next Chapter.

Being that most men who follow the Wars over all the World, receive wages, they justly deserve the name of Mercenaries; but if you will consider how their wages are paid, I suppose, you will rather think them Voluntarys, at least very generous, for doing the greatest part of their service for nothing. It is said of the *Switzers*, that they will not fight, unless they be paid duly. If other Nations were of their humour, Princes and States would be necessitated to agree better than they do, because seldom would their Armies fight for them, because seldom they are paid by them. The *Baptist* infamates, that Souldiers should be paid their wages, because he bids them *be contented with their wages, and do violence to no man*. But few or no Evangelic Precepts are obeyed, and this as little as any; Souldiers get not their wages, and violence is done to many men. At the first view, it would seem strange, why Princes pay their Souldiers very well and duly in the time of Peace, when they have little or nothing to do with them, and very ill and very seldom in the time of War, when they have most to do with them. But the reason is soon found, they need far greater numbers in time of War than Peace, and many are not paid with so little money as a few are. In the Wars of *Europe* these last four-score years and upwards (wherein his Majesties Dominions were free, except in the late unhappy Civil War) we find that the Estates of the *United Provinces* have payed their Armies better than any other Prince or State; this makes the Mercenary Souldier run to their Service, and capacitates them to make great levies in a very short time. The effects of the bad payment of the *Spaniards* appeared, when their King stood most in need of their service seventy years ago and a little upwards; and many times since; for that gave a rise to those terrible Mutinies, in which they possessed themselves of Towns, and treated with their Generals and Superiours, as if they had been Free Estates. This incapacitated the *Spanish* Ministers to prosecute the War against the new Estates, in which time, it is not to be thought, that either they, or the Prince of *Orange* were idle Spectators. The most considerable Army the *Sweeds* had in the year after the death of their Victorious King *Gustavus Adolphus*, lay idle at *Donaverth*, losing the time of Action, and treating for their pay. *Boccalini* informs us, that once the Gardiners complain'd to *Apollo*, that they had no Instruments to make all the weeds of their Gardens run and dance after them, as Princes and Free States, who could make all the idle and unprofitable members of their Principalities go out of the Gardens of their Commonwealths, with the rattling of a Drum, and the sound of a Trumpet. But I think, Princes and States are to be much more admired for another secret art of their own, whereby they get these Drones to do them both laborious and hazardous service, for very little Money, and at a low expence. The Pay and Wages for Officers and Souldiers of both Horse and Foot, are different according to the establishments of several Princes and States. I shall speak a little of some of them; for to speak of all, though I could, were needless.

The *German* Emperours establishment during the time of the long War, was fair enough, for there was promised to every Colonel of Horse 300 Dollars, to a Lieutenant-Colonel one hundred and eighty, to a Major one hundred and a Lieutenant one hundred, to a Lieutenant sixty, to a Cornet fifty, besides allowances of fodderage for so many Horses, proportionably according to

Armies universally ill paid.

*Boccalini* his Ragganli.

*German* Emperour his Pay.

to their qualities, monthly: To a Quartermaster twenty four Dollars, to a Corporal twenty two, to a Clerk fifteen, to a Trumpeter as much, and to an Einpanner or Trooper twelve. The Pay for the Officers and Souldiers of Foot was much less: But they got not three months Pay of twelve in a whole year. But *Buckler* tells us, that in the year 1658, at *Frankford on the Maine*, the Electors and Princes of the Empire, who had joynd in a League, (whereof there are many made in that Country) had unanimously agreed upon a Pay to be given to their forces, so long as the League continued, (most of their Leagues are broke in shorter time than they are a making) and it was this. A Rit-master was to have for himself every month sixty Dollars, and allowance for six Horses, which amounted to forty eight Dollars, so he had in all one hundred and eight Dollars monthly. But because all the Officers of Horse had allowance for some Horses, beside their own Pay, I shall for brevity set down the allowance for themselves and Horses together. A Lieutenant had monthly forty four Dollars, a Cornet as much; a Quarter-master twenty three; a Corporal twenty one; the Clerk, Trumpeter, and Chirurgion each of them eleven; and the Smith as much; a common Trooper eight. Before I speak of the Foot-pay, I shall premise, that the Kings of *Denmark* and *Sweden*, and most of the *German* Princes allow a Waggon with four Horses, and two Saddle-Horses for a Captain of Foot, and the like number between the Lieutenant and Ensign. The Princes then of this *German* League allowed for a Foot-Captain, himself and Horses monthly forty eight Dollars; for a Lieutenant twenty one; for an Ensign-bearer as much; for a Sergeant six; for a Fourrier, Furier, Captain at Arms, Clerk, Drummer, Piper, and Gentleman of the Company, each of them two Dollars, and the fourth part of one; for the common Soldier every month two Dollars.

I shall not speak here either of the *Danish* or the *Swedish* pay; they being much about one with this agreement, except that their allowance is a little more and greater both for the Under-officers, and the common Soldiers. The *French* Pay will be much about one with the *Swedish*: And therefore, my Reader, if he know any thing of his Majesties Establishment, will quickly perceive, that his Pay is greater than any of those I have spoke of, and is better paid than all of them.

How the *German* Princes paid their Souldiers in their last short War, I know not, but in the long one, I am sure, they paid very ill, and so did the *Swed*. Those who were in Garrison got sometimes three, but for most part but two Lendings in the month, every Lending being but a little more than half a Rix-dollar, to which was added the assistance of some proviant Bread. Why they call this a Lending, I know not, unless it be to make the Souldiers believe they lend them money, when they are but paying them a part of their own. But the poorest witted Souldier knows well enough, that his Pay-masters, under the notion of lending them a third part, borrow from them to a very long day, all the rest of their Pay. This is for their Garrisons. In the Fields, they may happily deceive themselves, whether they be Officers or Souldiers, that expect any Money, but must be contented with Commis Bread, till by some Victory, any of their Generals be enabled to quarter his Army in a plentiful Countrey, and there it is, where the common Souldiers may put themselves in Clothes, the Officers in good equipage, and the Colonels make themselves rich; for the *German*, *Danish*, and *Swedish* Colonels play too often the Royetelets, and petty Kings in their several Regiments. But some Officers there be, who never meet with such opportunities, and some are not dextrous enough to lay hold on such occasions when they offer themselves; for at such times, there is something else required, than to receive Pay from the Clerk of the Company. I remember, a Countrey-man of mine told me once, that he had served the Crown of *Sweden* eight years, whereof he had been a Captain three, and that in all those years he had never been Master of four-score Crowns at one time.

One hundred years ago, Armies were better paid than now they are, and Officers and Souldiers could tolerably well subsist, great care was then taken, by a seasonable distribution of money to prevent Mutinies, and desertion of the service; why it is not so yet, perhaps want of Money may be the cause, though

Pay of the Confederated German Princes, An. 1658.

*Swedish*, *Danish* and *French* Pay.

All far short of his Majesties.

Bad Pay in the long *German* War.

Too many  
weak Regi-  
ments cause  
of bad pay.

though there is now much greater store of money, than was then; if Princes and States have other reasons for it, they are not to communicate them to Soldiers, who are very improper Judges of them. I thought it strange to see fix or seventeen years ago, the native *Spaniards* to whose keeping the strong Citadel of *Amwerp* was intrusted, begging publicly in the streets of that City. But I thought it a more lamentable sight to see both there, and in *Germany*, and elsewhere, Lieutenant-Colonels, Majors, and Captains begging for an Alms. In former times Regiments were thrice, four, or five times stronger than now they are, and consequently Troops and Companies were for their numbers as strong if not stronger, than now half Regiments are. Hence it is, that I believe there are hundreds of old men yet living, who have seen private Captains far higher esteem than Colonels are now. And I suppose if Princes and States thought it fit to follow the old way, and make their Troops and Companies three times stronger than now they are at their first levy, they might be as well serv'd, and have a vast expence of Treasure. If an army of twenty four thousand men were to be raised, whereof eighteen thousand were to be Foot, and six thousand Horse, six Colonels might as well now command the 18000 Foot divided into six Regiments, as six Colonels did the like fifty years ago, and four Colonels might command the six thousand Horse, divided into four Regiments, allowing to each one thousand five hundred Horse. The expence that would be saved here of the pay of compleat Officers of twelve Regiments of Foot, and two of Horse, would exceedingly help to pay the other eight.

Numbers of  
Swedish and  
Hessick Regi-  
ments,  
after the  
Peace of  
Münster.

Be pleased to see the truth of this influenced by an observation I made in the year 1649, after the Peace of *Münster*, *Christina* Queen of *Sweden* had in her pay in *Germany*, (besides her forces in the rest of her Dominions) four hundred and twenty Troops of Horse and Dragoons, and three score Regiments of Foot. In some Regiments there were twenty Companies, in some twelve, in some ten, and in some eight. All the Companies in the whole sixty Foot Regiments were reckon'd to be fix hundred and thirty. Her Confederate the *Landgrave* of *Hessen*, had a hundred and eight Troops of Horse, and a hundred and eighty Companies of Foot; all the Horse Troops should have been at their first levy eighty Riders apiece, every Foot Company a hundred and twenty fix at least; therefore the Queens four hundred and twenty Troops of Cavalry, should have been at their first levy thirty three thousand six hundred, and her fix hundred and thirty Companies should have been at their first levy seventy nine thousand three hundred and eighty men. The *Landgrave's* a hundred and eight Troops of Cavalry should have been eight thousand six hundred and forty Horse. His hundred and eighty Companies of Foot should have been (at a hundred and twenty fix men a piece) twenty two thousand six hundred and eighty men. Be pleased to add the *Landgrave's* eight thousand six hundred and forty Horse to the Queens thirty three thousand six hundred, the aggregate is forty four thousand two hundred and forty. Add the *Landgrave's* twenty two thousand six hundred and eighty Foot, to the Queens seventy nine thousand three hundred and eighty, both the Infantry amount to a hundred and two thousand and sixty. Now it is well known that when their Armies were Called, they did not exceed, nay nor come near the half of these numbers; for if you add the number of the Infantry to that of the Cavalry, the Aggregate will be a hundred forty six thousand three hundred. Now I conceive thirty Colonels might have commanded all the Cavalry, and thirty three Colonels all the Infantry, these would have been in all but sixty three Regiments. And I am very sure there were not so few Colonels as a hundred and forty. So there might have been sav'd the expence of the Officers of eighty Regiments, both in the time of War, and at that time too when they were to give their Officers a little satisfaction-money (for so it was called) in lieu of all their Arrears, when they disbanded them.

Recruits bet-  
ter than Le-  
vies.

And truly I should think that unless some new emergency, or some unlook'd for disaster seem'd to require it, the constant recruiting old Troops and Companies might advance a Princes service as much, and save his Treasure much more than the levying new Regiments doth, which still draws both trouble and expence along with it. But it is time for me to forbear, for perhaps I have gone too far.

Since

Since Money is generally scarce in the Wars, in so much that Soldiers cannot receive their Wages duly, let us see what allowance of Meat and Drink (ordinarily called Proviant) Princes allow their Soldiery, to furnish which every Army should have a General Proviant-master; and truly I conceive him to be an Officer as necessary and useful, if not more, in the fields, where mostly our Modern Armies are entertain'd with Proviant, as either a General Commissary, or a Treasurer. His Charge is to provide Victuals, Corn, Fleish, Wine, Bread and Beer; he hath the inspection of them, and should see them equally and proportionably divided to the Regiments according to their several strengths; for which purpose he should have all the Rolls and Lists by him, which his Secretaries should carefully keep. He hath no power to sell any Proviant under what pretence soever, without the Generals express Warrant. All Mills where the Army comes are under his protection, and he is obliged to protect them. He hath the ordering of all the Magazines for Victuals, and to him belongs the care of seeing the Garrisons, and fortified places sufficiently provided with such Meats and Drinks as are most fit to preserve; these are Corn, Grain, and Meal of several kinds, Stock-fish, Herrings, and all other Salted-fishes, Salted and Hung-fishes, especially Beef and Bacon, Cheese, Butter, Almonds, Chestnuts, and Hazelnuts, Wine, Beer, Malt, Honey, Vinegar, Oyl, Tabaco, Wood and Coal for Firing, and as many living Oxen, Cows, Sheep, and Swine, Hens and Turkeys as can be conveniently fed; for which purpose as also for Horses, he is to provide Straw, Hay and Oats. This General Proviant-master hath under him a Lieutenant, a Secretary, a Clerk, a Smith, a Waggon-maker, and a Waggon-maker, a Quarter-master, and some Officers who are called Directors.

A Proviant-  
master Gene-  
ral, his Duties.

Provisions  
for fortified  
places.

There are few Princes who have not their particular establishment for their Proviant both in Field and Garrison, as well as for Money; the order whereof commonly is this, they allow so much Bread; Fleish, Wine or Beer to every Trooper and Foot Soldier, which ordinarily is alike to both; then they allow to the Officers according to their dignities and charges, double, triple, and quadruple portions; as to an Ensign four times more than to a common Soldier, a Colonel having commonly twelve portions allow'd him. The ordinary allowance for a Soldier in the field, is daily two pound of Bread, one pound of Fleish, or in lieu of it, one pound of Cheese, one pottle of Wine, or in lieu of it, two pottles of Beer. It is enough, crys the Soldiers, we desire no more, and it is enough in conscience. But this allowance will not last very long, they must be contented to march sometimes one whole week, and scarce get two pound of Bread all the while, and their Officers as little as they, who if they have no provisions of their own carried about with them, must be satisfied with Commis-bread, and cold water, as well as the common Soldier, unless they have money to buy better entertainment from Suters. I have known Captains give a very great demonstration of their patience, and their affection to their Masters service, by satisfying their appetites with water, and very coarse bread, one whole Summer, and part of the next winter.

Allowance of  
Proviant.

But they will be refreshed when I tell them of free Quartet which Princes and their Generals are many times forc'd for want of money to grant, where they can Quarter their Armies in Towns and Villages, and this proves oft the destruction of a Country: for though no exorbitancy be committed, and that every man both Officer and Soldier demand no other entertainment than what is allowed by the Prince or State where they serve; yet when an Army cannot be Quarter'd but close and near together, to prevent Infalls, Anfalls and Surprisal of an Enemy, it is an easie matter to imagin what a heavy burthen these places bear, whom in poor mens houses, six, seven, eight, it may be fourteen or fifteen Soldiers are lodged, for in such cases it is ordinary to quarter two thousand Foot, or a thousand Horse in a little Town, where perhaps there are not above three or four hundred houses. And wialth it is very hard to get Soldiers and Horsemen kept within the limits of their Duty in these Quarters; after they have endur'd hunger, thirst, and other hardships in the field. It is true; all Princes who for

Free Quarter,  
very burden-  
some to a  
Country,  
though never  
so well regu-  
lated.

D d

prefer.

preservation of their Armies from extream ruin, and for want of Treasure, are necessitated too often to make use of this free Quarter, do not only make strict Laws and Ordinances, how many times a day Officers and Soldiers are to eat, and how many Dishes every one according to his quality is to call for, but likewise set down the precise rates and values of the Dishes, that the Host be not obliged to do beyond those limitations, yet the grievance continues heavy and great.

*Ordnances for free Quarter.* The Ordinances concerning free Quarter of the Emperour, the Kings of Denmark and Sweden, and German Princes, are upon the matter with little difference all one, as thus: A Colonel is to have twelve dishes of meat, each at the rate of the eighth part of a Dollar, ten pound of Bread, and ten measures of Wine. A Lieutenant Colonel, eight dishes, eight pound of Bread, and six measures of Wine. A Major or Captain six dishes of Meat, six pound of Bread, and six measures of Wine. A Lieutenant and Ensign, each of them four dishes of Meat, two pound of Bread, and one measure and a half of Wine. Every Corporal, and every Drummer two dishes of Meat, two pound of Bread, and one measure and a half of Wine. A common Soldier or Trooper so much Fleish, Bread and Wine as I spoke of before, when I told you what Proviant was allow'd him. If the Army be not in a Wine-Country, then all those I have spoken of, have a double allowance of Beer. This is besides the Hay, Straw, and Oats the Country is bound to furnish to the Horses, not only of the Cavalry, Artillery, and General Officers, but to those Horses likewise that belong to the Infantry. And this grievance of Foderage proves many times heavier than the free quarter, all being often eaten up in a short time, wherewith the Inhabitants should maintain their Horses and Beasts. In these Countries where the Country-people receive a little money for what the Soldiers spend on their Marches in their transient Quarters, as for most part in his Majesties Dominions is more tollerable than where they receive no moneys at all, though the Hosts of both Foot and Horse might be considerable losers, when they get but a Two-pence or a Groat for a nights entertainment.

*Foderage.* Service is that which every Host is bound to furnish either in Town or Country to those that are lodged with them, whether they be Officers, Troopers, or common Soldiers, whether they be on free quarter, or to pay for their Diet. Service comprehends a Bed, Lodging, Table, and Table-linnen, Fire, Salt and Vinegar. It is a grievance likewise, because many times the Soldiers are extremely extravagant in demanding more of those than they need. I find in some Histories of France, that ninety years ago or thereby, this Service was called *Offence*, and when they got pay, they were to seek no other *Offence* or Services but a Bed, a Table, and a Table-cloth, and liberty to dress their Meat at the Hosts fire. Nor might they invite one another to their Quarters, because that prov'd troublesome to their Landlords. But when moneys were wanting, then the Soldiers were to have free Quarter, which was so well regulated, that none might demand any other entertainment than what the Host was pleased to give them, provided that was sufficient to satiate nature. And withal, five Shillings sterling in money every month, wherewith to buy shoes, or other small Necessaries. And truly this was a better order for free Quarter than any I have yet spoken of. A very especial care was taken to punish all such who transgressed any of these Ordinances. And about that same time I find that the Protestants pay was very frugal, the Foot was paid thus: A Captain had every Month a hundred French Livres, the Lieutenant had fifty, the Ensign thirty, the Sergeant fifteen, every Corporal, Pipe, and Drummer twelve, and the common Soldier had nine.

*Protestant pay eighty or ninety years ago.*

## CHAP.

## CHAP. IX.

Of Military Laws and Articles, of Courts of War, of the Judge-Marshal, and Provost-Marshal-General.

THE Laws of God and Nature would not be sufficient to keep wicked man within the bounds of his duty, if the Municipal Laws of the Land were not superadded, and those would signify but little too, if the punitive execution of them did not follow the transgressors of them. I know not indeed why Soldiers should not be governed by those same Laws whereby other subjects of that same Prince and State are, if it be not for two reasons: First, an Army being in the field, and making no long abode in one place, Criminals and other guilty persons cannot be so formally and legally convicted before the ordinary Judges of the Land, as the constant Inhabitants may, especially when an Army is out of a Prince his own Dominions, as many times it is. Secondly it is found not only fit but necessary, that more severe Laws be made in Camps than in Cities, for I know not by what authority, for what reason, or by what instinct men who follow the War, assume to themselves a greater liberty to sin than other Mortals do, as if the entering themselves in a Militia, did let them loose from all Civil bonds and eyes of humane Society, and that which in a Commonwealth is a Capital crime, were but a venial *Peccadillo* in an Army. That some Armies are better govern'd than others, is easily granted, and that fewer gross crimes are committed in some, than in others, will not be denied, being some Generals are more just, more exact, and more severe than others are; and which is more than that, some Armies are better paid than others be; for Theoderick King of the Goths said well, *Disciplinam non servat jejunus exercitus*: A hungry Army observes no Discipline. But that the Roman Armies in ancient times, and some since their decay, were so well govern'd, and all the members of them so orderly, is but a dream; their terrible disorders and extravagant deportments are to be seen in History, and some of them I have touched in the beginning of my Discourses of the Roman Militia. And if in an Army some offences be not instantly punished, it will be found peradventure within a few hours impossible to punish them at all. Hence it is that a Commander in the War is not only permitted to do that which the Civil Judg may not do, but is liable to censure if he does it not, as to inflict present death, either by his particular order, or with his own hand without formal process, as in the case of mutiny, to kill one in the beginning of it, and so to terrify others from prosecuting it, or in the case of disobedience, when the appearance or pursuit of an enemy, will not suffer the Delinquent to be legally proceeded against, or upon a march when an enemy is either in Van, rear or flank; a Marshal-General may be order'd to hang all without process, whom he finds at such a distance from the Army without his Colonels Pass, and in this last case Officers may kill those Soldiers that straggle or lag behind. But I should advise all Commanders not to make themselves *Bourreaux*, and to be very sparing to kill with their own hands, except in extraordinary cases.

These reasons have given a just rise to Military Laws, which ordinarily are called Articles of War, there are, or at least, should be as many several Military Constitutions as there are Princes or States, who wage War, for every one of them hath his several Laws and Statutes, yet all or most agree in these following particulars.

First, strict Laws are made for the observance of Religious Duties, a submission to Church-Discipline, and a due respect to be given to all Ecclesiastical persons, against Atheism, Blasphemy, Perjury, and the prophanation of

Reasons for the severity of Military Laws.

Soldiers in some cases may be put to death without process.

Articles of War.

For Religion.

For Loyalty.

the name of God. Secondly for the maintenance of the Majesty and Authority of the Prince or State, in whose service the Army is, that nothing be done or spoke to the disparagement of himself, his Government, his Undertakings, or the Justice of any of his actions, under all highest pains. Thirdly for honour, respect, and obedience to be given to all superior Commanders from the highest to the lowest of them, and none of their Commands are to be disputed, much less are they themselves to be affronted, either by gestures, words, or actions. But this is to be understood that the command be not diametrically contrary, and prejudicial to the Prince his service; but indeed such commands would be so clear that they need no canvassing, otherwise any disobedience opens a door to resistance, that whereth in sedition, which often is supported by open rebellion. To clear which, suppose what frequently falls out, that the Governour of a well fortified, and a well provided place offers to deliver it up to an enemy without opposition, those under him may resist for unjust and so base a command; and they not only may, but ought to resist him, for the disobedience in such a case of the subaltern Officers and Soldiers is a piece of excellent service done to their Master; and if they do it not, they are liable to those Laws of War, which for giving over a Fort in that fashion, sentences the Governour to an ignominious death, the inferior Commanders to be shamefully cashier'd, and the common Soldiers to be disarm'd, and made serve as Pioneers to the Army; which were acts of great injustice, if Inferiors were bound to give a blind obedience to all the Commands of their Superiors, whatever they be, without exception. And such a case it is, when an Officer commands those under him to desert their Post, whether that be in Town, Camp, Leaguer, or Field, and go over with him to the Enemy. If they do so, and are ever retaken, he is punisht for his treachery, and they for their obedience to so illegal a command.

For keeping strict Guards, and Watches.

Fourthly, Articles of War are made for due and strict keeping of Guards and Watches; and here (as in many other points) observe the severity of Military Law, for he who after tap-too discharge any Hand gun, be it Pistol, Musket, Fusée, or Carrabine (unless against an enemy) or he who sleeps on his Centinel, or deserts it, or he who is drunk on his Watch, are all to die; these be crimes which the Municipal Laws of most Nations do not punish with death, yet in the Laws of War this severity is thought no more than necessary.

Against stragglers.

Fifthly, Laws are made against those who stay behind, or straggle in ordinary or extraordinary Marches.

Against Runaways.

Sixthly, Against Fugitives and Runaways, either such as leave their Colours when they are in Garrisons or Quarters, and desert the Service under any pretence, without a Pass, or such as run away from their Colours, or their Officers in the field, in time of Skirmish or Battel, or such who in storms and assaults desert their Posts, till either they are wounded, or have made use of their Swords, all these are liable to death, and those who wound or kill any of them in their flight, in their going or running away, are not to be accountable for it.

Against Treaties with an Enemy.

Sevently, Against those who make any Treaty or agreement in the field with an enemy, without the command or consent of him who commands in chief. And here again observe another case wherein Inferiors are to refuse obedience; the Military Law condemns a Colonel for such a Treaty, and every tenth Soldier of his Regiment to die with him, for giving obedience to so unjust a command.

Against needles Surrender of Forts, and several other crimes.

Eighthly, Against those who surrender fortified places, unless extream necessity require it, of which I shall speak in a more proper place.

Ninthly, Against those who mutiny, burn houses, without the Generals command, commit robbery, murder, theft, or violence to those who have the Generals safeguards, and against those who keep private correspondence, unless order'd to do it by the General; all these crimes by most Military Laws are punisht with death.

Against Duels.

Tenthly, Against private Combats or Duels, the Combatants and their Seconds are to die; and if superior Officers knew of the Combat, and did not hinder it, they are to be cashier'd with ignominy; a necessary Law enough, yet seldom put in execution.

Eleventh-

Eleventhly, Against those who sell, play, or pawn, or change their Arms either defensive or offensive, whether he be a Horseman, or a Foot-Soldier; he who doth any of these, is not only punishable, but likewise he who bought, won, or took them in pawn.

Twelfthly, Against false Mulsters, whether it be of Men, Horses, Arms, Saddles, or other Furniture, by these Articles not only those who make Mulsters, the false Mulster, but all those who help to make it, are punishable.

Thirteenthly, Against those who detain the pay of either Horsemen, or Foot-Soldiers, any Officer guilty of this deserves to die. Neither if an Officer have lent money to a Soldier, may he pay himself, or retain in his hand what he pleaseth, but must give him as much of his pay as can enter. tain him to do his Masters service.

Fourteenthly, Against those Officers whatsoever they be (except the General) who give Passes. The Swedish Articles order a Colonel (who presumes to give a Pass) to lose his life, and to lose his charge if he permit any under his command to go home without the Felt-marshals knowledge.

Other abominable crimes, such as Adultery, Incest, Sodomy, Beastiality, Parricide, are examin'd, try'd and punisht according to the Municipal Laws of the Prince or State who is Master of the Army. And many smaller faults are left to the cognizance, discretion and arbitrament of a Court of War.

A Council of War, and a Court of War, are commonly by ordinary Soldiers confounded, as if they were one thing, whereas they are very different; the first being compos'd of those persons whom the Prince or his General calls to consult with concerning the managing the War, and these are indeed but Counsellors, and have in most Armies their President, who is nominated by the Prince or State, they do but advise for the Prince or his Captain-General, have a negative voice, and retain a power to themselves to do what they please. A Court of War consists of those Officers who are call'd together to be a Jury in the examining, processing, and sentencing Delinquents; and it is twofold, a General or high Court of War, and a Regiment, or a low Court of War.

The Causes belonging to the General Court of Wars cognizance, are matters of Treason against the Prince or State, injuries and affronts done or offer'd to the person or honour of their General; differences between the Cavalry and Infantry, between one Regiment and another, between Officers of one Regiment, or between Officers and Soldiers of one Regiment. To the decision of a General Court of War belong all Civil affairs and business, though they have been determined in the lower Courts; for in these cases Appeals are permitted to the higher Court; neither can the sentence of the lower Court be executed, till the process be fully heard in the superior, if the parties concerned have appeal'd to it. When the business concerns the Prince or State, or that any General person or Colonel is criminally accused, the General or Commander in chief of the Army is obliged to preside himself. But in those other cases which I have mention'd, He may appoint a Lieutenant-General, or a Major-General to preside. I know the Swedes give the Presidency in General Courts of War, constantly to the Auditor-General, or Judge-Marshal, in the General or Felt-Marshals absence. But truly I think this is not done without some derogation to those General Officers who assist; for though upon the matter the Auditor-General orders the proceedings of the Martial Court, yet in point of honour he should not preside in a high Court of War no more than a Regiment-Auditor (in the Discipline of these same Swedes) presides in a lower Court. The Assessors should be twelve in number at least, (for they may be, and ordinarily are more) besides the President, and in some places fourteen besides the President. These be the General of the Artillery, the Lieutenant-General of the Army, the Generals of the Cavalry and Infantry, the Lieutenant-Generals, and Major-Generals of Horse and Foot, the Quarter-master General, and such Colonels as the General, or Auditor-General thinks fit to appoint. After they are conven'd, they take their places thus: At the head of the Table, the President sits alone, upon his right hand at

Against sell-ers or pawn-ers of Arms.

Against false Mulsters.

Against those who detain the pay of the Princes.

Against those who give Passes.

Greater Crimes.

Smaller faults.

A Council of War.

A General Court of War.

Cafes to be determined by it.

The President of it.

The Assessors.

the side of the Table, sits the General of the Artillery, and under him the General of the Cavalry. Upon the Presidents left hand at the side of the Table, sits the Lieutenant-General of the Army, and under him the General of the Foot. Under the General of the Cavalry sits the Lieutenant-General of the Cavalry, and under the General of the Foot, sits the Lieutenant-General of the Foot; and in that same order the Major-Generals, and next them the General Commissary, and General Quarter-master. Next them, all the Colonels who are called there, take their places according to the time they have served as Colonels in that Prince or States service; the right side of the Table (which is that on the Presidents right hand) being more honourable than the other. After they have all taken their seats, they rise again, and hear an Oath read, wherein they swear with hands up, to be free from all malice, envy, hatred, revenge, fear, and affection, and that they shall judge righteously and impartially, according to the Laws, Constitutions, and Articles of War, and their own best judgment, and conscience. So help them God in the great day. The Provost-Marshal General is to be the Accuser, with the help of the Princes Prolocutor-fiscal, and to him belongs also the execution of the sentence.

The lower Court of War is that which is kept in the several Regiments, whether Horse or Foot, which the Colonels, and in their absence the Lieutenant-Colonels may call, when ever they think the necessity of their affairs require it. A Regiment Court-Martial may judge and determine in all causes, both Civil and Criminal, and of all persons (except the three Field-Officers) within that Regiment. The Colonel presides, in his absence the Lieutenant-Colonel, and in his the Major; or if none of these be present, the oldest Captain, but the Regiment-Auditor, never, may not in the *Swedish* Armies. In the Regiments of Horse, the Colonels Assistors are his Lieutenant-Colonel, and Major, three Rit-masters, as many Lieutenants, as many Cornets, and as many Corporals, or more, if the Colonel pleases. In a Regiment of Foot, two Captains, two Lieutenants, two Ensigns, two Sergeants, two Furriers, and two Fouriers, where such Officers are allowed; where not, more of the Sergeants, and two Corporals. They may be in all more than thirteen, but fewer they may not be. The Regiments Provost-Marshal presents the accused party with a Guard to the Court of War, after the members have sworn as the General Court of War useth to do, and formally delivers his accusation; from this Court, there may be (as I told you before) appellations, in Civil affairs, but not in Criminals, yet no sentence of death pass by a lower Court of War can be executed, till the General approves of it, and sometimes he remits the examination of it to a superior Court; especially when he hath ground to believe that the Regiment-Court hath past either too rigorous, or too mild and favourable a sentence. And this superior Court call'd in such cases, is commonly call'd a Court of Error, because it cognosceth of the Errors of the inferior ones. The Prince or State still retains power to moderate and mitigate the sentence of either of the Courts, or graciously to remit and pardon the offence; and in their absence their Generals may do the like, except in the cases of *Les Majesté*. But after the sentence of either the one Court, or the other, is pronounced, no man that bears charge or office in the Army is permitted to speak for pardon or mitigation, unless it be Ensigns (to whom something of that nature by custom is indulged) and in some places Officers who transgress in this point are punished with the loss of their places, and such as have done so, may be sure none will be so kind as to plead for their restoration.

These Laws, Ordinances, and Courts of War, the sentences of these Courts, and execution of these sentences, makes up that part of a Militia which ordinarily is called the Discipline of War; for the right ordering and regulating whereof, an Auditor-General, Inferior Auditors, a Marshal-General, the Inferior Provosts, Marshals, and their Lieutenants, with Executioners, or Hangmen, are absolutely necessary members in all Armies.

The Auditor-General is he whom we call Judge Marshal, and whom some call Judge-Advocate. He ought to be a grave and judicious person, who fears God, and hates vice, especially bribery. A Lawyer he should be, in regard most

most Articles of War have their rise from Law, and many cases chance to be voided in Courts of War, where no Military article is clear, but must be determin'd by the Civil, or by the Municipal Law of the Prince, to whom the Army belongs, and the Judge-Marshal's duty is to inform the Court what either of these Laws provides in such cases. Some Princes remit the whole Justice of the Army to absolutely to the Judge-Marshal, that they give him power to punish Soldiers who transgress publick Proclamations, of himself, without the Colonels consent, yea, whether he will or not. The Provost-Marshal General, and all Officers of Justice of the Army, whatever name they bear, are to obey the Judge-Marshal's directions and orders. He may cause Delinquents to be apprehended, and send them to the Regiments to which they belong, with direction to the Colonels to call Regiment Courts of War, at which he may appoint the Provost-Marshal, or his Lieutenant to be present, and to appeal from it in case any unjust or partial sentence be pronounced. All complaints whether in matters Civil or Criminal use to be brought before him; and in many of them he hath power to give judgment himself without any Court, and in others he hath authority to oblige Colonels to do Justice, wherein if they fail, he may bring them before a General Court, to answer for their partiality. All differences that are among Merchants, Tradesmen, Mark-keepers and Suters, who are permitted to frequent the Army, or that happen between any of them, and the Officers and Soldiers, are brought before him, and in them all (after due examination of the whole fact, and witnesses) he hath power to judge and give sentence. He hath power to call together a General Court of War, and to call such Colonels to it as he thinks fit, but herein he seldom acts till the General or Field-Marshal advise the matter with him. Such Colonels as he cites to be Assistors, and do not appear, he may fine, and by the Fiscal exact the Fines he hath imposed. He is bound to examine all Prisoners of War, as also all such as frequent the Army, and may be suspected to be spies. All Testaments, Contracts, and Obligations between party and party, are judged to be in force when they are signed and attested by him. He hath power of the Measures and Weights within the Army, and may order the Marshals to set fitting Prices on all vendible things that are for Back or Belly. And he is to have a care that the Provost-Marshal's neither wrong the Soldiers, nor the Merchants, Victualers or Suters, and he is Judge in any difference that may arise between any of them.

A Provost-Marshal General is by those who do not well understand his Office, taken at best to be but a Jaylor, but by some to be a Hangman. But no Jaylor ever durst assume the power which all Military Laws and Customs give a Marshal, for he may by virtue of his Office, without any command or permission of his Superiors apprehend those he finds actually transgressing the Articles of War, or in any other gross misdemeanor, and according to the quality of the fault, either detain them Prisoners with a Guard, or yet clap them in Irons. But he may neither dismiss them, nor yet impose further punishment on them without order from either the Commander in chief of the Army, or the Judge-Marshal General. At some times, and in some occasions he is permitted, yea commanded to hang or shoot to death such as he finds in contempt of late Proclamations flagrant, robbing, burning, or Plundering. And for that reason a Guard of Horse is allow'd him, these the *French* call Archers. Whoever offers to oppose him in the exercise of his charge, be what he will, is to die for it. All Provost-Marshal's of Regiments, Troops, or Companies, whether of Horse or Foot, are to swear obedience to the Commands of this Marshal-General; and whoever pays it not, is by the command of the Auditor-General turn'd out of the Army, with the consent of the Colonel or Captain, according as he is a Regiment or Companies Marshal. All Marshals of Regiments are bound when they are in the field every morning and evening to wait on the Marshal-General to receive his directions according to Emergencies, and he who fails in either attendance or obedience, is punishable according to the quality of the fact. I have told you that in General Courts of War, he is the Accuser, and is to see the sentence put in execution. He is to have a strict eye over his inferior Marshals that they do their Duties uprightly and impartially, and that they permit not the Soldiers to wrong the Victualers and Suters, nor those to wrong the Soldiers, by taking great

His Qualifications, and Duty.

His Power very great.

A Provost-Marshal-General,

His Power in an Army.

His Duty.

greater Prices, or selling with less measures or weights than those appointed by the Auditor-General. He ought to take pains to learn what the Prices of things are in these Towns where the Mark-tenters buy their Wine, Beer, Tobacco, Vinegar, Oyl, Bread, Bacon, and other Provisions, that accordingly the General Auditor may know with the greater justice to impose the Prices. But the truth is, the Buyers are too often abused, and the Prices set too high by the collusion of the Provost-Marshal with Suters, and the Suters bribing the Judge-Marshal. The Provost-Marshal General hath a Jaylor under him, who must be paid by every Prisoner his Jail-money, and if Irons be clapt on him, he must pay for them besides. He is to have a pottle of Wine or Beer of every Hoghead that is brought to the Camp by the Suters, and the Tongue of every Beast that is slaughter'd in it, and for these he agrees with the Regiment-Marshals. The same power he hath in the field with an Army, the like he hath in all Garrisons, though he come to any of them but accidentally, or upon some emergency.

His Jaylor.

Under the Marshal-General are Hangmen, and those are the fellows who glory that all this great show and parade of Justice, of Courts of War, of Judge-Marshals, of Provost-Marshals, and Clerks, would be but a fanfare, and signify nothing at all, if it were not for them. They avouch that they are the Pillars, the props, and supporters of Justice; for if, say they, the Executive part of the Law, be the life of the Law, then Hangmen, who are the true and unquestionable Executioners of the Law, keep life in the Law, by taking away the lives of the Breakers, contemners, and transgressors of it.

Hangmen.

I have known another high Judiciary in Swedish Armies of equal power with the Marshal-General, for what power this last hath in Quarters, Garrison or Camp, the same hath the other in the field on a March; he is qualified with the title of Rumor-master General, whether he be made use of in other places, is more than I have learned. His charge is to ride with a Guard of Horse, and some Hangmen on the Van and Flanks of the Army, and in a Retreat; in the Rear, to save all the several Quarters and Country from being pillaged or plunder'd, and the Country people from being wrong'd; and many times he is commanded to use Summary Justice and execution on the offenders, in the place where they are taken, but for most part only to apprehend them, and deliver them over to the Marshal General.

Rumor-master General.

The Laws and Articles of War of every Prince and State ought to be promulgated to all the Armies, and read over to every particular Regiment, Troop, and Company every month, or at least every quarter of a year that none may have reason to pretend ignorance. In all Courts of War, higher or lower Officers of equal quality, as Major-Generals, Colonels, Majors, Captains, Sergeants and Corporals, (after a full examination, and hearing of parties, and witness) go apart by themselves, and after some debate agree upon the sentence, which he who hath the Precedency among them, whispers in the ear of the Clerk, who after he hath written all the several sentences, gives them to the Auditor, whether General, or Particular of a Regiment; and he observing wherein most agree, makes that the sentence of the Court which is sign'd by the President, and so sent to the General, if he have not presided himself. In Regiment-Courts of War such inferior Officers, suppose Sergeants and Corporals ought to be chosen to sit, as know in some measure what it is to judge according to equity and reason: for I have seen many of them in several places of the world, who thought they gave their verdict like wise men, and gallant fellows, (even when Articles of War were clear) when by their sentence they refer'd an offender guilty of a Capital crime, to the mercy of the Lord General, or the Colonel. The French Councils of War now may consist of seven Officers, and in them Lieutenants, sub-Lieutenants, and Ensigns must only stand with their hats off, but give no sentence.

How the members of a Court of War give their sentence.

CHAP.

## CHAP. X.

## Of Exercising, Drilling, and Training the several Bodies of the Cavalry, and the Infantry.

HAVING levied and arm'd our Soldiers both of Horse and Foot, and sufficiently entertain'd them with goodly promises of Pay, Proviant, Service, and free Quarter, and shown them under what Laws and Discipline they are to live, it will be time to teach them the Duties of Soldiers, and this is done by Exercising and Drilling them. What kinds of Exercise Officers and Soldiers were us'd to in ancient times, hath been abundantly told you in my Discourses of the *Gracian* and *Roman* Art of War. Wrestling, Running, Leaping, Swimming, all which harden and enable a mans Body, and render the Soldier active and dexterous in Battle, at Storms and Assaults, in pursuit of his enemy, and sometimes in flight to save his own life, were the duties imposed in ancient times, and to them properly belongs the word of Exercise. But this kind of Exercise is now rather permitted than commanded. The using the Spade and Mattock in making Ramparts and Ditches, building Walls, Sconces, Forts, and Castles, constantly practis'd in time of peace by the Ancients, especially the *Romans*, is not now at all thought of, till either the Siege or defence of a Town, or the necessity to fortifie a Camp render it necessary, and then six Soldiers (not accus'd before to that manner of Exercise) are not able to work so much as one Country-fellow newly taken from the Plow. The custom of shooting at Butts with Bow and Arrow in *Scotland* and *England* is much, if not wholly worn out. In foreign places their shooting with Firelocks and rifled Guns at Marks every Holy-day, may make them good Firemen, and good Marksmen, but doth not strengthen the nerves and arms of men as the Bow did. But to bring these Exercises so much conducing to the health and strength of an Army in fashion again, must be the work of no private person, but of a Prince or State.

Exercises properly to be called.

Another part of Military Exercise consists in teaching the Soldiers both of Horse and Foot to fight orderly and readily with an Enemy, and this is that which properly we call Training and Drilling. It consists of two parts, the first is, to teach them to handle and manage their offensive Arms (whatsoever they be) handsomely, readily and dexterously, and this is ordinarily called the Postures. The second is to make them when they are in a Body, to cast themselves in such a figure or order as shall be commanded them, and this is commonly called the Motions and Evolutions.

Training and Drilling divided into two Parts.

Before I speak any more on this Subject, I shall say that though this Drilling and Training, be not so much forgot as those other Exercises are, whereof I have but just now spoken, yet it is too much neglected in many places; neither do I think it is so much used in any place of *Europe*; as in his Majesties Dominions, in which the Ancients are well imitated who train'd their Armies very punctually in time of Peace, as well as in time of War. I wish all Companies who otherwise are well enough train'd, were accus'd to make Marches when they are exercised, as I said in my Discourse of Defensive Arms. For though I do not desire they should be made to run or walk twenty, or five and twenty miles in five or six hours time, and in full Arms as the *Romans* did; yet I think they would be much strengthen'd, and made more healthful, and more able to endure fatigue, if they were made twice a week, march in a Summer-morning seven or eight miles and back again in the afternoon, and proportionably as far in the Winter. This being frequently practis'd in time of peace, would make long and speedy

Much neglected.

Marching a necessary point of Military Exercise.

Ee

Marches



A Mock-  
march.Supine care-  
lessness of  
Colonels.

Old Soldiers.

Drill-masters.

Drilling of  
Horsemen.

Marches (which often are necessary in the time of War) even with Defensive Arms very easy, and it would accustom the Soldiers to keep their ranks and files punctually, provided Officers be attentive to see them do it on that March. This would be to four better purposes than for Commanders to march with Squads, with half or whole Regiments a half hour, it may be a whole one, up and down, and again upon one spot of ground a right Mock-march, whereby some Officers contrary to their intention (for they think they are doing a very handsome feat) make themselves ridiculous to both the Spectators, and their own Soldiers. The *Grecians* and *Romans* in time of War drill'd their Armies in the Fields, but Training is lookt upon now as an unnecessary thing, not only in the Field, but in Towns and Garrisons likewise. This is not the Prince or States fault, but is an inexcusable neglect and carelessness of Colonels, who make not their Captains do their duty in so necessary a point of War. I have seen in *Germany* and *Denmark* Regiments newly raised, and some also sent out of *Sweden* in the time of the long War before the Peace of *Amster-* only exercised and drill'd three or four times, and that was enough for them for the whole time they were to serve; for a man would have made himself ridiculous if he had spoken of drilling old Soldiers, to keep them in mind of their Postures and Motions; this would have been lookt on as a disparagement to them, for it would have been presupposed that they stood in need of Exercising, as in truth most of them did. It is a pity, and sometimes matter of sport, to hear men glory that they are old Soldiers, who either never have learned, or have forgot, what belongs to their profession, and so upon the matter prove themselves to be old fools. Nay, I have seen in these late Wars many new levied Companies, Troops and Regiments never Train'd or Exercised at all; nay, not so much as one lesson given to a Soldier for the handling his Arms. It is true, most of those who were levied in my time, had serv'd in those Wars, which were before my time, but all had not, and therefore some were raw and unexperienced, and the oldest Soldiers of them needed exceedingly to have had their memories refresh'd. This was the condition of five thousand Foot, and three Troops of Horse which the City of *Danck* levied and entertain'd in the time of the late *Swedish* War against *Poland*, from the year 1656, till the year 1660. I have not seen braver men, nor better equip'd in any Militia than these were; but in one whole Summer that I was there, I never saw one Company, or one man of a Company drill'd or exercis'd. Since the Estates of the *United Provinces* made their Peace with the King of *Spain*, their Officers have been negligent enough of this duty, which might have been easily observ'd in most of their Garrisons, wherein I have been. But I suppose their late alarms have made them resume their ancient care and diligence.

These Military Exercises were so far worn out of use, that I knew Count *Kohringmark* in the year 1655, (when he raised some new Regiments for his Master the King of *Sweden*) take some old Officers to be Drill-masters to the new levied Companies, which notwithstanding were provided with all the Officers belonging to them, and these Drill-masters he entertain'd with Monthly wages, which I thought was not done without some blemish to the reputation of all the Officers, especially of the Colonels and Captains.

That part of Training which teacheth the handling Arms is different to wit, that which teacheth a Horseman to manage handfomely and readily his Pistol, Carbine, and Sword, whether he be a Curiaffer, or Harquebussier, and that which teacheth a Foot soldier to handle his Musquet and Pike, and his *Swedish* Feather, if he have one. And as a Horseman is obliged to learn to Saddle and Bridle his Horse quickly and well, to mount and dismount handfomely, to ride decently, and carry his body well, or as it is called to have a good seat in his Saddle, and how to use his voice, his hand, his leg, and his spur, so he is obliged to teach his Horse to obey him, whether it be in trotting, galloping, running, standing, stopping, turning, or wheeling. The Horseman ought to be taught how to keep his Pistols and Carbine fixt, and bright without rust, how to charge them quickly, and prime them, how to fire them, and readily charge again. And he must be especially careful not to ride a shie-horse, for such a one may not only bring his Rider in danger and disgrace, but disorder the whole Troop; Exercise, and accustoming his Horse to all feats of Horse-

manship,

manship, especially to see fit, to stand when a Pistol or Carbine are discharg'd close by him, and to hear the Trumpet, will by degrees banish shieness from him, and therefore frequent Drilling-troops of Horse, teacheth both man and horse their duties. Troops should in some points be exercised by sound of Trumpet, that Horsemen may know the several points of War by their several names, as, to the Watch, to Saddle, to Horse, to March, to Charge, to Retire. The particular words of command for Drilling a single Horseman, that is, to teach him the right and true use of his Arms, whether he be a Curiaffer, Harquebussier, or Carbine, are too tedious to be set down here, and indeed needless, for they are vulgarly known, and are chose for the Arms of the Infantry, whether for the Pike, or the Musquet.

To teach either Horsemen or Foot-Soldiers their Motions and Evolutions when they are in Bodies greater or smaller, is the second part of Training or Drilling. The words of command for both Horse and Foot in these Motions are the very same, only the Distances are different. Three Foot are allowed between files of Foot, and that is order, six is open order, and twelve is open open order, or double double distance; and these you may make use of in Exercising, Marching, or Fighting, as you think convenient. In Marches the length of the Pike requires six foot of distance between ranks. Some allow in exercising Bodies of Horse, six foot for single distance between ranks and files, and twelve for double distance. The *Germans* ordinarily allow ten for the one, and twenty for the other. All these Motions and Evolutions may be reduced to four kinds, these are Facings, Doublings, Countermarchings, and Wheelings. I do not intend to trouble either my Reader or my self with the several words of command, ordinary Drill-masters have most of them, though not all. But he who would have those for Horse exactly, may find them in the Supplement to the Compleat Body of the Art Military; and both for Foot and Horse in the famous Earl of *Strafford's* Instructions for the Discipline of his Army; And those for the Foot alone, very well done by Sir *Thomas Kellie*, and completely indeed by Lieutenant Colonel *Elton*, in his compleat Body of the Art of War. Yet I shall desire my Reader with me to observe in Exercises of Foot and Horse these few Particulars.

First, That none of the three ordinary ways used for doubling of ranks in Bodies of Foot, can be made use of in exercising Bodies of Horse, as now they are Marshalled in most places of *Europe*, that is three deep; or three in file; nor can it be where they are five in file, as in some places they were all odd numbers, being improper for doublings either of ranks or files.

Secondly, That the Facing of a great Body of Horse to either right or left Second hand, or about by either right or left hand is a difficult work, (though with Bodies of Foot it is the easiest motion of all the rest) and cannot be suddenly done, and therefore is dangerous if an enemy be near to take advantage of the disorder of the motion.

Thirdly, If all the three Countermarches, *Laconian*, *Macedonian*, and *Choreutic*, Third hand, be of very little use and great danger in the Infantry, (as I have endeavour'd to make appear in one of my Discourses of the *Grecian* Militia) then I suppose it will be easily granted that the use of any of the three is as little, and the danger as great in Bodies of Cavalry.

Fourthly, That I conceive Wheeling a more proper motion, and more easy for the Horse than for the Foot, it is a motion that hath been much used by Horse in fight, for unless in wheeling they are charged in the flank (and if so they are ill seconded) they are quickly reduced to their first posture, but it is not so with the Foot, for if the Body be but indifferently great, suppose fifteen hundred men, standing at three foot distance in files, and fix in ranks, you must first make them come both ranks and files to their close order before you can wheel your Battel, and that requires some time, for it is a motion of its self; and the greater the Body be, the longer time it will have to make that first motion for great Bodies move slowly. Next, the motion it self of wheeling the Battel, is not soon done if well done, for if it be not order'd discreetly, the Body is immediately in confusion. Thirdly, when you have wheel'd this Body of fifteen hundred men, you must beg yet a Cessation of Arms from your Enemy, till you put your Battel in a fighting posture, which you cannot do till you reduce

E c 2

reduce

Motions, or  
Evolutions of  
Bodies both  
of Horse and  
Foot.

Distances.

Observations  
concerning  
Training.First Obser-  
vation.

Fourth.

reduce them to their first order; for at close order your Musketeers cannot fight, and therefore you must cause your Battel to open; it is true, the ranks will quickly open backward, but the files being no less in a Body of fifteen hundred men than two hundred and fifty, must have such a time to open, (though they do it with all the halt imaginable) that a resolute Body of Horse will charge thorough them before you end those three motions. But a Body of Horse being in rank and file at that distance at which it is to fight, needs no command to close ranks and files before it wheel, nor no command to open them after it hath wheel'd, being constantly in a posture to receive an enemy. And with submission to great Drill masters, I should think the motions of Facing and Countermarching of Bodies of Horse, whether greater or smaller, might be spared in their Exercise, because you may face an enemy with a Squadron of Horse either in flank or rear, by wheeling either to the right or left hand, or by either of the two about, a great deal sooner, with a great deal of more ease, and with a great deal of less danger than you can do by either Facing or Countermarching.

Fifth. Observe that no man can or will attain to a perfect understanding of either postures, motions or evolutions in the Training, particular men, or yet Bodies of Horse and Foot by reading the words of command in a Book or Paper, or looking upon the figures of them, for the Military Art is practical, one shall understand what belongs to Drilling and Training, more by looking on the real practice of it three days, than by the contemplative study of it three years: when you see a Countermarch in the Field, you will quickly understand what an Evolution it is when you see the figure of it in a Book; but you will not so soon know what it signifies when you see the figure before the practice.

Sixth. And lastly, I avouch it to be the essential duty of a Captain to Exercise his Troop, or company himself, whether it be of Foot or Horse, nor should it be permitted that his Lieutenant should do it when he is present, much less a Sergeant (as I have often seen) for thereby he Uncaptains himself, and clungeth places with his Lieutenant. And this is too ordinary a Military grievance, against which the Earl of Strafford guarded by an express instruction that no Lieutenant should exercise a Company, unless the Captain were absent, which he might not be, without either sickness, or that Lords own permission; a very just command. And by the same reason all Colonels should exercise their Regiments; and in their absence their Lieutenant Colonels, but when either of them are present, the Major ought neither to be commanded, nor of himself offer to do it, and this is contrary to the opinion of many, who will impose so many duties on a Major, that they make thereby Colonels, and Lieutenant Colonels, Cyphers, or very insignificant Creatures.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. XI.

Of Companies, Regiments, and Brigades of Foot, what they have been, what they are, how they are Marshal'd; of all their Officers, their Duties and Qualifications.

I Suppose most Military men acknowledge the Infantry to be the Body of an Army, with it the Artillery, Munitions, and Provisions lodg, and so doth he who commands in chief. The members of this Body are Regiments, or Brigades, and the sinews and arteries of these are Companies. A Company is a Band of armed men Marshal'd in rank and file; a rank and file differ in this, that the first consists of men, whether on horseback or foot, standing in one front side for side; the second of men standing in one row or lane, one behind another, so they may easily be converted, a file into a rank, and a rank into a file. The number of these ranks and files must be determined by the number of men appointed to be in each Company, for which there is no general rule, every Prince and State ordering that as they please, neither do they restrict themselves constantly to one number, but appoint their Companies to be stronger and weaker as the emergency of affairs, or the present *Rais Belli* seem to require it.

In former times ever since Gunpowder was invented, it has been so likewise, for sometimes Companies were more numerous than at other times, yet never were the weakest of them of so small a number, as generally now they be.

The first time I remember to have read of a Company of one hundred in the Modern War, was in the Civil Wars of France in the Reign of *Charles the Ninth*, about one hundred years since; in them I find that the Protestant Foot-Companies were but generally one hundred strong; for which I can guess at no reason, unless it were that many Gentlemen who were forc'd to take Arms, and durst not stay at home, might be invested with Charges and Employments suitable to their qualities: yet methinks it had conduced more to the advancement and prosecution of the grand design that Troops and Companies of *Gens d'Armes*, or Curiaffiers had been made up of those numbers of Gentlemen, a service very fitting for them, and suiting well with the French humour.

But in those Legions of France instituted by *Francis the First*, (whereof I have spoken in my Discourse of Levies) which consisted of six thousand men a piece, every Legion had twenty Companies, and every Company three hundred men. And though these Legions fell a great decacy from their Primitive Institution in *Charles the Ninth's* Reign, yet the number of three hundred in a Company continued long after that; for I do not find in all *Momus's* Commentaries (which he continues till near the end of *Henry the Third's* Reign) mention made of any French Company of Foot under three hundred Combatants. The Spanish Companies were either four hundred, or three hundred, till our own time. In the days of the Emperor *Charles the Fifth*, the German Foot-Companies were for most part five hundred. *Paolo Giovio* writes that *Alphonso Davala* Marquess of *Guast*, related to him that when his Master the Emperor invaded *Provence*, and thought to have taken *Marsilles*, he had in his pay fifty Companies of Germans, each Company of five hundred Foot-Soldiers, and Of five hundred mark what he adds, according, saith he, to the custom of Germany. I find in *Maximilian the Second's* Reign, that in his Military Institutions he order'd all his German Foot-Companies to be four hundred fighting men. And so strong for most part did they continue in the Reigns of the Emperours *Rodolph*, and *Maximilian*. *Ferdinand* the second in all his Wars with the *Bohemians*, the Duke of *Brunswick*, Marquess of *Baden*, Count *Mansfield* and *Bethlem Gabor*, the King of *Denmark*, and in the beginning also of his long War with the King of *Sweden*,

Company of one hundred strong.

Of three hundred.

Of four hundred.

Of three hundred. den, had never fewer than three hundred men in a Foot-company at the first levying of it. But thereafter when the War was of a long continuance, his Companies were not levied so strong, and in end came to be but of one hundred. But it was not so neither in *Tily*, nor in *Wallenstein* time. The Estates of the *United Provinces* in the beginning of their War with Spain, ordinarily gave Commissions for raising Companies two hundred strong. *Christian* the fourth of *Denmark* his *German* Companies were all three hundred strong, but so were not his *Scots* and his *English*. Of what strength the *Swedish* Companies were till the days of *Gustavus Adolphus* I know not, the actions of that Kingdom, except with *Denmark*, and a little with *Sigismund* their Hereditary King, that was Elected King of *Poland*, having made no great noise in the World till that Glorious Kings Reign. He order'd each of his Foot-Companies to be of one hundred twenty and six men, these for their number resembled the *Grecian Taxiarchie*, which consisted of eight Files, every File being sixteen deep, and so the *Taxiarchie* consisted of one hundred twenty and eight men, as I have told you in my Discourses of the *Grecian Militia*. But some years after that Kings death, the *Swedish* Feltmarshals order'd every Company of Foot to consist of one hundred forty and four Soldiers besides Officers.

Alluredly, as I have said before in my Discourse of Levies, Princes found that by strong Regiments and Companies they sav'd much Treasure spent upon the Officers of weaker ones. But it seems they have in latter times found they were better serv'd by many Officers and weak Companies, than by few Officers and strong Companies, since all are alike paid, and therefore almost universally in *Europe*, no Foot-Company at first levying is above one hundred Soldiers, unless in some places, especially in *Holland*, where the Colonels Company is allowed to be fifty stronger than those of private Captains. And though the *Swedes* in the long *German* War order'd every Foot-Company to consist of a hundred and forty four men, yet in their *Dutch* levies, when they invaded *Poland* in the year 1655, they appointed each to consist of one hundred Soldiers.

Formerly scarce the fourth part of a Company was arm'd with Fire-guns, whether Harquebuses, or Musquets. In every one of the seven Legions which were ordain'd by *Francis* the First, to be a constant Infantry in *France*, there were at most (in the latter end of his Reign) but eighteen hundred Harquebusers, all the rest of the six thousand were heavily armed, their offensive weapons being long Poles or Perches, most whereof were Pikes, to which were added Pistols and Swords. The Forces of the Emperour to which were added Pistols and Swords. The Forces of the Emperour *Charles* the Fifth, and his Brother *Ferdinand* King of the *Romans* at *Vienna*, when they expected *Soliman*, were reckon'd to be at least one hundred and ten thousand Horse and Foot, whereof eighty thousand belong'd to the Infantry, and of these only twenty thousand were Harquebusers, the other sixty thousand were heavily armed; and for the offensive they had such weapons as I have described in another place. *Maximilian* the Second order'd (as I told you before) his Companies to be four hundred strong, whereof one hundred and forty were appointed to be Harquebusers (the Musquet not being then in request) with Headpieces and Rapiers, among whom ten of the lustiest and strongest were to carry each of them a Harquebus, a Croc, the Calibre whereof was made to receive six Balls cast of one pound of Lead; all the rest of the Company were to carry Pikes, Halberds, and Partizans, and all of them were to be in full defensive arms, with Swords, and each of them a Pistol at his Girdle, or as it is called in the establishment, a short Fire-gun. In process of time when Soldiers became expert at the Musquet, Companies how strong or weak soever were divided into three parts, two thirds whereof were Pikemen, and one third Musqueteers; thereafter the Musquet crav'd the half of the Game, and got it, so that each Company was equally divided into Pikemen and Musqueteers. But equality for most part is short liv'd, and so far'd it in this, for very soon the Musqueteers challeng'd the two thirds, and obtain'd them, leaving but one third for the Pikemen, which for most part yet they keep, though in several places (as I have said before) Pikes are sent to look for their fortune elsewhere.

Let

Let us then suppose that which is mostly true, that every Foot-Company consists now of one hundred men, before we can marshal it, we must know how many men the Prince or State alloweth to be in one file, which makes that which we call the depth of the Battel; the *Latin* and high *Dutch* Languages call it the height; the files being known, the ranks are quickly found. I am not here to tell you of the Square-root, by which many have studied to marshal their Battalions, for I intend to speak fully of that in a Discourse a part. But I speak in this place of the depth that every Prince appoints for his Foot.

Before the Reign of the Great *Gustavus Adolphus*, for any thing I could ever learn, Foot-Companies were marshal'd ten deep almost universally, but he marshal'd all his Infantry in six ranks. And after he had invaded *Germany*, the Emperour with most of the *European* Kings and Princes kept their Foot still at ten deep; but before the end of that War which he began, all of them follow'd his way, and made the file of their Foot to consist of six men, except the Prince of *Orange*, who still kept ten in file: I should except likewise the Earl of *Strafford*, who in his Instructions for the better Discipline of his Army, order'd every Captain of Foot to draw up his Company eight deep.

In a business of this nature, where there is difference, a man may tell his opinion without affectation of singularity; and therefore I suppose it will be granted me, that the more hands a Captain can bring to fight, the more shrewdly he will put his enemy to it, provided still his Battalions be of that strength as to receive the shock of a resolute Impression, and in case of the worst, that he have Relieves to come to his rescue. Of Relieves I shall speak hereafter. Now I am hopeful it will not be deny'd me but that more hands are brought to fight by eight men in a file, than by ten, and more by six men in a file, than by eight. Take a second argument, The more able you are to save your self from being furrounded or out-wing'd by an enemy, or the more able you make your self to surround and out-wing that enemy of yours, the greater advantage you have over him. Both these are done by a large front, now it is undeniable that eight in file enlarge the front more than ten, and fix more than eight, and consequently eight deep contributes more than ten, and six more than eight for gaining the victory.

That more hands are brought to fight is very soon instanced, first by a Body of Musqueteers, and next by a Body of Pikemen. Let us suppose a Body of fifteen hundred Musqueteers marshal'd ten deep is to fight with a Body of Musqueteers of equal number, that is fifteen hundred, six deep, and that they are equally stout and experienced, and equally good Firemen. The fifteen hundred ten deep must give fire by ranks, as the fifteen hundred six deep must likewise do; now the fifteen hundred ten deep can make no more but a hundred and fifty in rank, for a hundred and fifty multiplied by ten, produceth fifteen hundred, but the fifteen hundred six deep make two hundred and fifty in rank, for two hundred and fifty multiplied by six, produceth fifteen hundred; so that the fifteen hundred six deep at every Volley pours one hundred Leadens Bullets more in the Enemies bosom, than the fifteen hundred ten deep; and consequently when fix ranks of both parties have fired, the fifteen hundred ten deep have received six hundred Ball more than the fifteen hundred six deep, which without all doubt hath made a great many men fall more of the one side than the other. Next one hundred and fifty files of the fifteen hundred six deep, take just as much ground up in front as the whole Body of the fifteen hundred ten deep, and therefore the other hundred files of the fifteen hundred six deep, may fall on the sides of the fifteen hundred ten deep, if they be not flank'd either with Pikes, or with Horsemen. It is the like case, *mutatis mutandis*, between fifteen hundred eight deep, and fifteen hundred six deep; for fifteen hundred eight deep will make but a hundred and eighty eight in rank, for a hundred eighty eight multiplied by eight produceth fifteen hundred and four; now the fifteen hundred six deep make two hundred and fifty ranks, and so shoots at every Volley sixty two Bullets more than the fifteen hundred eight deep.

Make the like trial of two Battalions of Pikes, each of them fifteen hundred strong, equally arm'd for the defensive, and their Pikes of equal length, the hundred files wherewith the fifteen hundred six deep out-wings the fifteen hundred ten deep, will likewise enter on their sides, and very soon ruin them if they have.

Depth of modern Bodies of Foot.

Ten deep.

Six deep.

Eight deep.

Reasons for six deep.

The great advantages! 1500 Musqueteers six deep have of 1500 Musqueteers ten deep.

The same advantages Pikemen also have.

be not flanked by their friends; and though they be, yet these hundred files of the fifteen hundred Pikemen fix deep, being otherwise idle may happily give their flanks some work to do. Nor hath the fifteen hundred Pikemen ten deep any advantage of the fifteen hundred fix deep, in the force of the impreflion; for I have demonftrated in one of my Difcourses of the *Grecian* Militia, that fix ranks of Pikemen may either give or receive the charge abundantly, and therefore where Pikemen are ten deep at their charge, the laft four ranks should keep their Pikes ported, becaufe the prefenting the points of them is altogether ufelefs. Neither was it the apprehenfion of the weaknefs of his Body of Mufqueteers drawn up fix deep, that made the King of *Sweden* make ufe of his Feathers to defend his Mufqueteers againft the *Polonian* Horfe; for these Feathers may ferve a Body of Firemen drawn up ten deep as well as a Body of Mufqueteers that can refist a refolute charge of Horfe, it must be Pikes, Halberts, or these Feathers, or something like them.

Nor do I think after the Invention of Gunpowder, that ten deep was thought fit for Foot, in imitation of the *Romans*, as some fancy, for I have shewn in another place, that *Vergilius* (who is lookt on by many as the Oracle of the old *Roman* Militia) doth make the *Roman* file to consist of eleven men, but I think it was out of this consideration, that after the first rank had fired their Guns, they could not be ready to fire again till the other nine ranks had all fired, and withal a Mufquet-rest was taken to help; with so much wariness did our Ancestors walk when first they made use of the new found Engines of fire. We read of a Count of *Vaudemont*, who within thirty years after the Invention of Gunpowder, made use of two Culverines in his Wars with the Duke of *Bar*, and by their help defeated his enemy; but at every time the Pieces were discharged, the Count himself fell to the ground for fear. But as Great *Caesar* says, *Ufus est rerum Magister*, Use and Custom over-master things, and therefore the Cannon is now no so dreadful as it was, nor is the Mufquet so unmanageable as it was thought; daily experience lets us see, that the first rank of fix can fire, make ready, and stay for the word of Command, before the other five have discharged their shot, even in the hottest Piece of service, and without the help of Mufquet-rests. And I suppose it needs be thought no Paradox in me to say that five ranks of Mufqueteers can fire one after another without intermission, and the first of the five be ready to fire again, before the last have discharged; let any Commander try it with expert Firemen, he will find it will be done easily enough. And that you may see that this is no new conceit of mine, I shall tell you that *Giovio* informs us that at *Venna* the twenty thousand Harquebusers that were in the Christian Army, were all marshal'd five deep, and so made four thousand files. It is without all peradventure that the best Commanders then in *Europe* were there, who would not have permitted this if they had not known that the first rank could have fired and made ready again, before all the other four had discharged; neither must you impute this to the ignorance of the Historian (as being a Churchman) for he is so punctual as to write nothing of any Military action but what he had from the relation of the greatest Captains that were upon the place.

And truly if you will consider all I have said, or all that may be said on this subject, you may perhaps think with me that both Mufqueteers and Pikemen may be marshal'd five deep with no inconvenience at all to the service. I think I hear some speculative persons cry out, that this is against the rules of all Tactics, who reject odd numbers as unfit for doubling. But stay, do you exercise for shew only, or for use. If only for shew, I grant you should neither have odd ranks nor files; but if for use, I say, that five deep is better than six deep, for those very reasons that made six deep better than eight deep, and eight better than ten. You say you cannot double your ranks at five deep, what then? I say you need not, for I would have your ranks no fewer than five when you are ten deep; why double you your ranks, is it not to make them five? and thereby to enlarge your front, and why then may you not be five ranks at first, and thereby save your self the labour of doubling? And as it is not at all necessary to double your ranks, when your Battalion consists of no more but five ranks, so I conceive the doubling of ranks not necessary when your Battel is but six deep, for three

Reasons for ten deep.

For six deep.

Five deep.

Reasons for it.

Objections against it.

Answered.

three ranks of Pikes is not strong enough either to give or receive a Charge, nor are they numerous enough for Mufqueteers to fire one rank after another without interruption, it not being feasible for the first rank to fire, and be ready before the third rank have discharged, so that when fix ranks are made three, it is only for a parting blow, for the Mufqueteers to fire kneeling, stooping, and standing. Now you may order the first three ranks of five to fire in the same fashion, kneeling, stooping, and standing, and you have by the bargain two ranks in reserve, till the first three recover, and those two ranks may afterward fire, the first rank kneeling, and the second standing; and then all the five ranks have fired, and are as ready either with Buts of Mufquets or Swords to receive the enemy if he advance, as the fix ranks doubled in three, and in far better order. Either then your doubling of ranks is unnecessary in service, or five deep at first is as good (if not better) as ten ranks to be doubled in five, or six ranks doubled in three. And though five ranks cannot be doubled, the inconvenience of that is not so great as the advantages it hath of a large front, and bringing many hands to fight; and if upon any emergency (which will fall out very seldom) you conceive your front too large, you may quickly help it, by causing your files to double, and then you are ten deep. But I shall quickly part with this opinion, when I hear a stronger argument against it than that, which says, that thereby ranks cannot be doubled; for the truth is, it is my private opinion that there be many superfluous words in Exercise, and though I think doubling of ranks and files too, sometimes convenient before the near approach of an enemy, yet I hope none will deny that both of them are very improper in the time of service. But, *Loquendum cum vulgo*, is a Golden sentence.

Well, we have our Foot-Company no stronger than one hundred men, and divided into three parts, whereof two are Mufqueteers, and Pikemen are glad to be admitted to make the third. These must be marshal'd fix in one file, now seventeen times six is more than one hundred, and sixteen times six is less than one hundred. Add therefore three Corporals to the hundred Soldiers, you shall have seventeen complete files, and one man over, whom you may appoint to help the Ensign to carry his Colours, for a Furor is not allow'd him in all establishments. A Company being thus marshal'd in seventeen files, eleven must be Mufqueteers, and six Pikemen, to wit, on the right hand of the Pikemen, six files of Mufqueteers, and on the left hand five files.

The Captain is to teach his Soldiers to keep their just distances between file and file, end between rank and rank. Distances are ordinarily threefold, Order, open Order, and close Order. The first of three foot, the second of six, the third of one foot and a half, to which in some case is added open open order; which is of twelve foot. At Exercisings both ranks and files should stand at open order, in Marches the files at order, but the ranks at open order, becaufe of the Pikes which must have more ground than Mufqueteers require, and in service both the files and ranks of Mufqueteers must be at order, that is three foot distance, but the Pikemen both in file and rank at close order, that is at the distance of one foot and a half. I must tell you in this place of a general mistake, and is the very same I accused *Vergilius* of in the *Roman* Militia, and it is this: All say that the files when they stand in Battel, should be at order, that is at the distance of three foot, as indeed they should. But if you ask how many foot of ground seventeen files (whereof our Company consists) possess in front, they will immediately answer you, fifty and one. And here there is a double error, first, no ground is allowed for the Combatants to stand on, for the distance of three foot between files, takes up that one and fifty foot, or very near it. Secondly, they make seventeen files to have seventeen distances, whereas they have but sixteen. This oversight I have observ'd in most Tactics, Lieutenant Colonel *Elton* is very clear in his definition of a distance, which (though I told you of it before) I shall again give you. Distance, says he, is a place or interval of ground between every rank and rank, and every file and file, as they stand. By this description then, three foot of distance being allowed between every file and file, there are in seventeen files sixteen distances or intervals, which make but forty and eight foot, then you are to allow seventeen foot to the Combatants, that is one foot for every man to stand on, seventeen being added to forty eight, make sixty five, and so many foot of ground doth a Company possess.

The Authors private opinion.

Seventeen Files in a Company of one hundred men.

The several kinds of Distances.

Mistakes in reckoning Distances.

Distance of Files.

F f

Distance of Ranks. fets in front, if it consist of seventeen files; for the ground of the ranks you are to compute it thus: Six ranks take six foot to stand on, and thirty foot for five intervals (six foot being allow'd for open order) in all six and thirty foot, which a Company, Regiment, Brigade, or Army of Foot, constantly possesseth from the toes of the Leaders to the heels of the Bringers up, unless you bring the ranks to stand at order, which you may frequently do with very good reason, and then the five Intervals take up but fifteen foot, which being added to the six foot on which the ranks stand, make but twenty one foot. And when Pikes are to give or receive a Charge, you may bring them to close order, that is one foot and a half, and then the five Intervals take up but  $7\frac{1}{2}$  foot, these being added to six, make  $13\frac{1}{2}$  foot. Observe that in Exercising this Company of seventeen Files, you are to set aside one of the Files, because it is odd, and so will hinder the doubling the Files. The Colours of the Company are to be on the head of the Pikes, neither can they conveniently be between the second and third rank in time of Battel, as some would have them to be, for you may easily consider what room an Ensign can have with his Colours between ranks when they are at order, much less at close order, as they should be in the time of Battel.

The Colours. It will be fitting before I go further, to meet with an objection concerning Distances, it is this: The three foot of distance allowed between Files, say they, must be reckoned from the Centers, that is from the two middle parts of the two File-leaders, as from the middle part of the right hand File-leader to the middle part of the File-leader, who stands on his left hand. I wonder at this notion, for hereby two File-leaders take up one foot of ground, and so doth the rest of the File, and there are but two foot of Interval between the two files, and this cannot at all quadrate with the definition of distance, for that is an Interval between Files, and not betwixt the two middle parts of two mens Bodies. And the Authors of Tactics should have been clearer in their expressions, and have said, two foot between Files which they knew was too little, and have added that every File should have one foot of ground to stand on, for what language is this, a man shall have half a foot for his right middle part, and another half foot for his left middle part; for this way of their reckoning of the three foot of distance, amounts to just so much, and no better language, which I conceive is very improper? Besides, by this account the right and left hand Files, would have each of them one half foot of ground more than any of the rest of the Files, the right hand Filemen hath it by the right middle parts of their bodies, and the left hand Filemen by the left middle parts of their Bodies, because these two Files on these two hands have no Sidemen, which you may easily conceive if you please a little to consider it.

Objection against my Distances of Files. Answered. Let us in the next place see what Officers are appointed to have the command and inspection of this Company, and here we may find some difference in the several establishments of Princes and States, yet in this we find all agree to have a Captain, a Lieutenant, an Ensign, Serjeants, Corporals and Drummers, except the Spaniard who rejects the Lieutenant as useless; some allow no more Officers than those I have spoken of, some allow more, to wit, a Captain of Armies, a Furer, a Fourier, and a Clerk or Scrivener. And besides, some allow Lancepates, or Lancpates (as they are commonly called) as also Reformado's, and Gentlemen of a Company. But neither Lancepates, Gentlemen of the Company, nor Reformado's are Officers, and though Corporals be, yet they carry Arms and march in rank and file. I shall describe all these, and all the Officers of a Foot Company, beginning with the Reformado, and ending with the Captain.

Reformed Officers. Those are called Reformado's, or Reformed, who have been Officers (suppose Commissioned, and those only) and are out of charge, and bear Arms, till they can be prefer'd. In some places they are permitted to be without Arms.

Gentleman of a Company. A Gentleman of the Company is he who is something more than an ordinary Souldier, hath a little more pay, and doth not stand Centinel. In French he is called *Appointe*, and with the Germans he is called *Gefreuter*. They march and watch with Arms, they go common Rounds and Patrouills; and near an Enemy they are to be the forlorn Centinels, whom the French call *Perdu*. Lancepate is a word deriv'd from the Italian, *Lancepata*, which signifies a broken

ken or spent Lance. He is a Gentleman of no ancient standing in the Militia, for he draws his Pedigree from the time of the Wars between France the First, and his Son Henry the Second Kings of France, on the one part, and the Emperor Charles the Fifth, and his Brother-in-law the Duke of Savoy on the other part, in those Wars when a Gentleman of a Troop of Horse in any Skirmish, Battel, or Rencontre, had broke his Lance on his enemy, and lost his Horse in the Scuffle, he was entertain'd (under the name of a Broken-Lance) by a Captain of a Foot-Company as his Comrade, till he was again mounted. But as all good orders fall soon from their Primitive Institution, so in a short time our *Monfieur Lancepata* (for so he was called) was forc'd to defend from being the Captains Comrade, and became the Corporals Companion, and assist'd him in the Exercise of his Charge, and therefore was sometimes called by the French, *Aide Corporal*. But when the Corporal grew weary of the Comradeship of his *Lancepata*, he made him officiate under him, and for that had some allowance of pay more than the common Soldier, which he enjoys in those places where he is made use of, and still keeps the noble Title of *Lancepata*, (though perhaps he was never on Horseback in his life) corruptly *Lancepata*, The Germans, *Swades*, and *Danes*, acknowledge Reformado's and Gentlemen of Companies, but reject the poor *Lancepata*. The Hollander in his Militia acknowledgeth all the three, and so I believe do the French. But to our establishment at home, I believe they be all three strangers, and so most of them are in other places. Companies of hundreds are divided into three Corporalships, two Corporals are Mulqueters, and one is a Pikeman. His right Title is *Caporal*, an Italian word, deriv'd from *Cape*, which signifies a Head; this *Caporal* being the Head of his Squadron. And from the same word *Cape*, it would seem the Captain of a Company, or of an Army hath his denomination. A *Caporal* ought to be an experienc'd, vigilant, and a laborious Soldier; he hath an absolute command of his Squadron, neither may any in it disobey him, if any do, the *Caporal* may beat him with his Sword, and commit him to prison; when a Mulquet-rest was in fashion, he was permitted to beat with it. He is to warn all his Squadron, or a part of it, (according as he receives order) to the watch, or to be sent on party, or other duties. Upon the watch the Corporal (having got orders from his Superiors) appoints, when, where, and how long each of his men are to stand Centinel, and he is bound to teach them how they are to behave themselves when they are Centinels, and is to visit them frequently, but if he find any one of them asleep, he must not leave him as he found him, as an *Athebian* Captain did, (who kill'd a sleeping Centinel) but he must bring him to the *Corps de Guard*, and there make him Prisoner till further order. The *Caporal* is to receive the Rounds at his Court of Guard, and take the word from them. But of this I shall tell you more in another place. He is also obliged when he is not on the watch, to teach all that belong to his Squadron, their postures, and to handle their Arms. So you see this *Caporal* of ours hath work enough to do for all the pay or wages he gets.

In some places a Piper is allowed to each Company: the Germans have him, and I look upon their Pipe as a Warlike instrument. The Bag-pipe is good enough Mulick for them who love it; but sure it is not so good as the *Almain* Whistle. With us any Captain may keep a Piper in his Company, and maintain him too, for no pay is allowed him, perhaps just as much as he deserveth.

Two Drummers are universally allowed in every Company of one hundred men, and more (as also of the Corporals) according as the Company is strong. They ought to be skilful to beat a Gathering, a March, an Alarm, a Charge, Retreat, Travaile or Dian, and the Taptoo. If they can do that well, and carry a message wittily to an enemy, they may be permitted to be Drolls; for to be graduated Doctors, is a thing not at all required at their hands.

The Officers of a Company who march not in rank and file are divided into Commissioned and Uncommissioned; the Captain, Lieutenant, and Ensign, are called Commissioned Officers; all the rest are Uncommissioned, these are the Clerk, the Fourier, the Furer, and Captain of Arms; all these four where they are made use of are called under-Officers, and the last three of them are under the command of the Sergeant, who is also an Uncommissioned Officer.

Lancepata.

A Caporal, or Corporal.

The way of a French Caporal, punishing Soldiers by making them stand long Centinel, is prejudicial to the service.

His Duties.

A Piper.

Drummers.

Under-Off. cers.

Clerk.

The Clerk or Scrivener is he who keeps the Rolls of the Company, receives the Pay, and gives it out according to the directions of the Captain, to whose command he is only liable, and to whom only he is accountable, and in his absence to the Lieutenant. He ought to have so much literature as to read and write fair, and to have some skill in Arithmetick; this under-Officer is allowed in all establishments.

Fourier.

A Fourier is a French word used now in most Languages; It is he who makes Quarters for the Company in Towns and Villages by Bills, and in the Fields by a designation of a plot of ground appointed for the Quarter of a Company. He is to wait upon the Regiment's Quarter-master, and what commands he receives from him, he is to communicate them first to his Captain, and then put them in execution. He is Quarter-master of the Company, and should have skill to give to every Soldier the ground allow'd him for his Hut, and to give to all alike; it is his duty to see all the Huts built of one length and breadth, that there may be an uniformity of them all; it is also his duty to receive the Companies Proviant by the Regiment Quarter-masters direction, whether it be at the Quarter-masters own lodging of Hut, or at that of the Proviant-master General. A Fourier is allow'd with the French, Germans, Danes and Swedes, but neither with the Hollanders, nor with us at home.

Captain of Arms.

A Captain of Arms is he who hath the oversight of the Arms, that they be fixt and bright; I think he should be a Gunsmith, that he may make them fixt and bright, he is a member necessary enough, though not allow'd in all establishments.

Furer.

The Furer is he who is allowed to help the Ensign to carry the Colours, for which he hath pay; the Germans call him *Gefrehter Caporal*, which is, Corporal of the Gentlemen of the Company, for with them they are properly under his command. And both he, the Captain of Arms, and Fourier do duty with Halberds among the Germans, Danes and Swedes; we have no Furer with us.

A Serjeant.

A Serjeant is a *Frisch* word, for those who are appointed by the Justice to apprehend and imprison men for either Criminal or Civil matters, are called Serjeants; yet this word is now become universal, for that Officer of the Company who commands next the Ensign. In the high Dutch he was called *Feldweibel*, but now the word Serjeant hath prevailed over all. When Companies were three hundred strong, there were three Serjeants in it, now for most part all Companies have two. It is a charge of very much fatigue, for to him it belongs to see all his Captains commands obeyed, he gives all the Under-Officers (except the Clerk) their directions, what they are to do almost in every particular, and the like he doth to the *Caporals*. He receives the watch-word and all other Orders from the Major of the Regiment, carries them to his Captain, receives his, and delivers both to his Lieutenant, and Ensign, to his fellow Serjeant, to the *Caporals*, and when it is his turn, watcheth with his Halbert, either on a Post alone, or under a Commissioned Officer. Yet for all this his place in many parts of the world, is not thought creditable, (but sure it is not dishonourable.) I cannot conceive for what reason, unless it be that his title of Serjeant makes him be thought one of that Canaille who drag people to prison, and these indeed are of the very dregs of the Rascality.

His Charge too much undervalued.

*Louis de Montgomery* says that in his time (and that was about sixty years ago) no man of an honest family in France would accept of a Serjeants place, which could have been for no other reason but that I have mention'd; the very name of a Serjeant deterring men from the charge; and it is so still in most places, especially in the Low-countries, and here at home. And I have wonder'd very oft to hear mean Gentlemen say, they scorn a Halbert, but if you will give them a Pike, they will gladly accept of it, for which they have not above the third of a Serjeants pay; and when they are Pikemen, they must punctually obey the Serjeants commands, or bear the weight of that Halbert over their Heads, which they scorn'd to carry on their shoulders; for a Serjeant hath power to beat both with his Halbert and his Sword. And first if his Charge be not honourable, it is honest, and should not be so much villpended, which superior Officers might soon help if they would cherish Serjeants more than many of them do. I encounter'd once with a Country man of my own at the *Buch*, who told me he had serv'd the Estates full forty years; I askt him if in all that time he had

ever

ever got the preferment to be a Serjeant, he reply'd, he might have had a Halbert often, but scorn'd it: I enquir'd then if he had attain'd to any degree better than a Serjeants place? he told me, yes; for at that very time he said, he was the oldest Gentleman of a Company in the Estates service. To which dignity I could not chuse but wish him much joy.

The Ensign is more properly called the Ensign bearer, than any other title we give him in English; for Ancient seems to be an improper and corrupt word. In the French Tongue he is called *Port-ensign*. In the low Dutch, *Fandager*, in high Dutch, *Fendrich*, all which signify a Carrier of Colours. His title shews his Office, his principal charge (where Lieutenants are allowed) is to have a care of the Colours in time of action, whether it be Battel or Assault, he ought to be valiant, and rather die than lose the Ensign recommended to his care. After he hath march'd a mile out of his Quarters, he may ride and give the Colours to another to carry, which other is ordinarily a Pikeman, (whose Pike his Companions are obliged to carry by turns) but at the fight of a General Officer or his own Colonel, the Ensign-bearer is bound to alight and take his Colours in his own hand. In France in the time of Henry the Great, he was allow'd to have a young fellow to assist him to carry his Colours, who for that service had half a Soldiers Pay. But I have shewn you that in other places a Furer is allow'd for that, who in Quarters or Camps doth the duty of an under-Officer with a Halbert.

If you will have the description of a Lieutenant, as ordinarily it is given, he should be valentous, well experienc'd in matters of War, and who hath given proof of it, vigilant, and patient of fatigue should know the wants of the Company, and should endeavour to get them supply'd, should know to exercise the Company in its postures, motions and evolutions, and should be of such a behaviour as to gain both love and respect from the Soldiers. But I ask, if he be all this, what hinders him to be Captain, or if he must still keep the title of Lieutenant, what needs any Captain at all? It is answer'd, the Captain should have all these qualifications, but when he is absent, the Lieutenant represents him; true, but when the Captain is present, whom represents the Lieutenant then? I suppose no body, for his title shews him to be a Deputy, who is no more a Deputy when the person (whose Deputy he was) is present. Next it is said the Lieutenant is in the rear, when the Captain is in the Van, and in the Van when the Captain is in the Rear; true, but so may the Ensign-bearer be, having his Colours carried by another, whose wages shall not be the fourth part of those of a Lieutenant. And since in all Charges of an Army the inferior still officiates in the absence of the superior, why should a Colonel have a Lieutenant-Colonel, and a Captain a Lieutenant, whose duty is only to officiate when the Colonel and Captain are absent? for when they are present to speak strictly, the Lieutenant-Colonel, and Lieutenant, have not one word to say, no commands to give, nor punishment to inflict; and therefore when the Colonel is absent, the Major may as well do his duty as the oldest Captain doth the Majors. I suppose for these reasons the Spaniards (a warlike people) have truck Lieutenants and Lieutenant-Colonels quite out of their Rolls in all their Spanish Regiments. I have heard that *Gustavus Adolphus* intended to have done as much but that the Swedes would not part with their ancient custom, nor would give way to bring Spanish *Alferos* in their Armies; and therefore the King (who it seems thought not the Lieutenant very necessary) order'd the Ensign-bearer to have equal pay with the Lieutenant, and to do equal duty with him in Watches and Guards. It is hard to persuade some people to part with an ancient custom; and they say all Innovations though for the better, are dangerous; and therefore Lieutenants need not be angry with me for my private opinion, that they are none of the most necessary Officers in an Army, will do them but little hurt.

But the truth is, that which mostly makes Lieutenants necessary is, that at first Levies, Captains are chosen who are unexperienc'd, yet because of their birth and quality are thought fit to have the command of Companies to be raised in those places where the authority of themselves and their friends conduceth much to the furtherance of the Levy, whether it be made by the authority of the Prince, or by a voluntary Enrolling. And for this reason the Lord *Carolina* requires

Ensign-bearer.

In France, except in Regiments of Guards, there be now only two Ensigns, one of the Colonel, the other of the Lieutenant-Colonel.

A Lieutenant. His Qualifications.

Whether needful, or not.

Innovations dangerous.

A Captain;

requires a Captain to be a Gentleman of good birth, young, valiant, and liberal, and doth not at all require experience. But if you like not that, but will have another description of a Captain, then I pray take that which I have given of a Lieutenant, and I suppose you will believe, it may serve them both. Having given you the description of so many Officers of a Company of one hundred men, I think you will conclude that Company will in a very short time consist of able and well exercis'd Soldiers, I wish it may be so, and I am sure it should be so.

In former times a Captain march'd in the head of his Company with a Headpiece, a Corset, and a Gorge, all high Proof, and so did the Lieutenant in the Rear. But you may now travel over many places of *Christendom* before you see many of those Captains and Lieutenants. The difference of the Armour was none but that the Captains Helmet was decor'd with a Plume of Feathers, the Lieutenants not. The Feathers you may peradventure yet find, but the Headpiece for most part is laid aside.

The Spanish and French Captains and Lieutenants likewise carry Pikes, the Spaniards shoulder'd, the French comport'd: The Germans, Swedes, Danes, and almost generally all others carry nothing in their hands but Canes; but indeed besides that it was not the custom formerly to do so, I hope it will not be denied but that in time of action, Officers should have some other offensive Weapons in their hands than either Canes or Swords, and on a march their servants may carry thee whether they be Pikes or Partisans. The Marquis of Guast, *Alphonso Davala*, who had the command of several Imperial Armies, when his Master Charles the Fifth took a view of his numerous forces at Vienna, march'd in the head of the Infantry with a Pike in his hand. Marshal *Monluc* at the Battle of *Ceresole* carried a Pike, because he led a great Battalion of Pikes; but on all other occasions he used a Halbert or Partisan, as he tells us in several places of his Commentaries, in one whereof speaking of the Halbert, he says, *Il a toujours aymé, de me jouer de ce baston là: I lov'd always, says he, to play with that batton*. And assuredly a Partisan or Halbert is a more manageable weapon for an Officer, than a Pike. The Serjeant is distinguished from the Captain and Lieutenant because he shoulders his Halbert, they comport theirs. And I suppose it were fit the Captain and Lieutenants, Halberts or Partisans should be diversify'd by several trimmings, that the one may be distinguish'd from the other.

The word Captain is a general word for all Commanders, as Captains of fifties, of hundreds, and of thousands; and he who commands over all the forces, is called very properly a Captain General, but now it is most ordinarily taken for him who commands a private Company or Troop, and so passeth current in all Languages that I understand.

A Company being thus describ'd with all its Officers, a Regiment is soon understood, which I shall define to be a certain number of Companies join'd in one body under one head. This definition agrees with all Regiments, of whatever strength they be. There is not a definite number of Companies ordain'd for each Regiment, some consisting of six, some eight, some twelve, and some of twenty, but ten is now most ordinary, and formerly it was so when Regiments were three thousand strong, and each Company three hundred; yet I find that in every French Legion (which consisted of eighteen Companies) there were about three hundred three and thirty men in each Company, for every Legion was fix thousand strong. Nor is this word [Regiment] one hundred year old, nor do I know of what Language it is; in the French and Italian Tongues it was called a Legion, and so it was in Latin, and he who commanded in chief over it was called Colonel, and Colonello. In Spanish it was called *Terço*, and its Commander, *Maestro del Campo*. In high Dutch it was called *Faulein*, and he who commanded it, *Oberster*, which signifies Superior, or Supreme. But Colonel is now understood in all Languages, and the word [Regiment] however barbarous it be in itself, hath suppress'd all other names and titles, and is now only used in all European Tongues. The Swedes in my time order'd all their new levied Regiments to consist of eight Companies, and each Company of one hundred and twenty six men, and this made the Regiment to be one thousand and eight men; Regiments consisting of ten companies, and each company of one hundred men, wants but eight of the former number, and both of them resemble the

Grecian

Captain and Lieutenant in Harness,

With Pikes.

An Halbert, or Partisan.

Captain a general Title.

A Regiment.

A new word.

*Grecian Chiliarchy*, which contain'd one thousand and twenty four men; so that you may call our Modern Colonel, *Chiliarcha* in Greek, more properly than you a Colonel. can call him *Tribunus Militum* in Latin.

A Regiment thus compos'd of ten Companies hath Officers (besides those of Companies already describ'd) whose charges belong equally to all the ten, these are called Officers of the Staff, in high Dutch the Etymology of the word I cannot give you; these are the Colonel, the Lieutenant Colonel, and the Major, these three are called likewise Officers of the Field. Besides them there belongs to the Staff, a Preacher, a Chirurgion, a Quarter-master, and a Provost-Marshal; these four are entertain'd in all Regiments, by all States and Princes who maintain Armies, and some have also a Regiment-Scrivener, or Clerk, an Auditor, and a Hangman. The Scrivener receives the Pay according to the Muster-rolls, whereof he is the Keeper, and gives it out to the particular Clerks of Companies, according to the directions of the Colonel, to whom when present the Scrivener is only accountable, and in his absence to his Lieutenant-Colonel. The Auditor hath that same power in a Regiment that a General Auditor or Judge-Marshal hath in an Army, and what that is I have told you in the ninth Chapter of our Modern Art of War. In some places to save expence, they make the Quarter-master supply this Scriveners place, nor do some Princes allow any Regiment-Auditor, though I think him a very necessary Officer, for without him our Regiment-Courts of War (especially if the business be of any intricacy) are very disorderly; nor do some allow wages to Regiment-hangmen, and where they are wanting, capital crimes must be punish'd by Harquebussiers, and scourging must be convert'd into the Gatloope. The Regiment Provost-Marshal hath power to apprehend any Soldier whom he sees transgressing the Laws and Articles of War, from doing whereof no Officer may hinder him; but he hath not power to set any Prisoner at liberty, nor those whom himself hath imprison'd. He is Gaoler, and keeps those who are committed to him, either in Irons, or without Irons, for which he hath a Guard allow'd him. He is to present the Prisoners to the Court of War, and to desire that Justice may be done on them for the crimes they have committed, which he is obliged to specify, and he is to be present at the execution of every sentence; and when a Soldier is to run the Gatloope, he is to give him the first lash; he is to impose prices on Wine, Ale, Beer, Mead, Tabaco, and all manner of Meats, according as he receives directions from the Provost-Marshal General. And if the Victuallers, Suters and Mark tenters transgress, he is to make price of those Wares, in venting whereof any of them did fail, the half whereof belongs to the Judge-Marshal, and the other moiety to the Princes Procurator Fiscal, and he hath an allowance of every Hoghead of Wine, Ale, Beer, and Brandy.

The Chirurgion must be skilful in curing all manner of wounds (so they be not mortal) for many brave Gentlemen get their bones broken with Bullets, which would not so frequently prove deadly to the Patients if they were attended on by good and experienced Artists. The Chirurgion should be a sober man, and ought to do his duty warily and carefully, since the lives of both Commanders and Soldiers are often in his hands. Besides his monthly pay he should have his Surgeons Chest furnish'd with all manner of Necessaries for curing Wounds of all kinds; and this Chest is to be furnish'd at the Princes charge, and all Wounds received in the Prince or States service, he is obliged to cure (if he can) without demanding any thing from the Patients, but all other got accidentally, or by quarrelling and Duels, he is not obliged to cure but for payment, in which the Officers are bound to assist him.

The Preacher be he Priest or Minister, whether Lutheran, Reformed, or Roman Catholic, his Office is well enough known, there is much respect to be paid him, and the Laws of War provide severe punishments to those who offer any injury or offence to his person or charge. His duty is to have *Ceram Animarum*, the care of Souls, and it is well if he meddle with no other business, but makes that only his care.

The Quarter-master should be an understanding man, he it is that should receive provision from the Proviant-master General, and divide it proportionably out to the Fouriers of the several Companies according to their strengths, having

A Regiment-Staff.

Regiment-Scrivener.

Auditor.

Hangman.

Provost-Marshal.

Chirurgion.

Preacher.

Quarter-master.



His Duties.

having first receiv'd orders for it from his Colonel, for properly his business is not with money. If the Regiment march alone, he is to go before and take the Fouriers along with him, and he makes Quarters, and gives the Billets of the several Companies to these Fouriers, which they ought to draw by lot, but he is obliged to deliver out of his own hand the Billets to the Field and Staff-Officers. If the Regiment march with an Army, or a part of it, he is to receive such Quarters as the General Quarter-master assigns to him, and divide them proportionably to the Regiment. But if the Army be to encamp, he is to receive from the Quarter-master General such a proportion of ground as the strength of his Colonels-Regiment requires, which plot of ground he is immediately to mark at the four corners of it with four long staves, upon which should be some cognizance whereby to know for which Regiment that Quarter is design'd, and then the Quarter-master is to divide that piece of ground, taking first so much as ordinarily is allow'd for the Colonel and all his Regiment-staff, and then measuring to each Fourier as much ground as is allow'd for a Company with all its Officers; he is to see the Fouriers mark the ground assign'd to the particular Companies, with four lesser staves at the four corners of the design'd Quarter, and then subdivide that ground into so many parts for Huts, and to mark every Hut at its four corners with four little sticks or twigs, and for all this he and his Fouriers should have measures such as are appointed by the Quarter-master General, and approv'd by the General, all which shall be spoke to more fully in my Discourse of *Casframentation*. But the Regiment Quarter-master must see all these things done himself, and not trust the particulars to his Fouriers, who oft-times are very careless or ignorant, or both; and indeed our Modern Armies produce but too many Quarter-masters of little better stuff, though you see they should be men of metal, who have learned some Arithmetick, and have some skill of *Casframentation*. Formerly the Eldest Captains and Rittmasters in *Swedish* Regiments used to be their Quarter-masters, but that custom is worn out; at home our establishment joins the Quarter-master, and Proforce, their charges in one person, which conjunction agrees not with all humours.

His Qualifications.

Wagon-master.

In some Establishments a Wagon-master is one Officer in a Regiment-staff, for which there may be very good reason: of him I shall speak in my Discourse of the Baggage of an Army.

Drummer-Major.

There is another inconsiderable Staff-Officer in most Armies, yet necessary enough in all Regiments of Foot, and that is the Drummer-Major, the *French* call him Colonel-Drummer: He is to receive his directions from the Major of the Regiment at what hour he is to beat to the watch, when the Dian, and when the Taptow wherewith he is to acquaint the several Drummers of companies, and appoint them by turns for these Beatings; he is also to order them in what divisions each of them shall beat when the Regiment marcheth; and they are to obey all his directions punctually. In some places he gets a third more of pay than other Drummers, but here at home we acknowledg no such Creature.

Major.

The Major of a Regiment is both an Officer of the Field, and of the Staff: It is fit he be an understanding person, and experimented, of a quick apprehension to receive his Orders, and a ready dispatch in delivering them; he should be vigilant, and of a body able to endure toil. He it is that marshals the Regiment, and appoints every company its due place according to the Precedency they have one of another. He orders the Captains, Lieutenants, and Ensigns to lead Divisions in a march according to their Dignity. In the Field he receives the word and all other orders from the Major-General, and when he comes back to the Regiment, he is to give no orders out till first he hath imparted them to his Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel, and received their directions; likewise he is to call one Sergeant of every Company together (at the setting of the watch is the proper time) and deliver the watch-word, and all his other orders punctually to them, that they may carry them to their several Officers. He is not only bound to give the Orders, but to see them obeyed, for he is frequently to visit the Guards, and where he finds his directions either disobey'd or neglected, he is to bring those to an account who are accessory to the oversight or contempt.

The

His Duties.

The Inspection the Major hath of the Guards, hath got him the title in *Latin* of *Vigilantium Prefectus*: If he be in Quarters where the Regiment lyes alone, far from the General, he receives his Orders from his Colonel; in his absence from his Lieutenant-Colonel; in a Garrison from the Governour. The *French* Discipline admits him not to command Captains, unless he have a Company himself. The *Swedes* of a long time allowed him no company, yet allow'd him the command over Captains, but it is now many years ago since they were permitted to have companies; hence perhaps it is that when they have no companies, they may be called Sergeant-Majors, as when they have companies, the *Germans* call them Captain-Majors, but the *English* use frequently the words of Sergeant Major, and Sergeant-Major General, none of them are used either by *German*, *Swede*, or *Dane*.

Lieutenant-Colonel.

A Lieutenant-Colonel is that in a Regiment that a Lieutenant is in a company, and therefore when the Colonel is present, the Lieutenant-Colonel hath no command; and since in the Colonels absence the other commands the Regiment, I think he should be endued with all those qualifications that are required to be in a Colonel, and what these are I shall tell you as others have told me, with my own sense of them.

Colonel.

A Colonel say some should be a Gentleman of great experience in Military Affairs, bold and resolute, courteous, affable, liberal, judicious, and religious: But such descriptions of Military Officers seem to proceed from those Philosophers who teach men to conform their lives and actions to the strict and severe rules of Moral virtue; for my part I would not only have a Colonel to be pious and religious, but his whole Regiment likewise; but because this may rather be wish than expected, I say, if he be not exemplarily pious, he may notwithstanding be a Colonel good enough, so he be not a profest Atheist. I would have a Colonel to be affable and liberal, but though he be both churlish and Parsimonious, he may be a Colonel good enough. I would have a Colonel to be experienced in most of the points of War; yet though he be not, and hath seen but little, if he be of a ready wit and good judgment, he may be a Colonel good enough: for Princes and States, when they raise Armies, think it fit to make choice of Colonels who can levy Regiments, for which employment without question men of good birth and quality are most proper. But courage, an aptitude to learn, and proneness to follow advice, are qualities very essential and requisite in all men of that charge, it is little matter how avaritious a Colonel be, so he offer not to meddle with any part of the pay of his Regiment, except his own. It is the less matter though he be ignorant in some points belonging to his command, so he be willing to be advised by those of his Officers who understand them: But those who fancy that the Title of Colonels entails a right upon them, to command what they please, and to pay their Regiments as they like, and by their wilful ignorance confound matters of Government, and Discipline, and introduce and frame Customs in their Regiments, which no others use, should be chac'd out of all Armies as presumptuous, arrogant, and impertinent, if not worse.

His Qualifications.

Having spoken now sufficiently of all the Officers belonging to a Company and Regiment of Foot, it will be time to put the several Companies in one Body, thereby to make a Regiment; but I will first tell the Captains that after they have for some time exercis'd their Companies, and thereby known the abilities of their several Soldiers, they must be careful to put them in ranks and files according as they find they deserve; the properest, tallest and strongest men they should arm with Pikes, the rest with Muskets. Next to the Corporals the most deserving should be File-leaders; the next place of dignity is the reer, the third is the middle or fourth rank, the fourth dignity is the second rank, as being next the Van, the fifth place of dignity is the fifth rank, as that which is next the reer; the sixth and last place is the third rank: All this is meant where all Companies and Battalions of Foot are marshal'd six deep. Next to this the Captain should have regard to the right and left hand files, and having drawn up his men as he thinks each of them deserves, he is to command his Clerk to write down the names of all that are in Arms, just as they stand in files, and thereafter when he draws out his Company, let him constantly put them in Battel according to that Roll; this being done four or five days, the

To marshal a Company in ranks and files.

G g

Soldi.

Soldiers by custom knowing their places, their Leaders, and their Sidemen, will be able without the help of their Officers to marshal themselves. When all the Companies are to be join'd in one Body, every Captain should cast his odd men in the reer, (and it is impossible there can be above five odd men in one Company) that the Major may make files, and so join them to the Regiment in such places as he thinks fitting.

There be several ways of drawing up Regiments of Foot, and they may vary according to the several opinions of men, and yet all of them may be good enough: But a Major should not marshal the Regiment according to his own fancy, or yet that of his Colonels; but according to the known practice of the Prince or State, in whose Service he is; for Uniformity is required in Military Customs as much, or rather more than in other things. The pleasure of the Prince, or of his General in matters which depend on their own judgments, ought not to be debated or disputed. I will not trouble my Reader with the difference of opinions in marshalling the several Companies, according to the Precedency of those to whom they belong, whether these be Officers of the Field, or private Captains, when they are to be join'd in one Body: But shall lay down three grounds, wherein I suppose all our Modern Commanders agree. These are,

*First*, That the Regiment should be marshal'd in a Square front, the Wedg, Rhombus, and Ring-Battels, not being now made use of, except for show.

*Secondly*, That the Pikemen make the Body, and the Musqueteers the wings.

*Thirdly*, That the Colonels Company ought to have constantly the right hand, whether the Regiment be drawn up in one, two, or three Divisions. When Regiments were two or three thousand strong, it was thought fit to marshal them in three Battalions or Divisions, and these were called, the Colonels, the Lieutenant-Colonels, and the Majors Divisions; but being to speak of a Regiment consisting only of one thousand, and composed of ten Companies, I shall tell you how I have seen such a one marshal'd both in one and in two Divisions, the manner whereof pleaseth me better than any other that I have either seen or read of, leaving notwithstanding every man free to his own choice, for I offer not to impose.

The Major of the Regiment having either chused the ground himself, or got it assign'd to him by the Major-General, if he be to draw up in one Division, orders the Colonels Company to draw up on the right hand, next to that the Majors, thirdly the second Captains, fourthly the fourth Captains, fifthly the sixth Captains, sixthly the seventh Captains, seventhly the fifth Captains, eighthly the third Captains, ninthly the oldest Captain, and lastly the Lieutenant-Colonels Company. I know some would have the Majors Company to be where I have plac'd the youngest Captains, because they think next to the Van and the Reer, the middle is the most honourable place: But if they take heed they will find it is not so with a middle Company as with a middle man in a file, who upon doubling the front by half files, becomes a Leader. Besides, no Company can properly be said to be in the middle of a Regiment, unless the Regiment consist of odd Companies, which seldom or never is practised; for draw up a Regiment of ten Companies in one front, the sixth Company (which is accounted the middle one) or the Company in the middle of the Regiment is not so, for it hath five Companies on its right hand, and but four on its left. Now my reason for drawing up the Companies in that order whereof I have spoken, is this: The right hand or the Van is the most honourable place, and next to it the left hand or reer. Now the honour comes from danger, which is for most part expected from the Van or the Reer, and hence it will follow that the nearer a Captain and his Company are the danger, the more honourable place they have; and therefore the nearer they are to the Van and the Reer, the more honourable place they have. If then the Regiment be attackt in the Van (where most danger is expected) the Majors Company is by much, nearer the danger when it is marshal'd next to the Colonels, than if it were drawn up about the middle of the Regiment, and consequently is in the more honourable place; by this same reason the oldest Captain is to be nearest the Lieutenant-Colonel, who hath the second place of honour; for if the Reer be attackt, the Lieutenant Colonel is nearest

Uniformity  
in Marshalling  
Regiments in  
one Prince  
his Service.

A Regiment  
marshal'd in  
one Division.

Reasons for  
the manner  
of it.

nearest the danger, and next him the first Captain, by this same rule of proportion the second Captain is next to the Major, it being fit since the first Captain hath the second place of dignity in the Reer, that the second Captain have the third place in the Van. And if this rule hold (as I hope it will) the third Captains Company must be drawn up on the oldest Captains right hand; that so he may have the third place from the Reer, as the second Captain had the third place from the Van. And to make short, I place the fourth Captain in the fourth place from the Van, and the fifth Captain in the fourth place from the Reer, the sixth Captain in the fifth place from the Van, and the seventh and last Captain in the fifth place from the Reer. Now because an Enemy is sooner expected in the Van than in the Reer, the Van is more honourable than the Reer, and therefore I marshal the last Captain in or near the middle of the Regiment, where being furthest from danger either in Van or Reer, he obtains the place of least dignity, for though all places are honourable, yet some are more honourable than others. I marshal then a Regiment of ten Companies, drawn up in one Division thus:

Colonel.  
Major.  
Second Captain.  
Fourth Captain.  
Sixth Captain.  
Seventh Captain.  
Fifth Captain.  
Third Captain.  
First Captain.  
Lieutenant-Colonel.

Order of a  
Regiment in  
one Battallion.

The Companies standing in this order, the Major will have but little trouble to Body them, one of two ways: First, he may command all the Pikes to advance twenty or twenty four paces, and there join them; then let him cause the Musqueteers of the five Companies on the right, to advance to the right hand of the Pikes, and the Musqueteers of the five Companies on the left hand to march up to the left hand of the Pikes, and so his work is done.

How to put  
them in one  
Body.

Secondly, if he have no other ground than that he stands on, he is to command the Pikemen to march thorough the files of the Musqueteers by the right and left hand, till they meet in one Body in the middle, the Musqueteers being likewise order'd to march by both hands to their due distances, so that this motion is a *Chacean* Countermarch of files. This may be done with much ease, and a few words, if the Major please; but some have the vanity to make themselves and their Soldiers more business than they need by crying this and that, riding here and there, making work to themselves, and sometimes sport to the Beholders.

If the Major be order'd to marshal the Regiment in two Divisions, he may do it thus: The Colonels Company being to have the right hand of the first Division, and the Lieutenant-Colonels of the second Division, he ought to place the other Companies according to their Dignities, and these are the Majors Company in the Reer of the first Division, and the first Captains in the Reer of the second Division; the second Captain next to the Colonel in the first Division; the third Captain next to the Lieutenant-Colonel in the second Division; the fourth Captain on the right hand of the Major in the first Division, and the fifth Captain on the right hand of the oldest Captain in the second Division; the sixth Captain next to the second Captain in the first Division; and the seventh and last Captain next to the third Captain in the second Division. The ten Companies of a Regiment then drawn up in two distinct Battalions are in this order:

To marshal  
a Regiment of  
ten Companies  
in two  
Battalions.

#### First Division.

Colonel.  
Second Captain.  
Sixth Captain.  
Fourth Captain.  
Major.

#### Second Division.

Lieutenant-Colonel.  
Third Captain.  
Seventh Captain.  
Fifth Captain.  
First Captain.

Order of ten  
Companies  
in two Divi-  
sions.

Reasons for that order.

My reason for this, because the Regiment being now divided into two Bodies or Battalions, the two Reers are next in dignity to the two Vans, and those that are nearest to the two Reers are next in honour to those who are nearest to the two Vans; for this reason I place the sixth Captain just in the middle of the first Division, as furthest from danger of either Van or Reer of that Division, having two Companies before him, and two behind him, or two on each hand of him. And I place the last Captains Company in the middle of the second Division, as the place of least dignity, and that belongs to him, all other Captains having the Precedency of him. The Pikes of the first and second Divisions are in the middle of their several Battalions, and the Musqueteers of the five Companies of each Body equally divided on both hands of the several Bodies of the Pikes, which is done in that same way as when the Regiment was marshal'd in one Division.

Objection against that way of marshalling.

Answered.

I know some are of opinion that the Majors Company should be in the Reer of the Lieutenant-Colonels Division, because the third place of honour in the Regiment belongs to him, and the Colonel having the Van of the first Division, and the Lieutenant-Colonel of the second, the Major should have the Reer of the second Division, because it is the Reer of the whole Regiment; I should easily subscribe to this if it were not for two reasons: First, though it be but one Regiment, yet being divided, it should be lookt on as two distinct Bodies, and it is more honourable to have the Reer of the first, than of the last. Secondly, when a Regiment is divided into two parts, the Major ought to wait and lodg at the quarter of that Division of the Regiment where the Colonel is; because from him he receives his Orders, Directions, and the Word, which he is not oblig'd to carry to the Lieutenant-Colonel (if the quarters of the two Divisions be divided, as many times they are) but the oldest Captain is obliged to come and receive them from the Major at the Colonels Quarter, the first Captain in that case officiating as Major for the Lieutenant-Colonels Battalion. Now if the Major ought to be where the Colonel is, as I think he should, then I think the Majors Company should be where himself is.

Regiment or Brigade marshal'd a third way.

The Great Gustavus used another way of marshalling his Regiments and Battalions of Foot, which taken altogether was not square of front, yet altho the four parts or Bodies which compos'd it, were square. The manner was this, Suppose one of his Brigades to be eighteen hundred men (as I can assure you he had many weaker) whereof twelve hundred were Musqueteers, and six hundred were Pikemen; the Pikes advanced twenty paces before the two Bodies of Musqueteers, who immediately join'd to fill up the void place the Pikemen had posselt. Then were the Pikes divided into three equal Bodies, two hundred to each Battalion, the middle Body whereof advanced before the other two so far that its Reer might be about ten paces before the Van of the other two. The two Bodies of Pikes that staid behind, were order'd to open a little to both hands, and then stand still, all fronting one way to the Enemy; by this means the place which the two hundred Pikes posselt in the middle, remaining void, there were two passages like fall-ports, between the Reer of the advanced Body of Pikes, and the two Battalions that staid behind, out of one whereof on the right hand issued constantly one or two or more hundreds of Musqueteers, who before all the three Bodies of Pikes gave incessantly fire on the Enemy, and when the word or sign for a Retreat was given, they retir'd by the other passage on the left hand, back to the great Body of Musqueteers, where so many of them as came back unwounded, were presently put in rank and file, the fire continuing without intermission by Musqueteers, who still fallied thorough the passage on the right hand; and it is to be observed that the firemen fought thus in small Bodies, each of them not above five files of Musqueteers, and these for most part but three deep. So you may consider that near the third part of the Musqueteers being on service, the other two thirds were securely shelter'd behind the three Battalions of Pikemen, who were to be compleatly arm'd for the defensive. These Pikes had Field-pieces with them, which fir'd as oft as they could, as well as the Musqueteers; this continued till the Pikemen came to push of Pike with the Enemy (if both parties staid so long, as seldom they did) and then the Musqueteers were to do what they were order'd to do, and the order did depend on emergencies and accidents, which as they could not be then seen, fo

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no certain rules could be given for them. In this order did I see all the Swedish Brigades drawn up, for one year after the Kings death; but after that time, I saw it wear out when Defensive Arms first, and then Pikes came to be neglected, and by some vilipended.

Worn out.

For the March of a Regiment, if it can all march in one breast, it should do so; but if not, and if the ground permit it, let the right hand of Musqueteers march in breast, next it, the Body of Pikes, and after it the left wing of Musqueteers. But if none of these can be, then as many should march in one petty Division, as the way can permit; as suppose twelve, eight, or ten, and so soon as you come to open ground, you are to march presently in Squadrons, or as they are now called Squads, or in full Battel, that is, the Regiment all in one front; for by that means your Soldiers are readiest to receive an Enemy, they march in a more comely order, and straggle far less than when they march few in breast, and in a long row. The Major appoints Captains, Lieutenants, and Ensigns to lead Divisions, and Sergeants to attend the flanks, every one according to their dignities; but for my own part I never thought it convenient, much less necessary that every small Division of a Regiment should have a Bringer up, since he must be (as some will have it) a Commission'd Officer, as well as the Leader of a Division should be. For first consider, that in a Regiment of one thousand strong, there are an hundred sixty and six files, and admit that the way will permit eight files to march in breast, (as that falls not always out) by that account you shall have one and twenty Divisions consisting of eight Files apiece; multiply twenty one by eight, the Product is a hundred and sixty eight Files, which consists of a thousand and eight men, eight more than the number: Reckon again how many Commission'd Officers you have in ten Companies, besides the three Field-Officers you shall have but twenty nine, now of these twenty one must be allow'd to lead the Divisions, and by that account you have but nine Officers to bring up, so you want thirteen Commission'd Officers for that employment, for Sergeants should neither be permitted to lead or bring up, but in case of necessity, their duty being to attend the flanks. Besides, all Commission'd Officers are not always present, some frequently being either sick, wounded, or absent on furlough. It will be enough therefore if all these petty Divisions be led by Commission'd Officers, (which yet cannot be, unless you allow some Ensign-bearers to stay from their posts) and by this means you may spare six foot of ground between two Divisions; for those who will allow Bringers up, allow eighteen foot between two Divisions, to wit, six foot between the Reer of the first Division, and him that brings it up; secondly, six foot between that Bringer up, and him that leads the next Division, and six foot between that Leader and the Division he leads. This was the order of the two Princes of Orange, Maurice and Henry. But if there be no Bringer up, twelve foot will serve well enough between Divisions. Nor am I of their opinion who will have a Colonel of Foot to begin his march on Horseback; for since he commands Foot, he is bound at first to march on foot, though afterwards he may ride. And I avouch too, that he who leads Bodies of Foot should not ride at all; because he may very infensibly make the Reer run after him. If the Major lead the Regiment, or a part of it in his Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonels absence, he is bound to do it in Towns, in Leaguers, or at Passes on foot, because then he officiates as Colonel; but if any of his two superior Commanders be present, then he should be constantly on Horseback, for being he is not tyed to any one place, but must be sometimes in the Van, sometimes in the Battel, sometimes in the Reer; now here, now there, to see that every Officer and Soldier do their duty; he should never be on foot when the Regiment marcheth.

And because the Captain-Lieutenant cannot constantly march on foot, others should be ordain'd to assist him by turns, and those others should be Captains, for by the courtesie of Arms the Captain-Lieutenant is youngest Captain. But this assistance he is to get, is only in the Field, for so soon as he comes near to Town, Village, or Quarter, he is to march on the head of the Regiment behind one of the three Field-Officers, and all the

The March of a Regiment.

Reasons why every petty Division cannot have a Bringer up.

A Major still on Horseback.

A Captain-Lieutenant.

Captains ought to go immediately to their several Divisions.

A Brigade.

It hath been a custom of a long time, and in many places, to put several Regiments in one Body or Battalion, which they call a Brigade. There are of these both of Horse and Foot, and the Colonel, who commands that Body, is called a Brigadier. It is not as yet defin'd, for any thing I know, how strong a Brigade should be, three thousand, two thousand, eighteen hundred, or fifteen hundred. The Estates of the *United Provinces* had always Brigades of Foot in their Service, but those were strong, five or six thousand. I have seen six Regiments in one Brigade, and yet it did not consist of so many as two thousand men that carried Arms; here you may suppose there were Officers enough for so few Soldiers. The Colonel who is oldest in that service commands the Brigade. There is likewise a Major of the Brigade, who receives the Word and other Orders from the Major-General, and gives them to the Majors of the other Regiments of the Brigade, and they to their Colonels and Lieutenant-Colonels, and then to the Sergeants of all the several Companies. This Major of the Brigade is ordinarily he who is Major of the oldest Regiment of that Brigade.

When a Brigade marcheth, the Regiments of it have the Van-day about by turns, but to have not the Companies of the several Regiments. It seems something strange to me that a Regiment of one thousand Foot should be divided into two several Bodies, the Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel Divisions, and yet that Regiment Embodied with another, perhaps with other two, and march all in one Body. Truly I should think if the first be needful, the second should not be necessary.

Colonels of two Regiments.

It is a custom with some Princes to give some of their Colonels more Regiments than one, which I have seen, though I confess I never saw any good reason for it; for if a Prince or a State will advance a Colonel above or beyond his fellows, he may rather give him some higher title, and consequently greater pay; yet it were the more tolerable if both Regiments were of Foot, or both of Horse, for then they might make up a Brigade, and he who is Colonel of both, might be Brigadier of both. But I have known some of them Colonels of Horse and Foot, and sure they cannot officiate in both Regiments at one time, and therefore I confess that in one of them a Lieutenant-Colonel is very necessary. But it must minister some fuel of heart-burning to many brave Gentlemen, who have served Princes faithfully, to see some men provided with two Charges who have done no more than themselves, (perhaps not so much) when they have no Charge at all. But to him that hath must be given.

Observe that in the *French Service*, Majors being commanded to be under Captains, the stress of the command of the Regiment lies on the Lieutenant-Colonel.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. XII.

Of Troops, and Regiments of Horse, of their Officers, and of Dragoons.

THOSE who serve in the Wars on Horseback, are by a general word called the Cavalry, which is now understood in all Languages, though it be deriv'd either from the *French* word *Cheval*, or the *Italian* and *Spanish* word *Cavallo*, both which signify a Horse. Though the *Germans* make much use of the word Cavalry, yet they have one of their own as proper and significative as it is, and that is *Remery*. We have no other word for it in *English* but what is borrowed from the *French*. It hath been in ancient times a noble service, and still should be so; for as I observed before, those who served on Horseback, especially the men at Arms or Curiaffiers, were all Gentlemen, and most of them of a high extraction; but now a promiscuous levy by the Trumpet hath well near abrogated that commendable custom, and made men of all sorts (so they be of bodies fit for service) whatever their birth be, welcome to ride in Troops. When the *Romans* said, a man was *equestris ordinis*, they meant he was a Gentleman; and when they spoke so, it was nothing else but that he was of that rank or class, out of which Horsemen were chosen to serve in the Wars. This made them with much reason demand as their due, the precedence of the Foot, though still the Infantry be the strength of the Army, but now that Horsemen are Plebeians as well as Footmen; the hand and the door is no more due to the one, nor to the other; and in many places Commanders of Horse and Foot, who carry alike Offices, take the precedence according to their antiquity of bearing charge. But in most Courts and Councils of War (and hath it by the determination of the Prince) the Officers of the Cavalry have seats given them before those of the Infantry, neither do the last contend for it.

It was near the time of the Emperours, before the *Romans* had any light armed Horsemen, but almost with all other Nations, and in all times, a Cavalry was divided into heavy and light armed, and they are called so from their offensive Arms, the heavy arm'd are called Curiaffiers, *Gens d'Armes*, and men at Arms from their defensive armour, but the light armed are now called Harquebusers from their offensive weapon; the Harquebuser which before the invention of the Musquet and Pistol, was a weapon (only differing in length) common to both the Foot and the Horse, and they had both their denomination of Harquebusers from it. And though none of them now use the Harquebuser, and that the Foot-firemen are called Musqueteers from the Musquet, yet the light Horse, though they use Pistols, keep still the old name of Harquebusers.

What Arms both for offence and defence both those kinds of Horsemen had formerly, and what now they have, is formerly told you in several Discourses.

It hath been of late a custom to arm the light Horsemen with Carrabines hung about their shoulders in Leather Bandiliers, besides their Pistols, so that upon the matter, whole Troops are so armed with Carrabines, that you may call them Carrabineers, but it was not so in former times, for only a prescribed number of them were ordain'd to attend every Troop of Curiaffiers, and had no Officers of their own, the manner of their service was to ride up within such a distance as they were order'd, and discharge their Carrabines on the enemy, and immediately turn to either hand by a Caragoll, and get them behind the Troop, and this they were oblig'd to do, as oft as they were commanded to it by him who was Captain of the Company of Curiaffiers. Hence it is that the Lord *Carbousine* tells us that Carrabine is a *Spanish* word deriv'd from *Cera*, which signifies a face; and *Bino* which signifies twofold, as one would say, double fac'd, because the Carrabineer kept his face to his enemy, till he had fired his piece, and then turn'd his face to his friends when he Caragoll'd.

In former times there were only Troops, but no Regiments of Horfe.

Numerous Regiments of Horfe.

French Cavalry.

Chapeau.

Gens d'Armes of two kinds.

Archers.

Light Horfe-men.

The difference between an Archer, and a light Horfe-man.

How many Horfes all three were oblig'd to keep.

Seventy or eighty years ago there were no Regiments of Horfe (properly fo called) only Troops or Companies, and thefe sometimes were two hundred ftrong, sometimes one hundred, and sometimes not fo many, and upon occafion of fervice, Troops were join'd together, and the command of fome of them given for a time by the Prince or State to fome perfon of great quality, whom they thought fit for that employment. Sometimes three Troops were join'd together, fometimes five or fix, yet they had not the name of a Regiment, nor had he who commanded that Body fo compofed, the title of Colonel. The Estates of the United Provinces ufed this much, but now they levy Regiments. The furious Wars which began in *Chriftendom* in the year of our Lord 1618, (whereof in procefs of time we had a deep fhare at home) reverfed many good old cuftoms and conftitutions, and with other changes introduced Regiments of Horfe, and not only fo, but brought in fuch numbers of them that I have feen in more Armies than one, a greater number of Horfe-Regiments than of Foot. Infomuch that fome years before the Peace of *Munfter*, Regiments of Horfe were fo weak that the Officers of the feveral Troops being all in the Van, did near make a full rank equal in number to any of the three ranks behind them, which were compofed of Riders or Troopers. And becaufe in Battel, Officers by their courage give good example, this helps well to make the Regiments and Troops fight well, and upon this account I aver that thefe Regiments confifted rather of four ranks, than of three, and fo were not properly three deep. But let us look a little further back, yet not beyond the time that Piftols came in requett.

The French Cavalry even in *Henry* the fourth's time, and the beginning of the Reign of *Lewis* the Juft, was compofed of three kinds, thefe were *Gens d'Armes*, Archers, and light Horfe. How the *Gens d'Armes* were mounted and arm'd hath been told you; and thefe were ufed by the ancient *Gauls* before ever the *Roman* name was known among them, and were called *Chapeau*. Thefe latter *Gens d'Armes*, or Curiaffiers, were all order'd in feveral Troops, but not in Regiments; thefe Troops were all to be compofed of Gentlemen by their birth, and were not of equal ftrength, they were of two kinds, for fome were in the Kings pay, fome not. Thofe entertain'd by the King, were called *Des Ordonnances du Roy*, or of the Kings Eftablifhment. Some of them confifted of one hundred Gentlemen, fome of fixty, fome of fifty, and fome of forty, according to the quality or merit of the Captain, or the pleafure of the Prince. The French Troops of *Gens d'Armes*, which were not in the Kings pay, were compofed of thofe Gentlemen who were obliged to ferve on their own charges three months within the Kingdom of *France*, and forty days without it.

The French Archers before the time of Gunpowder carried Bows and Arrows, and from thence had the name of Archers; but at this time of which I fpeak, they had for weapons, Piftols, Swords, Maces, or half Lances. Thofe who were called *Chevaux Legers*, or light Horfe, had much the like Arms, but inftead of a Piftol, each had a Harquebuis hanging at his Saddle. The main difference between thefe two confifted in this, that the Archers compofed no feveral or diftinct body of the Cavalry, but were to attend the *Gens d'Armes*, for every man of Arms had the allowance of an Archer to wait on him; fo that how ftrong foever the Company of the *Gens d'Armes* was, of that fame number were the Archers that attended it. But the Cavalry *Legere*, or the light Horfe were not at all oblig'd to any fuch attendance, but had a General of their own who march'd them, who march'd with them, and fought with them, either as he himfelf thought good, or as he was order'd to do by the Great Conftable, or one of the Marshals of *France*. And affuredly the Inftitution of the Archers to attend the men at Arms was excellent, for the Curiaffiers not being able to Caracol, are oblig'd in their charge to break thorough, or be beaten; and in any of thefe cafes, the Archers were of good ufe: If they were worfied to fupport them, or to purfue the enemy when he was put to flight, which the men at Arms could not do, becaufe of the weight of their Armour. Now all thefe three, *Gens d'Armes*, Archers, and light Horfemen, were oblig'd to keep each of them more Horfes than one; whereas now our Troopers are oblig'd to keep no more but one, and have allowance of a Piftol find

I find, that in the Wars which the Proteftants of *France* made with their Kings, *Charles* the Ninth, and his Brother *Henry* the Third; they managed them at as fmall an expence, as poffibly they could; yet they oblig'd every man at Arms, to keep three Horfes, two ftrong Courfers, and one Gelding; every Archer, and Light-Horfe-man, two, a good Horfe, and a good Nag. And I fuppofe, you will really think it ftrange, how they could keep fo many, when I tell you what allowance of pay they had: Every man of Arms had 45 French Livres in the Month, about Three pound fifteen fhillings Sterling; every Archer and Light-Horfe-man had Thirty Livres, about Two pound ten fhillings. A Captain of all three had five Riders pay allow'd him, the Lieutenant four, the Cornet three, and the Quartermafter two: very inconfiderable wages, but affuredly, they had either other shifts, or things were at eafier rates in *France* then, than they have been fince.

In the times of the Emperours *Ferdinand* the Firft, *Maximilian* the Second, *Rodolph* the Second, and *Matthias*, I find that the German Eftablifhment was, that no Rittmafter, or Captain of Horfe fhould have any Rider in his Troop but Gentlemen, and that every Troop of Curiaffiers fhould confift of Three hundred Riders, many whereof were bound to maintain three ferviceable Horfes, and all the reft, two at leaft; and every one of thefe Gentlemen who kept either two or three Horfes, were to keep a luty fellow well Hors'd, in quality of a fervant, armed with a long Gun, wherewith they rode, when commanded, before the Troop, and fired on the Enemy, and immediately retired behind the Troop, as I told you, the Carabineers did, thefe being equal in number to their Mafters, made up Three hundred, and refembled the French Archers. Thefe Dutch Servants had the Emperours pay, or that of fome German Prince, but their Mafters received it, with their own; nor had the Mafters power to put away thefe Servants, or the Servants to go from the Mafters, fo long as the War lafted; but if any difference arofe between them, it was voided by the Rittmafter, or Marhal of the Army. Thefe German Companies of Horfe had for Officers a Captain, a Lieutenant, a Cornet, a Quartermafter, and fix Corporals, whom they called Rittmafters (which is to fay, File-leaders) each whereof had fifty Troops under his command; two Trumpeters; There was likewife allowed to every Troop, a Prieft, a Clerk, a Chirurgion, a Dagmaker, a Saddler, and a Smith. All thefe Curiaffiers were armed for offence with two Piftols, a Sword, and a Lance; fo long as this laft was in fafhion; fo if you will reckon all that belonged to this German Troop, both Mafters, and thofe who attended them (who were all oblig'd to fight) you will find it confifted of fix hundred fighting men, and of nine hundred Horfes at leaft. But fince that time I have feen four Regiments in that fame Country, who were not all of them together fo ftrong.

In later times, Comiffions have been given for levying Regiments, free Squads, and Troops, but all Regiments did not, nor do not confift of alike number of Companies, nor all Companies of alike number of Riders, nay, not under one Prince, you fhall fee a Lieutenant Colonel have four Troops in his Squadron (which he calls free) becaufe he acknowledgeth no Colonel, or other Commander under the Major General, and each of thefe Troops to have fifty or fixty Riders, being oblig'd to have no more by their Rittmafters Capitation: You may fee in that fame Army a Regiment of fix Companies, each of Seventy men; another of eight Troops, each of fifty horfe, fo little is a uniformity in equal numbers of Troops, or of Horfemen in every Troop regarded, or look'd after. I faw one Regiment in the *Swedish* fervice (I may fay one, for I faw not fuch another in any of their Armies) in which were according to Capitation, twelve Troops, each of them confifting of one hundred Riders effectivly, but four of the Regiments of that Army were not fo ftrong, as that Regiment was alone.

Troops, Squads, and Regiments of Horfe in our Modern Wars, are not caft into Wedges or Rhombs as fome of the Ancient ones were, at which manner of figures *Allian* makes his *Grecian* Companies to be very dexterous: The Square front being now only in ufe. The number of Ranks of either Regiments or Troops, whether they be ftrong or weak, are alike in all, becaufe the depth of the Battel is determined by the Prince or State to be alike in all, and

In the Proteftant Wars, 14 years ago

Old German Companies of Horfe, particularly Curiaffiers.

Their Officers.

Troops and Regiment of thofe times.

How deep  
Horse should  
be marshal-  
ed.  
Difference of  
opinions.

Square Root.

Three deep.

in the matter of this depth there hath been great variance among those, who assume to themselves the title of Tacticks, who teach the rules of War. Many would have the file of Horsemen to be five deep; others will not hear of that, because thereby ranks cannot double; an objection which I have answer'd already, in my discourse of Exercise. Others will have six, because that admits doubling of ranks, but that is rejected, because if six deep be enough for the Foot, it will be too much for the Horse. There be others who would have every Troop of Horse to consist of sixty and four Riders, and these being Marshall'd eight deep, and eight in front according to the square root, make a perfect square of men and Horse, and this speculation seems very pretty, but I reserve my answer to it till I speak of the square root it self; for the present let it suffice, that if six deep be too many for a Cavalry, eight deep will be very far out of purpose. The late Earl of *Strafford*, as he appointed, in his Military Instructions, the foot to be eight deep, so he order'd his Troops of Horse to be four in File. But Universally now, for anything I know (unless it be in the Low-Countries) the Horse are Marshall'd three deep, without regard to doubling of ranks, whereof I have already spoken; and assuredly, this of all others, brings most hands to fight.

When you have known how deep the Troop is to be drawn up, you should cause to be set down in paper, in what order you will Marshal your Horsemen, whom you ordain to be Leaders, and whom Bringers up, and whom for the right and left hand files, that all your Riders may be placed according to their dignity, then it will be an easie matter to draw up your Troop, and for the Major to draw up the Regiment, for being that all the Horsemen are arm'd alike, there is no separation to be made of one part of the Troop from another, as there is of separating the Pikemen from the Miquelets in Foot-Companies, the Major giving every Rittmaster his place of dignity according to his antiquity or Commission; and those intervals being kept that are appointed, the several Troops, be they few or many, are very soon cast into the mould of a Regiment.

In my discourse of drilling, I said, that in exercising a Body of Horse, whether one Troop or more, some allow for order six foot, some, ten, and for file open order some allow twelve foot, and file and file sufficient, but in marching there should be the length of a Horse between rank and rank, but so much is not at all needful between files: now it seems the *Germans* allow ten foot for the length of a Horse in marching and exercising, as well as in their Caltramentation; for when Horse are orderly quarter'd in the field, ten foot of ground are allowed for a Horse to stand on between his head and his tail. But for all this, I say, six foot are not to be allowed in all motions of exercise, as in Whittling, which is the proper motion of the Cavalry, you cannot make it, till your ranks and files be at close order, and in this motion of Wheeling, observe, that the Wheeling to the left hand, being the Bridle hand, is more proper, than to the right: Observe also that after your body hath Wheel'd you are to reduce them to their first order, by making the ranks open, which they must do by advancing, and not by stepping back as the foot do.

The stronger the Troop be, it should have the more Corporals, who begin now to be qualified with the Title of Brigadiers, for it seems not proportionable for a Troop of One Hundred and Twenty to have no more Corporals, than a Troop of sixty, or seventy, yet for most part now all Troops have a like number of Officers, and these are, the Captain or Rittmaster, the Lieutenant, the Cornet, the Quartermaster, three Corporals or Brigadiers, two Trumpeters, some have three, and some four, a Saddler, and a Smith, and some allow a Chirurgion, and a Clerk. Many Troops have no allowance, for the last four, though all four are very necessary; In some places, if a Chirurgion be allowed for every Regiment, it is thought very fair, many Rittmasters entertain a Saddler and a Smith in their Troops, allowing them the pay of Trumpeters, and what benefit else they can make by their several Trades. But if all who ride in the Troop be Gentlemen, they will not permit these two Mechanics to ride with them, yet my opinion is, since all who ride now in Troops are not Gentlemen, they may without any disparagement, suffer a Smith and a Saddler to ride in rank with them, being they are profitable members of that little Commonwealth. It is, I think an oversight, that a

Clerk

Distance.

Wheeling.

Officers of a  
Troop.

Clerk is not allow'd for every Company of Horse; for a Quartermaster hath enough to doth otherwise, though he be not bound to officiate for the Clerk, to receive the Pay of the Troop, and give it out, and keep the accounts of it; unless you will say, that the paying Money to a Troop falls out so seldom, that the receiving it, will be rather a divertissement than a trouble to the Quartermaster.

Having spoke to the Duties of a Captain, Lieutenant, and Ensign-bearer of a Foot Company, I have nothing to add to the Duties of a Rittmaster, Lieutenant, and Cornet, but between the Quartermasters of Foot and Horse, there is this difference, that the first hath no command, but the second hath, in other duties there is none. But I shall tell the Quartermasters of Horse, that they should have skill in Caltramentation, as much as the Foot Quartermasters have, and rather more; for the last look only to the regular quartering of Men in the Field, the first to the quartering of both Men and Horses. A Corporal of Horse should have experience, for he either assists the Lieutenant in placing and setting the Guards, or he doth it himself without his Lieutenant, he sets the Sentinels, and sees them reliev'd; and orders the *Paravents*, which are Rounds. He is to ride in Rank, and if the Troop march not in breast, but in three several Squadrons, then there is a Corporal on the right hand of every Squadron; but in absence of higher Officers, Corporals lead Divisions, so do they those parties which they are to command, if there be none to command above them.

When a Troop is divided into three Squadrons, they have not their denominations from the Corporals or Brigadiers, but the first is called the Captains Squadron, the second the Lieutenants, the third the Cornets, and if there be a fourth, it is called the Quartermasters. When a Troop marcheth, the Captain leads the first division, the Cornet with his Standard the second, the Quartermaster leads the third, and the Lieutenant brings up; yet some will have the eldest Corporal to lead the last division, and the Quartermaster to bring up on the Lieutenants left hand, for which I see very small reason, or rather none at all. Some French Troops and ours likewise, have besides these Officers whom I have nam'd, a Sub-Lieutenant, or under-Lieutenant, who hath no command in the Lieutenants presence, but in his absence he commands over the Cornet; the French have likewise a *Guidon*, to whom perhaps may answer he who in other places is appointed to carry the Standard, either in the Cornets absence, or when he pleareth to appoint him to carry it. As to the Officers of the Regiment-Staff of the Cavalry, they are the same with those of the Foot, and their Duties are the same.

But now methinks I hear a Trumpeter found a Call. Of Trumpets and of Trumpeters I have spoke in my Discourses of the *Roman* Art of War: That which I have now to add, is, Trumpeters should be skillful to found all the points of War, and in the Fields they should seldom want their Trumpets about them for sudden Alarms: And because they are frequently sent to an Enemy, they ought to be both witty and discreet, and must drink but little, that so they may be rather apt to circumvent others, than be circumvented; they should be cunning, and wherever they are sent, they should be careful to observe warily the Works, Guards, and Sentinels of an Enemy, and give an account of them at their return to him who sent them. One Trumpeter should constantly lodge where the Standard quarters. The *Germans* Trumpeters assume to themselves a great deal of liberty, and have in a manner set up a Republick of their own, independent of that Discipline, by which the Army (of which they are members) is governed. They pretend to have their own Laws, whereby they punish crimes very severely, especially such faults, that any of their number commits against the Articles of War of that Prince whom they serve; and endeavour to vindicate themselves from any punishment inflicted by others, than those of their own Common-wealth. If any Trumpeter be abus'd or disgrac'd, whether by his own Rittmaster, or any other Officer, he rest resent it, as an injury done to the whole fraternity; for which they will very readily make him march a whole week without a Trumpeter to sound before him. None may found a Trumpet before a Troop but he who is master of their Art, and he must prove himself to be so, by produ-

H h 2

Quarter-ma-  
ster of Horse.

Corporals, of  
Brigadiers.

March of a  
Troop.

Sub-Lieute-  
nant.

*Guidon*.

Pretended  
privileges of  
the *Germans*  
Trumpeters.

cing a Certificate, sign'd by a certain number of Master Trumpeters, with their Seals annexed to it, and this in their Language, they call a *Larbrief*: If any, wanting this, offer to sound before a Company of Horse, the Masters may come and take him away with disgrace, in spite of the Rittmaster. Those who have not yet got *Larbriefs*, they call Boys, who must serve the Master Trumpeters in all manner of drudgery, though they could sound all the points of War never so well. They pretend to have got these privileges from the Emperor *Charles the Fifth*, under his Manual Subscription and Imperial Seal. Ask them where this Patent of theirs lyeth, some of them will tell you at *Augsburg*, others say at *Strasbourg*, and a third will say at *Nuremberg*. I have not seen any of them punished by their Officers, and whatever discipline of their own they have I know not, but I have not heard of any of their gross misdemeanors. I knew one Colonel *Boy*, an ancient Gentleman, who for many years had commanded Horse, in whose Regiment no sound of Trumpet was heard, for none of them would serve under him, because in his younger years he had kill'd a Trumpeter with his own hand. But it is well these pretended privileges of theirs are confin'd within the bounds of the *German* Empire.

There is another Martial Instrument used with the Cavalry, which they call a Kettle-drum, there be two of them which hang upon the Horse before the Drummers Saddle, on both which he beats: They are not ordinary, Princes, Dukes, and Earls, may have them with those Troops which ordinarily are called their Life-guards, so may Generals and Lieutenant Generals, though they be not Noble-men. The *Germans*, *Danes* and *Swedes*, permit none to have them under a Lord Baron, unless they have taken them from an Enemy, and in that case any Rittmaster, whatever extraction he be of, may make them beat beside his Trumpeters. They are used also for State by the Princes of *Germany* when they go to meat, and I have seen them ordinarily beat, and Trumpets sound at the Courts of *Sweden* and *Denmark*, when either of the two Kings went to Dinner or Supper.

Dragoons are Musketeers mounted on Horses, appointed to march with the Cavalry, in regard there are not only many occasions, wherein Foot can assist the Horse, but that seldom there is any occasion of service against an Enemy, but wherein it is both fit and necessary to joyn some Foot with the Horse, Dragoons then go not only before to guard Passes (as some imagine) but to fight in open Field; for if an Enemy encounter with a Cavalry in a campaign or open Heath, the Dragoons are obliged to alight, and mix themselves with the Squads of Horse, as they shall be commanded; and their continue firing, before the Horse come to the charge, will, no doubt, be very hurtful to the Enemy: If the encounter be in a close Country, they serve well to line Hedges, and possibls Enclosures, they serve for defending Passes and Bridges, whether it be in the Advantage, or a Retreat of an Army, and for beating the Enemy from them: Their service is on foot, and is no other than that of Musketeers; but because they are mounted on Horse-back, and ride with the Horse, either before in the Van, or behind in the Rear of an Army, they are reckon'd as a part of the Cavalry, and are subordinate to the General, Lieutenant General, or Major General of the Horse, and not to those of the foot. And being that sometimes they are forced to retire from a powerful and prevailing Enemy, they ought to be taught to give Fire on Horse-back, that in an open field they may keep an Enemy at a distance till they get the advantage of a closer Country, a Straight, a Pass, a Bridge, a Hedge, or a Ditch, and then they are bound to alight, and defend that advantage, that thereby (though perhaps with the loss of the Dragoons themselves) the Cavalry may be saved. When they alight, they cast their Bridle Reins over the necks of their side-mens Horses, and leave them in that same order as they marched. Of ten Dragoons, nine fight, and the tenth man keeps the ten Horses. For what they have got the denomination of Dragoons, is not so easie to be told, but because in all languages they are called so, we may suppose they may borrow their name from *Dragon*, because a Musketeer on Horse-back, with his burning Match riding at a gallop, as many times he doth, may something resemble that Beast, which Naturalists call a Fiery Dragon.

Since

Since then a Dragoon when he alights, and a Musketeer are all one, I have foreborn hitherto to speak of the several ways how the ranks of Musketeers fire, having refer'd it to this as a proper place. Take them then, thus:

If the enemy be upon one of your flanks, that hand file fires that is nearest the danger, and the next standing still to do the like, that which hath fired, marches through the rest of the files, till it be beyond the furthest file of that wing of Musketeers: But if you be charg'd on both flanks, then your right and left-hand files fire both, and immediately march into the middle of the Body, room being made for them; and in such pieces of service as these, Officers must be attentive, dexterous and ready to see all things done orderly, otherwise confusion first, and immediately after a total rout will inevitably follow. If your Body be retiring from an enemy who pursues you in the rear, the two last ranks stand, whereof one having fired, it divides it self into two, the one half by the right, the other half by the left-hand marcheth up to the Van, making ready all the while, this way is much practis'd, especially in the Low-Countries, but with submission to their better judgments, I should think it more easie for these ranks that have fired to march every man of them up to their Leaders, and then step before them thorough these intervals of three foot that is between files, and this may be done without any trouble either to themselves or their neighbours. If the service with the enemy be in the Van, as mostly it is, ranks may (after they have fired) fall off two several ways: First, the rank which hath fired, divides it self into two, and the half goes to the right hand, and the other half to the left, and then they fall down to the rear, and so of Leaders become Bringers-up, till another rank comes behind them. But I would have this manner of falling off banish'd out of all armies, for in a great Body it breeds confusion, and though in drilling it may leisurly be done without any considerable disorder, yet in service with an enemy, where men are falling, it procures a pitiful Embarras, and though it did not, yet it ought to give way to a more easie way of falling off, which is the second way I promised to tell you of, and it is that I spoke of, of falling down by the intervals of ground, that is between files, and this I would have constantly done by turning to the left-hand after they have fired, because after that Musketeers recover their Matches, and cast about their Muskets to the left-side, that they may charge again, which they are a doing, while they fall off to the rear. But there is a third way for Musketeers to do service better than by any of these two, and that is not to fall off at all, but for every rank to stand still, after it hath given fire, and make ready again standing, the second advancing immediately before the first, and that having fired likewise, the third advanceth before it, and so all the rest do, till all have fired, and then the first rank begins again. It is not possible that by this way of giving fire, there can be the least confusion, or any thing like it, if Officers be but half men; there is another way of firing sometimes practis'd, that is by three ranks together, the first kneeling, the second stooping, and the third standing, these having fired, the other three ranks march thorough the first three, and in the same postures fire likewise. But here I shall desire it to be granted to me that which indeed is undeniable, that when the last three ranks have fired, the first three cannot be ready to fire the second time. Next, firing by three ranks at a time, should not be practis'd, but when either the business seems to be desperate, or that the Bodies are so near, that the Pikemen are almost come to pull of Pike, and then no other use can be made of the Musket but of the Butt-end of it. I say then that this manner of six ranks to fire at two several times is not at all to be used; for if it come to extremity, it will be more proper to make them all fire at once, for thereby you pour as much Lead in your enemies bosom at one time as you do the other way at two several times, and thereby you do them more mischief, you quail, daunt, and astonish them three times more, for one long and continued crack of Thunder is more terrible and dreadful to mortals than ten interrupted and several ones, though all and every one of the ten be as loud as the long one. But that I seem not to pass my word to you for this, be pleas'd to take the authority of *Gustavus Adolphus* King of *Sweden*, who practis'd it at the Battle of *Lutzen*, where after he had fought long, and that the *Saxon* Army on his left-hand was beaten by the *Imperialists*, he caused the Musketeers of

The several services of a Musketeer.

How he fires in the flank, and falls off.

How in the rear.

Musketeers after firing fall off two several ways.

The first not at all good.

The second good.

But not at all to fall off is best.

Three ranks to fire at one time, and then the other three.

Not so good as all six ranks to fire at once.

Practis'd at Lutzen.



How to do it.

some of his Brigades to fire all at once by kneeling, stooping, and standing, which produced effects conform to his desire. If you ask me how fix ranks can fire all at one time, and level their Muskets right? I shall tell you the foremost three ranks must first be doubled by half files, and then your Body consists but of three ranks, and the posture of the first is kneeling, of the second stooping, and of the third standing, and then you may command them all to fire.

How Dragoons should fire, and fall off.

If you command your ranks (after they have fired) to fall to the rear any of the two ways already spoken of, though you take never so good heed, you shall lose ground, besides that it hath the show of a retreat, but by making the ranks successively go before those which have fired, you advance still, and gain ground. In this order should Dragoons fight in open field, when they are mixed with Horse, in this order also should they fire and advance when they intend to beat an enemy from a Pass. But when they are to defend a Pass, a Bridge, or a Strait, they must then after firing fall off to the rear, by marching thorough the intervals of their several files, because it may be supposed they have no ground whereon they can advance.

*Marsinet the French Marshal de Camp* tells us of another manner of firing different from all these that I have mentioned, as thus: Of six ranks of Musketeers he would have the first five to kneel, the sixth to stand and fire first, then the fifth to rise and fire next, and consecutively the rest, till the first rank have fired, after which he will have the foremost five ranks to kneel again, till the sixth discharge, if the service last so long. By this way you can gain no ground, and I think its very fair if you keep the ground you have, for I conceive you may probably lose it, and which is worse, the ranks which kneel before that which gives fire, may be in greater fear of their friends behind them, than of their enemies before them, and good reason for it, in regard when men are giving death to others, and in expectation of the same measure from those who stand against them, they are not so composed nor govern'd with so steady reason as when they are receiving leisurely lessons in cold blood, how to pour Lead in their enemies bosoms. But I have spoke of this in another place, perhaps more than becomes a private person, since I find that manner of giving fire is practised in the French Armies by order of his most Christian Majesty.

In the marshalling of Regiments, Brigades, Companies, and Troops either of Horse or Foot, Commanders must be very cautious when they have to do with an enemy, not to charge the ordinary forms, for if at that time you offer to introduce any new form wherewith your men are not acquainted, you shall not fail to put them in some confusion, than which an enemy cannot desire a greater advantage. If you have a new figure of a Battel in your head, be sure to accustom your Companies and Regiment very often by exercise to the practice of it, before you make use of it in earnest. But by this, let me not seem to put a restraint on any ingenious spirit that is capable to create new figures, I think they should be exceedingly cherisht by Princes and their Generals, and such of them as are approv'd by them should be practised. The old *Romans* indeed kept themselves morosely to their ancient forms, whereby they had been exceedingly prosperous, and call'd all new Inventions *Schematismus*. But we are not bound to follow them in all their opinions, for I am of *Lippus* his judgment, *Valde mihi placent nova, & novitia ista Inventiuncula*: These little new Inventions, saith he, please me mightily. Lieutenant-Colonel *Elton* in his Compleat Body of the Art of War, hath very many pretty figures of several Bodies of Foot, all of them exceeding delightful, and fit for show, and some of them for use, provided, Officers and Soldiers be often and thoroughly accusom'd to them, before they be practised in fight of an enemy. And to this purpose he himself speaks very well towards the end of his Book, and with his words I shall close this Chapter. "The substantial and solid things of War, are to be precisely regarded, without which an Army, though of the most valiant men, will be expost to the greatest dangers, and will fall into a most certain ruin."

Musqueteers on Horseback are called Dragoons in all Languages from the word *Dragon*, because when they are mounted on Horses, and riding with burning Matches (especially in the night time) they resemble fiery *Dragons* flying in the air, but now that in some places Dragooners Muskets are converted into Carabines (a change not to be despised, if the Carabine can send a Bullet as far

as

as a Musquet) I conceive they may rather be called Carabineers than Dragoons. In France the Lieutenant of Horse marcheth now on the left hand of the Captain or Ritmaster, four or five foot nearer the Troop, an Innovation, as many other customs are, against which I have little to say, or rather just nothing.

### An APPENDIX to the former CHAPTER.

HAVING spoken enough of the Officers of both Horse and Foot, and of those who are neither, and yet both Dragoons, it will not be amiss to speak a word or two to some Questions that are started concerning them. I shall propose them, and speak my thoughts of them; for to answer and solve them to the satisfaction of all, would be an undertaking purely impossible.

The first question shall be this, which of the two Officers of equal quality, both under one Prince or State, the one of Horse, the other of Foot shall command in chief, having no Superior at that time above them, supposing those who are to be commanded consist of both Foot and Horse. The second Question shall be, whether an Officer of an inferior quality may upon occasion command one of a higher degree: As whether a Lieutenant may command a Captain? The question is subdivided into two: As first, whether an Officer of Horse, of an inferior quality, may command an Officer of Foot of a higher degree? And next, whether an Officer of a King, Prince, State, or Generals Guards, ought or may have the command above an Officer of a Superior quality, in any other Regiment of the Army? Suppose a Lieutenant of the Guards of Foot to command over any Captain of another Regiment of Foot, and the like of the Horse, there may fall out a thousand emergencies and occasions for such encounters, and therefore they would be obviated and provided for by necessary and punctual orders. As suppose, which is very ordinary, there be but one general person with a part of an Army, and in an Encounter he is kill'd, the Colonels under him striving for the Command in chief, make themselves a prey to the enemy, which fell out but a very few years ago to the *Danes*, when they unfortunately fought against the *Swedes* in the Isle of *Rügen*. Next, suppose a strong party of Foot and Horse commanded by a Colonel, who hath under him but one Lieutenant-Colonel, and one Major, several Ritmasters, and Foot-Captains, the three Field-officers are kill'd, the question is, Whether the chief command belongs to the eldest Ritmaster, or the eldest Captain, or to him of these two, who can shew the eldest Commission in that same service. If the first of these Questions be well and judiciously handled and discuss'd, there will need but a few words to be spoken to the rest.

The first Question being, which of the two Officers of Horse and Foot of equal quality shall have the command? there be some who take a broad axe to it, and by an equal division would satisfy both parties, and say, that in the Fields the Officer of Horse, and in Towns, Castles, Garrisons, and fortified places, the Officer of Foot should have the prime command; this Arbitration would seem to give pretty good satisfaction to peaceable men, but the ambition of Commanders of Horse challenges the Superiority in all places; nor do I think the Officers of Foot should be so modest as to give it them in any place without the express command of the Prince, or his General. Affuredly this Superiority cannot in reason be challenged by either Foot or Horse, unless they conceive their employment is either more necessary, more to be trusted to, or more honourable than the other. We shall then get some light to decide the controversy, when we have examined whether the Cavalry or Infantry of an Army be most necessary, or most trusted to, and most honourable, or all three. And first as to the necessity, reason, and if I have any right reason, common sense will

will evince that *Horfes* are not absolutely necessary in the managing a War, but as they say, *ad bene esse*, only needful they are for the better managing the War, or to say better, they are useful and convenient, but the Foot are purely and absolutely necessary, as without which no War ever was, nor no War ever can be managed. Consider that the Impugnation and defence of Towns, Forts and Castles is one of the most important and most necessary points of War, or of the whole Military Art, yet these have been, may be, and for most part are maintained and defended, and assaulted and taken by the Foot only, without the help of *Horfemen*, and I think they are not Paradoxical, who say that *Horfemen* are so far from being necessary, that they are not convenient within besieged places, and without at Sieges as little, unless an enemy with Succours be expected. And in the field a well order'd and courageous well armed Battalion of Foot, are not so soon trode down by a Brigade of *Horse* as some men fancy, and when their charge is stoutly stood out, I know not what the *Horse* can do, but ride, I will not say, run away. If we look upon the practice of Nations both ancient and modern, we shall find all I have said supported, and more too. And though our young Gallants will be governed by no former customs, yet I believe Truth itself hath bid us follow the good old way. And therefore let us take a short view how little necessary many Nations have thought *Horfemen* to be in their Wars.

The first Battel we read of in holy Writ was when the King of *Sodom* and his Confederates were beaten, and the Prisoners and Goods rescued by *Abraham*, we find none of these nine Kings had any *Horfemen*; nor do I think any will fancy that *Abraham* mounted his three hundred and eighteen Servants on horseback when he pursued *Chedorlaomer*, *Amraphel*, and the other two Kings. If we had not the warrant of holy Writ for it, we should not be obliged to believe that the Kings of *Judah* and *Israel* would have mustered so many hundred thousands of men in such short and narrow spots of ground as that whereof they were masters; and since we read not of any *Horfes*, we may conclude, all their Armies consisted of Foot. Nay more, the Kings of *Israel* were commanded not to multiply *Horfes*; and *Solomon* is taxed for prevaricating with this command, as well as for his multiplying Wives and Concubines. Now if the Lord of *Holts* had thought it necessary that *Horfemen* should have been in the *Holt* of his Chosen people, he would not have forbid their Kings to multiply *horses*, but rather have commanded them to provide store of them for managing their Wars, which they might easily enough have done out of *Egypt*, where abundance of them were to be bought. It seems then to me that neither the *Israelites* nor their neighbours, the *Ammonites*, *Mobabites*, nor the Nations whom Gods people were order'd to extirpate, thought *Horfemen* necessary at all.

And if we peruse other *Histories*, we shall find that many ancient people of the world had many bloody Engagements without the help of *Horfes*. And not to go so far back, it is not yet above a hundred and sixty years since the *Switzers* with their Foot-Battalions without the help of one *Horseman*, durst fight against Armies composed of numerous Foot, *Horse*, and Artillery, witness their Victory at *Novara* over the *French* Army, wherein they destroyed all the *French* Infantry, took all their Cannon, and chace'd away all their Cavalry. And *Francis* the First knew well what work they gave him at *Martignan* when he was in person at the head of two brave Armies of Foot and *Horse*, one *French*, the other *Venetians*, as you have it related in the seventh Chapter of the *Modern Art of War*. The *Americans* following the light and law of Nature, made fierce Wars among themselves before *Columbus* discover'd them, without *Horse*; and when they saw some of these Animals mounted by *Spaniards*, they had such notions of them, as fabulous Antiquity had of the *Centaurs*, whom they imagin'd to be half men, half beast. The civiliz'd *Grecians* made use of *horses*, but not as absolutely necessary, for many of their Battels were fought without them. And the *Romans* who conquer'd most of the then known World, made use but of few of them, and many times they made their *Horfemen* quit their *horses*, and fight on foot, so little accounted they them to be absolutely necessary; but of this more hereafter. Only observe, that as the *Grecians* had but the sixth part or the eighth of their Armies *horse*, so the *Romans* for most part had but the fourteenth part of their Army mounted on horseback. And let no man say that this

this was done for want of *horses*, for so it continued to be when they were Masters of all *Italy*, *Spain*, *France*, much of *Affrick*, and a good part of *Greece*. How little *James* the Fifth of *Scotland* conceived *Horfemen* to be necessary in his Armies, you may see in an Act of his Parliament, Anno 1640, two years before his death, wherein he ordains that if any come to the place of *Randezvous* on *Horseback*, he shall send back his *horse* with a Foot-boy, except *Earls*, *Lords*, and *Barons*, and the reason he gives, is because these *Horfes* destroy poor peoples Corn and Meadows, and are not necessary in his *Holts*, where all men must fight on foot.

In my Discourses of the *Grecian* and *Roman* Art of VVar, I spoke not of these questions mentioned here: for as the *Lacedemonians* being asked why their Law-giver *Licurgus* made no Law against Thieves? answered, because no such crime as Theft was heard of among them; so I say, neither *Grecian* nor *Roman* knew any thing of those questions mentioned in these Papers. And since by what is said, VVars have been, and may be managed (though not so well) without *Horse*, but not at all without Foot, I conclude the last absolutely necessary, but not the first; what reason then that a Foot-Officer that is absolutely necessary, should be commanded by an Officer of *Horse*, without whom the War in case of necessity may be managed?

Next, we are to consider whether the *Horse* or Foot is most trusted, and which of the two Services is most honourable, and these I shall speak of not severally, but conjunctly, for I suppose it will not be denied that the greater the trust be, the greater is the honour; for if the King intrust a Citizen or a Merchant, who is neither Lord, Knight, nor Gentleman, to be a Privy Councillor, certainly that Citizen by that great trust is not only honourable, but right honourable, and that title belongs to him as well as to a Lord. We are here to consider that an Army composed of *Horse* and Foot, represents a man, the Infantry his body, the Cavalry his sides, assuredly the intrinsic parts of a man that are contained within his breast and belly, are more honourable than the extrinsecal ones, which be his sides, legs, and arms; and hence it is that they get the name of noble and vital parts, and if this comparison hold, as I hope it will, then it is as extravagant a desire of an Officer of *Horse* to be admitted to command over an Officer of Foot as for the rib of a mans side to seek power over the heart, liver, or lungs of the same man. Or if you please, an Army is like to a bird or fowl, the Infantry is the body of the bird, and the Cavalry the two wings; the sides of a man may be pitifully wounded, and the wings of a bird broken, and yet the bodies of both man and bird preserved; and even so, as long as the Infantry keeps the Field, Victory is there, though both the sides or wings of the *Horse* be broken and fled. And so it fell out at the Battel of *Oxenfield* in *Germany*, in the year 1638.

With the Infantry the Artillery both ancient and modern, was, and is constantly intrusted with the Infantry, the Magazines of Arms, Provisions, Victuals, Ammunition and Money is intrusted; with the Infantry are intrusted the Castles, Forts, Ports, Havens and Strengths of the Land, and the Prince his Treasure, and these make the vitals, not only of an Army, but of a State. In fortified Camps not only all these, but even the Cavalry it self are intrusted to the Infantry, who are to maintain and defend the Ramparts, Bastions, and whole Circumvallation of the Camp. With the Infantry the Prince who manageth the War, or his General, or both constantly intrust themselves, and either the one or other is the head of the Army: Now, as I said before, where the greatest trust is, there is the greatest honour; and consequently the Infantry are more honourable than the Cavalry. These things were well enough known to the *Grecians* and *Macedonians*; he that commanded the whole *Phalanx*, that is the whole Army, stayed with the heavy armed Foot, so did all the Artillery and Ammunition of the Army. And certainly they had Detachments, as well as we have; and the *Sunagmarch* of a Foot-*Phalanx* had under his command two hundred and fifty six men, with Colours and suitable Officers; how would the merry *Greeks* have laughed, if this *Sunagmarch*, whom our Captains fifty years ago in many places, (when Companies were three hundred strong) did represent, had been required to submit himself to the command of an *Elarchois*, who was Captain of sixty four *Horse*, and represented our Rittmasters now a-days; for sometimes the *Grecian* Troop of *Horse* was one hundred.

In the *Roman Art of War*, a Legion was commanded by Tribunes by turns, or as we call it from the *French*, by *roues*; he whose fix month it was to command, had ordinarily four thousand two hundred, sometimes five thousand, and sometimes six thousand Foot under his command; the Horse ordained to attend this Legion were but adjecitious, and were seldom above three hundred, sometimes not so many. The denomination of any Officer is *a majori parte*, from the greater part, and therefore the Tribune was a Colonel of Foot, and yet commanded these three hundred Horse as absolutely as he did any Centuriate in the Legion. Hence it is that with reason I aver that in the *Roman Discipline* the Horse were constantly commanded by Officers of Foot; and peruse all the *Roman Histories* you shall not find that ever any Officer of Horse pretended to the command of any of the Foot. With the *Roman Infantry* were intrusted their Balists, Catapults, their Battering Rams, their Ambulatory Towns, their Bridges, and all the Materials whereof these were composed. Now these were the Artillery of the Ancients: with the *Roman Infantry* were intrusted the Treasurer and Treasure of the Army, all Provisions for Man and Horse, their Altars and places of Devotion; and though the Troops of Horse had their petty Standards and *Vexilla*, yet the Eagle which was mounted on a long Pole, and was the great Ensign of the Legion, was constantly intrusted to the keeping of the first Centurion, who was a Foot-officer. With the Foot the Consul march'd, lodg'd, and fought. All these being intrusted to the *Roman Foot*, and not to the Horse, shews that these Conquerours of the World esteemed the Foot-service more honourable than that of Horse; for still I say, the more trust the more honour. It is true, the *Roman Horsemen* were all elected of Gentlemen, (for so I interpret the *Equestris Ordo*) and therefore I doubt not but they had a Precedency at door and Table before the Legionary Soldiers, who were all levied out of the Commons; but that gave them no Superiority or command over the Foot, which is the thing now pretended to. Nor will the *Roman Discipline*, which order'd the Horse to ride the Rounds about the Guards of Foot, as you have it in the twenty second Chapter of the *Roman Art of War*, entitle these Horsemen to any Superiority or command over these Guards of Foot; no more than a Gentleman who is sent to go a Round with Musqueteers to attend him, will evince that he hath the command of these Guards or any Centinel of them, both the Ancient and Modern Rounds being only obliged to give an account to those who sent them, in what posture they found the Guards and Centinels; yea, these four *Roman Horsemen* who were to ride the Rounds, were commanded to lye at the door of the Hut or Tent of a Centurion of Foot, which I think denoted their subjection to him.

Thus I think it is clear, that with these ancient *Romans*, to whose arms and discipline of War most of the world paid homage, the Foot-service was more honourable than that on Horseback. To confirm this, I hope it will be granted me, that where the greatest danger is, there is to be expected the greatest honour. Now very often the *Roman Consuls* where they saw the Enemy prevail in Battel, they called the Cavalry or a part of it thither, but mistake it not, it was not to fight on horseback, but to make them alight from their Horses, and fight on foot with the Legionaries, which encouraged the Foot when they saw the Horse could not ride from them. And therefore since the danger was greater to fight on foot than on horseback, the *Romans* thought fighting on foot more honourable than fighting on horseback, and consequently the Foot-service more honourable than that of Horsemen. *Julius Caesar* the greatest Captain that ever was, practis'd this in the greatest Battel he ever fought, which was against the *Helvetians*, now called *Swissers*. To shew good example he alighted first from his horse, and then caused all his Cavalry to alight, and as himself tells us, caused all the horses to be driven away a great way from that place of Battel. And so did several of the *Roman Consuls* before him. And I think you need not doubt but the horsemen being on foot were marshal'd by the Tribune as the Foot were, and so the Decurions who were Captains of horse, received their orders from the Centurions, each whereof commanded sixty Footmen, whereas the Decurion had but the command of thirty. So here we see Officers of Horse commanded by Officers of Foot, but never the contrary. I find *Abner*, *Joab*, *Amasa*, fight still on foot, and so did their Master *David* King of *Israel*, so did

*Saul*

*Saul* before him, and most of the Kings of *Judah* and *Israel* after him, except some who fought on Chariots to their small advantage, but none fought on horseback; I believe *Abisalom* fought on foot, though after his rebellious Army was routed, he mounted on a Mule to carry him away with more haste than good speed. Many Kings in the Modern Wars since Gunpowder made a noise, have fought on foot; *Edward* the fourth of *England* fought nine Battels on foot, our Kings of *Scotland* did so frequently. And if King *James* the fourth was kill'd at *Flodden*, he was slain fighting on foot, and all these were Princes who trac'd the path of honour, and studied both to shew their own valour, and to overcome their enemies, which they conceived they did more properly on foot than on horseback.

Since the best govern'd Kingdoms and States both ancient and modern have given the honour to the Foot and not the Horse, by intrusting them with their chief strength, their Treasure, their Artillery, Provisions, Ammunition, Towns, Castles, and fortified places, I cannot enough admire what new light the Commanders of Horse of our time have got, that can move them to demand a Superiority over the Officers of Foot, of equal quality with themselves. If they say because they can be sooner at an enemy than the Foot can, it will be answered that they can also ride sooner from an enemy than the Foot can go. I shall easily grant that three or four score years ago, the Curiaffiers of *Germany*, and *Gens d'Armes* of *France* being all Gentlemen might very well have Precedency at door or board of the Foot Soldiers, but could not thereby pretend to any Superiority or command over them. But now the case is altered, for in *Germany*, *Denmark*, *Sweden*, the *Low-Countries*, and here with us in *Scotland* and *England*, for most part the horsemen are levied out of the Plebeians as well as the Foot. And I believe the *Gens d'Armes* of *France* are most fallen from their Primitive Institution, most of their Cavalry being composed of the Vulgar, except the Ban and Arreerban, which consists of Gentlemen that have Estates in lands, who by the tenure of their Lands and Inheritance are bound to serve the King on horseback, so many days within, and so many days without the Kingdom.

But before I go further I conceive my self obliged to anticipate an objection, which both may, and will be made by the great Champions of the Cavalry, and it is this, that many, at least some States and Kingdoms have been, and some at this day are, whose strength consisted, and consists in Horse, and not in Foot. But though I grant them all they seek, which yet I will not do, they gain nothing unless they make it appear that a War can and may be managed with horse alone, and not with any Foot, which they will never be able to do. First, they say that in the days of *Tore*, the greatest strength of *France* consisted in Horse; that Kingdom indeed gloried much in a noble and courageous Cavalry, but examine their stories, you will find that the most glorious of their Kings, *Charles* the Great, his Father *Pepin*, and his Father *Charles Martel*, their famous achievements in *France*, *Saxony*, *Germany*, *Spain* and *Italy* were done with Foot as well as with horse; many of their Kings fought on foot, and *Orlando* Nephew to *Charles* the Great, when he had fought well on foot died, of thirst and wounds. Those of their Kings who made their Cavalry their greatest strength in the field, bought it dear when they were so often worsted by the *Spaniards*, *Flemings*, but most of all by the *English*, whose greatest strength consisted in Infantry. This made the *French* Kings beg and hire Foot from *Scotland*, *Germany*, and mostly from the *Swissers*. These last being discontented with *Lewis* the Twelfth, made all *France* tremble, when with a numerous Army (in which not one Horseman was to be seen) they were like to fall like an Inundation on that Kingdom, and were come the length of *Dijon* in *Burgundy*, and had reach'd *Paris* without stroke of Sword, if the Duke de *Tremouille* had not amus'd them with a Treaty, in which he was forc'd to grant them all they desir'd, and for performance gave them what Hostages they required. *Francis* the First perceiving the error of some of his Predecessors, in trusting too much to Horses, ordered seven Legions of Foot, all *French* to be levied, enrolled, and paid each consisting of seven thousand men, to stand perpetually in time of Peace and Wars, and these he call'd, and I think very deservedly, the sinews and nerves of *France*.

Next they will object, that the *Mamluks* kept their Empire in *Egypt* and *Syria* above two hundred years with Horse, and without Foot. This is a horrible mistake, for their Towns and Forts were taken by Foot, and defended by Foot without Horse. They also lost their Empire by putting too much trust in their Horse, for the Great *Turk Selim* with his Foot and Cannon beat and kill'd *Campion Gaurus* in the Field, and *Tomomby* at *Cairo*, and so put an end to that Tyrannical Monarchy.

Thirdly, They will instance the *Persian*, who defends his Kingdom without Foot, only with Cavalry; but this is a mistake, for their Towns are defended with Foot, and *Ismael* in the *Calderan* Plains pay'd dear for trusting so much to his Horse, when he was chac'd away by *Selime* Foot and Artillery. Since that time the Kings of *Persia* have endeavour'd, but without success, to get *European* Officers to Train their Foot, and order their Artillery; for my part I can as soon dream that the *Persian* Squadrons of Horse put themselves in Enchanted Castles, as that they defended their Towns against Sieges and Assaults of the *Turks* with Horse and no Foot. And I can as soon fancy that the *Sophi* rode with forty thousand *Persians* all on Horseback over the Walls of *Babylon*, as that he took it back from the *Turk* without an Infantry.

The *Hungarians* will come next in play, but they never managed any of their Wars without Foot, though they pay'd as dearly for trusting too much to their Cavalry as ever any did, their Army consisting most of Horse being routed by *Solimani* Foot and Cannon, and their King kill'd, and most of their Kingdom made a Province, the remainder of it falling into the House of *Austria's* lap, hath been these hundred and twenty years well defended by *German* Foot.

It will be in vain to bring *Pole* on the stage, for peruse the Histories of that Nation, you will find none of their Wars to have been made either offensively, or defensively without Foot; to imagine that the *Polonians* conquer'd the half of *Prussia* from the Knights of the *Teutonic* Order, and took in so many well wall'd Towns without Foot against that warlike fraternity, is a meer speculation. Nor have they bought the great trust they repose in a numerous and valiant Cavalry at a cheap rate. In the year 1621 *Pole* was sav'd almost by a miracle, for assuredly Prince *Vladislaw* would not have defended his Fathers Kingdom, though he had eighty thousand Horse, and some thousands of Foot with him, against *Sultan Osman*, who invaded it with three hundred thousand *Turks*, the great Body and strength whereof consisted in the *Janizaries*, who mutinying against the *Grand Signior*, forc'd him back to *Constantinople*. But what a risk did *Pole* run lately in the years 1655, and 1656, and 1657, where *Charles Gustavus* overcame that Kingdom with an Army of twenty thousand men, most of them Foot; and observe what a well train'd and order'd Infantry can do, *Anno* 1656, when the rebellious *Polonians* had returned to their duty, and that their King *John Casimir* in the head of one hundred thousand Horse, and a considerable number of Foot and Cannon, assisted and flankt with some Trenches and Redoubts, was routed and beat out of the Field by the King of *Sweden*, and the Elector of *Brandenburgh*; both whose forces in Horse and Foot did not exceed thirty two thousand. If all this be true that I have said, as I believe it is, then I may conclude, that the Foot-service is more necessary, more honourable, and of greater trust than the Horse one. Since I believe I have made it appear that a War in all its parts, points and dimensions may be managed with Foot, without any Horse, (though I confess not so well) but that it can be so without Foot, is a pure Speculation; why should then Officers of Horse be so overweening as to pretend to a Superiority over Commanders of Foot of equal quality with themselves, since they themselves may with less hurt and less inconvenience be spared out of an Army, than those of the Infantry? Nor do I see with what right an Officer of Horse can pretend to the command of an Officer of Dragoons of the like quality, for that Dragoons are reckon'd to belong to the Cavalry, though their service be on foot, will only entitle the General or Lieutenant-General, or Major General of the Horse to command over them, but not a Rittmaster to give Orders to a Captain of Dragoons, unless he can shew an elder Patent. Yet when I serv'd in *Germany*, this Emperours Father order'd a Colonel-General over all his Dragoons, but whether he was Independent from the Commander in chief of the Horse, I cannot so well tell. And if

in the field the Commanders of Horse ought not to assume this Superiority, much less ought they to do it in Garrisons, Towns, Castles, or yet in Barricaded Villages, for these do resemble fortified places. On the other hand, notwithstanding the opinion of some, who understand well enough, I think it would be of very hard digestion for an Officer of Horse, though within a Fort or walled Town to receive Orders from a Foot-officer of a lower quality than himself. Suppose a Colonel of Horse to be under the command of a Lieutenant-Colonel of Foot, or a Major of Horse under a Captain of Foot. For though there be no Subordination between them, yet when an Officer of a higher quality is commanded by one of an inferior degree, it brings superior charges in disrespect and dislike, which would carefully be avoided. *Koningmark* who became a famous General in the *German* War, when he was Colonel of Horse, came to lye with some of his Troops in *Osnabrug*, where Lieutenant Colonel *Lunsdaine* commanded in absence of his Brother Sir *James Koningmark* pretended to that Command, protesting that if Sir *James* who was a Colonel, had been there, he would willingly have submitted to his Command, but that either himself, or any other Colonel should receive Orders from a Lieutenant-Colonel, was a thing he neither could nor would understand: A temperament was found out by those who mediated between them, and the expedient was, that the Lieutenant-Colonel should keep the Keys, and exercise all other functions of a Governour, except the giving the Word, which the Colonel of Horse should give week about; this sav'd the Lieutenant-Colonels interest, and the Colonels reputation. The Great *Gustavus Adolphus* King of *Sweden* order'd that where two or more Colonels of Horse or Foot were in the Field or Quarter together, without any General Officer to command above them, the Colonel who had the eldest Commission, should command in chief, whether he serv'd to Horse or to Foot, and so it was to be understood of all other Officers under a Colonel. And whereas it might fall out that many several Colonels might have received their Patents all in one day, or that otherwise their antiquity might be debatable, in that case it was order'd that they should cast lots, which is an excellent way, for the wisest of men hath left it on record in the best of Books, That the lot causeth contention to cease, and parteth between the mighty. Now why should any Soldier, or why should any General, nay, why should any Prince be ashamed to follow the rule or example of so famous a King, or so renowned a Captain as Great *Gustavus* was known to have been.

Having spoken so much to the first question, I suppose I need speak but little to the second, which, you may remember, I subdivided into two parts, the first was, Whether an Officer of Horse may command an Officer of Foot; though of a superiour quality, as suppose a Lieutenant of Horse command a Captain of Foot, a Quartermaster of a Troop of Horse to command a Lieutenant of Foot, a Captain of Horse to command a Major of Foot, and that only by virtue of their serving on horseback: But if it be true, what I have asserted, and endeavoured to prove, that no Officers, (what ever their service be) Horse or Foot, of equal quality can with reason pretend to the command of one another; then it will assuredly follow, that an Inferiour can far less pretend to any such authority over a Superiour. But there seems to be a greater difficulty in the second question, which is, Whether an Officer of a King, Prince, or Generals Guards, either of Horse or Foot, ought to command over not only his equals in another Regiment or Troop, but even over those, who in quality are above him: As whether a Lieutenant of these Guards may not, or should not command over any Captain of another Regiment, or a Captain of those Guards over any Major of the Army. And truly, as the question is stated, and so ordinarily it is stated, I must answer negatively: And yet shall go as great a length, with these Officers of Guards, as I conceive true Military Discipline, and method of War will permit me, and perhaps further. I say then, that a Generals guard either of Horse or Foot, much more that of a King, or absolute Prince, in a march should constantly have the Vant of all other Regiments, Companies, or Troops of the Army, both for their honour and that they may be in time at the Head quarter to officiate, and do duty: I say next, that all Officers belonging to these guards have the priority and precedence, not only of Door and Table, but even in all Courts and Councils of War, before any

any other Officers in the Army of their own rank and quality; but not of others of a higher charge; nay more, though it be a received maxim both in the Civil and Military Law, that *Par in parem non habet potestatem*, One equal hath no power over his equal; yet I hold when Officers of guards are by some emergency or other, or by command, to march, or quarter with Officers of other Regiments of equal quality; the Officer of the guards should have the command over the other. Suppose these be either Captains, Lieutenants, Majors, Lieutenant Colonels, or Colonels, further than this I cannot go, till I get more light, than the high demands of some hath yet afforded me. Nor can I fancy any reason for this pretence of superiority, but the will and pleasure of the Prince, his General or his Privy Council, and indeed that must neither be contradicted nor controul'd; yet I conceive, the inconveniences of such an unusual command, may be represented to the Prince, his General and his Council; and I suppose they will be loth to give, or to leave any occasions of heart burnings, animosities, debates, or discontents. How strange and odd will it be to see a young and raw Captain of the guards, who by the favour of powerful friends hath come to that charge, to command over a grave and experienced Major? it is the way to make Discipline of War contemptible to some, and ridiculous to others. I remember that in *Germany* one of the *Swedish* Lieutenant Generals had the chief command of a little Army, and over all the Garrisons of that Country, which were not few; a strong party of that Army of Horse and Foot was drawn out to attack a little Town strongly barricado'd, by the enemies; five hundred commanded Foot were to fall on first, under the conduct of a Lieutenant Colonel: He who was Lieutenant Colonel of the Lieutenant Generals Regiment, which had the name of Guards, pretended to the command, and debated it strongly; there was an elder Lieutenant Colonel than he, of another Regiment, who stiffly refused to yield to the Lieutenant Colonel of the Guards, pretending to the command, because he had been a Lieutenant Colonel in the *Swedish* service long before the other; the Lieutenant General is consulted, who presently order'd them to cast the Dice for it, his own Lieutenant Colonel by lot gained the honour, but lost his life by the bargain: You see how this Lieutenant General was loth to give occasion of discontent, by preferring an Officer of the Guards to another of that same quality, but of an elder standing; and yet, if I had been worthy to have been Arbitrator, I had awarded the command to the Lieutenant Colonel of the Guards: Thus far have I hazarded to publish my opinion of this controverted point; and as every thing that men write, must be subject to the variable judgments of several Readers, so I profess I shall be willing to alter my opinion when the reasons of others shall even but probably convince me to have been in an error. I am sure to maintain either the one or the other, will transgress neither Act or Statute of either Church or State. Ordinances of War, even of the greatest of men, are not irrevocable as the Decrees of the *Medes* and *Persians* were said to be. But notwithstanding any reason can be given for the maintenance of what I have said in avoiding this question, this great King of *France* gives a Superiority of some Officers over others of that same degree, and not only to those of his own Guards (which are very many) and those of the Queen, the *Dolphine*, and *Monseigneur* his Brother, which I look upon as tolerable; but he gives the command to *French* Officers over strangers of a higher quality, in so much that in one Chapter of his Ordinances, he orders Lieutenant-Colonels who are strangers, to be commanded (if I remember right) by a *French* Ensign. If private men might examine the Directions of mighty Monarchs, I should think this were enough to encourage all strangers to offer their service to the Capital Enemies of his most Christian Majesty.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. XIII.

Of Feltmarshals, Lieutenant-Feltmarshals, Lieutenant-Generals, Generals of the Cavalry, and Infantry, Major-Generals, and Adjutant-Generals.

OUR Modern forces being levied, muster'd, arm'd, well exercis'd, disciplin'd, paid and provianted, and moulded in Troops, Companies and Regiments, call now for General Officers, that these Independent Bodies whereof I have spoken may be cast in the shape of an Army. These shall not be wanting, for it is but too ordinary to have more General Officers in an Army than there are Colonels in it, and yet a great deal of more Colonels than are necessary, if you consider the weakness of their Regiments. And truly I think it is an insupportable abuse and vanity, that no sooner is a Lieutenant or Major-General sent with a part of the Army on some exploit, which may require some considerable time, or that upon some other occasion, either for a speedy march, the accommodation of the Army, or the ease of the Country, every one who commands apart one wing or Tertia of that Army, in a very short time makes up a complete General staff. Of the General of the Artillery, Commissaries, Muster-masters, and Proviant-masters General, and of the Auditor and Provost-marshal General, I have spoke in their proper places, and so I shall hereafter of the Quarter-master, Scout-master, and Waggon-master General, and now I am to give you a brief description of these General Officers mention'd in the Title of this Chapter.

The word *Felt*, or Field-marshal imports nothing else but that person who marshals the Field, and is called in *French*, *Marshal de Camp*, and so the Primitive institution of the Office was, and so it continued, till within these fifty years; for the present in *Germany*, *Sweden* and *Denmark*, those who command Armies Royal consisting of Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery, are qualified by the Titles of *Felt-marshals*, and have an equivalent authority to the ancient Marshals of *France* far above that of *Marshals de Camp*; and those *Felt-marshals* have under them Lieutenant-Generals of the whole Army, Generals and Major-Generals of Horse and Foot, and these last are now the Marshals of the Field, for they draw up the several Regiments and Brigades of both in order of Battle. So upon the matter a *Felt-marshal* is now General or Commander in chief of the Army, so were *Barrier*, *Torstenjone*, and *Wrangel*, successively one after another, in the long *German War*, under *Christina* Queen of *Sweden*. These *Felt-marshals* now have Generals and Trains of Artillery under them. A *Felt-marshal* absolute command of an Army, as I said before, is of no old date, for in my time *Ho* was *Felt-marshal* to *Wallenstein*, *Gustavus Horne* to the King of *Sweden*, *Kniphausen* to the Duke of *Lunenbourg*; and as in process of time he hath intently attain'd to a higher and more absolute power than before, so the Title of Lieutenant *Felt-marshal* signifies now more than it could be interpreted to do at its first institution, and the title it self is not old. When the late King of *Sweden* invaded *Pole*, he gratified some of his ancient General Officers with this Title, and it was then and is now, where it is used, look'd upon as more honourable than that of Lieutenant-General, for what reason I cannot divine; yet it is certainly so, for a Lieutenant *Felt-marshal* commands Generals of Horse or Foot, Count *Koningmark* had commanded several Armies in chief in the long *German War* both prudently and successfully under the title of Lieutenant-General, but thought himself honour'd seven years after the Peace of *Munster*, with this title of Lieutenant *Felt-marshal*. That must be most honourable that a Prince fancies to be so, and there is good reason for it, because he is the fountain of honour.

Many General persons in an Army.

Lieutenant-Felt-marshal

Lieutenant-General of an Army.

Roman Legates.

A good custom.

General of the Cavalry.

His Duties.

A Lieutenant-General, (if you take the word strictly) hath no command when his General is present; I think it is a most proper Title for those who command Armies in chief under a Monarch or free State, because they are their Lieutenants in *Militariibus*, or if a Prince have appointed a Captain-General to command all his forces, then that Captain-General commissions Lieutenants-Generals to command petty Armies under him; but when he joins his forces, the Command of the Lieutenant-General seems to cease, because he is but the Deputy of him that sent him, and a Representative is no more a Representative, when he whom he represented is present. The Roman Consuls had their Lieutenant-Generals, who were called Legates, who commanded Armies apart, when the Consuls thought fit, but had no command when the Consul was present. Nor doth *Cæsar* give those Legates even in the Consuls absence, an absolute power; for speaking of one of his own Legates in the French War, I believe it was *Labiennus*, he commends him for not hazarding a Battel with the *Gauls*, though he seem'd to have the advantage, because, saith he, a Legate hath not that power which he hath, who is *Imperator* or Commander in chief. One of the Dukes of *Annals* commanded an Army in France against the Protestants with the Title of Lieutenant-General, but so soon as he join'd forces with *Henry Duke of Anjou*, who was Captain-General for his Brother *Charles the Ninth*, the Duke resign'd both his Title and Office. But notwithstanding all this, Lieutenant-Generals continue both in their Title and Office in their Generals presence; and I have known Felt-marshal have Lieutenant-Generals under them, who have commanded both the Horse and Foot of their Armies, even when the Felt-marshal was present; as the Earl of *Bramford* who was Lieutenant-General to Felt-marshal *Barrier*, and *King*, who was Lieutenant-General to Felt-marshal *Leflie*. I think the great Dukes of *Muscovia* have a very commendable custom to chuse any of their Colonels, who they fancy are qualified for it to be Generals or Lieutenant-Generals of a competent number of forces fit for the expedition they are to be employed in, and so soon as that piece of service is done, the Colonel lays down his Commission, and returns to his former Charge, without the least thought or imagination, that he is disparag'd thereby, the frequent practice of this custom banishing such thoughts out of all mens heads. Neither would such a practice be fancied to be a degrading of men from former honours in other places of the world, if they were but a little habituated to it. The French gives now the Title of Lieutenant-Generals very frequently, I suppose they are independent one of another, and are the Kings Lieutenant-Generals, which is very proper, and obey none but such as he commands to give Orders to them.

A General of the Cavalry commands it under him who is Commander in chief of the Army, whatever title he bear, whether General, Felt-marshal, Lieutenant Felt-marshal, or Lieutenant-General. He is to see the Troops and Regiments of Horse kept at that strength that they are appointed to be of; and if by Battel, long marches, great fatigue, or other accidents of War, the numbers of men be diminish'd, Horses lost, or made unserviceable, it is his duty when they come to Quarter, to see the Troops made strong, the Horses put in good case, and the Riders well cloth'd and arm'd. In Musters he is obliged to see that no Colonel or Ritmaster wrong the Muster-masters, by making a show of borrow'd men, Horses or Arms, whereby the Prince may be cheated in his Purse, or disappointed in his service. He is to take care that the Cavalry be paid, and provided with Proviant and Fodderage, and good Quarter. He should also be a person who understands something of the Foot-service, in regard that when the greatest part of the Horse is sent in any Expedition, ordinarily some Foot are sent with them, and then it is the General of the Cavalries office to command both. But it is a pity that all General persons should not make it their study and their work to understand both the Foot and Horse-service, for I have seen considerable parties of Foot more hara's'd and spoil'd in a short time under the command of an Officer of Horse, than if they had been routed by an enemy; so little discretion some have to know the difference between a man and a Horse. It seems in the Low Country service the General of the Horse commanded next the General, and in his absence over the Army, even when they had Felt-marshal; but that custom is not now in other places

places where Felt-marshal, and Lieutenant Felt-marshal command the Generals of the Horse; and it would seem that the Estates of the United Provinces have now voided the difference otherwise, since they qualified the two Commanders in chief of their Armies with the Titles of Felt-marshal, Prince Maurice, and *Wurz*.

A Lieutenant-General of the Horse being in his Generals absence to do the same duties; he should have the same qualifications. If the Cavalry be marshal'd in one Body, the General is to stand on the right hand of it, and the Lieutenant-General on the left. But if the Horse be drawn up in two wings, the General commands the right, and the Lieutenant-General commands the left wing.

A Major-General of the Cavalry is to receive the word, and all other Orders from the Commander in chief of the Army; he is to impart them to the General, and the Lieutenant-General of the Cavalry, and after he hath received their commands, he is to give all to the Regiment Quarter-masters of Horse, which they carry to the several Regiments. All complaints and differences between Officers and Horsemen, or among themselves, are first brought to him, which he should endeavour to compose in an amicable way, but if he cannot, he is to proceed according to the Articles and Constitutions of War. He hath the inspection of all the Guards of Horse, and orders them, and keeps lists of Convoys and Parties, that the several Officers and Troopers may have their turns, in which a Major-General should show himself very impartial; for very few or none there be, who will not think themselves wrong'd in their reputation, if others be prefer'd to them, where either danger may probably be look'd for, or profit expected, unless it can be made clear to them that it is not their turn to go on that party, or with that Convoy. It is the Major-General who marshals the Cavalry in Battel, having first advis'd about the manner with the General of the Horse, or in his absence with the Lieutenant-General. If he be an understanding, active, stirring and vigilant person, a General and Lieutenant-General may be laid aside, as in many Armies over Christendom they are, though not in all. This Officer the English qualify with the Title of Commissary General of the Horse.

The Duties of a Lieutenant-General, and Major-General of the Foot are the same which I have told you belongs to those of the Horse, *mutatis mutandis*. Generals of the Foot are but rare, *Banier* was under *Gustavus Adolphus*, and *Lind* under *Charles Gustavus*, both Kings of Sweden, and some of the Emperours Armies had them likewise. Some Lieutenant-Generals of the Infantry I have likewise known, but these are not in all Armies. But a Major-General of the Foot is thought a necessary Commander in all Armies, though they be never so weak; when any of them is wanting, or out of the way, the oldest Colonel officiates for him. The English call him Serjeant Major-General of the Foot, and in some places he is order'd to be constantly President of the Council of War.

The name of Adjutant-General denotes his charge and office, for he is a helper to those General Officers of whom I have spoken in this Chapter. The orders and directions he gives are not to be look'd upon as his own, but the Generals, and therefore his person must be known to both Officers and Soldiers of the whole Army. If he have a Regiment, he may of himself in some urgent occasions give such directions, as he thinks warrantable, and for which he knows he can be accountable, otherwise, whether he be a Colonel, or not, he must be sparing to give any other Orders than those he hath received. He must be very ready, active, and stirring, of a quick judgment to receive, and of a ready utterance to deliver his commands. In an Army Royal when it is encamped, or lyeth in Quarters, or yet when it is marching, two Adjutant-Generals, one for the Horse, and one for the Foot, if they be men of active bodies and minds, will be sufficient, but in a Battel they are too few. To supply which defect, and not to increase the number of Adjutants, the Commander in chief ought to have half a dozen of understanding Gentlemen well mounted, and these as the General rides along the Army either to marshal or encourage it, should ride with him, that the whole Army may know them as such, who are to be employed to carry the General's directions, which may be very many, according

Lieutenant-General of the Cavalry.

Major-General of the Horse.

Major-General of Horse.

His Duties.

General Officers of the Foot.

Adjutant-General.

His Duties.

K k cording

His Charge made despicable.

Aide de Camp, and Aide Major.

Corporal of the Field.

cording as the many emergencies and changes of things may make him alter his commands; and the fittest persons for that employment are such Reformado's as have been Majors of Horse and Foot formerly. I have seen this place of Adjutant-General made very contemptible by some Generals, who have fill'd it up with men, whose mean understanding, little experience, dulness of spirit, and weak intellectuals render'd them despicable and ridiculous to those to whom they pretended to bring their Orders. He is, or should be, a great helper to the Major General, whether of Horse or Foot. But where there are two or three Major Generals of the Infantry, and perhaps as many or more of the Cavalry, I think there needs no Adjutant at all, for I know no reason why every Major General should have an Adjutant General, nor will men be found to engage in a charge that is made so common, unless it be such insignificant persons as these I have spoke of. In France this Adjutant General is called *Aide de Camp*, and in some Foot Regiments the Major had his Adjutant, who was called *Aide Major*; and this for most part is one of the Lieutenants, who hath no allowance for it. In the old English Discipline of War this Adjutant was called a Corporal of the Field; and there were four of them in every Army, wherein they were well known; they were mounted on good and swift horses; their charge and employment was the very same in all things with that of our Modern Adjutants.

If I have rightly described an Adjutant General, I must confess I differ from *Monsieur de Gaya*, who hath lately written a short System of the Art of War; in his Nineteenth Page he would have us believe that the charge of an Adjutant General, or *Aide de Camp*, as he calls him, is fit for a young man of quality, and in which (says he) it is easy for him to learn and make himself perfect. Indeed I acknowledg we are bound still to be learning what is good, yet I cannot allow an Adjutant to be an Apprentice, and though it becomes him to be taught by his Betters, yet he should be so perfect in the Military Art, that he is bound to teach others; nor can I allow him to be very young, since he imbraceth a charge which befits none but an experienced Soldier. But *Monsieur de Gaya* adds, he should be wife, vigilant, and vigorous. I confess a young man may be wife, but I believe wisdom here is taken for experience, whereof young men of quality may be very oft destitute. But *Monsieur de Gaya* forgot to bestow the qualification of Courageous upon his *Aide de Camp*, which if he want (being he is to carry and distribute his Orders in the time of hottest danger) I will not give a rush for all his wisdom, vigilancy and vigour. He says also, that his *Aide de Camp* should be always, (*tous jours*) besides the General Officers to carry their Orders where they are necessary. But if he be always with them, how can he be from them when he carries their Orders where they are necessary? certainly he must be but sometimes (*Quelquesfois*) with them, and sometimes from them.

Besides all these General persons mentioned, some would have a Quartermaster General for the Horse, besides the Quartermaster General of the Army, because this last stays constantly at the head Quarter with the General of the Army, and the other should be constantly with the Horse. But I think places and offices should not be multiplied in Armies, and therefore the Quartermaster of the oldest Regiment of Horse may officiate in the Cavalry in the absence of the Quartermaster General, of whose office I shall speak in my Discourse of *Castramentation*.

Though many of these General Officers of whom I have spoken, may seem to be more burdensome than useful, to either Prince, State, or Army, yet this present Emperour *Leopold* was glad to make use of them all in his late War against the *Turk*, to satisfy that noble desire of honour which many Princes, and other persons of high and eminent quality had to serve him against the common Enemy of the Christian name.

I have told you of all the Duties these General persons are bound to pay in their several charges, but I have not spoke of those parts, virtues and qualities, wherewith some who write or speak of that Subject, would have them endued, they will be too tedious to rehearse, neither can I well do it without Tautologies. But I shall tell you that the qualifications required by some Authors for a Captain General, being divided between him and all the General persons under him, may in my opinion serve them all sufficiently, and what these are, you may read in the next ensuing Chapter.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XIV.

### Of a Captain General, or Generalissimo.

IF our first Parents had not rebell'd against their Creator, their posterity had enjoy'd an everlasting peace, and so such a person as we now speak of, had been very unnecessary. But I assure my self never man (except *Adam* when he was in the state of perfection) was endued with these gifts, wherewith some Notional Authors will have a Captain General to be qualified. He must; say they, be pious towards God, just towards man, and loyal to his Master. He must be very affable, very wise, of a sudden and quick apprehension, of a solid judgment, and happy memory. He must be very severe in his command, and yet very merciful. He must be liberal, and free from all manner of Avarice, painful, magnanimous, and courageous, and in one word, endued with all the Moral Vertues. He ought to be an old Practitioner in the Military Art, and well experimented in all its parts and duties. Perhaps you may think this enough, but *Polybius* in his Ninth Book requires more, for he will have his General to be both an Astrologer, and a Geometer. If you will tell me where, or in what region of the habitable world, all these qualifications shall be found in one person? *Eris mihi magnum Apollo.*

That he who is intrusted with the supreme Command of Royal Armies, one or more, and with the whole Militia of a State, should be an accomplisht person, and if it be possible, such a one; as we have describ'd, will not be readily denied, since it is a Command of the highest nature, the greatest honour, and deepest consequence that can be confer'd on any single person of what quality or degree soever, for he is intrusted not only with the lives of those that are in Arms under his Command, but with the defence of the whole Country, Towns, Forts, and Castles, with the honour, welfare; and standing of the Prince and State, and with the lives and properties of all their Subjects. The loss of his Army, or Armies by his negligence, inadvertency, rashness or cowardice, may occasion the loss of all these, or make them run a very great hazard by his indiscretion, much more by his treachery; he may in one moment of time lose the lives and liberties of many thousands, make numbers of women widows, children fatherless, and fathers childless, he may lose the honour and beauty of a whole Province, yea of a whole Kingdom, all which he was bound by his office and charge to preserve.

The consideration of these things mov'd most of the ancient Kings and Emperours, and those of latter times likewise to manage their Wars, and lead their Armies in person. Those who laid the foundation of the first four Monarchies did so, as in the *Assyrian*, *Nimrod*, *Belus*, *Ninus* and *Semiramis*, and when their posterity did it not, their Empire was in the wain, and ended with *Sardanapalus*, who hid himself from the sight of men among his women. *Cyrus* led his Armies himself, so did some of his Successors, but when others of them staid at home, and sent their Lieutenants abroad, the Persian Monarchy decay'd, and became a prey to the Great *Alexander*, who manag'd his Wars in person, and so did those great Captains of his, who cut out Kingdoms to themselves out of their Masters Conquests; but their Successors lost them by sitting idle at home, and employing their Generals abroad. Many Roman Emperours after *Augustus*, went to their Wars in person, whereby they preserv'd their Imperial Dignity; but when others employed their Lieutenants (though many of these were excellent men, and often victorious) the Empire was torn in pieces. The Kings of *Leon*, *Navarre*, *Castile*, *Portugal*, and *Aragon*, after the destruction of the *Gothish* Monarchy in Spain, went to the field in person, and recover'd those Kingdoms out of the hands of the *Saracens*. When the Kings of France of the *Merovingian* and *Carolemanian* race kept within their Palaces, and suffer'd

A Notional description of a Captain General.

The charge of a Generalissimo is of the highest nature.

A Prince to manage his Wars in person.

Many Instances to prove it.

Qualifications of all these General Officers.

Places should not be multiplied.



the Majors thereof to govern their Armies, they lost their Kingdoms and Crowns. Our Kings of *Scotland* and *England* used mostly to manage their Wars themselves; the Emperor *Charles* the Fifth led his greatest Armies himself, and for most part was always victorious, for his loss at *Algiers* occasion'd by the visible hand of Heaven; and his forced Retreats from *Inspruck*, and the Siege of *Metz*, were but small blemishes in the beautiful and fair Map of his victorious reign. But since his time his Successors the Kings of *Spain* have sat at home and entrusted their Armies to their Generals, and we see that their wide and far stretch Monarchy has been since that Emperours time in a constant decadency. All the Kings and Emperours of the *Ottomans* race went in person to the Wars, till *Selimus* the second changed that custom, and since that time none of them have done actions by their Balthas comparable to those of their Ancestors. In our own days the Emperor *Ferdinand* the Second entrusted the managing his War against *Gustavus Adolphus* to his Generals, *Wallenstein*, *Tilly*, and *Pappenheim*, all brave and great Captains, yet that Martial King being in person on the head of his Armies, prevailed over them all.

We may perceive the great odds of managing a War by a Prince in his own person, and by his Captain General by taking a view of the actions of two Brothers, both of them excellent Princes, these were the Emperor *Charles* the Fifth (of whom I but just now spoke) and *Ferdinand* the First, King of the *Romans*, *Hungaria* and *Bohemia*. The first, (as I have already said) led his most considerable Armies himself; the second staid constantly at home, and sent his Captain Generals to manage his Wars of greatest importance; mark the issue, *Ferdinand* lost three Royal Armies, each of them composed of a well appointed Cavalry, Infantry, and Train of Artillery: one of them at *Essecabie* under *Cazianus*, another at *Buda*, under *Rocandolf*, and the third at *Pesth*, under *Joachius* Marquess of *Brandenburg*; all three were wofully and shamefully lost without fighting. And if any think that the misfortune of all the three, or any one of them could not have been prevented by the Princes own presence, I shall answer that undoubtedly it had, and my reason is this, because that which lost them all, was the irresolution of the Generals; who durst neither fight, nor retire in time, as being this and wary to hazard that which was not their own; whereas *Ferdinand* (if he had been present) would quickly have resolv'd either on the one or the other, and consequently would have either retir'd in time and sav'd all his three Armies, or have fought, and by that means been victorious, or would have been beaten with more glory to himself, and mischief to his insolent enemy. And this is more particularly clear in that Army commanded by *Rocandolf*, who after multitudes of Insidels were already arrived for the relief of the besieged Queen and City of *Buda*, and that *Soliman* himself by speedy marches was hastning thither, could not be mov'd or perswaded by any intreaties or remonstrances of the principal Commanders of his army to raise the Siege, vowing and protesting that he neither could nor would do it, without an express warrant from his Master King *Ferdinand*; but before that could come, he and his misfortunate Army were both irrecoverably ruin'd. The said History of all these three Armies, you may read at length in *Paolo Giovio*.

Be pleas'd to take another instance of a later date: In the year 1658, *Charles* *Gustavus* King of *Sweden* invaded the Dutchy of *Holstein* with a very considerable army, his Horsemen and his Soldiers were almost naked, and all beaten with a long march from *Pole*; nor was it so strong as eleven thousand of all. *Frederick* the third King of *Denmark* intrusts a well appointed army of sixteen thousand Horse and Foot to a Felmarschal, and stays at *Copenhagen* himself, by the persuasions of his Privy Council. The *Swedes* being in person on the head of his haras'd army prevail'd every where, ruin'd the *Danish* army without one blow, and besieged the reliques of it in *Fredericksode*, a strong Town; storm'd it, and took it with the slaughter of the *Danish* Felmarschal, and most of his men, and got in it above one hundred Brass-guns, and much Ammunition: After this a vehement Frost being commanded from Heaven to favour him with a Bridge, he stept over the Ice from life to life on the *Belt*, where he forced the *Dans* to accept of such conditions as he impos'd, which were both dishonourable and disadvantageous. Sure if the King of *Denmark* had been personally present with his forces, he had at least once fought for it.

To

Actions of  
two Brothers  
compar'd.

Actions of  
two Kings  
compar'd.

To make War in person seems to be one of the essential Duties of a King or Sovereign Prince; this was one of those reasons which the people of God gave for their desire to have a King to rule over them, *To do justice among our selves, and to lead out our armies to battle against our enemies, and they add, after the manner of other Nations.* So then it is clear that Kings at that time went to the field in person. So did *Saul* the first King of *Israel*, and so did *David*, and most of all his Successors Kings of *Judah* and *Israel*. And if it be objected that *David* made *Joab* his Captain General, I give two answers, first *Joab's* authority ceased when *David* was present, which he was almost constantly with his forces, till he was established King of *Israel*. For *Joab's* employment where he commanded in chief, (if I have observed right) was first against the Rebel *Abalom*; and this was a Civil War, and then against the *Ammonites*, and that was a foreign War, both these had their rise from sudden Emergencies. In the last the Kings presence, till the latter part of it, was not necessary, and in the first not at all convenient. But secondly, I answer that *David* did often repent him of the large Commission he had given to *Joab*, who thereby made himself so strong that the King durst not hazard to punish him for his misdemeanors, which he often inflam'd in those words, *You are too strong for me, you Sons of Zeruiah.* As to *Solomons* making *Benajah* Captain General, it signified but little, since there was no War in his time, and the Captain of the Host was almost constantly beside him. If any War had fallen out, probably *Solomon* would have conducted his forces himself. But his reign was peaceable, as being the Type of the Prince of Peace; yet he might have repented it if he had consider'd that high trust on *Jeroboam*, who if he had been Captain General, probably would not have fled to *Egypt* for fear of King *Solomon*; for his actions against *Rehoboam* declared afterward, that the heart of a Rebel was within his breast, whatever his exterior deportment was in the time of that peaceable King.

But to what I have said, That Sovereign Princes should conduct their armies in person, it will be objected, That an Infant King cannot manage a War: To which I answer, that then the Prince nearest in blood should do it, as well as he should govern in Civil affairs. And if it be said, he may usurp; I answer, Better he do so than a fellow subject, who may play the like prank, if he be invest'd with the like power. But it is known that many Infant Kings have been carried about with their armies to encourage them, to great an influence hath the presence of Sovereign power, (though in a Child) over the spirits of Military persons. Observe what *Henry* the sixth of *England's* valiant Uncles did for him; and how faithful they were to him during his Minority. Observe also that *Roxane* her being with Child to the Great *Alexander*, made his ambitious Captains (after his death) smother their soaring thoughts till time should discover to them whether their Sovereign was in her belly or not, that accordingly they might know how to take up their measures.

In the second place it will be askt what shall an old decrepit, or Valetudinary King do, who is not able to go to the field? Truly I shall not desire him to do as that King of *Morocco* did, who in the Battel he fought with *Sebastian* King of *Portugal*, caus'd himself to be carried in a Litter, whereby he gain'd the Victory, though with the loss of his own life in the field. But I say such a King may intrust as many of his subjects as are able and capable to lead armies, but he should put the managing the great bulk of the War principally in the hands of the heir of the Crown to command over all, and if he be not of age fit for it, then that great trust should be given to the next Prince of the blood, who is capable of it. When the Imperial and *Spanish* forces invaded *France* in the year 1635, the *French* King made his Brother *Gaston* Generalissimo, who chae'd the enemy out of the Kingdom. After the Emperor *Ferdinand* the Second had suffer'd many losses, at last he made his own Son the *Hungarian* King, Generalissimo over all his armies, who at his very first Encounter with the *Swedes* routed two of their armies at *Nordling* in the year 1634, and in the space of two months made them lose more ground than they had gain'd in two whole years before.

Thirdly, it will be said a Sovereign Queen cannot lead armies, and therefore cannot manage the War in person. I shall not answer, that many Princesses have done it gloriously and successfully both in ancient and modern times, and there.

Kings of *Israel*  
and *Judah*  
made War in  
person.

The object-  
ion of *Joab*  
answer'd.

That of *Benajah*  
answer'd.

Objections  
against what  
has been  
said. First,

Answer'd.

The Second;

Answer'd.

therefore all should imitate them. But I shall say, that she can employ no better nor fitter Captain General than him who is nearest in blood to her self, for she is most proper to represent the Sovereign power who is next to it. I confess Queen Elizabeth of England did not so, and yet was fortunate in all her Wars, she had very gallant and loyal Subjects, neither was it in her power to make that choice I spoke of, because he who was next to her in blood, was a Sovereign Prince of another Kingdom. And if it be objected that *Christina* Queen of Sweden manag'd her *German* War fortunately under the Conduct of several brave Captains, who were not of the blood: I shall answer it is true, yet for all that, I aver that all of them did not so much in sixteen years time after the death of *Gustavus*, as he did alone in the space of two years. And *Christina* at length found it necessary to give the great trust of all her armies in *Germany* to her nearest Cousin the Count Palatine, and send him over with the Title of Generalissimo, which she never bestowed on any of her Subjects.

Fourthly, it will be said, that a free State must chuse and trust a Captain General with their forces, for a State cannot go to the Field in person, as little can it send one of their blood, for he may be a near kinsman to two or three of the State, and have no relation to the rest. To which I answer, that I look upon it as an intrinsecal defect in all free States, whether Aristocratical, or Popular, that a pure necessity is put upon them to intrust their armies to such a General, as they in their prudence make choice of, and of whom frequently they live in a perpetual jealousy, fearing his usurpation almost as much as a profest enemies invasion; and for that reason they do often limit his Commission with so many restrictions, and give him such Committees and Councillors about him, that he is forc'd many times to let slip fair occasions, wherein he might have done the enemy great mischief, and his Masters eminent service. And in the election of their General, it is no small question in a State, Whether it be best to chuse a native or a stranger? The *Athenians* employ'd their own Citizens, the *Spartans* their Kings, who were created for no other purpose but to lead their armies; for in time of peace they had no more authority than any of the other thirty Senators. The *Romans* made use of their yearly Consuls. The *Venetians* mostly make choice of strangers, and have for most part been happy in falling upon prudent and faithful Captains. The Commonwealth of the *Switzers* consists in their Union among themselves against all enemies, especially the House of *Austria*, from whose subjection they emancipated themselves. All the thirteen particular or Provincial Estates being independent one of another, and being without a Head, they are subject to Ruptures, and Civil Wars, as they were more especially in the time of *Zwinglius*, for matters of Religion. But their jars last not long, fear of a common enemy teaching them to compose their animosities, for nothing makes a Society more faithful than fear of one who hates all of them. When they join unanimously at their general meetings, and prosecute the results of their Counsels, they are formidable; and when they make a General of their forces, whether it be for their own service, or that of foreign Princes (for very mercenary they are) it is but for one expedition, or for one piece of service, which being ended, his Command is at an end likewise, and so they need not be jealous of him, or of any that succeeds him. The Estates of the *United Provinces* of the *Netherlands* manag'd the long War they had with the King of *Spain* under the Conduct of four Princes of *Orange* successively one after another, neither needed they ever fear the Usurpation of any of them; for though their power was almost unlimited, yet it could not tempt those Princes, who were so eminent for virtue, to whose goodness, magnanimity, justice and fortunate conduct, these Estates under God, owe their freedom, yet were they jealous of the late Prince; but it seems they are now desirous to witness their gratitude to that illustrious family by making this present Prince their Captain General.

How remedies this inward disease is in all free States, that they must intrust their Militia to one or two persons, the ruin of some Commonwealths makes it manifest: *Lacedaemon* several times was like to lose her liberty by some of her Kings, who were nothing but her Captain Generals, and at last they lost it under the Tyrant *Nabis*. The fear of Usurpation made *Athenians* commit an inexcusable folly, or rather a madness in their *Ostracism*, whereby the people banish'd the

Answered.

The Fourth.

Answered.

All Free States jealous of their Generals.

Athenians.

Spartans.

Romans.

Venetians.

Switzers.

United Provinces.

Free States usurp'd by their Captain Generals. *Lacedaemon*.

the best qualified of their Citizens. *Rome* for all her wariness in intrusting her armies to Annual Consuls, mis'd but little to lose her freedom in the Dictatorship of Bloody *Sylla*, and scarce had the recover'd it after his death, when she was rob'd of it for ever by *Julius Caesar*. *Castruccio Castracani* usurped the Republick of *Lucas*, and so have some other petty free States of *Italy* been used. How that *Hodge podg* of *Oligarchie*, Tyranny, and Anarchy, the long black Parliament of *England*, (which pretended it self to be a free State) was used by their Captain General *Cromwell* is a story well enough known, and he knowing that he might be used in that same fashion, would never part with the Command of the army, no, not after he had usurped the Sovereignty.

And indeed if Sovereign Princes will look back to by past ages, they will find it dangerous to intrust their whole Militia to one Subject, unless he be a Prince of the Blood. You may find in Holy *Writ*, *Abner* Captain of the Host of *Israel*, bring the Kingdom over to *David*, and though the same *David* seems to attest that *Abner* died not like a fool, yet I believe he died like a Traytor, and that was as bad, and an insolent Traytor too, for he told his Master to his face, he would betray him. And truly if *David's* Political ends had not hinder'd him, I think he had done as just and as generous an act to have put *Abner* to death as he did, when he caus'd *Baanah* and *Rechab* to be slain, for bringing him the head of their Master *Ishbosheth*. Nor was *Ishbosheth* the last King of *Israel* who was so serv'd by his Captain General, *Zimri* conspir'd against *Elab*, and kill'd him with his whole family. *Omri* Captain of the Host, bandies against *Zimri*, and forc'd him to burn himself in the Kings Palace. And *Tibni* went fair to have done as much to *Omri*. *John* Captain of the Host marcheth against his Master King *Joram*, and slew him with his own hands, and beheaded seventy of his Brethren. *Pekah* a Captain conspir'd against King *Pekahiah*, kill'd him, and made himself King.

Prophane Story will furnish more examples of this kind than are necessary to be rehear'd. The Emperour *Mauritius* was forc'd to see his Wife and Childrens heads struck off, and then receive the same measure himself by his General *Phocas*, who usurped the Empire. How *Pepin* and *Hugh Capet*, both Majors of the Palace, and Generals of the forces, used two Kings of *France*, by disburdening their heads of their two Crowns, and clapping them upon their own, are stories well enough known to any who hath read the *French History*. The *Caliphs* of *Egypt* and *Babylon* had their Estates and Dignities, and some of them their lives taken from them by their Soldans, who were their Captain Generals. In our own time *Ferdinand* the Second Emperour of *Germany* was like to pay dear for making *Wallenstein* Generalissimo of all his armies, for by that power that haughty Captain General went fair to have rooted out that branch of the House of *Austria* in *Germany*, which hath chain'd the *Roman Eagle* in that family for some ages; and to have made himself King of *Bohemia* to boot.

On the other hand a Subject would be very wary and cautious to undergo a charge so burdensome and dangerous, as that of the Supreme command of all armies belonging to either Prince or free State; for though he hath not been wanting to his Duty, yet if in the managing of his charge he have miscarried by chance or misfortune, he may make account to pay dearly for it, unless he have to do with both a just and a merciful Master. And if he be so fortunate to do those exploits which extend the Dominions, and add to the honour and benefit of the Prince and State whom he serves, he hath done but his Duty, and can crave no reward but *ex beneplacito*; nor needs he expect any, except from a Gracious Prince; nay it is well if he come off without some dishonour or disgrace put upon him, if not worse, some Princes not loving to look on men who have done them extraordinary services, because they may pretend to these extraordinary rewards, which they intend not to bestow upon them. In bad Requitals free Republicks have shown themselves most unjust to many of their best deserving Captains, as *Sparta* to *Agis* and *Cleomenes*, *Athenians* to *Themistocles*, *Miltiades*, *Cimon*, *Phocion* and *Pericles*. *Rome* to *Cornelius*, *Camillus*, and both the *Scipios*. Nor have some Princes forbore to stain their honours by being injurious to Captains, who have done them the most signal services. How basely dealt *Therius* with *Germanicus*? How cruelly did *Nero* use *Corbulo*? And with what

Rome.

Lucas.

Oligarchie of England.

And Monarchies also.

Kingdom of Israel.

The Empire.

France.

Wallenstein.

Subjects would be wary to undergo this great charge.

As very dangerous.

Some free States unjust to their Generals.

Some Ma.  
narchs also.

Boccalini.

Presumption  
of Captains.

Ruins many  
of them.

Insultances.

A Prince can-  
not affront  
his Subjects.

what inhumanity did *Justinian* use the famous *Bellisarius*, who was the supporter of his Empire? How ungratefully did *Ferdinand of Arragon* requite *Consalvo di Corduba* the great Captain, to whose Valour, Conduct, and Indefatigable labours he ow'd the Kingdom of *Naples*? So true is that observation of *Philip of Comines*, the greatest services are often requited with the greatest ingratitude. *Boccalini* in one of his *Ragguagli*, hath a shrewd hint at this. He tells us, that on a time, the news at *Parma* were, that *Doria* was appointed with his Fleet to fall upon *Barbarossa*, at a place, where he could hardly either fight or get away; having made Shipwreck of some of his Fleet, *Doria* sent privately to *Barbarossa*, advis'd him of his danger, and advis'd him to get him out of his way. One of *Doria's* Captains who was his Kinsman, not knowing of this, came to him, and desir'd him not to lose so fair an opportunity, to ruine the Arch-Pyrate: *Doria* perceiving his simplicity, drew him aside, and told him, he was not well seen in the Affairs of the World; for, said he, my fortune is so strictly join'd with that of *Haradien*, that if he be totally routed, I perish, because I shall be altogether useless: for I would have you know, said he, and learn it of me, since you are but a young Captain, that Princes use Military men, as they do broad Hats, and thick hoods, which in wet weather, they wear to save them from the Rain, but cast them away, so soon as the Sun shines.

But if great Captains, who have done Princes great service, be rewarded, or at least, be not ill used, they should be aware of another rock; and that is presumption, upon which they run, when they think the glory of those Actions they have done, intitles them to a liberty to do what they will: For they should remember, that good services are but Duties, which they owe, and which are not to be rewarded but according to the pleasure of the Prince; but Crimes are punishable by the Laws of the Land where they live, and upon this shelf many brave Captains have split themselves, and suffered Shipwreck: So did *Pausanias*, the famous *Spartan* King, and *Alcibiades* the Valiant *Athenian*; and so did the *Roman* *Marius*, who saved the Capitol from the *Gauls*; so did *Biron* Duke, Paite, and Marshal of *France*, under *Henry* the Great; Sir *William Stanley* under *Henry* the Seventh, of *England*, and the Earl of *Essex*, under *Queen Elizabeth*. The like did the great Captain *Wallenstein* Duke of *Friedland*, whom I mention'd a little before, who stain'd all his fair actions and eminent services, with the black and infamous Crime of Treason, against one of those Emperors whom he had served so well, and who had given him so great a trust. This was likewise *Joabs* inexcusable fault, who presuming on the greatness of his Office, rather than that of his services, was many times too saucy with his Prince: And though *Aber* deserved a worse death, than that he got, yet he deserved it not from *Joab*, *David's* servant; and, no doubt, it was intolerable presumption in *Joab* to revenge his Brothers Death on a man, with whom his Master had but just now entered into League: And though perhaps the same *Joab* had enough of reason of State on his side, for killing *Abalom*, yet it was his duty, to have used him as the King had him; for Princes love to be served in their own way, and obedience should be the Glory of Subjects. This presumption of his moved *David* to leave him a bloody legacy on his Death-bed, which *Solomon* did not scruple by any pretence of devotion, to cause to be executed even at the Horns of the Altar, where he had taken Sanctuary. Nor can Generals excuse their Revolts, Treasons, or Rebellions, by any Affronts or Injuries, they can pretend to have received from their Princes. And of this *Narves* was guilty, though wronged by the Emperor *Justin*, so was the Duke of *Bourbon*, Great Constable of *France*; the First, for bringing the *Lombards* into *Italy*, the second, for deserting his Masters service, and going over to *Charles* the Fifth; for a Sovereign Prince cannot give his Subject a just cause to cast off his duty; And *Tacitus* tells us, that we should suffer the wrongs of Princes, as we do Rain, Tempests, Hail, Thunder, Lightning, and other injuries of the Air.

And yet for all that hath been said, or can be said on this subject, this high and important charge of Captain General of all the Forces, and Armies of a whole Kingdom, hath been offer'd in all Ages, by Sovereign Princes to Subjects (for of necessity, sometimes free States must do it) and we find but

few of those Subjects, who have refus'd it, for desire of Honour (the Idol of ambitious Souls) makes them insensible and blind, that they can neither feel the present weight, or foresee the future danger of so high and so heavy an employment; but if Princes and Monarchs, will have such Captain Generals, as are not of their own blood, they had better trust their own Subjects with the charge, than strangers: for the first owe them Fealty, Loyalty, and Allegiance, the second, only Military service, from which obligation they shake themselves free, when ever they think it time. As *Francis Sforza*, Father of him who Usurped *Millan*, deserted *Joanne Queen of Naples*, and went over to her Enemy of *Arragon*. I humbly think, that a Prince who hath many Armies, should be either by himself, or one of his Blood present with one of them, and entrust the rest to persons of known abilities, who should have no higher titles, than that of Lieutenant Generals, and are to be independent one of another, and this will make them emulous, endeavouring which of them shall do their Master best service; but when Reason of War requires a conjunction of Forces, then as I have often said, the Prince, or one of his Blood should have the supreme command; for to a Prince, all the Lieutenant Generals will give ready and submissive obedience, without repining, grudging or murmuring, which men ordinarily do not to fellow-Subjects. *Charles* the Ninth of *France*, made but a sorry progress in his Wars against his Protestant Subjects, till he made his Brother *Henry* Duke of *Anjou*, his Captain General, who though he was but very young, yet all the Kings Generals giving him an intire obedience, in a short time he brought those of the Religion, to a very low and petitioning condition. The Emperor *Ferdinand* the Third, in the year 1637. gathered together most of his Armies to the number of Eighty Thousand men, gave the conduct of them all to one Count *Gallas*, with the title of Generalissimo, and commanded him to chase the *Swedish* Feltmarshals Banier, and *Lestir* out of *Germany*. *Gallas* put them indeed to a fearful Retreat, which they made to the *Baltick* Sea, but his Authority was not so great, as to procure an absolute obedience of all the Generals under him, to his commands, which occasioned the ruin of most of those numerous Forces, within less than nine Months: But three or four years after, the same Emperor made his Brother Arch-Duke *Leopold*, Captain General of his Armies, and sent him against the same Banier, whom he forc'd to retire in some disorder, in which he lost well near the whole Left Wing of his Cavalry. The Arch-Duke notwithstanding some losses which he suffered, did not only preserve, his Brother the Emperors interest, and Forces, but gained several advantages against the *Sweed*, till he was called to be Governour of the *Spanish Netherlands*. Then again went the Emperors affairs wrong, till he went in person to his principal Army, where his presence made his Generals do their Duties so well, that the *Sweed* was once more at a loss; so much doth a Princes presence contribute to the carrying on of Military designs.

To lay a side that Chimerical description I gave you in the beginning of this Chapter of a General, give me leave to say, that one ought to be chosen for that high charge, who knows something of all inferior charges below his own. The *Sweed* breed some of their Nobility, in Armies, making many of them begin with an Ensign bearer or Cornets place, and so rise by degrees, till they attain to the command of a part or Wing of an Army; they continue but a short while in one Station, yet so long, as they may understand what belongs to every charge under a General. In the next place, our General should be stout, not rash, resolute to lay hold on occasion, as knowing, he is bald behind; he should be very secret, and ready to hearken to advice and have judgement to discern, whether it be good or bad. Very young this General ought not to be, for he must not be a *meer novitair*, (I speak still of Subjects); very old he must not be, for age dries up the radical moisture, cools the blood, and weakens the body; and thereby makes a man unfit for these Actions, which require both present resolution, and present expedition: In short, if you have a General indued with some knowledge in Military Affairs, with some prudence, with some liberality, and an unblemish'd reputation; he may pass for sufficient enough, though he have not all these qualities in the Superlative degree: for perfection is not to be look'd for in

Ment ambid-  
on.

The French  
Kings Brother  
Generalissimo.

Leopold the  
Emperours  
Brother Ge-  
neralissimo.

The late Em-  
petour in  
person with  
his armies.

Qualities re-  
quire for a  
General.

Stratagems.

the depraved condition of mankind. As to Stratagems, if he be witty, he needs not lose his time to read *Frontinus*; for as *Xenophon* tells us, a General should know how to invent Stratagems of his own, as well as to know those who have been before him, as that Musician is the better Artist, who can make new Tunes, than he who can only sing or play old ones. And in all those qualifications I have now spoke of, all General persons are invited to take a share.

Fortune un-constant.

But there are some who in the choice of a General require another qualification, and that is that he be fortunate; but how shall you know whether he will be fortunate in his future undertakings? if you say, because he was happy in his former employments, you will take your measures very ill; for many are fit to conduct parties or parcels of armies, and to follow such directions as are given them, who are very incapable to manage the charge of a whole army; and it is very well known that a Commander in the Wars may be fortunate enough under one Master, and very unfortunate under another. Besides, fortune is unconstant in all things, and in nothing more than in matters of War. I knew when Count *Koningmark* was Major, Lieutenant Colonel, and Colonel, no enterprise succeeded well with him, nor had he fortune favourable in any party he conducted. But when he came to have a petty army under his own peculiar Command, all went well with him, and as he was advanced to higher employments, fortune attended him more and more, so that he was esteemed to be one of the most successful Generals Queen *Christina* of Sweden had; but observe the change, when he came to serve the late King of Sweden in his War against *Pols*, this *Koningmark* is pitifully taken at Sea by the *Danzickers*, and kept Prisoner till the Peace was made. It hath indeed been observed of some, that they have lost all the Battels that ever they fought, as if some inexorable destiny had constantly attended their persons, how brave and accomplished they were. They say never Battel was won for *Henry* the Sixth of England, when he was personally present, but several were when he was absent. There was one of our Earls of *Douglas*, who had the nick-name of *Tinfield*, or Loose-battel, a courageous person, and well experienced in the managing of the Wars of those times, and though he wanted no qualification of a good Captain, yet lost he all the Battels that ever he fought; and this ill fortune attended him when he join'd with *Piercy* in his Rebellion against *Henry* the Fourth King of England, for that Battel was lost, wherein he thought he had kill'd three or four Kings, and he himself was taken Prisoner. The same rigid fate attended him over to France, where fighting at *Vernonville* against the Duke of *Bedford*, he lost both the Battel and his Life.

An odd opinion.

There is another extravagant opinion, that it is good for a General to be once beaten, that he may thereafter shun those errors which occasion'd his overthrow; but the Escapes, neglects, and Mistakes in the time of Action, are so many, that if a General did not endeavour to prevent them, till by every one of them he lost a Battel, Conflict, or Rencontre, he should never win a Field in his life. A great deal better it is, saith *Momus*, for a Captain to be wise by the loss of other men, than by his own, and by the neglect of others, (who thereby have shipwrecked themselves) to steer his course so that he split not upon that same rock.

Generals should hazard their persons

Many there be who fancy the safety of an army to be wrapt up in the safety of him who commands it, and therefore will not have him to hazard his person, but a distinction must be allowed here, for if the Prince or Monarch be in person at the Medley, when he exposes himself to danger, he hazards more than his army, for he hazards the State and Commonwealth; yet many Princes have done it, *Cyrus*, the Great *Alexander*, *Cæsar*, *Henry* the Fifth of England, and *Henry* the Fourth of France, *Charles* Gustavus, the late King of Sweden, all of them successfully, and his Majesty now reigning, magnanimously at *Worms*. But indeed it should not be done by them, but in extream necessity. But when we speak of any other Generals, except Sovereign Princes, whatever annoys they bear, I say, he who will not have them to hazard their persons, robs them of one of the most essential qualities of their Office, and that is Courage. If a great Captain be never so prudent, never so knowing in the Military Art, never so vigilant, never so industrious, if he be not stout, all these things amount to nothing. Nor do I mean for all that, that he should be rash, there is a difference between

between staring and stark mad. He should not hazard his person but where his presence is necessary, as when he sees or understands that in time of Battel the enemy is prevailing against such a part of his army, thither he should run, for his presence may restore the fight, as hath been seen a thousand times, and it is certain, that in time of action, hardiness is more necessary than prudence. Neither is it enough for him, in time of Battel to hazard himself, but he must do it also in viewing those Forts and Towns which he is to besiege, or the ground where he is either to fight or encamp, yet he ought to be so well guarded, that he may not be surpriz'd by any sudden eruption, or the ambush of an enemy, as the Roman Consuls *Marcellus*, and *Claudius* were by one of *Hannibals*. Nor must a Generals courage stop here, for where he finds his advantages, fears the weakening of his own, or the strengthening of his enemies forces, he should not only hazard, but should dare the enemy to Battel, and fight it boldly; for occasion is so disdainful and nice, that if you do not court her when she offers her self, you will hardly ever find her in so good an humour again. Let it not be said that a General may be courageous, and yet not hazard himself. He must shew his courage sometimes, yea many times. It is good for him to be cautious, but he must be adventurous too, and if he be not this, he may happily preserve what he hath gain'd, but cannot probably make any considerable new Conquests; and it is upon such a subject that *Momus* saith, *Un Cui que crains, ne fera rien de bon*, a Chieftain who fears will never do good.

In several occasions.

Fronte capillatæ est, postulat occasio calvæ.

But I think I hear some say, that a General should hazard his person least of all in Battel, because if he fall, the rout of the army immediately follows. I grant it hath sometimes fallen out so, but that must not make a general rule; for as the safety of an army consists not in the safety of the General, so the loss of an army follows not necessarily the loss of a General. Many brave Generals and Captains (when their armies are irrecoverably routed in the field) are forc'd to fly, and so preserve themselves to better fortunes; so on the other hand many armies have been sav'd, and have gain'd the day, after their Generals have either fled out of the field, or been kill'd in it. At a Battel fought with the *Imperialis* in the year 1638, *Palsgrave Birkfeld* fled with most of his General persons, yet his army gain'd the Victory, and in our own days the Generals of three armies, join'd at that time all in one, fled before the Battel was half fought, yet the mishap was that the General who fought against them, and bravely kept the field, lost the honour of the day. *Titus Livius* tells us, that the two *Decii*, Father and Son, both Consuls in two several Battels which the Romans fought with their neighbours in Italy, when they saw their own men began to fly, consecrated and devoted themselves and their prevailing enemies to Mother *Tellus*, and all the Infernal spirits, with all the Hellish rites of that Heathen action describ'd at length by *Livy*, that thereby the Roman army might recover the honour of the Field well near lost, and so they being bravely mounted rode among the thickest of their enemies, where valiantly fighting, both of them were kill'd, which made Victory presently turn over to the Romans. But we must not believe with *Livius*, that the Consuls bequeathing themselves so heartily to the Devil was so acceptable a sacrifice to heaven, or so supererogatory as to move the Gods to reward it with success to their party; no, it was that excess of valour which they shew'd in the action, that encourag'd the flying Romans to turn head, and follow their Generals in that desperate Charge, and I doubt not but the deaths of their Consuls exasperated them and put an edge on their revenge, and that procur'd them the Victory. The same Author informs us that a Roman Consul, one *Petilius Latus* fighting bravely against the *Ligurians* was kill'd, to revenge whose death the Romans fought so well, that they chac'd their enemies out of the Field. *Polybius* in his second Book speaks of a very remarkable Battel which two Roman Consuls fought with two *Gallick* Kings, the two Consuls having marched with two several armies two several ways by a strange Chance met in such a manner, that one of them began the skirmish with the Van of the Gauls army, when the other began to attack their reer, but at the first shock one of the Consuls was kill'd, to revenge whose death his army charg'd and fought thorough the Gauls, routed them totally, kill'd on the place forty thousand, and took ten thousand, with one of their Kings. The *Theban Epaminondas*

Generals should hazard themselves in Battel.

Loss of a General doth not lose an army.

Instances for it of ancient times.

got his mortal wounds at *Mantineæ*, wherof he died that night, yet was his army victorious.

But to come nearer home and our own days, *Maurice* Duke of *Saxe* in the Emperour *Charles* the Fifths time, was kill'd in that Battel he fought with *Albert* Marquess of *Brandenburg*, yet his army got the victory. A little before that time the Duke of *Bourbon* was the first man that was kill'd at the assault of *Rome*, which did so enrage the army, whereof he was General, that it never gave over storming the Walls till they enter'd them, and then sackt the City. The Prince of *Orange* who succeeded that *Bourbon* in the command of that same Imperial army, was kill'd in a hot encounter with the *Florentine* General *Ferrucci*, yet his army was victorious. The great King of *Sweden*, *Gustavus Adolphus*, was kill'd even as the Battel of *Lutzen* began, yet did his army fight bravely the whole day, and forc'd the *Imperialists* to go out of the field at night. I knew Feltmarthal *Kniphausen* a good Commander, while he was marshalling the few forces he had at *Halsdon* in the Bishoprick of *Munster* against one *Luerfjam* Lieutenant General to the Elector of *Cölen*, shot dead, upon which one *Crauzenstein*, who commanded next the Feltmarthal, gave the enemy so gallant a charge, that *Luerfjam* little army was defeated, and himself taken. And to conclude, a General may lose more to his Prince, by too much care to preserve his own person, than by freely hazarding it. Now as our General is bound to give proofs of his courage, so in time of action he ought to be of an excellent temper, for if at that time he be transported with vanity, presumption, credulity; or other perturbations of soul, he may either hazard too much, or not hazard at all; for these or any of these passions may move him to give those Orders and Commands which may easily make him lose the day, and with it the service of his Master, and his own Reputation for ever.

## CHAP. XV.

## Of Intelligence, Spies, and a General Scoutmaster.

A Man can scarcely speak of a careful General, but you will hear him say, that he had always good intelligence, but I can tell him that no General ever liv'd that had always good intelligence, nor is it at all possible. But certainly it is the duty of all Commanders, especially those who lead armies, to endeavour to get Intelligence of their enemies designs, counsels, projects, motions, and marches, their numbers, their strength, their Artillery, the quality of the Soldiers, whether young and raw, or old and experienced, but more especially of the qualifications, virtues and vices of him who commands in chief. And if a siege of a Town or a Castle be to be formed, to know the situation of the place, its manner of Fortification, Bulwarks, Parapets, Ditches, and outer works, what men are within it, what provisions, what Munitions of War, and what Artillery, and what Officers, particularly what a person the Governour is, how the Posts are divided, and what numbers of men are assign'd for keeping every one of them, and many more particulars, that accordingly the General may know how to take his measures, whether he shall presently storm it, or Block it, till he starve the Garrison out of it, or if he shall make his approaches and batteries against it.

Almost every Soldier can tell you, that in all armies Intelligence is the life of action, but how to get good Intelligence to which a General or any Commander may trust, is an Art yet to be found out, and I say more, it will never be found

Influences for  
it of later  
times.

To look for  
Intelligence,  
the duty of  
all Comman-  
ders.

found, so long as that remains true (and it will remain true till the Heavens be roll'd up like a scroll) which Truth it self hath said, and it is this, *That all men are liars*, and so long as men are so, what Intelligence shall men believe. We are not to expect it from Angels, and the Devil is a liar from the beginning. To confirm this by one instance which is unquestionable, What Intelligence durst the leader of Gods people trust, when ten of these twelve Intelligencers, which by Gods appointment were sent to spie the Land of Promise, did by their fearful and false relations make the people murmur. This truth of the uncertainty of all Intelligence in Military affairs, which I assert, will best appear if we examine all the kinds of Intelligence that can be had, and these I suppose can be no more but two, publick and private Intelligence. Every one of these will admit of a subdivision, for both of them are of several sorts.

Publick Intelligence is got first by those parties whether stronger or weaker, whether of Horse or Foot, that are sent either from an army, a part of it, or from a Garrison, to learn those things, or some of them that I have mention'd in the beginning of this Chapter. If the party be to go far, it is to be the stronger, and to divide, some part of it is to stay behind at some pass or strait, to secure the retreat of those who advance further. Now suppose this strong party meets no opposition, but returns safely, the Intelligence they bring is either from the Country people, which signifies but little, and for most part just nothing, or else the party hath taken some Prisoners. These can tell you how strong they conceive your enemy is, where he was yesterday, or where he was this morning, but cannot tell you where he will be this night or to morrow, nor can they tell you any of his designs or intentions; and if any of the two, either Country people or Soldiers undertake to reveal the secrets of the Enemies General to you, you are unhappy if you trust them, for ordinarily they speak either ignorantly or falsely; and it is certain, that either a Fool or a Knave may ruin you if you believe either of them. The two Roman Consuls *Petunius*, and *Posthumus* lost a brave army at *Caudium*, where they were shut up in the straits of Mountains till they were contented to be disarmed, and pass ignominiously under the Gallows to redeem their lives from the *Sannites*; this mishap befell them for trusting the Intelligence of the Country people, or Soldiers cloth'd like Country people, who assur'd them that the army of the *Sannites* was not within one hundred Italian miles of them. You may read it at large in *Livies* Ninth Book. *Curio*, *Cæsar's* Legate in *Africk*, a good Soldier, believ'd the Intelligence that some Prisoners whom he had taken from the enemy, gave him; which was, that *Juba* King of *Mauritania* was gone home from *Orica*, and had taken most of his army with him, but had left behind him his Lieutenant General *Sabucus*, with some few forces, upon which the Credulous *Curio* marcheth out of his well fortified Camp, fought out the King who waited for him, fought and was beaten, hardly being able to make a retreat to his Leaguer, where he lost his life. *Cæsar* hath it in the Ninth Book *De Bello Civili*.

When you send a smaller party for Intelligence, it must not be far, it is done when an enemy is near; these are to discover, or as it is commonly called, to recognise, it is ordinarily of an odd or uneven number, as seven, nine, eleven, thirteen, fifteen, or more. If it consists of fifteen, three may go before, four follow to sustain them, and then eight to receive the other seven. Suppose they come safe back, they bring you word that at such a distance they saw no enemy at all, or they saw such a number in such a place, or they saw their whole army marching; you have reason upon this to draw up in Battel, if you be not strongly encamped, yet the marching army may prove Trees, or Cows at best; I have sometime seen the like of this fall out. But this weaker party perhaps brings you a Prisoner or two, if so, it hath done much; but what you are to trust of a Prisoners Intelligence, I have already told you. And here, as the Proverb goes, a *Tartar* may be taken, your party may be beaten, and some of them if not all made Prisoners; you will say you care not, none of them can tell your intentions; I believe you, but if that be true, then those you take from your enemy, can tell as little of his. But you will say upon a march sufficient Officers shall be sent with these parties which are called forlorn Hopes, (and so they may be called if an enemy be near) and these will bring in true Intelligence; yet for all their sufficiency they may bring you such news as may pre-

To get true  
Intelligence,  
very difficult  
Influenced.

Publick Intel-  
ligence by  
stronger par-  
ties.

Very often  
false.

Two instan-  
ces of it.

Publick Intel-  
ligence by  
smaller par-  
ties, not al-  
together to be  
trusted.

Nor three of  
Officers;

pre-

Influenced in  
Cæsar;

And Confidius  
one of his  
Tribunes;

And incharis  
the fifth,

And Zalasfar  
one of his  
Captains.

Yet Intellig-  
ence must  
still be look'd  
after.

No trust to  
an enemies  
Intelligence.

Other ways  
of publick  
Intelligence.

prejudice you if you give absolute trust to them, for the best of men may be mistaken, and may mistake things. Take two notable examples of this, *Cæsar* marching against the *Helvetians*, commanded *Labiennus* with two Legions with all possible speed to go before, and possess a hill not far from the Enemies Camp, this at a Curliory march he did; *Cæsar* marcheth with the rest of his army, but sent one *Confidius* a Tribune of great experience, and approved valour before, to bring him certain word in what posture the *Switzers* were: *Confidius* mistakes the two Legions which were with *Labiennus*, to be *Helvetians*, and when *Cæsar* with his army was within one Italian mile and a half of that place, *Confidius* came posting to him, and assur'd him the enemy was Master of the hill *Labiennus* should have possess'd, and avouched he knew them by their Arms and Colours to be *Helvetians*, and which was worse, he told him he could not learn what was become of the two Legions. This Intelligence made the great *Cæsar* immediately alter his resolution, which was to have fallen on the *Helvetians* that very day, for he was in great want of Provisions: Well, he drew off, and encamped on the next hill, and when the day was well spent, he came to know that *Labiennus* and his two Legions had possess'd that hill as they were appointed, that *Confidius* had out of fear imagin'd the *Romans* to be *Switzers*, and that the enemy was march'd away far enough. *Cæsar* steps aside to look for bread to his hungry army; the foolish *Helvetians* thinking he had fled for fear, follow'd him to their loss, otherwise they had escap'd him for that time, perhaps for good and all. Thus *Cæsar* by misintelligence was like to have lost a fair opportunity to fight his enemy; and whom should he trust, if he might not trust a Veteran Captain, and as himself calls him, *Rei Militarie peritissimum*, most expert in Military affairs?

The second instance is, when *Francis* the first made his Retreat from *Lan-dray* and *Guisse*, he encamped one night in view of the Emperour *Charles* the Fifth, who follow'd him, making how as if he intended to fight *Charles* the next day; about break of day one *Zalasfar* a brave and experienced Captain, was sent to discover, who at his return assur'd the Emperour that the *French* King was lying still in the same posture he was in the night before, and that a Regiment of *Switzers* had the outer guards, and several pieces of Artillery with them: fair day-light made his error known, the *French* army was got clear away, those that *Zalasfar* took for *Switzers* were the Emperours own guards of *Germanis*, and his Pieces of Ordnance were old Trunks of Trees. This made the poor Gentleman ridiculous to that whole army, in which he formerly had so much respect, and did worse than that, for his misintelligence lost him his Masters favour, who by it lost the opportunity of taking his advantage of the rear of the *French* army.

If you ask me what shall be done in this case, I answer, the usual custom must be followed, Intelligence must be both sought and bought; for parties, forlorn Troops, smaller bodies of Horse, and sometimes of Foot, must be sent out for Intelligence: neither can any army, or part of an army march with any security, unless some be sent before to discover. The want of these made the *Roman* army under *Flaminius* become a prey to *Hannibal* at the Lake *Thrasimene*, where the Consul lost his life. I am not too vain as to give any new rules for Intelligence; all I pretend to in this place is to demonstrate that no Intelligence can be so exactly good, but it may prove wrong, nor can any be sent for Intelligence be they never so witty and expert, but they may mistake. Neither is there any Intelligence more to be doubted or misbelieved than that which comes from an enemy; *Sabinus* one of *Cæsar's* Legates trusted what *Ambiorix* a petty King of the *Gauls* in publick hostility with him, reported; this cost the lives of a Legion and five Cohorts of *Romans*, besides that of the Legate himself. *Cicero* another Legate not giving trust to the same *Ambiorix*, sav'd himself and his Legion till *Cæsar* came and reliev'd him out of eminent danger.

There be other ways of publick Intelligence by shots of Cannon or Muskets, from Hills, Mountains, Towers, or Trees, as also by Beacons with smoke by day, and fire by night. I confess in some cases there can be no better way found out, yet these may readily prove uncertain, as many times they have done to your Centinels and Guards may make these shots and signs upon misapprehensions, and so disturb you with false alarms, or an enemy may have surpriz'd your Guards

Guards and Centinels, and by giving you no sign, or false signs, ruin you. Intelligence may also be given publicly from the Steeples and Towers of besieged places, and from Mountains without, by either Cannon or fire, by signs, and Counter-signs, yet all of them may be misunderstood, miscarried, or betray'd. But more of this in my Discourse of Besieged Cities, Towns, and Castles.

Private Intelligence is got by word, or by writing either from those who dwell and converse with your enemy, or those you send among your enemies disguised as their friends. To corrupt a Secretary of a Prince or a General, is a good way for Intelligence; and to do this, he who commands an army must spare no Gold, and therefore a Parsimonious General will have but bad private Intelligence, or rather none at all. Governours of Forts, and Officers to whom Posts are intrusted, either in Garrison or Field, must be tried how they may be corrupted. This is an excellent way for Intelligence, and makes the destruction of an enemy easie, and it ought to be attempted, essay'd, and prosecuted with all earnestness, prudence, and secrecy. One will do wisely to seem to give full credit to the Proposals, Intelligence and promises of these Traytors, but he must not always do it, for in this rule will hold exactly, *Disce dissidere*, learn to distrust. How many Generals and other great persons have been cheated by such seeming Traytors, History and daily practice bear witness. In the time of the Civil Wars of *France* in *Charles* the Ninth's reign, a Protestant Officer within *Orleans* agreed with much secrecy to deliver one of the Ports to the enemy who besieg'd the Town, and accordingly some hundreds were admitted within the City, who were all Massacred, and a number of great Guns and Muskets were fir'd on those who were following, after the Portcullies were let down, and the Drawbridge was pluckt up. Sir *Philip Sidney* was little better used with his Intelligence out of *Alot*. Such an entertainment was prepar'd for five or six thousand *Spaniards*, to whom *Breda* should have been deliver'd in the night-time, when the Prince of *Parma* govern'd, if I remember right, but when they came near the Town, they grew jealous, and so return'd with little loss.

In the next place Generals ought to have a wary eye over their Secretaries; I believe few of them trust them with all their secrets, nor is it fit they should. And what trust can you give him, who is willing to betray his Master to whom he hath sworn fidelity? should you not be afraid that he will rather betray you to whom he hath sworn none? Yet this way of Intelligence hath in all ages been tried, and hath very often prov'd successful, and therefore it must be still practis'd, and something must be hazarded, for all cannot be made cocksure. *Wallenstein* as was afterward well known, really intended to have betrayed the Emperour his Master, and all his armies; but the Duke of *Wymar* and other *Swedish* Generals durst not trust him, till they got assurances, and before he could give these he was dispatched to another world. Wherefore I say, something must be adventur'd, but let it be done with all imaginable care and circumspection, that if your Intelligence fail you, the loss may not be considerable.

Written Intelligence is very dangerous, both for the person that carries it, for him who sends it, and for him who receives it. If the bearer of it be taken, he will no doubt be put to exquisite tortures till he tell from whom he brought it, and be hang'd when he hath told it; this brings the sender or writer in danger of his life, and the intercepting this written Intelligence divulgeth some of his secrets to whom it is sent, and so puts him to new resolutions, for though the advices he sent be written in Cyphers, yet the art of finding keys for Cyphers is now common; and though a Cypher be not unlockt, yet he to whom it is pers. directed, will rationally conclude it was unlockt, and therefore will find it needful to fall upon new resolves. Other manners of writing with illegible Ink, are yet both so soon found out with fire and water. But notwithstanding all this there is a necessity of writing many times, and it must take its hazard.

Private Intelligence by word of mouth is certainly the surest way, (if any way of Intelligence can be sure) provided the persons employed be witty, sober, vigilant, and faithful. The first three qualifications may be known by conversation, but the last only by frequent trial, and yet he may be faithful to you in many things, who may cheat you to purpose at the last blow. These be the Intelligencers, whether men or women, who are properly called Spies, upon whole

Private Intel-  
ligence by  
word, or by  
writing,

Proves often  
false.

A Traytors  
Intelligence  
to be distrust-  
ed.

Written In-  
telligence  
dangerous.

So are Cy-  
phers.

Are yet both  
so soon

Not always  
to be trusted.

Their miser-  
able condi-  
tion.

How the Ro-  
mans found  
out Spies.

Two great  
Captains both  
Brothers, ru-  
in'd for want  
of Intellig-  
ence.

whose Intelligence no prudent General, Governour, or good Officer will build resolutions, till it be confirm'd by several hands, and even then it will be needful to walk with circumspection. We find in the life of *Cæsar*, writ both by himself and others, that he made it his great work to get Intelligence of his enemies posture, doings, and designs, and that the wonderful celerity he us'd in all his expeditions, was the product of his Intelligence, yet did he never trust any that ever he got from either friend or enemy, till it was confirm'd to him from others; yet I have told you that his Intelligence did fail, it is true not so oft as his Legates were abus'd by theirs, because he trusted not so easily. When Spies are sent, he who sends them must let them know none of his own designs, for these they may readily reveal. These Spies are in a woful condition, for so soon as they are suspected, they are immediately search'd, and if any Papers be found about them, either in their Clothes, the soles of their shoes, their hair, hats, sheaths of daggers or swords, they are put to torture, and then all they know for most part is reveal'd, and though no Papers be found with them, yet are they tortur'd to tell what perhaps they know not. The *Roman* way to find out Spies was by a Trumpet or a Cryer to command all to their Huts and Tents, and those who were then found wandering abroad, were apprehended, and examin'd for Spies.

But I do not remember to have heard or read of a greater mischief, that want of Intelligence did to any than to the two famous *Carthaginian* Brothers, *Hannibal* and *Asdrubal*: for after the last's arrival in *Italy*, *Hannibal* faceth one *Roman* army, relolving to hinder it to join with another, which he knew was sent to hinder his Brother to join with him; *Asdrubal* faceth the other *Roman* army under Consul *Livius*, and provoketh him to Battel, but in vain. All the four armies are encamped and fortified, each diligently observing the motions of his adversary. Yet *Claudius Nero* the Consul who oppos'd *Hannibal*, marcheth in the night with six thousand commanded *Romans* out of his Camp, joins with *Livius*, who was at least a hundred miles distant from him, without the knowledge of either of the two Brothers. Neither had *Asdrubal* any knowledge of the Conjunction but his own conjecture by the numbers of the Horfes that he saw go out to watering, and the two *Classiums*, the Badges of two Consuls; he retir'd that night, but was overtaken next day, beaten and kill'd. Nor did *Hannibal* know any thing of the whole matter, till *Nero* was return'd in safety to the *Roman* Camp, and that he caus'd *Asdrubal*'s head to be thrown before one of the Gates of *Hannibal*'s; at the sight whereof the Gallant *Carthaginian* wept, and said, he now saw too well the fortune of *Carthage*; meaning no doubt, that the Heavens were not to be any more propitious to that powerful City, when such two famous Warriors as himself and his valiant Brother were ruin'd for want of Intelligence. For,

*Quos vult perdere, hos dememat Jupiter.*

*Jove demets whom he intends to destroy.*

The punish-  
ment of Spies  
very severe.

But to return to our Spies, to put them to death without mercy, or to use them worse, hath been so ancient, and still is so universal a practice, that to speak any thing against the injustice of it, might justly make a man ridiculously singular. In ancient times for most part they were tortur'd to death, and little better are they used in the Modern War. But do not you think the *Romans* used Spies more mercifully at the Siege of *Capua*, who only cut off their hands and noses, and so let them depart in peace.

*Cæsar* who was merciful enough, and made great use of Spies himself, caus'd the hands of two messengers to be cut off, who were taken carrying Letters from *Carduba* to young *Pompey*; and in the same War he apprehended four Spies in his Camp, one was a Soldier, and three were Slaves, the Soldier he beheaded, but the Slaves he Crucified. So you see Soldiers must be subject to the punishment of Spies if they suffer themselves to be employed in their office. But since Spies are made use of by all Commanders in the Wars, by all Princes, nay by all Princes, why is there a more severe animadversion against them, than against Robbers, Murderers, yea Parricides?

ricides? They are not only allowed, made use of, and commended, but bountifully rewarded by those who employ them; why then is not there some capitulation for them, or at least some greater mitigation of their punishment, than to deliver them over to the cruelty of a Butcherly Hangman, to whip, torture, hang, spit and quarter them? Certainly their Office is lawful, otherwise lawful Princes would not make use of them; why are they then so horribly punish'd for going about their duty? Yes, assuredly their Office is lawful, since *Moses* by Gods own appointment sent a dozen of them to spy the Land of *Canaan*, one whereof was *Caleb*, who went in and possess'd his share of it, and another of the Twelve was *Jehovah*, who thereafter was Captain General of the *Israelitish* Army. Two Spies were likewise sent to *Jericho*, who ow'd the safety of their lives to the Harlot *Rachab*, and when they lodg'd at such a womans house, had they not been sent by Gods own people, might not a man have said, that Knaves and Whores were well met together?

But to conclude, if Spies escap'd without very severe punishment, Camps, Armies, and all Fortified places would be pester'd with that base, though necessary Canaille.

The *English* have a General Officer whom they qualifie with the Title of Scoutmaster General, I have known none of them abroad, but I hear in some places of *Italy* they have something very like him, and that is, *Il Capitano di Spiani*, the Captain of the Spies. I cannot believe that this Scoutmaster, or this Captain hath any thing to do with that Intelligence, which I call'd publick, and is got by parties whether of Horse or Foot; for the commanding these out, and the keeping the Lifts of their Turns or Tournes belongs properly to the Major Generals, and several Majors of Regiments both of the Cavalry and Infantry, none whereof I conceive will suffer the Scoutmaster to usurp their Office. They must then only have the regulation of the private Intelligence, wherein no doubt they may ease the General of the Army very much. But being that Spies are properly under their command, if this Scoutmaster General, or this *Capitano di Spiani* be taken Prisoner by the enemy, whether he may be ransom'd and used as an Officer, or hang'd as a Spy, is a question, which because I cannot determine, I shall leave it as a Probleme. The *French* have lately constituted a Captain of Guides, who perhaps is the Captain of Spies I speak of.

Spies may be  
lawfully used.

Scout-master  
General.



## CHAP. XVI.

*Embatteling by the Square-root, examined and rejected.*

Several kinds  
of Battalions  
marshal'd by  
the Square-  
root.

THE great Apostle of the Gentiles tells us, *That the fashion of this world perisheth*; And truly I admire not at altho' Embattelling Bodies of Foot and Horse by the Square-root is worn out of fashion, but I admire much that ever it was in fashion. I shall not offer to prepossess my Reader with a bad opinion of it till I inform him of the thing it self. Authors mention Battalions square of men, and Battalions square of ground, Battalions of a large front, and doubled Battalions. To these by the permission of those Speculative Martialists, I shall add another, and that is a Battalion square both of men and ground, whereof I do not remember that I have heard any of them either speak or write.

What is  
meant by the  
Square-root.

It will be requisite for that Commander who intends to draw up his Company, Regiment or Brigade by the Square-root, to have Tables of several numbers by him, whereof the *Sieur de Preissac*, *Beckler*, and *Whithorne* (who translated *Machiavel's* his Art of War into English) have been at the trouble to leave some behind them, but to little purpose; for any ordinary Arithmetician can make a square number, which is nothing else but a number multiplied in it self. As 3 multiplied by 3 produceth 9, 9 multiplied by 9 produceth 81, 81 multiplied by 81 produceth 6561, in it self multiply 6561, the product will be 43046721, and so in infinitum. But observe first, that all numbers are not square, and of these that are square you may extract the root without a fraction, as a 100 is a square number, because the root of it is 10 without a fraction; for 10 multiplied by 10 produceth a 100. But when you extract the root of a number that is not square, you must take the nearest, as 10 and 11 are not square numbers, and therefore you must take the root of 9, and that is 3, now 3 multiplied by 3 produceth but nine, and so in 10 you have the fraction of one, and in 11 of two. Observe, secondly, that every number above 10 hath for its square a number above a 100, as 11 multiplied by 11 produceth 121. Observe thirdly, that the root of a square figure is the side of it, and in a quadrate square all the sides are of a like length; so that if you would know the superficial contents of a square figure equilateral, you multiply the number of one side by it self, as by example if the number of one side of that figure be a 100 men, the Product will be 10000; But if it be an oblong square, that is, which hath two sides longer than the other two, you are to multiply the length of one of the longest by the length of one of the shortest; as by example, there is an oblong square, whereof each of two sides contain a 100 Foot, and each of the other two sides but 50, multiply then the longest by the shortest, that is a 100 by 50, the Product will be five thousand.

Three neces-  
sary observa-  
tions.

Battalions  
square of  
men, how  
made.

This being premised, if you would have a square Battalion of men, you are first to see what the number of your men is, and next extract the root of that number, and according to it, form your Body of equal number of men in rank and file. As the number of your men to be marshall'd is 256, which was the number of the *Grecian Syntagma* or Company, extract the root of 256, you will find it to be 16, for 16 multiplied by it self, produceth 256, and therefore your rank and your file must each consist of 16 men, this is a Battalion square of men. Or suppose your number to be 6560, you will find it is not a square number, and therefore you must take the root of the next square number to 6560, and that you will find to be 6561, the root whereof you will find to be 81, for 81 multiplied by it self produceth 6561, and therefore to marshal 6560, you must make your rank consist of 81 men, and your file of as many. But truly you will not find this so easy to be done in the field, as on a piece of Paper, and when you have done it, perhaps you will say it was not worth the half of your pains.

To

Battalions  
square of  
ground.

To make a Battalion square of ground is to allow no more ground to your front or your rank, than you do to your file or flank, and for this they will give you a rule which will be hard enough to follow on any sudden occasion, and it is this, allow seven foot in length, and three in breadth for every Soldier; multiply the number of men you are to marshal by three, and divide the Product by seven, then extract the square root of the Quotient, that will be the number of men for your file, by the number of men in your file, you are to divide the whole number of men in your Battalion, and the Quotient of that will be the number of men for your rank. This is a little harsh, yet I cannot make it clearer, perhaps an example will clear it. Suppose your men to be 1600, the ordinary number of weak Brigades, multiply 1600 by three, the Product is 4800. Divide 4800 by seven, the Quotient will be 685, with a fraction of five. When you extract the root of 685, (because it is not a square number) you must take the nearest, and that will be 26, for that multiplied in it self produceth 676, and this wants but nine of 685. Then by the rule your file consists of 26, and by it you are to divide your 1600 men, and you will find the Quotient to be 61, with a remainder or fraction of 14; so by this rule your rank consists of 61 men, and consequently your 1600 men come to be 61 in rank, and 26 in file, for 61 multiplied by 26 produceth 1586, which with the fraction of 14 makes just 1600. Now three foot being allowed to every man in rank (according to the ordinary computation) 61 men in rank possess 183 foot of ground, and seven foot being allowed for every man in file, the ground the 26 possess, is 182 foot, which wants but one of the 183, and that proceeds from the fraction of 14. And hereby you have your Battalion of 1600 men to possess equal ground, though the rank consist of 61, and the file but of 26. And this you will think is very pretty to see or look on, whether it be worth your labour or not, you can best tell after you have order'd it, which I suppose you will not do without some trouble. Besides, in this computation (as I have often said) there is an inexcusable error committed by most men in reckoning Distances and Intervals, for they still reckon as many of them, as there be men in rank and file, as here, they make 61 Intervals in front, because there are 61 men in front, whereas really there are but 60 Intervals, and in the file they make 26 Intervals, because there are 26 men in file, whereas really there can be no more but 25 Intervals. And these two mistakes will quickly make a vast alteration in your Battalions squareness of ground.

A Doubled Battalion is so called, when the rank consists of twice as many men as the file doth. The way to marshal it is this: The men you have to order, their number being known, double on paper, for you will, I suppose, find that more easy, than to double their number really in the field. Then extract the square-root of that double number, and that must be the number of men for your rank, and the half of that must be the number of men for your file. As by example, you are to marshal 3200 men (the number of ancient Regiments) in a Doubled Battalion, double them, and say you have 6400; extract the square root of 6400, you will find it to be 80, for 80 multiplied by 80, produceth 6400, and so you must marshal your 3200 men 80 in rank, and 40 being the half of 80, your file must consist of 40 men, for multiply 80 by 40, the Product is 3200. Take an example of a number that is not square, and let your men be 2500; double these, and so they are 5000, look for the square-root of 5000, you will not find it exactly, because it is not a square number, and therefore you are to take the nearest, and that will be 71, for 71 multiplied in it self produceth 5041, and that is 41 more than the double number of your men: let therefore your rank be of 71 men, the half whereof should be the number of your file, this you cannot do exactly, because 71 is an odd number, you must therefore take 35, and that is the half of 70, and so make your file to consist of 35 men, and you will be near right, for 71 being multiplied by 35, produceth 2485, which wants but 15 of your number of 2500. We read that the *Spaniards* used these Battalions in the times of old, but now they do not.

A Battalion of a large front is that in which there are many more men in the rank, than in file. These Battalions may be form'd easily, and they are those which are now universally used, but the square root men will needs give us a rule for it, which is of a harder digestion than the practice of the thing it self. Yet I shall tell you what it is; you shall divide your whole men by that number

Battalions of  
a large front.

M m 2

of which you intend your front shall consist, and the Quotient of that Division shall be the number of your file; as by example, you are to marshal a 1000 men, and you intend they shall be 50 in rank, divide the 1000 by 50, the Quotient is 20, and so your 1000 men shall be 50 in rank, and 20 in file. But if you intend to have a 100 in front, you divide a 1000 by a 100, and the Quotient will be 10, and so your Battalion hath a 100 in front, and 10 in file, for a 100 multiplied by 10 produceth a 1000. We may safely conclude 10000 men may be marshal'd in this form of Battalion, with the half of this Arithmetick, and is daily practised. For at this time all Bodies of Foot drawn up either ten or fix deep, and Bodies of Horse three deep, are Battalions of large fronts, and are marshal'd very well by those who neither know, or ever did hear of a square-root.

But let me add to these Theoretical marshallings of a Battalion square both of men and ground, let the number of your men be what it will. And thus, Make first as many men in file as in rank, and then you have a Battalion square of men. In the next place allow no more distance between your ranks than you do between your files, and then your Battalion is square of ground likewise. As for example, you are to draw up 2500 men, extract the root of that number, you will find it to be 50, for 50 multiplied in it self produceth 2500, and therefore your rank must consist of 50 men, and your file of 50 men, and consequently you have a Battalion square of men; then allow as you must do, for every Combatant one foot to stand on, by that means every rank possesseth 50 foot, and every file 50 foot. Allow 49 Intervals in the rank, for more there are not, and for every Interval three foot, amounts to 147 foot, and allow no more but three foot for every Interval in the file, you have likewise 147 foot for the Intervals of files; now add 147 to 50, which the fighting men stand on, the aggregate will be 197, and so many foot of ground doth every rank possess, and so much doth every file possess; and consequently your Battalion of 2500 is square of ground as well as of men. Would you know how much ground this Battalion so marshal'd possesseth in all, multiply 197 by 197, and you will find the Product to be 38809 foot, which will be near eight Italian miles. But I hear you cry out that six foot are always allow'd for an Interval between ranks. But I answer you negatively, not always, for so many Foot are but allowed in a march, because the length of a Pike requires that distance, when it is shoulder'd, but standing in Battel ready to give or receive the Charge with Pikes either order'd or advanced, three foot are sufficient for the Pikemen as well as for the Musqueteers; and when they Charge, one foot and a half of distance between ranks of Pikemen is enough. If you will then make use of this Battalion of mine, let it be with Pikes advanced, but if you be pleas'd to follow my advice, you shall never make use of it at all.

But all these forms of Battels fram'd by the square-root, (except the Battalion of a large front, which is more easily fram'd without it than by it) are of much trouble and little use, they are these which bring fewest hands to fight, and renders them apt to be surrounded, and so are all Battalions that have deep files. Next by that manner of Embatteling you must constantly alter the forms and figures of your Battel, according as the numbers of your men increase or decrease, and in them there is a daily change. Captain *Cruso* who *Englisch Du Preissart* Military Resolves, in a Marginal Note calls Embatteling by the square-root an impertinent curiosity; and to what purpose, saith he, the square-root, since now all *Europe* marshals their foot ten deep, except the *Swede*? for he wrote near forty years ago. And to that same sense at this time, I say, to what purpose the square root, since now all *Europe* marshals their foot six deep, and their Horse three deep, except the *Hollander*? But I shall bring you a greater authority against deep files, and square-root Battels; *Xenophon* tells us when *Cyrus* fought with *Croesus* for the Kingdom of *Lidia*, *Croesus* his army was marshal'd both Horse and Foot thirty deep, except his Mercenary *Egyptians*, who were ten thousand, who would not, says he, abandon their Country custom in making square Battels, and therefore their 10000 men were drawn up a 100 in rank, and a 100 in file, and a 100 times a 100 makes 10000. And so their Battalion was square of men, and might have been also of ground if they allow'd no greater Intervals of ranks than of files, which hardly they could do, being they were all offensively arm'd with Pikes both long and strong. But our

Author

A Battalion square of men and square of ground likewise.

Objection,

Answered.

Most of all these useless.

Egyptians square Battalion of 10000 men.

Author saith that *Cyrus* was glad of this, wishing *Croesus* a whole army had been marshal'd a thousand deep, for then he had sooner destroy'd it, as I have told you in the second Chapter of my Discourses of the *Grecian* Art of War. Yet *Xenophon* tells us that these *Egyptians* fought best of any of *Croesus* his army, yea so long till they had fair quarter given them. And withal he informs us that *Cyrus* his own army (his Foot I suppose he means) were marshal'd 24 deep, and that was eight more than the depth of the *Macedonian* Phalanx.

## CHAP. XVII.

### Of the Modern way of Embatteling and Marshalling Armies.

AS all Armies are marshal'd according to the pleasure of those who command them, so their pleasure often is, and ever should be over-ruled by the circumstances of time, the posture of the enemy they have to do with, the Weather, the Sun, the Wind, and the ground on which they are to fight, if the General find by his foreparties, or Vancouriers, that his enemy is before him, drawn up in Battel, ready to receive him, he will do himself an injury to march forward, for it is not to be facied, that his adversary will be so courteous as to permit him to marshal his army, but will take his advantage and fall upon him, before he can draw up his Van, especially if his march have been thorough any close or strait Country; and in such a condition as that, a General's own ready wit and resolution must serve him for Counsellors, for there will be no time given him to call a Council of War. But we speak now of Embatteling Armies, when Generals have half the choice of the ground.

The manner was in many places, and still is in some, to marshal Armies in three distinct Bodies, one behind another, the first was called the Vanguard, the second the Battel, the third the Reer-guard. But several times every one of those consisted of three Bodies likewise, these were two wings of Horse, and one Body of Foot; and when they march'd, these three great Bodies were called the Van, Battel and Reer. Their proper Title was to be called so when they marched, for many times when they drew up in order of Battels, it was in one Breast, and then the Horse were divided in two wings, and the Foot made the Battel. This was done when the ground was very spacious, and to prevent surrounding, otherwise Armies seldom fight but in two Battels, if not in three. But as I said, time, ground, the power of an enemy, minister occasions to a Commander of an Army to alter the ordinary custom, and frame a new method of his own to serve him for that opportunity. I shall give you one instance, and that of a mighty army, marshal'd, as few before it have been, and I believe none since. It was that which *Charles* the fifth, and his Brother King *Ferdinand* had at *Vienna*, when they lookt for Sultan *Soliman*, the ground was very spacious, and though their numbers were very great, yet those of the *Turk* were very much beyond them, and they fear'd to be out-wing'd by his numerous Horse. The order of their Battel was to be this if they had fought: They had sixty thousand arm'd with Pikes, Halberets, Partisans, and other long Staves, these were divided in three great Battalions, each of twenty thousand; on the right hand stood one of them, on the left hand the second, and the third in the middle. There were about six or seven thousand Harquebussiers on foot, to attend each of these great Battalions of Pikes, who were to have several little Intervals thorough which these Harquebussiers were to fallay and fire incessantly before the grand Battalions, till they should be necessitated to retire through these same Intervals to the Reer, and then the Pikes were immediately to close and fill up those void places. These three great Battalions separated one from another,

A General should have a ready wit.

Armies marshal'd in three distinct Bodies.

How the mighty Army of the Emperor Charles the Fifth was marshal'd at Vienna.

another, made two great Intervals, in each of which stood fifteen thousand Horse. Here then you see upon the matter, one of the bravest Armies of Christians that ever was marshal'd in one front without reserve (only some thousands of men were order'd to guard the Baggage and Munitions) scarce read of before or since. Here you see the Pikemen make the Wings, whereas both before and since they made the Body: Here you see the Firemen marshal'd behind, and ordain'd to fall from their station, and do their service in the Van, and then to retire to their place according to the custom of the ancient *Gracians* and *Röman Velites*, and not marshal'd on the wings of the Pikes. And here you see the Horse, who before that time and since made the wings of an army, make now the Body of it, strongly flanked with Pikes; this being the inversion of former Ordinances of War, was then thought necessary to prevent the surrounding, and the impetuosity of the *Turks* numerous Cavalry.

Armies for most part now are marshal'd in two distinct Bodies, the Vanguard, and the Arrear-guard, which are commonly called Battel and Reserve. But it is not only difficult, but purely impossible for any the most experienced General, to set down any one certain rule or order, whereby he may constantly keep one manner of marshalling, or one form of Battel, as it is called *formacies*, though he could be assur'd that his Regiments or Brigades of both Horse and Foot, should constantly continue of one strength, since the place, situation, Houses, Villages, Castles, Hills, Valleys, rising heights, hollow grounds, Waters, Woods, Bushes, Trees, and Marshes, do occasion such alterations as make the form or mould of an Army cast in one place, change so much, as you shall not know the face of it on another piece of ground, perhaps not above one or two hours march from the former. And in this, as I said before, the General is to act his part, and take such advantages as he may, and readily possess himself of such places, which being in the enemies power might do him prejudice. One of his great cares in Embattling would be to secure both his flanks, which are called the right and left hand of his Army with some River, Brook, Ditch, Dike, or Retrenchment, if these cannot be so readily got, then he may do it with the Waggon or Baggage of his Army; for in time of Battel it is almost impossible for a Battalion or Body either of Horse or Foot to stand when it is charg'd both in front and flank, and this is ordinarily done by overwinging, so that the strongest in number hath the advantage, which the weaker should endeavour to counterbalance by art, policy, and stratagem.

This makes me wonder how *Charles* the Fifth, a great Warrior, in his Instructions to his Son *Philip* the Second, asserts that thirty thousand Foot, and four thousand Horse is a sufficient Army against any enemy how strong soever, provided it be still kept at that strength, and fresh men put in their places, who are either put in Garrisons, or are kill'd or dead; because, saith he, hardly shall you find any ground capable to contain more without encumbrances. But himself found ground to marshal one hundred and ten thousand men at *Vicenna*, almost all in front; and if he find ground to marshal these thirty four thousand men, certainly it will be necessary to have a Reserve of twenty thousand. And assuredly greater numbers have the advantage of smaller, if they be well order'd to second one another, whether the ground be spacious or narrow, Reserves being rightly placed.

Many are of opinion, and it is grounded on reason enough, that Horse and Foot fight best together, but they differ in the way, for some would have one Regiment of Horse, with two Regiments of Foot, or if the Cavalry be so strong, a Regiment of Horse for every Regiment of Foot, and marshal'd alternately; as first, a Regiment of Horse, and then one of Foot, and so with the rest. Others like not this so well, but like better to fortify their Squadrons with Plottons of Musqueteers, who give their Volleys incessantly, before the Horse come to their Charge, and this assuredly doth exceedingly disorder and dammage Bodies of Horse before they can come to make use of their Pistol or Lance, for the Lance is not yet out of fashion with the *Polonians*, *Hungarians*, *Transylvanians*, and *Walachians*, besides those of more Eastern Nations. Of this manner of mixing Foot with Horse, *Gustavus Adolphus* made good use in his Wars with *Pole*, and in *Germany* too, especially at the Battel of *Leipsick*. But that great Prince was not the first that invented it, it was used in the world many

Battel and Reserve.

Flanks of an Army to be well secur'd in Battel.

Numbers a great advantage if they be well order'd.

Horse and Foot together.

Plottons of Musqueteers with Horse.

many ages before him among the ancient *Gracians*, *Romans*, and *Germans* too as I have already shewn you. *Colum* the famous Admiral of *France* had ordinarily Harquebussiers of Foot mixt with his Horsemen; and truly as I think, Musqueteers have done, and can do good service against Horse before they come to the Charge; so I conceive in the Charge, Pikemen well arm'd for the defensive, would notably assist Horsemen if they were interlin'd with them. But it seems Generals think not so, because they do not use it.

But in the marshalling Armies there is great difference of opinions concerning the Intervals between the greater Bodies, whether these be Regiments or Brigades. Some allow but 24 foot of ground between them, and they say if they be greater, the enemy may easily get into these void places, and so fall upon the flanks of the several Bodies and ruin them, a consideration that carries much reason with it. But truly this order is good if the Army be drawn up in one front, without any Reserve. But if it have a Reserve these narrow Intervals in the Battel render it useless, nay they may help to ruin it. My reason is this, a Reserve is appointed to advance against an enemy, at one of these three occasions, which are when the Battel is weary, when it is in danger, and when it is beaten. Now in none of these three can the Reserve be steedable if there be not ground for it to advance, to draw up, and to fight, but who can imagine that a Brigade of three hundred men in front, in the reserve, can advance, draw up, and fight on a spot of ground twenty four foot broad, or yet on a plot of ground three hundred foot broad, for there they should only have ground to stand on, but no room to handle their arms, especially their Muskets. But it will be yet worse if the Brigades of the Battel be flying, and these of the Reserve advancing, for there shall be in that case such a medley, and an Embarrass, that they shall ruin one another without the help of an enemy.

I suppose for these or the like reasons, others allow as much Interval between two Brigades marshal'd in the Battel as can contain a Brigade drawn up behind it in the Reserve, all the Brigades being supposed to be of a like strength and number. And thereby whether the Battel reel, faint, or fly, the Reserve may come up to the shock with an enemy, without any impeachment given to it by the flying Brigades of the Battel, and thereby a fair opportunity given to those who fled or retir'd, to rally on the ground whereon the Reserve stood, which was the order the ancient *Romans* kept in their three Battalions of *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, as I have at length shewn you in my Discourses of their Art of War. And it seems in the days of *Charles* the Fifth about a hundred and twenty years ago, the Intervals between Battalions were so narrow, that the Reserves could give them little or no assistance, whereof he complains in his Instructions to his Son; for he saith they were all drawn up in direct lines, (these are his words) that if you beat, (saith he) the foremost Bodies, they fall back upon the rest, who are directly behind them, and so bring them in disorder and confusion: which hurtful error of marshalling, that Emperour saith he intended to rectifie, and to that purpose refers the King his Son to his written Notes upon that Subject. Now what better way is there to rectifie this evil, than to draw up any Battalion of the Reserve directly behind a Battalion of the Battel, but in a direct line behind the Interval that is between two Battalions of the Battel; and this is the *Romans* way, who drew up the three Bodies of their several Legions one behind another, Chequerwise.

And here the Objection mention'd before, that an enemy may easily enter at these wide Intervals and charge the flanks of the Brigades in Battel, must be answer'd, that these Intervals are defended with greater and smaller pieces of Ordnance, suppose every one of them with four greater and lesser Pieces, or with three, according as the Train is great or small; and if that does not the that Brigade of the Reserve that is behind the Interval in danger should be order'd speedily to advance and possess it: It would seem that the not marshalling the Battel and Reserve in this order at the Battel of *Woodstock*, fought in the year 1636, was either the *Swedish* error, or mistake; for *Baner* who commanded the right wing of the *Swedish* forces, being overlaid with numbers, had been undoubtedly beaten if the Battel and left wing had not prevail'd; so soon as he saw the danger, he sent Post after Post to Lieutenant General *Vickthamb*, who

Narrow Intervals between great Bodies,

Obstructs help from the Reserve.

Large Intervals of better use.

Charles the Fifth his Complaint.

Intervals defended by Ordnance.

Error at Woodstock Battel.

who commanded the Reserve, commanding him to advance instantly to his succour, but he made no great haste: the *Swede* having obtain'd the Victory, *Pszthumb* next morning is question'd for his slow advance, he justified himself by making it appear, that if he had advanc'd immediately, those who were running away in Troops would have routed him, at least have so disorder'd him, that he could have done no service, and therefore he stood firm in his first ground, till all the runnaways were past him, and then march'd up in good order. Most of this was known to be true, but if *Battel* and Reserve had been march'd in the manner I spoke last of, there had been no danger of that whereof *Pszthumb* was afraid, for there had been room enough for him to have advanc'd, and for those who fled, to have run away. But it seems it was order'd otherwise.

But we shall marshal an Army both ways, first with the lesser, and next with the greater Intervals; and we shall suppose our Army to consist of sixteen thousand Horse and Foot, and a few more. We shall draw them up in a fair Campaign or Heath, which hath very few or no encumbrances of Houses, Trees, heights, or hollow places, and the right hand of it shall be fenced with some unfordable water, and the left with the Waggon of the Army. The Army it self shall consist of seven Brigades of Foot, and six of Horse. Each Brigade of Foot shall consist of 1800 men, in all 12600. The six Brigades of Horse shall consist of 3600, which being divided into six parts, gives 600 Horsemen besides Officers, to every Brigade; in all 16200. In the first way of marshalling, I shall allow as I should do, one foot of ground for every Foot soldier to stand on, and three foot distance between files; but because some think this too much, have patience, and at my second marshalling of the army, I shall allow them less, though no less belongs to them. To every Horseman I allow four foot of ground for himself, and the distance between him and his sidemen. Some will think it too much, but *Boeker* allows him six, this is too much; at next marshalling I shall allow him less than four.

On the right wing of the Van-guard or *Battel*, shall stand two Brigades of Horse, and on the left wing as many, and between the wings the Body shall be composed of four Brigades of Foot. On the right wing of the Reer-guard or Reserve shall stand one Brigade of Horse, and on the left wing another Brigade of Horse, and between the two wings the Body shall be composed of three Brigades of Foot. The length of the *Battel* you may compute thus, every Brigade of Horse being six hundred, and drawn up three deep, consists of two hundred Leaders, for each of these, four foot are allowed, that is eight hundred. Multiply eight hundred by four, (which is the number of the Brigades of the *Battel*) the product is 3200. Three Streets or Distances each of eight foot broad must be allow'd in every Brigade, *inde* twelve Streets in four Brigades, these make 96 foot, then you have two Intervals on the right hand, one between the two Brigades of Horse, and another between the Horse and the right hand of the Foot, and as many you have on the left hand of the *Battel*, in all four great Intervals, each of them of 24 foot, for more some will not allow, *inde* 96 foot; add 3200 to 96, and both to 96, you will find the aggregate to be 3392. And so much ground doth the four Brigades of Horse possess with their Intervals. Each Brigade of Foot consisting of 1800 men, being six deep, hath 300 Leaders, these possess 1200 foot, 1200 being multiplied by four (which is the number of the Foot-brigades of the *Battel*) produceth 4800. There must be a distance of six foot between the right hand of the Pikemen, and the right wing of the Musketeers, and another on the left hand, these two Distances take 12 foot, and therefore four Brigades require 48 foot. Now four Brigades have three Intervals, each of 24 foot, *inde* 72. Add then 72 for greater Intervals to 48 allow'd for lesser Distances, the aggregate is 120; add 120 to 4800, the aggregate is 4920: so much ground doth four Brigades of Foot possess with their Intervals. Be pleas'd to add 4920 to the 3392 Foot, which the four Brigades of Horse possess, you will find the aggregate to be 8312 foot, which being divided by five to make paces, the Quotient is 1662, and two foot; so much ground do our four Brigades of foot and four Brigades of Horse take up in front, the Intervals between Brigades being allowed to be no greater than 24 foot. According to this allowance the Reader may easily calculate the longitude of the three Brigades of Foot,

Army of  
16200 Horse  
and Foot, di-  
vided into se-  
ven Brigades  
of Foot, and  
six of Horse,

Marshal'd in  
*Battel* and Re-  
serve with  
lesser Inter-  
vals.

The Longi-  
tude of the  
*Battel* com-  
puted.

Foot, and two Brigades of Horse, which make the Reer-guard or Reserve, if he conceive it worthy of his pains.

To marshal our Army of 16200 men another way, in order to Intervals, I shall in the first place allow no more ground to either Foot-soldier or Horseman for himself, and distance from his sidemen, but three foot in all. But for the great Interval between two Brigades, I shall allow as much ground as a Brigade may stand on, that the Brigade in the Reserve may possess it when order'd to advance. You will remember we agreed that four Brigades of Foot, and four of Horse should make the *Battel*, and three Brigades of Foot, and two of Horse should make the Reserve; which I marshal thus, On the right hand of the *Battel* two Brigades of Horse, but between them an Interval of as much ground as one of the Brigades possesseth. On the left hand of the second Brigade of Horse, an Interval of 24 foot, on the left hand whereof four Brigades of Foot marshal'd in one front; these four must have three Intervals, each of them capable to contain a Brigade of Foot, on the left hand of them an Interval of 24 foot, and then two Brigades of Horse with such a distance between them as that the two Brigades on the right wing had. The Reserve I marshal thus, One Brigade of Horse drawn up at a convenient distance directly behind the Interval between the two Brigades of Horse on the right wing of the *Battel*. Then on its left hand, three Brigades of Foot drawn up directly behind the three Intervals appointed to be between the four Brigades in the *Battel*, and on their left hand, the second Brigade of Horse drawn up behind the Interval appointed to be between the two Brigades of Horse, which makes the left wing of the *Battel*.

The Longitude of the *Battel* marshal'd as I have said, you may compute thus, The two Brigades of Horse on the right wing, each consisting of 600 Horse, and consequently of 200 Leaders, both of them 400 Leaders, each whereof hath three foot of ground allow'd him, require 1200 foot, and the Interval 600, the distance between them and the Foot 24, as much you are to allow to the left wing of the Horse, add these together, you will find the aggregate to be 3648. Each Brigade of Foot consisting of 1800 men six deep, hath 300 Leaders, and so the four Brigades have 1200 Leaders, each of these hath three foot allow'd him, *inde* 3600 foot, so every Brigade hath 900 foot of ground, as much must every Interval have, now there be three Intervals, and three times 900 amounts to 2700. There must be in every Brigade two Intervals, each of six foot between the Pikes and Musketeers, so 12 foot in every one, and in all the four 48. Add 48 to 2700, and both of them to 3600, the aggregate is 6348. So much ground is requir'd for the Foot of the *Battel*. Add 6348 to 3648, which was allowed to the Horse, the aggregate will be 9996, which will want four foot of two Italian miles. I shall neither trouble my Reader nor my self to compute the Longitude of the Reserve. What I have said of two ways of Marshalling this Army of 16200 Horse and Foot, is meant only in order to Intervals, for it is most certain, an Army may be drawn up in as many several figures and forms as there may be Generals to succeed one another in the command of it.

Between the *Battel* and Reserve there should be as great distance of ground as a Brigade of Foot possesseth in its Longitude; but the Army be marshal'd in three bodies, then the distance between *Battel* and Reer-guard must be double, that distance that is between Van-guard and *Battel*, that there be room for both to rally, this was observ'd by two late Princes of *Orange*, *Maurice* and *Henry*, in drawing up their Armies, following therein the practice of the *Romans*, in their Intervals between their *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*.

Marshal'd in  
*Battel*, and  
Reserve with  
greater Inter-  
vals.

Longitude of  
the *Battel*  
computed.

## CHAP. XVIII.

*Of the Women, and Baggage belonging to an Army, of the General Waggon-master, and of his Duties.*

OUR levied men being arm'd, paid, exercised, disciplin'd, divided into Troops, Companies, Regiments and Brigades, with Officers belonging to them, and sufficiently provided with General Officers, and a Train of Artillery, and at length march'd in order of Battel, are now ready to march, but I am afraid, the Baggage will disturb them, unless it be put in some order.

The great number of Coaches, Waggon, Carts, and Horses loaded with baggage, the needless numbers of Women and Boys who follow Armies, renders a march, slow, uneasy and troublesome. And therefore the *Latins* gave baggage the right name of *Impedimenta*, hinderances. But because without some baggage an Army cannot subsist, it would be his care who commands in chief to order the matter so that the baggage may be as incon siderable and small as may be, and that it march in such order that every Waggon-man, Carter and Baggage-man may know his own place, that so they may neither disturb one another, nor yet hinder the march of the Army. The place where the Baggage should march is appointed according to the knowledge the General hath of his enemy, if he be in the Rear, the Baggage should be sent before the Army; if he be in the Van, it should be in the Rear. But in these places there should be with it a Convoy of Horse and Foot, strong or weak, according as occasion seems to require. And of Convoys for Baggage I shall say these few things in general: In them these Horsemen who are not very well mounted, may well enough be employed, but no men are to be set there, whether of Foot or Horse, that are sick, lame, or wounded, for that were to betray both them and the Baggage to an enemy. When Convoys are put to fight for defence of their Charge, as many times they are, (for the desire of booty spurs men to desperate attempts) they should (if conveniently they can) cast themselves within the Waggon and Carts drawn up round for that purpose, from whence Musqueteers may do notable service, and out of which retrenchment the Horse may as they see occasion, make handsome sallies. If they cannot get this done, they should be sure to put as much of the Baggage, or all of it, if they may, between them and their own Army, and themselves between the Baggage and the enemy, whether he fall out to be in the Van, or in the Rear. Sometimes if the danger appear to be both before and behind, the Baggage marches in the middle of the Infantry, and though some be of the opinion, that the Baggage should still follow the Artillery, yet that doth not, nor cannot hold in all cases and emergencies, the marching of both Armies and Baggage many times depending on contingents, of which no determinate rule can be given.

The way to regulate Baggage is to appoint under a severe penalty that no Company, Troop or Regiment shall have more Waggon, Carts, or Baggage-horses than such a set number already order'd by the Prince, or his General, which should be as few as may be, with full power to the Waggon-master General to make all that is over that number, prize, with an absolute command to all Colonels to assist him in case of opposition. In the former Discourses we have seen that the *Circians* and *Romans* to free themselves as much as was possible, of this great Embarras of Baggage, loaded their Soldiers like Mules and Asses; this perhaps did suit those times, better than it would do ours. But most of our Modern allowances for Carriages of an Armies Baggage hath been in the other extremum. I shall instance four.

The *Swedish* Kings and their Generals allow ten Waggon to every Troop of Horse, and two to every Company of Foot, and a Suters Waggon to every one

Baggage justly called *Impedimenta*.

Baggage should have Convoys of Horse and Foot.

The number of Waggon, Carts and Baggage-Horses should be determined.

of them, sometimes two to a Troop of Horse, besides the Waggon allowed to the field and Staff-officers of Regiments. Let us then suppose that the Cavalry of an Army consists of five thousand Horse, and these divided into a hundred Troops, and fifty Horse in a Troop were thought fair in the *German* War. These hundred Troops had for themselves a thousand Waggon, and a hundred for their Suters. Model these hundred Troops in twelve Regiments, and allow for every Regiment staff eight Waggon, you are to have ninety six Waggon more, add these ninety six to the other eleven hundred, the Waggon of your Cavalry (besides Coaches) amount to eleven hundred ninety six. Let there be an Infantry of nine thousand men join'd to this Cavalry, let it be divided into fifteen Regiments, and each Regiment into eight Companies, there will be a hundred and twenty Companies, for every Company two Waggon are allowed, and one for the Suter, these are three for a Company, *inde* for a hundred and twenty Companies three hundred and sixty Waggon; for the Staff of every Regiment allow eight Waggon, *inde* for fifteen Regiments a hundred and twenty Waggon, add a hundred and twenty to three hundred and sixty, you have four hundred and eighty Waggon for the Infantry, besides Coaches. Add 480 to 1196, the Waggon of the Cavalry, the total of Waggon for both amounts to 1676, you may safely allow to the general persons of this Army at least a 120 Coaches and Waggon, and then you have 1796; besides all these numbers of Waggon belonging to the Train of Artillery, and the Proviant. I have seen in a *German* Army that exceeded not 6000 Horse and Foot, not so few as 900 Waggon.

My second instance shall be of the *Dane*, and some *German* Princes, whose allowance is somewhat less than the *Swede*.

The third of the Emperour, who allows more Waggon to both Horse and Foot than the *Swede* doth, and that is needless.

My fourth Instance shall be of the *French* allowance, not of our times, but Fifty years ago, for four of the Genl's arms Baggage a Waggon was appointed; *inde* 25 Waggon for 100 men at Arms. The light armed were allowed no Waggon, but were appointed to carry their stuff on Horseback; and how many Horse were allowed them for that use, I find it not specified; but we may make a conjecture, when we see how many were allowed to the Foot: In the time of *Henry* the Great, who died about sixty years ago, one Horse was allowed to carry the Baggage of four Souldiers: hence we may conclude, that a horse was allowed for the Baggage of two Light-horsemen, or of Archers; so for Infantry of 10000 men, besides Officers, 2500 Baggage horses were allowed. Besides, a Gadget or Boy was allowed to serve two Souldiers, *inde* for 10000 Souldiers, 5000 Gudgets, the very Vermin of an Army.

These horses and Boys, did, no doubt, very unnecessarily destroy both Proviant and Fodderage. And yet *Louis de Montgomery* in his *Milice Françoise*, approves of this allowance. But the *French*, now, of all other people puts the greatest restraint on their Baggage: And indeed, if *Montgomery* had liv'd till my time, I could have let him see one hundred *French* Souldiers, whose Baggage (except the Clothes on their backs) might all have been carried in a Handkerchief. And though I joyn freely with him in his opinion, that the Souldiers should not carry such burthens as the *Romans* did of old, yet I would have neither Horse nor Boy allowed to them; it is too much, that the bad Custom of later times, hath eas'd most of them of the burthen of defensive arms, and therefore every one of them both may, and should carry his own Knap-sack and four or five days provision of meat; with a Hatchet at his girdle, which last I see too much neglected, on this side of the Sea: in so much as where an Infantry comes to encamp, if it be for one night, or two, or more, the Souldiers must make use of their Swords, for cutting down branches of Trees, and to cleave Wood, either for making their Huts, or for fire; indeed I know not for what most of their Swords serve, being for most part so extremely base, yet assuredly Hatchets were more proper for those uses, I have spoke of, than their Ammunition blades, which can hardly cut any thing. But such an allowance of Boys and Horses, were in fashion in *France*, long before *Louis de Montgomery's* time: for I find some in Records of the Civil Wars, the Protestants did retrench these allowances,

*Swedish* allowance of Waggon.

*Dane* and *German* Emperours.

*French* allowance of Waggon and Horses fifty years ago.

Much retrench'd.

A Souldier may carry his own luggage.

Allowance of Boys to serve Souldiers out of use,

when their Souldiers were Garrison'd; for then it is said, four of them had but one Gudget allow'd them to wait on them, and a whole company of them, were but allow'd six horses for their Baggage, and indeed I think both these were too many for them in the field, in Garrison they needed none of them. Though you allow every Souldier two pound of Bread and Cheese every day, and God knows, he gets not so much many times in four days: suppose he hath a couple of Shirts, a pair of Stockins, and a pair of Shoes in his Knaplack, (and how many Souldiers have all these?) and a Hatchet; I say, all these will not weigh so much as a Head-piece, and a Corset, and therefore he may well enough be obliged to carry them.

As not necessary.

Every Regiment, whether of horse or foot, should have a Waggon or a Baggage-master, and where the establishment of the Prince doth allow him no pay, the Colonel should order a sufficient Sergeant or Corporal to exercise that Office by turns, these are to see that every Officers Baggage, from the highest to the lowest, march according to the Dignity and Precedency of him to whom it belongs, whether it be carried on Waggons, Carts, or Horses. But these Regiment Baggage-masters are not to suffer the Baggage of the Regiments to march, till they have received their Directions from the Waggon-master General, when, and in what manner it shall be done. This Waggon-master General's charge is exceeding toylsome, when an Army marcheth. Every night after the Army comes to Quarter, and every morning before it march, he must attend the Major Generals of the Cavalry, and Infantry, and receive his Orders from them, if the whole Army march together; but if the Cavalry march apart, then the Major General of the foot gives the Waggon-master his instructions, particularly a list, in what order the Army is to march, for ordinarily, Regiments and Brigades change by turns, and their Baggage must march in that same order, that themselves do: the Waggon-master having got his list, he accordingly orders the Regiment Baggage-masters (who are obliged to wait on him every morning) to cause their luggage march, where in they may not fail; for (unless some extraordinary occasion alters it,) the Prince, or in his absence, the Commander in Chief his Coach, or Coaches, with his Waggons go first, then the whole Train of Artillery behind it, the Coaches and Waggons of all the general Officers according to their dignity; after them, the Waggons of that Brigad, that hath the Van for that day, and so all the rest in order, according as the Regiments or Brigades march. If any Waggons or Baggage-horses press to be before these, behind whom the Waggon-master General hath ordered them to march, he may safely make prize of them, owe them who will. When the Waggons come to a Heath, or a Champaign field, the Waggon-master should order the Waggons to draw up two, four, or five in rank, and to drive in that order, so long as the ground permits them to do so, and this saves time, and makes dispatch, and when they come to strait ground, they are to fall off, by the right hand, in that order wherein they were before. The same course he is to take with Baggage-horses. This Baggage-master General is allowed to have two Lieutenants; so that if the Army march three several ways, (as sometimes it doth) himself and his two Deputies serve to marshal the Baggage of all the three. If the Army is divided into two, or the Cavalry march alone, one of his Lieutenants goes along with the Horse, the other stays with himself, and he is constantly to be there where the General of the Army and Train of Artillery either marcheth, or quartereth.

Many times Waggons are commanded to be burnt and destroyed; sometimes all the Women and most of the Baggage are left behind at some Garrison and fortified place, or with the Body of the Infantry and Artillery when expedition calls away all the Horse, Dragoons, and as many Foot as are able to march lustily. In some of these occasions, Officers go fair to lose their Waggons, and some of their moveables.

Women following an Army divided into three Classes, First.

Women who follow an Army may be ordered (if they can be ordered) in three ranks, or rather in Classes, one below another. The first shall be of those who are Ladies, and are the Wives of the General and other principal Commanders of the Army, who for most part are carried in Coaches; but those Coaches must drive according to the quality of them, to whom the Ladies belong,

long, and as the Baggage of their Husbands is appointed to march by the Waggon-master General. The second Classe is of those who ride on Horseback, and these must ride in no other place than where the Baggage of the Regiment to whom they belong, marcheth, but they are very oft extravagant, gadding here and there, and therefore in some places they are put in Companies, and have one or more to command and over-see them, and these are called in Germany, *Hurenweiber*, Rulers or Marshals of the Whores. I have seen them ride, keep Troop, rank and file very well, after that Captain of theirs who led them, and a Banner with them, which one of the Women carried. The third Classe is of those who walk on foot, and are the wives of inferior Officers and Souldiers; these must walk besides the Baggage of the several Regiments to whom they belong, and over them the several Regiment Marshals have inspection. As woman was created to be a helper to man, so women are great helpers in Armies to their husbands, especially those of the lower condition, neither should they be rashly banisht out of Armies, sent away they may be sometimes for weighty considerations; they provide, buy and dress their husbands meat when their husbands are on duty, or newly come from it, they bring in fuel for fire, and wash their linnens, and in such manner of employments a Souldiers wife may be helpful to others, and gain money to her husband and her self; especially they are useful in Camps and Leaguers, being permitted (which should not be refused them) to go some miles from the Camp to buy Victuals and other Necessaries. At the long Siege of *Breda* made by *Spinola*, it was observ'd that the married Souldiers fared better, look'd more vigorously, and were able to do more duty than the Batchellors; and all the spite was done the poor women, was to be called their husbands mules, by those who would have been glad to have had such mules themselves. Among all these kinds of Women in well order'd Armies, there are none but those who are married. If there be any else, upon examination made by the Minister, Priest, or Consistory, they are put away with ignominy, at least should be conformable to all Articles of War.

Second.

Third.

Women helpful to their Husbands in Armies,

Useful in Camp.

But a strange story is writ by good Authors of that famous Duke of *Alva*, whose name is yet so hateful to most of the *Netherlands*. They say at that time he marched from *Italy* to the *Low-Countries*, to reduce them to the obedience of his Master the King of *Spain*, a permission was given to Courtizans to follow his Army, but they were to ride in Troops with Banners. They had their several Capitaneesses and Alfieras, or she-Cornets, and other Officers, who kept among them an exact Discipline in all points that concern'd their profession: They were divided into several Squadrons according to their quality, and that was distinguishing not otherwise but by the difference of their beauties, faces, and features. Those of the best sort were permitted only to traffick with men of the highest quality, those of the second rank with Commanders of great note, those of the third with Officers of a lower condition, and those of the fourth degree with Officers who were of the meanest quality, and Souldiers, whom those of the other three ranks rejected. An excellent Commonwealth! where it was prohibited under all grievous pains, not to suffer themselves to be Courtied by any either above or below the rank wherein they were placed, and that was impartially done according to the Talent nature had bestowed upon them; so that every common Souldier, inferior person, or low Officer, Ensign, Captain, Colonel, or General Commander knew to whom they might address themselves, and from whom they might buy repentance. A practice which I suppose never had a Precedent in either Christian or Pagan Army, and which with an impudent face loudly cry'd defiance to both Religion and Moral honesty.

A strange story of Courtizans.

An abominable Commonwealth.

## CHAP. XIX.

## Of the March of an Army.

**I**F there be any confusion in the march of an Army, or that the right ordering it be neglected by general persons in appointing every Regiment or Brigade its own place, with the Train of Artillery and Baggage, or that Colonels, Majors and Captains be careless to obey their orders in their march, and suffer their Soldiers to run, straggle, and lag behind, it not only gives an enemy a wished advantage, but is enough of it self to ruin an Army even without the help of an enemy. In a march an Army may be surprized in passing a River, whether that be by Foord, Bridge or Boat, or when it marcheth thorough marsh grounds, or close Countries, when it ascends or descends Hills; to all these inconveniences a careful General should advert, and according to the Intelligence he hath, either he is to advance his march speedily to gain a pass or advantage of ground, or stop his march, and encamp and fortifie, and if nothing else will help, he should draw up in Battel, either fronting that same way as he was marching, or facing about to fight the enemy, whether he be in his front or rear, and let God dispose of the Victory as seems good in his eyes.

Our Modern Armies have marched, and do still march one of three several ways, these are first by dividing an Army into three several Bodies, Van-guard, Battel, and Arrier-guard; secondly, by marching in two distinct Bodies, as they use to fight, and these are commonly called Battel and Reserve. Thirdly, all in one Battel, whereby is meant the half of the Cavalry in the Van, the other half in the Reer, and the Foot between them. To clear all these three ways of marching, let us suppose our Army to consist of six Brigades of Horse, and eight of Foot. These are divided after the first way thus: In the Van-guard three Brigades of Horse, and out of these a strong party of three or four hundred Horse to go before to search the ways, and discover. That party should be about one *English* mile before the three Brigades of Horse, and out of it should be small parties sent out about half an *English* mile, which should constantly acquaint the great party, and it the Brigades behind, and so from hand to hand, till the Intelligence of all they learn, comes to the General. After these forlorn Troops of Horse follow commanded Musketeers, with Pioneers to smooth and make plain the ways for the Artillery, whether it be by cutting Trees or hedges, or filling hollow grounds or Ditches. After the three Brigades of Horse follow some Field-pieces, suppose the half of those that are with the Army, and some Waggon's loaded with Ammunition; immediately after them march two Brigades of Foot, these are follow'd by the Baggage of the whole Van-guard, and behind it a commanded party of Horse and Foot; so you see this Van-guard is a petty Army of it self. In the next place comes the Battel, in this order: First, two Brigades of Foot, after them the Prince or his General in person, attended with the Guard of his Body, and Servants; behind these the General or Colonel of the Artillery, who is followed by the great Ordnance, and whole Train of Artillery; after it cometh in due order, the Baggage belonging to the General Officers, and to all the four Brigades which compose the Battel; in the Reer whereof march two more Brigades of Foot, and these sometimes are brought up by a party of Horse. After the Battel comes the Reerguard of our Army; and that is the Reserve of the Van-guard, for first marcheth its Baggage with a commanded party of Horse and Foot, next follow two Brigades of Foot, then some Field-pieces; behind them, the other three Brigades of Horse, who have a party behind them at the distance at least of one *English* mile, to give them advertisement if an enemy be following. And this is the first, and a very commendable manner of the march of an Army. But observe to make the greater expedition, especially if an Army be numerous, these

three

three great Bodies may march three several ways if the Country conveniently afford them, and this makes a speedy march; but in this case the Battel must have two Brigades of Horse which it had not before, and consequently the Van-guard, and Reer-guard, each of them but two, whereas by our former marshalling each of them had three; when they divide, they are appointed to meet at such a time and place as the General shall appoint, whether that be every night, or every third, fourth or fifth night; this is done when an enemy is not near. The Commander in chief marcheth and lodgeth constantly with the Body of the Infantry and the Artillery. And these great Officers who command the Van-guard and Arrier-guard, have Majors attending them every day and night, besides Ordnance-Horsemen, to receive their Directions, and bring them speedily to them in regard some new intelligence may rationally move them to alter the manner of the march, or any Orders they gave concerning it.

The second manner of the march of an Army is in two Bodies, Battel and Reserve. You will be pleased to remember that the Army we now speak of consists of six Brigades of Horse, and eight of Foot, which I thus order: In the Battel shall first march 400 commanded Horse, who shall have a smaller party before them to discover; next them Pioneers or Country people with a party of Musketeers or Fire-locks to plain the ways, then four Brigades of Horse: Next them, Field-pieces, then three Brigades of Foot; after them the Prince, or he who commands by his authority, the General or Colonel of the Artillery follows; after whom comes the great Ordnance, and whole Train, which is followed by the Coaches and Waggon's belonging to the General, and all the other General Officers; after them comes the Baggage belonging to all the Brigades of the Battel, in that same order that the Brigades themselves march; after which come two Brigades of Foot, and then a party of Horse brings up the reer of the Battel.

The Reserve follows in this order: First, a Commanded party of Horse and Foot, then the whole Baggage that belongs to the Reserve; next to it Field-pieces with their Waggon's of Ammunition, after them three Brigades of Foot, and then two Brigades of Horse, about one *English* mile behind them, follows the Reer-guard of Commanded Horse. These two great bodies for expedition sake, may likewise march two several ways; (if the General have no apprehension of an enemy) and join, when he gives order for it. Observe when an enemy is in the reer, the Battel is the Reserve, and the Reserve is the Battel, and consequently more Brigades should be in the Reer than in the Van, and in the Reer at such an occasion, the Commander in chief of the Army should be.

The third manner of an Armies march, is when it neither marcheth in two nor three distinct Bodies, but in one intire Body, which is frequently practised, let me then once more refresh your memory by telling you our Army consists of six Brigades of Horse, and eight of Foot. Three Brigades of Horse march first, and make the Van-guard, these have before them commanded Horse, Pioneers, and Musketeers as the others had. Then follow four Brigades of Foot, the General after them, next him the General of the Artillery, with his whole Train, after it marcheth the other four Brigades of Foot, and these eight Brigades of Foot compose the Battel of the Army; the other three Brigades of Horse make the Reer-guard, behind which at a miles distance follows a strong party of commanded Horse. The Baggage may be in the Van, or the Reer, or if the General apprehend danger in them both, it may march immediately after the Train. This great Body may be very soon divided into either two or three several ones, and may march as many several ways as the General pleaseth.

But truly with submission to great Commanders I should be of opinion, that the Baggage of an Army should never be divided, unless the Army it self divides: if danger be in the Van, let it all stay in the Reer, the proper place of Baggage; if the enemy be expected in the Reer, post away all the Baggage to the Van; if in both, necessity will force it to be in the middle of the Army. But my humble opinion is, that without apparent danger it should constantly be in the Reer of the whole Army, for the disadvantage is but small that the Brigades or Regiments of the Van have (and withal they have but their turns of it) that they must wait very long at night till their Baggage come from the Reer: It is

but

These three Bodies may march three several ways.

Second manner in two Bodies. Battel.

Reserve.

These two Bodies may march two several ways.

Third manner in one Body.

May be divided easily into several Bodies.

The proper place of Baggage in a march.

A careless march the ruin of an Army.

An Army may march in three several manners:

First manner in three Bodies.

Van-guard.

Battel.

Reer-guard.





3000 horse marching five in Breast. Being our 3000 Horse are to march five in breast, you are to divide 3000 by 5, and the Quotient will be 600, so you have 600 ranks, we must allow every Rider ten foot for the length of his Horse, multiply then 600 by 10, the Product is 6000. Ordinarily a Horse's length is allow'd for an Interval between ranks of Horse; but because we would march close, we shall allow but the half of that, to wit, five foot: now there be in 600 ranks 599 intervals, multiply then 599 by 5, the Product will be 2995. Add 2995 to 6000, the aggregate is 8995, so many foot of ground 3000 Horse take up in their marching five in breast.

Ten Demi-Cannons draw one after another. We have ten Demi-cannon which shoot each of them a bullet of 24 pound at least, each of them shall weigh no more but 4400 pound of metal, though the Germans allow more than 5000. Allow then one Horse to draw 250 pound of this Piece, you shall need 18 Horses at least to draw one Demi-cannon, with her Carriage, Leaver, Sponge and Ladder, these 18 Horses being coupled, make nine couple; allow then for nine couple of Horses, for the length of the Piece and her Carriage 110 foot, and it will be little enough: multiply then 110 by 10 (which is the number of your Demi-cannon) the Product is 1100, so much ground they must have when they are drawn one after another, and here is no allowance for distance between them, nor shall we give any between the 20 Field-pieces, but shall allow each of them to be drawn by two Horses, nor shall we give more ground to the Horses, Piece and Carriage than 20 foot, that is for all the twenty 400 foot.

And twenty Field-pieces.

1200 Waggon drawn one after another.

Our 1200 Waggon will take up much ground, nor is it possible to help it. Nor can we allow less ground for a Waggon drawn with two Horses, and a convenient distance between it, and the Waggon which follows it, than 22 foot, multiply then 1200 by 22, the Product will be 26400, so much ground require twelve hundred Waggon when they are drawn one after another.

The Foot then require 11088 foot, the Horse 8995, the Demi-cannon 1100, the Field-pieces 400, the Waggon 26400, add these numbers together, the aggregate will be 48883. These make in paces 9776, and three foot, about nine Italian miles, and three quarters. If you suspect I have cast up a wrong account, be pleas'd to work your self, and mend it at your pleasure.

By this you may see if the Army be stronger than this of ours, as many be, or the Train greater, as indeed it should be, or your Waggon more numerous, as assuredly they will be, or the way narrower, as for most part it chanceth to be: you may see, I say, how many miles may be between your Front and your Reer. And indeed, though the Train of Artillery, by the sticking of great Guns and Pot-pieces in deep, dirty, or clay ground, give no retardment to the march, as frequently it doth; or that an Army meet with no extraordinary encumbrances, as happily it may: yet it will be no marvel to see the Van at the head quarter, before the Reer-guard be march'd out of their last nights Leaguer, though the march be fourteen or fifteen English miles long, and therefore there is good reason to allow as little distance or Interval between several bodies or battalions as may be, and to divide an Army into two, three or more bodies, and march several ways to make the greater expedition, when it may be done safely, and without danger of an enemy, and if he be in your Reer, and that you intend not to fight, dividing, so you keep good order, facilitates your Retreat.

The two Princes of Orange, Maurice and Henry, both of them excellent Captains, order'd that in a march, when one Regiment was divided into two great Partitions, there should be no more but fifty foot of distance between them, and only eighty foot between one Regiment and another. These Princes caus'd their Armies to march (according to ancient custom) in three great Bodies, Van-guard, Battel, and Reer-guard, and those they call'd *Tercios*, or *Tercets*, a Spanish word which signifies *Thirds*, and so the Spaniards call'd their Regiments of old, and for any thing I know they do so still. These *Tercets* of the Princes of Orange were indeed grand Brigades, and these had Majors, who were call'd Majors of the Brigades besides Majors of Regiments.

And

And in a march the Princes allowed no greater distance between these great bodies, but an hundred, or a hundred and twenty foot at most. And herein they did not quadrate with the opinion of some of our modern Captains, who will have as great a distance between Brigades as the longitude of a Brigade is, which we may suppose to be very many times a thousand foot, though sometimes less; and consequently if there be ten such Brigades of Foot, the very nine Intervals between the ten Brigades takes up nine thousand foot, near two Italian miles, and therefore if the way be not very broad, there will be several miles between the Van and the Reer of the Infantry; but the reasons brought by those that are of this judgment may be demonstrated to be but weak by a visible practice.

When an Army is to go over a Pass, a Water, or a Bridge, the whole Bodies of it should be order'd to march very close, losing something of their ordinary distances, that one Brigade, or Battalion being past, another may immediately follow without intermission. Captain Rind the late Kings Engineer, a very worthy person, says at the passing a strait an Army should make an halt, and draw up in battel; and then pass over so many in breast as the place will permit, and when they are all over, draw up again before they march. For the last part I shall agree with him, for no sooner should any Forlorn-hope, Troop, Company, or Regiment be over a Pass, but they should draw up in Battel till some others be over, and if there be not ground enough, they should advance by little and little, till they find a more spacious field, where they may draw up in breast, and expect the rest; or if he mean that every particular Regiment or Brigade should draw on that side of the strait which it is to pass, till the Reer of that Regiment or Brigade come up, and then begin their march over: I shall yet agree with him, but for a Van of an Army to stay till the Reer come up, before it begin to pass a strait, is a great loss of time, which in the march of an Army is very precious; for in an Army but of an indifferent strength, that halt shall be the space of at least four hours, and this furnisheth an opportunity to an enemy to oppose the passage, or wait his advantages on the other side of the strait, with more force, policy, and deliberation.

To march over a Pass, or a Strait,

And not lose time.

A close march the best, and securest.

## CHAP. XX.

## Of Quartering, Encamping, and Modern Castrametation. Of the Quarter-master General, and of the Quarter-master of the General Staff.

**T**HE day is far spent, and the Army hath march'd far. Quarter must be made somewhere, and it must be either in Towns, Villages, or the fields. If the Army be dispersed in several Villages or Hamlets, it is done that it may be refreshed for some short time, and when there is no danger of an enemy. If it be to lodge for one night, and an enemy is near, then both Horse and Foot stand in the field all night, with strong Guards, Forlorn-hopes, Rounds, and Patrouilles. If an enemy be not near, ordinarily the Head-quarter is in some little Town or Village, and the Cavalry quarter'd round about in Hamlets; the Infantry is encamped close by the Head-quarter, and if it be but to stay a night or two, it doth not usually entrench, but as the old *Grecians* did. Encamps on some place something fortified by nature, as on a hill, or some defensible ascent, or where a river may be on one hand, and a marsh on the other, and where the place is defective, they must help it with Spade and Mattock, if danger is apprehended. Or if the Foot must lodge in a Champain, their Waggon drawn about them will be an excellent good shelter against sudden Infalls, and this the *Germani* call a *Wagonburg*, that is a Fortification of Waggon; and it is better than the *Roman Fossa Tumularia*, in ancient times. Where ever this Night-leaguer chanceth to be, he who commands in chief, must be careful to choose such a place as waits for neither wood, water nor fodderage. An Alarm-place should be appointed for the Horse, in case their Quarters happen to be beat up in the night, as also a place of Rendezvous, at which the whole Army is to meet next day, (if it be all in one Body) and at such an hour as the General shall appoint.

The Encamping of an Army for some considerable time requires an orderly Castrametation and Fortification, and though it be not very ordinary, yet it hath been, and may be occasion'd by several accidents and emergements, such as these: When an enemy comes unexpectedly, whose strength and designs are not known; when a Prince or his General thinks it not fit to hazard a Battle; when he would preserve the Country behind him, whether it belong to the Prince himself, or to his friends, or that he hath won it from his enemy. When the Pestilence or other contagious Diseases rageth so in Towns and Villages that he dares not hazard to quarter his Army in them. When he supposeth he may destroy his enemy by temporizing, as *Fabius Maximus* who used to subdue his enemy more with hunger than the sword. Or as *Salust* says, The greatest commendation of a General is to gain the victory without blood: Or when *ratio belli*, and sometimes, *ratio status*, makes him stay for more of his own forces, or those of his friends and allies. This oblig'd the Great *Gustavus* to fortify his Leaguers, and his Armies within them at *Verden*, and at *Nuremberg*. Or lastly, when he is to besiege a Town, Fort, or Castle, which he conceives will not very long tender, and may rationally expect succours and relief.

Being then there are so many, and may be more reasons for a fortified Leaguer, I cannot agree with *Louis de Montgomerie*, who will only allow of Entrenched Camps in two cases, when an Army is near a considerable enemy, and when other lodging cannot be had. And he alledgeth that the *Roman* Camps and their *Hiberna*, and some of our fortified Leaguers would be only good in *Arabia* the Desert, but not in a Country where Towns, Villages, and Incorporations may be had. But besides the reasons I have given for Entrenched Camps, I shall say to *Montgomerie*, that it is not improbable but many of these places where

To Quarter in Villages.

To Quarter in the Field.

To Encamp, and fortify for a long time.

Reasons for it.

Louis de Montgomerie's disapprobation answered.

where the *Romans* kept both their Winter and Summer Quarters were then as Desert as *Arabia* is now; and in our time it is ordinary to take in Villages, Hamlets and Castles within the circuit of a fortified Camp; or if a fortified Town be either behind, or on the flank of a Camp, it adds infinitely to the strength and conveniences of it, provided there be no contagion or infectious diseases within that Town.

But let us suppose that which often falls out, that a Leaguer is to be planted in an open field, where no Town, or Village is, and then let us see, how an Army can be conveniently quarter'd in it, that it be so capacious as to contain all is ordain'd to be within it; and next that there be no part or place of it redundant or useless, in regard it must be fortified, and the smaller circumference a fortification is of, the more tenible and defensible it is, and the fewer men will maintain it. But before a Prince or his General form his Camp, he should be observant of such considerations as these which follow: First, if he can chuse, he should not Encamp in low grounds, for these are unwholesome of themselves, and will quickly be made worse. Next, if he Encamp on a hill, it should be such a one as hath a river, or water running by the foot of it, and such a water whose stream cannot be diverted by the enemy; for a river or deep running water doth not only serve the necessities of the Camp, but defends some side or part of it. Thirdly, he should be sure that his enemy have no fortified place or Garrison on the side or flank of his Camp, much less behind it, which may cut off the passages and avenues, whereby his Provisions should come. Fourthly, he should Encamp in such a place where his Horse may not want fodder, and where abundance of Hay, straw, or growing Corn may be had, both to feed the Beasts, and for the Soldiers to cover their Huts with, and to lye upon. Fifthly, if Woods be not near him, he should lay down a way how wood may be brought to him abundantly, for fire to the Guards, for dressing meat for baking and washing, for the use of the Artillery, for Pallisado's, Batteries, Platforms and Bridges. But observe that if a great and thick Wood be contiguous, as much of it as lyeth within seven or eight hundred foot of the Camp should be cut down, and two or three Sconces or Redoubts built where the Trees stood, for preventing ambushes, or sudden eruptions of an enemy. And after the Camp is planted and entrenched, the Commander in chief would order strong Convoys both of Horse and Foot, for bringing all manner of Victuals, Provisions, and Munitions to his Camp from these places where he hath appointed Magazines to be kept; as also he should appoint Guards to Convey the empty Carts, Waggon, and Horses back again, and cause his Soldiers to use the Country people kindly and well, and not suffer them to be outraged any manner of way, that thereby they may be encouraged to return the offer.

The defence of the Camp consists in two things, the first is its fortification, the draught whereof is the work of the Engineer, by enclosing it within and without the Ditch with Bulwarks, Curtains, Redoubts, Sconces, half moons, and Tenailles, all which go under the General name of Trenches, which word is only proper for the Fortification of a Leaguer, and but borrowed for the Approaches to besieged places. The second Defence of the Leaguer consists in its Guards, and of these I shall speak in the next Chapter. The subject of this is the orderly disposing and giving a due proportion of ground to every Regiment, Troop and Company of Horse and Foot, whereon to pitch their Tents, or build their Huts, to the Generals Tents, to all the General Officers, to the Train of Artillery, for the Proviant-master and Proviant, to the Waggon-master and Waggon, and finally to all that belong to the Army, from the highest to the lowest; and this is called *Castrametation*, a *Latin* word which signifieth the Measuring the Camp, for the ground must be proportionally given out by an equal measure, and the doing it is the proper work of the Quarter-master General.

This Officer knowing the Generals pleasure, is to give the several Regiments and Brigades their Towns, Villages and Hamlets for their Quarters; nor must any of them offer to take any other than those that are assign'd to them by him, and therefore when the Army is to be quarter'd, though but for one night, the Regiment Quarter-masters of the whole Army are bound to wait upon him and receive his directions; and if they be to Encamp in such a Leaguer as that we

Some Considerations necessary before Entrenching a Camp.

Magazines for Provisions.

Defence of a Camp.

What Castrametation is.

A Quarter-master General.



Quarter for  
the Lord Ge-  
neral,

All these things, whereof I have spoken, being prepar'd, which need not take so much time as I have spent in writing them; the Quartermaster General measures out to the Quartermaster of the Staff, the Generals Quarter, in the very middle and center of the Camp; and the ground that some would have allotted for it, seems to be more than needs, that is 300 foot in length, and 600 in breadth. This is very much; and four times and one half more than the Romans allowed to their Consuls *Prætorium*, which was two hundred foot square, and so contained within its circumference 40000 foot, and that was eight Italian miles. But if you will know how much ground is within the quarter of our modern General, you are to multiply the length of it by its breadth, that is 600 by 300, work and you will find the product to be 180000 foot, that is 36000 paces, 36 Italian miles. It is too much for any General, below a Sovereign Prince, or one of his blood. And therefore I think out of this may be taken a *Forum*, or Market-place, and a quarter for Volunteers or Strangers, and the General will still keep enough. However a Generals quarter should be very large, for he needs much ground for his Dining-room, Bedchamber, and Anti-chamber, a Hall for his Council of War to sit in, Rooms for his Major-Domo, his Gentlemen, Pages, Lacques, Butlers, Cooks, Master and Grooms: of his horses, for his Provisions, for Kitchens, Cellars, and Stables, for all his Serving-men and waiters; as also two places for those who wait for Orders, or attend dispatches, one covered, the other uncovered. But few of our Generals keep such a Port, unless they be Princes. This quarter should have a Ditch about it, with a Drawbridge, and a strong Guard kept at it.

For the Ge-  
neral Staff.

In the next place, the Castrametator measures out to the Quartermaster of the Staff, a quadrangle of ground, within the Circumference of which are to lodge all these General Officers, whom I have mentioned all over these Discourses, and therefore I shall not need to name them here; all of them may be quarter'd according to their places and dignities, in a place of 300 foot long, and 400 foot broad; multiply the one by the other, you will find the contents of it to be 120000 foot, and that is 24 Italian miles; which is ground enough.

For the Ge-  
neral of the  
Ordnance.

No sooner hath the Castrametator seen four staves prick'd at the four corners of the assigned quarter, but he leaves the particular lodgings to be divided (yet still according to his direction) to the Quartermaster of the Staff, and goes with the Quartermaster of the Train, to whom he measures out a Quarter for the General of the Ordnance, which shall be 300 foot long, and 50 broad, multiply the one by the other, the Content is 15000 foot, 3 Italian miles, in which may be lodged, besides himself, such of his Officers as he shall think fit. But in lodging the Train it should be considered, that several Guns with necessary Ammunition, are often left behind at needful places, and many of them must be planted on the Bulwarks, and Curtains of the present Camp, the rest will require the less ground; and therefore the General having already got his Quarter, all the rest of the Officers and others belonging to the Train, whatever name, Title, and Office they may bear (whom I particularly nam'd in my discourse of the Train of Artillery): the place for the Magazine of Arms and Ammunition for all the pieces of Ordnance to stand on, and an empty place where Waggon may be loaded and unloaded, and for some Streets, each of them twenty foot broad: for all these I say, it will be enough to allow a quadrangle of 300 foot long and 500 broad; for if you multiply the one by the other, you will find the content of this quarter (beside that of the Master of the Ordnance) to be 150000 foot, inde 30 Italian miles. If this be true, as probably it is, *Achilles Terducci* is much mistaken, to require for a Train of Artillery belonging to an Army Royal, (which himself will have to consist of 18000 Foot and 6000 Horse) the fourth part of the whole Camp; do not find, that the Lord *Basta*, the Imperial Lieutenant General in *Transylvania*, to whom I conjecture, *Terducci* was principal Engineer, ever had so considerable a Train, as required half so much ground.

For the whole  
Officers, Guns  
and Ammu-  
nition of the  
Train.

To the Proviant-master General we shall allow a Quarter 300 foot long, and 60 broad; the one being multiplied by the other, produceth 18000 foot, some more than three Italian miles, and one half. This will be enough for him and all his Officers and Baggage, and for a large place for disburthening of Waggon: for you should consider that all Provisions are brought to the Camp either by Country Carts, Horses and Waggon, and these return so soon as they are un-

For the Pro-  
viant-master  
General.

loaded; or by the Horses belonging to the Baggage and Suttlers of the Army, and these presently return to their Masters, and the Proviant it self is instantly given out and distributed to the Army.

unloaded; or by the Horses belonging to the Baggage and Suttlers of the Army, and these presently return to their Masters, and the Proviant it self is instantly given out and distributed to the Army.

As to the Waggon it is to be consider'd that all of them that belong to the General Officers and the Train, may get room enough at the several Quarters, and so may most of those that belong to the Regiments of Horse and Foot, but upon all adventures the Quarter-master General shall appoint a place for 600 Waggon, and the Waggon-master General and his Lieutenants, and for this use he shall allow no less ground than 300 foot in length, and 512 in breadth for the 600 Waggon, and 300 foot in length, and ten in breadth for the Waggon-master and all his Officers; this last quarter makes 3000 foot, more than one half of an Italian mile. To understand the quarter allowed for 600 Waggon, observe first, that we allow no more Horses for every Waggon than two, with a Waggoner and a Boy. Secondly, every Waggon must have 12 foot of ground to stand on in length, and fix in breadth, and every Horse four foot in breadth, and eight in length; for I will not allow so much length for a Baggage-horse, as for a horse for service, which is ordinarily reckon'd ten. Thirdly observe, that both the Waggon and Waggon-horses stand in their length by the breadth of the Camp, and in their breadth by the length of the Camp, as all Horses in Castrametation do, and so do the Huts of the Horsemen, and Foot-souldiers, as you will see anon. These grounds being laid down, fifty Waggon may stand by their breadth in 300 foot of ground, which is the length of the whole Camp, six foot being allow'd for the breadth of every one of them. Over against them fifty Waggon more, all in one row likewise, so a hundred Waggon are quarter'd for their breadth, which is the Camps length; for the length every Waggon hath twelve foot, so the two rows have 24 foot, and between them a street of twelve foot, and behind one of them another empty place of twelve foot for fodder, and the Waggon men to lye, though these ordinarily lye either in or under the Waggon, these two streets having allowance of 24 foot, and the two rows of Waggon 24 foot likewise, the quarter appointed for a 100 Waggon takes up 48 foot of the breadth of the Camp; multiply 48 by 6, because you have 600 Waggon, the Product will be 288, this ground 600 Waggon must have for their breadth; for their length is the same with all the quarters of the Camp, that is 300 foot. We have now 1200 VVaggon-horses to quarter, and that must be besides the Waggon; you know we allow four foot for the breadth of the Horse, and therefore in 300 foot, you may quarter 75 Horse, for 4 times 75 make 300. Over against these 75 more in one row, these make 150. Behind the one of the two rows an empty place for fodder, 6 foot broad, between the two rows a street 6 foot broad, the two streets have 12 foot in breadth, and the two rows of Horses have 16, that is 8 foot for every row, (and you remember 8 foot are allowed for the length of a Baggage-horse) 12 being added to 16, make 28, so many foot do two rows of Horses with two streets take up of the breadth of the Camp; and in these two rows are contain'd 150 VVaggon-horses, whose whole number are 1200, 8 times 150. Multiply then 28 by 8, the Product is 224 foot, and so much ground do these 1200 VVaggon-horses take up of the breadth. Be pleas'd to add these 224 foot to the 288, which is allowed to the VVaggon, the aggregate will be 512, which we allowed for the breadth of the Quarter measured out to 600 VVaggon, and 1200 VVaggon-horses, the length allow'd is the same of all other quarters 300 foot. Multiply 512 by 300, the Product is 153600, some more than thirty Italian miles, and one half, in the superficial measure.

For the Wag-  
gon-master  
General and  
600 Wag-  
gon.

For 1200  
Waggon-  
horses.

Our Castrametator hath left the VVaggon-master General to divide proportionally that allotted ground among his VVaggon, and is gone to quarter the Cavalry, but he finds unequal Lists, therefore he must be at the greater trouble to give to every Regiment ground according to its strength; for as I said before, all Regiments (even those under one Prince) are not of equal number of Troops, nor all Troops of equal number of men. But here we shall suppose we are to Encamp a Regiment of eight Troops, and every Troop to consist of a hundred Riders, comprehending in that number the Corporals and Trumpeters; you will remember that the breadth of the Horse is measur'd by

Quarter for  
the Cavalry.

the length of the quarter, and his length by the breadth of it. Observe secondly, that ten foot are allowed for the length of a Horse, and four for his breadth. Observe thirdly, that we allow to every Rider ten foot for the breadth, and four for the length of his Hut. But I hope the Horseman will not be so capricious as to think his Horse and he are laid in equal balance, because they have a like proportion of ground allow'd them, for if I cannot make a difference, I shall immediately make a distance by putting a Street five foot broad between him and his horse, and that shall be for his horses fodder.

A Troop then of a 100 Horses is quarter'd in two several rows, 50 in a row, side for side, which fifty Horses take up for their breadth; and of the length of the quarter 200 foot, to wit, four for every horse. The length of every horse hath 10 foot, every Riders Hut hath 10 foot, that and a Street between them 5 foot broad, make 25 foot, the other row of horse and riders take up the like quantity of ground, to wit, 25 foot, these added together make 50 foot. The horses stand tail to tail (because their heads must be to their Masters huts) and between the horses tails there is a Street 20 foot broad; add these 20 to the other 50, the aggregate is 70, and that is the breadth of a quarter allotted to a Troop of a 100 horse. As to the length of this quarter, it is as the rest 300 foot, whereof I told you the breadth of 50 horses took up 200. The other 100 is thus divided, The Ritmaster hath 20 foot of it for the length of his Tent or Hut, the Lieutenant hath 10, and the Cornet hath 10, and between him and the Troopers Huts there is a Street 20 foot broad, these make 60 foot; in the length at the rear of the Troopers Huts, there is a Street 20 foot broad, and that 20 added to 60 make 80; behind that Street the Saddler, Smith, and Sutler have a quarter 10 foot in length, which being added to 80, make 90; behind them there is a place for fires, and dressing meat, 10 foot long, that being added to 90 makes 100 and so the length of a quarter for an 100 horse is 300, and the breadth 70, multiply the one by the other, the Product will be 2100 foot, which is the superficial measure of that quarter. But observe that the Ritmaster quartering in the front takes up with his Hut all the 70 foot; the Lieutenant and Cornet behind him share that breadth between them, and accommodates likewise the Quarter-master, and him who assists the Cornet to carry the Standard, whom the Germans call *San Juckker*, the Gentleman of the Standard, or Colours.

Having lodged one Troop, it is easy to quarter a Regiment, and consequently a whole Cavalry. I told you our Regiment of horse should consist of 8 Troops, and every Troop of 100 Horsemen; if one Troop then require 70 foot in breadth, 8 must require 8 times 70, multiply then 70 by 8, the Product is 560. Some allow no more ground to a Colonel of horse than to a Ritmaster, there may be reason for it, if he quarter on the head of his own Troop, as ordinarily Colonels did when they had but the temporary command of 3 or 5 Troops, but now that he is absolute Colonel of 8 Troops, we allow his Captain Lieutenant to quarter on the head of the Troop, and we give to the Colonel and his Field and Staff Officers a Street of 70 foot broad, and 300 long; which I thus divide, The Colonel shall have all the 70 in breadth, and 40 in length behind him, the Street 20 foot broad, which traverseth the whole Regiment, then there shall be 200 foot in length, and still 70 in breadth, for all his Field and Staff Officers, and for Stables and Waggons. In the rear of these that Street which traverseth the rear of all the Horsemens Huts; behind that a plot of ground 10 foot long for Saddlers, Smiths, and Sutlers belonging to the Staff; and behind that 10 foot are allowed for Kitchens and fire, add these together, they make 300 foot in length, and 70 in breadth. Now the 8 Troops, and the quarter for the Colonel and his Staff, being all of equal length and breadth, must have 8 Intervals, for every one of which must be allowed 20 foot of breadth; so for all the eight 160 foot. The 8 Troops you remember had for their latitude 560, the Colonel 70, these added make 630, add for the Intervals 160, the aggregate is 790, for the breadth of a Regiment of Horse of 8 Troops, the length 300. If you would know the superficial measure of this quarter for a Regiment of 8 Troops of Horse, multiply 790 by 300, and if I have operated right, the Product is 237000 foot, 47 miles, and near one half.

The

The Castrametator hath now leisure to measure out ground to the Infantry, and he finds the same difficulty as he did in the Cavalry, that is, the inequality of the Companies in each Regiment, and the numbers of men in each Company. But having done his business on paper at home, he will easily give to each Regiment Quarter-master his due proportion of ground in the Field. But since all along in these Discourses, I have spoke of a Foot-regiment consisting of ten Companies, and of a Company consisting of a hundred men, we shall in this place quarter them according to that number. And first we shall lodge a Company according to the pattern whereof the rest shall be soon accommodated. In the number of the hundred I comprehend Caporal, Lance-pelatas, Appointees, Gentlemen of the Company, and common Souldiers. Those who shall be quarter'd as Officers, are Captain, Lieutenant, Ensign-bearer, two Sergeants, Clerk, Fourier, Furer of the Colours, Captain of Arms, and two Drummers, for these last are almost universally enroll'd with the Officers, I know not why.

The custom was in most places for the Captain, Lieutenant, and Ensign to lodge all three in the Van or front of the Company, and this is continued yet in many places. But truly, since a Lieutenant will needs be the second Officer of the Company, I think he should quarter as he marcheth, and that is in the rear. *Henry of Nassau* Prince of *Orange*, alter'd the custom, and order'd them all three to pitch their Tents in the rear of the Company, at least the Captain, for two reasons, that the Souldiers might more readily get to their place of Arms, and not be hinder'd with the huts or cords of their Officers Tents; and next that by their presence in the rear, debates and brawls betwixt Souldiers and Sutlers should either be prevented, or quickly voided. But let us in this place follow the old way, (which may soon be alter'd according to emergents, or the Generals pleasure) and quarter our Foot Company in the Field thus:

The Captain being in the front, shall have for his Tents 40 foot in length, and 24 in breadth; and observe that 24 foot is all the breadth that is allowed to the whole Company. Behind the Captains lodgings, on the right hand, the Lieutenant hath 10 foot of length, and 8 in breadth allow'd him for his quarter, and on the left hand the Ensign hath as much. Observe that behind the Captains Tents begins a Street which runs to the rear of the whole Company, and divides the Lieutenant and Ensigns quarters, and the two rows of Huts equally, and this Street is 8 foot broad; this Street is a direct one, and goes the length of the quarter; but there is another which is a traverse Street, and goeth through the latitude of the Company, and it is 10 foot broad, it begins behind the Lieutenant and Ensigns Huts, and traverseth the whole breadth of the Regiment when the Companies are join'd together. Observe that all the Huts of the Company are 8 foot broad, except the Captains, and therefore hereafter I shall only speak of the length of the Huts. Behind that traverse Street of 10 foot broad in a direct line, under the Lieutenant the oldest Sergeant hath his Hut, for which are allowed 3 foot in length, below him the Fourier hath 6 foot long, below whom the Clerk hath likewise 6 foot, and below the Clerk the oldest Drummer shall have 5 foot in length. Add these together, you will find that these four, Sergeant, Fourier, Clerk, and Drummer have 25 foot allow'd for their Huts in length, and 8 for the breadth, as all the Souldiers have. Behind the oldest Drummer in that same row are 50 huts for 50 Souldiers, for each whereof are allowed three foot and one half. Multiply then 50 by 3½, and the Product will be 175, add 175 to 25, which the four Officers have, the aggregate is 200, and so many foot of ground doth the huts of that row beginning at the traverse Street take up in length. Over against the oldest Sergeant, in a parallel line, and directly under the Ensign, is the second Sergeant lodged; below him the Captain of Arms, under him the Furer, and below the Furer the second Tambour, and under him the other fifty huts for the other fifty Souldiers all in one row; all these having a proportion of ground allowed equal to the first row on the right hand. In the rear of the Souldiers huts there must be a Street 20 foot broad for Waggons and Carts to pass and repass, and this Street traverseth the whole breadth of both Company and Regiment, as the other of 10 foot doth at the Van of the Inferior Officers huts. Next to this traverse Street in the rear there is a place for Waggons and Sutlers 10 foot long, and

P p 2.

Quarter for the Infantry.

Quarter for a Troop of one hundred horse.

For the Colonel, and his Staff.

The latitude of the whole Quarter.

For a Company of 100 men.

Allowance of ground for Huts.

behind that there is another place 10 foot long likewise, for fires and dressing meat, for there must be no fire among the huts, and both these places enjoy the full breadth of the Company, which is 24 foot. Be pleased then to remember that 40 foot in length are allowed for the Captain, 10 for the Lieutenant, 10 for the first traverse Street, 200 for the rows of under Officers and Souldiers huts, 20 for the second traverse Street, 10 for Suters, and 10 for fire, add these together, the aggregate will be 300, which is the length of the quarter. Remember also that 8 foot are allowed for the breadth of all Officers and common Souldiers huts, except the Captains. Then two rows of huts require 16 foot in breadth, between these rows there must be a direct Street running from the back of the Captains Tent to the rear, as I told you before, and it is 3 foot broad, add 8 to 16, makes 24, and so much ground the Captains Tents possesseth, and it is the breadth of the Companies quarter. Multiply the length by the breadth, that is, 300 by 24, the Product is 7200 foot, near one Italian mile and a half within the Circumference of this Companies quarter.

Let us in the next place quarter the Colonel with his Field and Staff Officers, which shall be done thus : There shall be a place in the middle of the Regiment, which shall be 300 foot long, and 64 broad; on the right hand of this place five Companies shall lodge, and on the left hand of it the other five. Of this place the whole breadth, to wit, 64 foot, shall be allowed to the Colonels Lodgings, and 50 foot in length, by which means he shall have all the Tents and Huts of his Captains, Lieutenants and Ensigns in a parallel line with his own. Behind the Colonels Lodgings is that Street whereof I spoke before, of 10 foot broad, which traverseth the breadth of the whole Regiment, and in which most Caltrametators, will have the Colours and Arms to stand, but Tents and huts before that Street will make it in my judgment very improper for that use. Below that Street there shall be a plot of ground 40 foot in length, and 64 broad, to be equally divided between the Lieutenant Colonel and Major, if they do not quarter besides their Companies, and behind them a Street 20 foot broad. Below that Street shall be a quarter 50 foot long, and 64 broad, to be divided among the Minister, Quarter-master, Auditor, Secretary, Chirurgion, and Marshal; and below them the third Street 20 foot broad. Next to that shall be a place 70 foot long, and 64 broad, for Waggons and Baggage; behind that the fourth Street of 20 foot broad, which is at the rear of all the Souldiers huts, and traverseth the breadth of the whole Regiment. Next to that are the two places formerly mention'd, for Suters and fire, one behind the other, each 10 foot long, and 64 broad. If you then remember that the length of the Colonels Lodgings is 50 foot, 10 for a Street, 40 for the Lieutenant Colonel and Major, 20 for a second Street, 50 for the Staff Officers, and 20 for a third Street, 70 for Waggons, 20 for the fourth Street, and 20 for Suters and fires, when you add these numbers together, the aggregate will be 300, which is the length of this quarter, as it is of all other quarters of our Camp, the breadth of this particular one being 64 foot, as I told you before.

In the quartering the ten Companies of the Regiment, five on the Colonels right hand, and five on his left, respect would be had to the dignity, antiquity, and precedence of the Captains; my own opinion is, they should be quarter'd according to that order wherein they were marshal'd in the field, and what that is you may find in the Eleventh Chapter.

Let us then take a view of the whole breadth of this Regiments quarter, for doing whereof we must first consider that the ten Companies make ten distinct Bodies, and the quarter for the Colonel and his Staff the eleventh. Eleven Bodies must have ten intervals, for every one whereof we shall allow 16 foot, that one Wagon may pass by another: multiply then 10 by 16, the aggregate is 160; this much is allowed for the ten intervals, every Company hath 24 foot for its add breadth; inde for 10 Companies, 240 foot, the aggregate is 464, and that is the latitude of a Regiment of Foots quarter. If you would know the superficial measure of this quarter, multiply the length of it, which is 300 foot, by the breadth of it, which is 464 foot, the Product will prove to be 139200 foot, near

28 Italian miles.

By

Length and breadth of a Foot companies quarter.

Quarter for the Staff of a Foot Regiment.

Its length and breadth.

Length and breadth of a Regiment of Foots quarter.

Its Superficial measure.

By what hath been said, it will be easie to know how any Troop, Company, or Regiment either of Horse or Foot, of what strength soever, may be quarter'd; as if the Colonels Company be stronger by fifty men, than the rest, as in some places they be, it may have a row of Huts more than others have. In the Low Country Wars, the Princes of Orange allowed four foot for the length of every Foot-Souldiers Hut; but the Germans for most part allow but 3½, whom in this point I have followed in this Caltrametation. By the account of four foot long for every Hut, a row of Huts for fifty men should have the allowance of 200 foot; but in our days Henry Prince of Orange took away 20 of that, leaving but 180, and these 20 foot he join'd to the breadth of the traverse Street in the rear of the Huts, which before was but 20, but by this addition came to be 40 foot broad, that Waggons and Provisions might have more room to go out and in, and pass and repass. The 300 foot which I have allow'd for the length of every Companies quarter, may be abridged or enlarged as the General shall find occasion for it; but an uniformity in the length of the whole Camp is both decent and requisite. He who commands in chief, may order (if his affairs require it) that in one row of fifty Huts an hundred Souldiers shall quarter, it will be no prejudice to them, but rather helpful, provided they have no wives.

Between the quarters of the Foot, and the fortification of the Camp, there is a void place of 200 foot broad, this the Ancients call'd *Pomerium*, we name it the Alarm and Parading place, or place of Arms : And though as I told you before, many would have the Colours and Arms to stand in that Street which traverseth the quarters behind the Colonels Tents, yet assuredly in time of Alarms the Souldiers running to their Arms, and the Ensigns to their Colours, cannot in so narrow a place but be much embarrass'd; besides, they have not room to draw up, therefore it were more fit to have the Colours fix before the head of the quarter in this place of Arms, and to have the Pikes of every Company leaning on a Tree laid across other two Trees fixed in the ground, and in fair weather the Muskets also, but in time of rain the Souldiers should carry them into their huts; and in that case I shall advise Officers to chuse the Musketeers to draw their Ball, because when an accidental fire comes, careless Souldiers (and how many be there of these?) will be more ready to run out of their huts, and carry their Knapacks and Cloaks with them, than their Muskets, and these being charg'd with Ball, render all endeavours to quench the fire exceeding dangerous, if not altogether impossible, because the Powder wherewith these Muskets are charged, being fired, sends their Bullets so extravagantly at random on all quarters, that men know not how to shelter themselves from them; an experience whereof I once saw in a transient Leaguer, which for that reason I speak of, was well near burnt to the ground, and yet next day I heard of no order given to prevent the like mischief for the future, which should have been done.

After the Regiment Quartermasters have given the Quartermasters and Fouriers their proportions of grounds; and that the four corners of each hut are marked with four twigs or sticks, the Souldiers that are not working at the Fortification fall to and make their huts, but the Officers must see it be done regularly, that none take more or less ground, than what is allowed them, lest thereby they spoil the uniformity of the Quarter.

If the General can spare none of that spacious ground allow'd for his lodgings, for a Market-place, and a quarter for Volunteers and strangers, then the Caltrametator must measure out ground for both, not far from the Proviant Office, for none of them must be neglected. When all is done, the Quarter-master General, or one of his Engineers, is to draw the Fortification of the Camp, all the Lines whereof are to be marked, by making a furrow in the earth, half a foot deep, and half a foot broad: The whole Trenches are to be wrought by the several Regiments of Foot, according to their numbers of men; because the Retrenchment is for their own safety, unless the Prince General get them to be helped by Country people or Pioneers. By what is said, you see our Quarter-master General should be a person of strong Intellectuals, and well seen in the Mathematicks, especially Geometry, which both Fortification and Caltrametation acknowledge to be their Mother.

Princes of Orange, their allowance for Souldiers huts.

Two Souldiers may quarter in one hut.

Place of Arms.

Muskets charged with ball, dangerous in huts.

Fouriers are to mark all the several huts.

Souldiers are to work at the Fortification of the Camp.

For



For avoiding Infection, noisom and contagious Diseases, procured by the daily killing and slaughtering Beasts in a plentiful and numerous Leaguer, it is convenient that deep pits be dig'd, and that all that is not useful be cast in to them, about the middle of the pit there should be a thick board laid fast, thorough which a whole should be cut, and what is cast in the pit should be let down through that hole, and therefore a board should be laid over that hole and then so much of the earth as was digged out of the pit, should be cast in, till the mouth of it be made equal with the superface of the ground, and that earth may be taken out as oft as you will, till the pit be full of these noisome things up to the board, and then it should be closed up; and if pits be used in this fashion, it matters not if these pits be dig'd among the huts, or in the Streets of the Camp. The carrying these things three or four hundred foot without the Camp, is exceedingly troublesome, and the killing the beasts so far without exceedingly inconvenient, and of no consequence, since thereby the Air may be infected as well without as within the Camp, and that is all one matter. Whether pits may not be dig'd for Souldiers to do the works of Nature in, and some Cloth Canvas or some such thing put about it, as the *Turks* do; or if it be best to continue the custom of going without the leaguer, one hundred paces, (which should be marked by a long pole, and a wisp of Straw at the top of it) shall not be the Subject of this Discourse: for assuredly, the debate of it cannot be very favory.

Where there is no great danger of a visible enemy, a General may quarter his Army in two distinct Bodies, Battel and Reserve, the distance between them being 4 or 500 ordinary paces; the Foot in the middle, and the Horse on both Wings, as the General thinks most expedient; as to these Oblong Quadrangles, wherein are encamped several bodies, whereof I have so oft spoke, you may if you please, call them as the *French* do, Parks, and that properly enough: Know likewise, that Custom hath obtained, that the outward line of Fortification of Camps that regards the Enemy without, is called Circumvallation, and the inward one towards the Besieged place, hath the name of Contravallation: Whereas in very deed and in common speech, both of them are Circumvallations; nor are they so to be termed, in strict fence and proper language, unless use be made of Stakes or Pallisades, which the Old *Romans* constantly practis'd, and are called in Latin, *Valli*, whereof I have spoken largely in another place.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. XXI.

## Of Guards, Watches, Parads, Sentinels, Rounds, and Patrols.

IT is to little purpose to fortifie either a Camp or a Castle, unless men be appointed to maintain the Fortification; and because men cannot watch constantly, therefore they must watch by turns, either according to the number of the men, that are quartered within the fortified place, or the danger the place may be in of a near and powerful enemy; for though Guards should be kept, and strictly kept, even when no danger seems to threaten, yet it were madness to weary Souldiers, as much by watching, when no enemy is expected, as when one is assuredly look'd for. If the Companies of Horse and Foot be full and compleat, I think either in Field or Garrison, an Enemy not being near, the fourth nights Duty is enough to keep Officers and Souldiers in mind of their business, though I know, others think the third night easie enough. If an Enemy be near, and have not yet made approaches, it will be to no purpose, to weary Souldiers more than is needful, the third nights watch will be sufficient, for it is not so much the number, as the carefulness, order, and diligence of watches that preserves a Camp, Town, or Fort from surprisal. But when an enemy hath invested the place, and made approaches, more Sentinels are requisite, and consequently more men ought to be on the guard, and this may bring the duty to the second night; sometimes I have seen Souldiers kept on Duty two nights together, and have only the third night allow'd them to repose, and not to go to bed or put off their clothes that third night neither, but to lie in readinels, to run to their Posts, so soon as call'd upon. But when a Besieger hath made Galleries over the Ditches, it is ordinary for the Besieged to lie constantly at their several Posts.

Our modern Guards are, as the ancient were, either of Horse or Foot, in the Fields whether the Camp be Fortified or not; Foot and Horse have some Guards appointed without the Leaguer, sometimes together, sometimes the Horse without the Foot, who are obliged to keep Sentinels on horse back in such places as the Major General, or Adjutant General shall appoint, and these Guards and Sentinels are to be visited often by the Officers of the Cavalry, who are on the watch, or by the Lieutenant or Major General of the Horse. These visits are ordinarily called *Petrollies*, or *Parovilles*, to distinguish them, I think, from the visits of the Foot Guards, which are called Rounds in Garrison; Horsemen are seldom required to watch in the night, unless it be in the time of a Siege, but in the day time they are obliged to ride out in parties as strong, and as far as the Governour of the place shall think fit to appoint, and this duty is ordinarily called, recognoscing, or beating the streets.

Within a leaguer, the Foot keep Guards constantly, besides these outer posts spoken of already. The Guards within are twofold, ordinary, and extraordinary. The ordinary are those which are kept within the Fortification, for its necessary defence; whether it be in the Bastions, Curtins, Redoubts, or Sconces. The extraordinary are such as are kept at the General, Lieutenant General, or other general Officers lodgings, at the Proviant, the Waggon, at the Artillery, and Ammunition; but observe that here the Sentinels must stand with Pikes, for being so near powder, they are not permitted to have burning Matches, and consequently not to take Tabaco.

There are also two kinds of Sentinels, extraordinary Sentinels, and ordinary ones. The extraordinary Sentinels are those we call forlorn, the word we have from the *Dutch*, which signifieth lost, the *French* call them *perdues*, which is the same. There are of them both Horse and Foot. The first sits on

Guards to be stronger or weaker according to the nearness of an Enemy.

Guards of Horse.

Foot Guards twofold.

Forlorn Sentinels or perdues of Horse.

Horse.

Forlorn Sentinels of Foot.

Horfe back with his ordinary Arms; the Foot perdue lyes on his belly, but hath neither Musket, Fulce, or Carabine, only a Sword drawn, and if he be Master of a Dagger and a Pistol he may have them too: He is called lost, because he is put in the most dangerous places, and nearest the Enemy; neither is he to come back, if he be only attack'd by one man; if by two, he may retire to the next perdue, if there be any, but if a greater number than two come upon them, they are bound to run quickly and Alarm that Guard to which they belong. In this place, speaking of an Alarm, I wonder, why Monsieur de Gage in the 82 page of his Book tells us, that in Garrisons, when Alarm is beaten or sounded, all Souldiers should first meet at their Captains houses, and from thence march to the places appointed for them to maintain. This to me seems very strange doctrine, unless he have assurance that an Enemy will neither enter nor scalade, till his Souldiers first very fairly meet at their Captains lodgings, and then march to their Posts; But by his favour, I hold it more convenient, that the Souldiers run as fast as they can, though man by man, *a la desbandad*, directly to the places of the Ramparts or Retrenchments ordained for them to defend, commonly called Posts, or Alarm-places, without taking notice of their Captains quarters. We make it the Sergeants duty to place the Foot; perdues at these Posts appointed by the Sergeant Major; but I have known it done by the Furor, or Caporal of the Gentlemen, and where such an Officer is allowed, it seems to belong to his office, and not to the Sergeant, who hath employments enough beside. He who is to be perdue, should be a Gentleman of the Company; whom the French call *Appointe*; and where there have no allowance of Pay, the Captain should make choice of some, whom by their birth and behaviour, he conceives most fit for that employment. The Furor, or Sergeant, is to bring the Forlorn to his Post, and bring the other away with him, he is also obliged frequently to visit his Perdues; for very often, if they be not vigilant, they are stolen away by an active Enemy. And therefore no Perdues, either of Horfe or Foot, should be entrusted with the Word, that they may not be able to give it to the Enemy, if they happen to be taken: A better order, in my opinion, than that of the Romans, who entrusted their Common Souldiers with the *Tessera*. Our forlorn Sentinels are much used in the field, when two Armies ly near other, waiting their advantages. But they are especially made use of at Sieges of Towns, Forts, and Castles.

Ordinary Sentinels of Horfe. Of Foot.

Their Duties.

The ordinary Sentinel, if he belong to the Cavalry, stands on Horfe back; the Foot-man, whether it be in Camp, Town, or Garrison, stands with his ordinary arms. It is true, I have seen Gentlemen of Companies stand with drawn Swords at the Chamber-doors of Princes, when they have been visiting Garrisons; but notwithstanding that, all Foot Souldiers should stand without doors with their ordinary Arms, whether they be Pikes or Muskets, when they are Sentinels, and constantly at their Sentinel posture; neither should any of them be permitted to set down their Arms the whole time they are on that duty, but if they be weary, they may shoulder their Pikes or Muskets, and walk to and fro with them, and so refresh themselves; but at the approach of a Commissioned Officer, they are immediately to return to their Sentinel-posture, yet they are never suffer'd to set their Arms out of their hands. But this is too much conniv'd at by Officers, who thereby shew either their negligence or ignorance, in not heeding or not knowing what belongs to a Sentinel; whose first duty is to have one of his hands at his Arms, when either they are order'd or shoulder'd, and both hands at his Musket, when he is at his Sentinel-posture: Nor do I know a more proper punishment for this neglect, than to make that Souldier who would not carry his own Musket one hour, carry both it, and three Muskets more belonging to his Comrades upon both his Shoulders two hours. As for the time, how long an ordinary Sentinel should stand, whether on Horfe or Foot, I know no reason why he should be on that duty longer than one hour, for he may grow either weary or sleepy, or both, and in that time he would be sometimes visited by his Caporal, or Lance-petate: And in a rigid frosty winter night, he should not be permitted to stand longer than half an hour at one bout. In Garrisons and Fortified Camps, Sentinels of Foot should be provided with Frocks and Hoods,

to

to keep them from rain, snow and cold, which every one of them is to deliver to him who relieves him: There should also be little Wooden houses (which commonly are called Sentinel houses) built for them on the Walls of Towns, Castles, and Camps; three on every Bastion, and two on every Curtain.

Those who stand Sentinels at Commanders and Officers doors in Towns or Leaguers, need not, and I think, should not challenge any man that passeth, unless he offer to come within his Arms; and if Officers would advert to this, neither themselves or others would be so much troubled with the needless vociferations and clamours of those senseless Sentinels, who stand at their doors. A Sentinel on a Wall in the night time should challenge all who come near him, if they be Rounds, he is to permit them to pass; if not, or that he knows not what they are, he is bound to fire upon them, and cry Alarm; upon which, not only the guards, but all within either Garrison or Camp, either do or should run in Arms to their several Posts. Those who stand at the door and Arms of the several *Corps de garde*, ought indeed in the night time to challenge all who come near them, but should hinder none to pass about their affairs, unless they misdeemean themselves by word or deed, but if those who come near them be Rounds, or call themselves so, the Sentinel is to stop them, requiring them to stand, and immediately to call out his Caporal; and if those persons, who call themselves Rounds, will not stand, after they have been twice or thrice required so to do, the Sentinel may lawfully fire upon them, or push at them with his Pike, and be free from any mischief that is done them, as being procured by either their own wickedness, or folly, or both.

The duty of a Sentinel to a Round, should lead me to speak of Rounds; but before Rounds be appointed to go, the Watch must be set, whereof the Round is an appendix or part. In setting Watches, and appointing Guards, observe shortly four things. The time when, the place where, the number how many, and the persons who should visit these Watches or Guards. A Guard that is vigilant preserves those who sleep, and Sentinels are the Guards of that Guard.

All these four particulars, are absolutely to be determin'd by him who commands in chief, and as his pleasure should over-rule in them all, so time, place, occasion, emergence, and the pleasure of the Prince or State whom he serves, should over-rule him. To keep too many on Watch, will in a short time render those who watch, incapable to Watch at all; to keep too few, encourage your enemy to attempt that, from which a well order'd and sufficiently strong Guard would deter him. But by all Souldiers, though there be no danger to be imagin'd, a Watch should be kept; neither can a command issue from a Prince, that can or should hinder an Officer to keep Watch, though their orders may be such, as may render men incapable both to do the main business about which they are sent, and keep any considerable Watch, or any Watch at all. But to our four particulars observable in Watches, I say,

The time when the Guards should be set in Armies (for I shall speak of Watches in Garrisons afterwards) if they be on a March, is immediately after a whole Army, or a part of it is quarter'd, whether that be in Towns, Villages, or the field: The Cavalry are to send out Troops and Parties to recognise, and keep outer Guards, sometimes they have Foot with them, but for most part they watch alone, and the Foot is to set their Watches instantly after their arrival, before any of them begin to quarter. The place where the Horfe-men are to keep their Guards is without the quarter, further or nearer, as it shall please the Major General, or Adjutant, to whom it belongs to appoint those Guards. The place for the Guards of Foot, is within the quarter, or very near to it, fortified by some Hedge or Enclosure, some Church or Church-yard, helped with the Spade and Mattock. The number, how many should watch either of Horfe or Foot is uncertain, as that which depends on the Intelligence a General may have of the nearness or remoteness of an Enemy. The persons appointed to visit these Guards are appointed by him who commands at the Head-watch, and these visitors are called *Parvoiles* and Rounds, as I observ'd before. In our Modern Militia we do not follow the *Grecian* nor *Roman* cu-

Sentinels at Officers doors.

Sentinels on Walls.

Sentinels at corps de garde.

Four particulars to be observ'd in all Watches.

The time when.

The place where.

The number how many.

The persons who visit these Guards.

itome, in giving the office of riding Rounds only to Horse-men, for with us those of the Cavalry ride their Patroviis, and those of the Foot either ride or walk their Rounds; of which more anon.

1. Fortified Camps, where Armies are to stay for some time, there is a definite hour appointed by him who commands in chief, when the Trumpet shall sound and the Drum beat for setting the Watch. So soon as the Horse-men are conven'd, they are sent to their several Posts without the Camp; for the Foot there is a place appointed where all the Guards shall meet, and this is called the Parading-place: *Parad* signifieth a show, and so doth *Monstre*. Military men have appropriated the first to that show, Watches make before they go to their several Posts, and the second to that show Officers and Common Soldiers make to Muster-masters and Commissaries before they enter into Pay, or after, when they are review'd.

In Leaguers the Foot-Watches are two-fold, first, private; these are Guards to keep Sentinels at the Tents of the Field Officers, the Colours, Arms, Ammunition, and Waggon. Next, publick Guards, and these consist of whole Companies, one, two, or three sometimes out of a Regiment, as the duty seems to require; these meet at the several Captains Tents or Huts, and after the Drums have done beating the Gathering, the Captains march with their several Companies in good order to the Parading place of the Regiment, or of the whole Army; more ordinarily to the last, which is either a place appointed peculiarly for it, or is the *Forum*, or Market-place, near the Generals Lodging, or Pavilion. Here they are drawn up according to the antiquity or precedence of the Regiments to whom they belong, by either the Major General, or Adjutant General of the Foot. At this Parade should all the Majors of the Foot be, as also one Sergeant out of every Company, and most of the Captains of the whole Army. The Companies being marshall'd in brest, the Major or Adjutant General calls the Majors together, to whom he imparts the several orders and directions of the General, which may, and very oft doth vary every night, because they depend on emergencies. The Majors stand in a ring on both hands of him, according to their dignity, the first standing on his left hand, in whose ear he whispers the Word, and he whispers it to him who standeth on his left hand, and so successively, till the youngest Major deliver it to the Major General: If it be returned right to him, there is no necessity to send it about the other way, as some would have; but if the Word be not deliver'd right to him, then he gives it to the Major who stands on his right hand, and so it is re-deliver'd to him by the Major, who stands on his left hand, not without a check to him or them, by whose inadvertency it was mistaken.

This word, for most part, is the name of a Town, a Country or a Castle, sometimes it is the proper name of a Man, and sometimes it is a Sentence, as it pleaseth him who gives it, who is still he who commands in chief. Men may pass any Sentinel without it in the night time, but none should pass the *Corps de guards* that are on the Fortification unless they give the Word. And from the misunderstanding of this, many gross abuses are committed, as when Servants, or other mean persons are sent in the night time either into Camps or Towns, concerning affairs very lawful in themselves, and have the Word given them, that they may pass the Guards, which should not be suffer'd; for if the business is necessary, and will admit of no delay, as the sending for a Physician, Apothecary, Chyrurgion, or Minister for sick or wounded persons, in such cases addressees should be made to him who commands over the whole Guards, who is obliged to send a Caporal, or a Gentleman of a Company along with the person that is sent, who should see him pass and re-pass without interruption. When the Major General imparts his orders to the Majors, the Sergeants of the Parade should make a ring at a good distance about them, standing with their Halberts order'd, and this both to shew with what respect orders should be given and receiv'd, as also to hinder any to come near, and hearken to what is said or spoken either to the Majors, or among themselves.

After the Majors have done their business with their Major General, they should give both the orders they have received from their Superiours, and their own to the several Regiments; and many think, they should do this at their own quarters, beside the Colours, which I think is formal enough, and may well

Where Orders should be given by the Majors to the Field Camps.

Watches in Fortified Leaguers.

A Parade, what.

How guards march to the Parade.

How the Orders and Word are given to the Majors.

An abuse in making it common.

well enough be done: but my humble opinion is, they should do it at the great Parade, and therefore I said before, that at it there should be a Sergeant of every Company there; and the reason I give for my opinion is this, that the several Companies that are to be sent from that Parade to divers places of the Fortification, there to keep Watch, may carry the Word along with them, and so not need to wait so long as for the Major first to go home to the quarter of the Regiment, and then give out his Orders, and send them to the Companies that are on duty in several Posts. And to anticipate that objection which I suppose will be made against my opinion, that Majors are to give to the Companies the orders of the Colonels, as well as of the Major Generals; I say, that at Parades, all Colonels, all Field and Commissioned Officers should be present, for a Parade is the Exchange of Officers, neither should any thing excuse their absence, but indisposition, or being on present duty, and this is incumbent for Officers to do, where-ever the Parade be, whether in Camp or Garrison; when the Major gives orders to his Sergeants he doth it in the same manner as the Major General doth to the Majors, and should have a ring of Musketeers about him, to hinder any to approach or hearken, unless they be Commissioned Officers of that Regiment, who may be within the ring, and may hear, but ought not to speak, while the Major is discoursing to the Sergeants. After Orders and the Watch-word are given, every Captain marcheth to that Post that is appointed him, and that appointment is made two ways, either as the Major General pleaseth, in sending Companies several nights to several Posts, and not constantly to one; or it is done by billets, the way thus, The names of the several Posts being writ in several Papers, they are call'd into a Hat, and are drawn by the Majors, who according to the billets they draw, send their Captains to their Posts: And this indeed is the best way, for it saves the Major General from suspicion of partiality; and doth a more general good than that, for it prevents Treachery, whether it be in Camp, Garrison, Town, or Castle.

After the Watch is set, it should not be permitted to any, whether he be Officer, or Common Souldier from the highest to the lowest, to leave his Post, unless sickness occasion it, neither indeed should an Officer (of what quality soever he be) by absenting himself, give example for Souldiers to desert their Posts; those Officers who do it should be exemplarily censur'd, yet for most part this piece of Discipline is neglected, which too often encourageth an Enemy to make attempts, which perhaps otherwise he would forbear. Truly, it is a shame to hear, what excuses I have heard in more places of the World than one, and none more ordinary, than for an Officer to say, I was no longer from my Guard than I was taking my Dinner and Supper at my Lodging. If Officers would dine or sup in their *Corps de guard*, as they are bound to do, Souldiers would not offer to go home to look for their meat. Officers servants should bring their Victuals to them, and Souldiers Wives should carry their Husbands meat to them; if they have Wives, if not, their Comrades should do it.

Watches being set, they should have Houses wherein they may shelter themselves from rain, snow, cold, or excessive heat, and fire should be in them, even in Summer, for kindling of Matches: These houses we ordinarily call Courts of guard, which some do not like; but I think they are wrong, for a *Corps de guard* in English signifies the Body of a guard, which may be in an open Field or Street, or where men may sit, stand or lye, and so the *Corps de guard* cannot properly be interpreted to be a House, which I think may be well enough call'd a Court of Guard. In these Houses all that watch in too hot or cold weather, or if it rain or snow, may stay within, except Sentinels, yet they must not all be permitted to sleep, for a third part at least should be still kept waking, and to that purpose they may be permitted to play, so they make no clamour or noise; and if it be fair weather, Officers should constantly see the third part of the Guard walking without doors. The Caporal and his Lance-pike, or he who assists him, should not both be asleep, and seldom should they both be within the Court of Guard, but without, either visiting the Sentinels, or attending the Rounds, for both these Duties belong to them.

All Commissioned Officers should be present at a Parade.

How the Posts are divided.

No Officer or Common Souldier should go from his Guard.

*Corps de guards*, what.

Two thirds of a Guard may be permitted to sleep.

Watches in Garrisons. Having spoke so fully of Watches and Parades in Leaguers and Fortified Camps, there is but little to add concerning them in Garrisons, whether Towns or Castles: In these, the Governours, and in their absence, their Deputies appoint the time when, the places where, the number how many, and the persons who shall keep Guards, and who shall visit them. The time when to let the Watch is ordinarily some hour in the afternoon, sooner or later, according to the length or shortness of the day, or the pleasure of the Governour: The Emperours Armies had a custome to do it constantly at twelve a clock of the day. The places where, are the several Courts of Guard, and sometimes the Market-place, where the Head-watch lodgeth, one at every Port, one at every Bastion, one at every Half-Moon, Raveline, and Horn-work, and sometimes not so many, according as the danger is great or less. The number how many is variable, according to the Intelligence or Strength of an Enemy, or according to the trust or distrust the Governour hath of the Citizens, Burgesses and Inhabitants. The persons to visit the Guards, are not only all Officers of whatsoever quality that are upon the Watch, but also the Gentlemen of the Companies, *Appointees*, or Reformadoes. If there be more Regiments than one in a Garrison, the Governour either calls all the Majors to him, and gives them the Word and other Orders, or if there be a Town Major, he gives his directions to him, and he imparts them to the rest of the Majors, and they to their Sergeants, in that same manner as I told you was done in a Leaguer; those that are on the Watch, and those that are to relieve them, standing all the while in Arms, and in great silence. After that, the Town Major divides the whole Watch into as many parts as there are several Posts, and sends them thither, either by his own command, or by billets: These Posts are of greater and lesser concern, and accordingly have more or fewer men allotted for their defence, and according to the number of the Souldiers, Superiour and Inferiour Officers are appointed to command them, as Captains, Lieutenants, Ensigns, and Sergeants, the Head guards being reserv'd for Field Officers, unless the place be besieged, and then they may have Posts assign'd them at Ports, Bastions, Half-Moons, or Horn-works. So soon as Guards come to their several Posts, the Officers who are to be relieved, shew what duty they are to do, and where their night and day Sentinels should stand; these being reliev'd, the Guard which hath watched, draws up in one body, and either marches or troops (according as the Governour orders it) if it have Colours, to the place where they lodge; but if it hath had no Colours, it marcheth to their Captain, or Colonels door, and is there dismiss'd.

Rounds. Those who visit the Guards, to see whether they and their Sentinels do their duty, are called Rounds. These are ordinarily divided into Grand, and Petty Rounds; nor do I know how to discourse better of both, than to reduce their duties to these questions which are made concerning them, and wherein many differ in their opinions, and resolve them as well as I can. First, Whether the G and Round should give or receive the Word? Many are of the opinion, that though the General himself go the Great Round, he should give the word to the Caporal, because under the notion of trying whether all the Caporals of the several Guards have the Word right, an Enemy giving himself out for the Captain of the Watch, may get the Word, to the great prejudice of the Camp or Garrison. And indeed I find it was constantly given to the Caporal by all Rounds fifty or sixty years ago, but the other custome hath now prevail'd over all, except it be with the *Spaniards*. But the Officer, be he who he will, that goes the Grand Round, being known, there is no danger to give him the Word; and so any of the two may be used, as it pleaseth the Prince or his General to appoint. The second question is, Whether the Captain of the Watch be obliged to go the first Round, or if he may send Petty Rounds before him, and go the Head round at any hour he pleaseth, because his main business being to see that all the Guards be present on their Posts, the longer he delays his coming, the better Watch will be kept, his presence being by them all expected every hour: Yet Custome in many places, obligeth the Great Round to go before mid-night, and to send Petty Rounds before him, if he go not the first Round himself, which he may do if he please; nay, some think he should go the first Round; but much of this, without hazard, may be left to his

Questions concerning the Great Round. First.

Second.

his discretion, who is Captain or Colonel of the Watch, unless he be limited by the General. But if the Governour intend to go the Head Round himself, he should acquaint him who commands the Watch with his intention; yet most Governours chuse rather to go Petty Rounds, because so they may best see how Sentinels behave themselves, and when they come to a *Corps de guard* they give the Word to the Caporal, who knowing him, presently calls out his whole Guard in Arms, that the Governour may see them all present; this is a duty which the Governour owes among many others: But I shall have a fitter opportunity to speak of him in my Discourse of Towns and Forts. The third question is, Whether this Colonel, Governour, or Captain of the Watch, may ride his Great Round, or if he be oblig'd to walk on Foot? It being granted he may ride, (as all Rounds in ancient times did) the fourth question will be, Whether he should receive the Word on Horse-back, or if he should alight, and either give it, or take it? I think, if he be permitted to ride, I know no reason but he may either receive or give the Word on Horse-back. The fifth question is, Whether the Grand Round be obliged likewise to go the last Round, which ordinarily is called the Morning Round? and if he do, whether he should likewise receive the Word? Indeed I have seen it in some places refus'd, and in some practis'd; in my judgement, there is no shew of reason why the Caporal should give the Word to any Round but the Head Round, though the General go it in person; for the receiving the Word by the Grand Round from the Caporals, is to know, that they have the Word so right, that they cannot be cheated with another Word by any of the Petty Rounds; there is neither necessity or conveniency to demand it again from them, and least of all for the Morning Round to seek it, for that is the last Round, after which it is no matter whether the Caporal have the Word right or not. Indeed, it is my opinion, that he who commands the Watch in chief, should go more Rounds than the Grand one, and especially the Morning Round, for then is the danger of an Enemies insall most to be suspected, but the receiving the Word once from the Caporals is enough in Conscience, and I think too much. But the Caporal is still obliged to call all his Guard to their Arms, whenever he sees him who commands the Watch in chief, let him go as many Rounds as he pleaseth. Our Rounders propose a sixth question, Whether he who commands a particular *Corps de guard*, either in Camp or Garrison, be he Captain or Lieutenant, be obliged to give the Word to the Grand Round, or if it be enough that the Caporals do it. To which I answer, that the Caporals having the Word right is most necessary, because it is he who receives all the Petty Rounds, and the Word from them: But if the Grand Round demand it from all the Officers, be they what they will, upon all the several Posts, they are obliged to give it to him, but this is seldom practis'd. When the Caporal hears the Sentinel, who stands at the Court of Guard, bid the Round stand, and calls him to come out, he should immediately issue with his sword drawn, and two Musketeers with cock'd Matches attending him: The Caporal is bound to ask, What Round? and if it be answer'd, The Great Round, then the Caporal calls out all the Officers and Souldiers to their Arms, and letting the point of his sword fall, either gives the Great Round the Word, or takes it from him, according to the custome of the place, and after that he waits on him, till he be past all the Sentinels on the Walls that belong to that *Corps de guard*.

Petty or common Rounds, where Guards are strong, are frequently gone, by Lieutenants, Ensigns and Sergeants; yea, and by Captains, where all the Watches are commanded by a Colonel, or a Lieutenant Colonel: But for most part, Reformadoes, *Appointees*, and Gentlemen of the Company, do that duty, as I said before; nor do they go these Petty Rounds when they please themselves, but when they are directed to do it by their superiours. At their return, they inform those who sent them, how vigilant or negligent they found Sentinels and Guards. They are obliged at every *Corps de guard*, to give the Caporal the Word, which if they do not right, he who commands that Guard may disarm them, and detain them Prisoners, and the two Musketeers (who ordinarily convoy them) till he acquaint the Captain of the Watch with the whole matter. There is a question, when a Round and Counter-round meet on the Wall, which of the two shall give the Word to the other? Some say, that he

Third.

Fourth.

Fifth.

Sixth.

Caporals duty to the Grand Round.

Common Rounds.

Question concerning them.

Too many  
Rounds pre-  
sents, and  
hurtful.

he who challengeth first, should receive it; others aver, that the inferior should give it to the superiour; and so say I, if they know one another, as a Gentleman of a Company to a Sergeant, a Sergeant to an Ensign, and he to a Lieutenant; but they add that equals should pass by other, without giving it at all, but this may prove dangerous; and truly, I think the best way to take away contests of that nature, is to send no Counter-round at all, but make all the Rounds go one way. Neither do I think the sending many Rounds the safest way to keep good Watch, for Sentinels (as experience daily shews) are more careful to take notice of Rounds who are their Friends, than of Enemies, who are without the Walls; especially when they are sure to be complain'd of and punish'd for neglecting to challenge the Rounds, but may easily shun to be question'd for not challenging an Enemy who surprizes them. I have known Watches and Guards kept in better order by a few Rounds, and the Officers who were upon Guard, their frequent visiting their own Sentinels, than when the Ramparts and Parapets of both Camps and Garrisons, did loudly echo with challenging, Who is there? and answering, Round; and then the reply, of either Round go by, or Round stand; and for that very same reason which I gave you but just now.

Patrovis.

There go likewise Rounds from the Head Watch through the Streets of Camps and Garrisons, and these are called Patrovis; they are sent to see that no abuses, thefts, robberies, clamours, squabbles or Riots be committed; and if they find any such, they are not to connive at the doers of them, as too many of them do, but are to bring them to the Head Watch till they be examin'd next day; and for this reason, I would not have fewer Musketeers Carabiners, or Fire-locks sent out with a Patrovis than eight or ten, because three or four may be beat back to their Guard by some that are very insolent, with whom no authority will prevail, but that which is armed; and indeed authority is not at all terrible, but when she appears in Arms, for *Pona sine vi-rius ira*.

Passelunt.

If Garrisons be kept in Towns, Forts or Castles, where Clocks are, the Sentinel may be reliev'd, as the hour strikes, and so save Match; but if in the Fields or Leaguers, where no public Clocks are, or in besieged Towns, where ordinarily Clocks do not strike, nor Bells ring, then the Caporals are to have allowance of Match, which they call *Passelunt*, whereby they regulate themselves to relieve their Sentinels, when six, seven, eight, or nine Inches of it are burnt.

Tappoo.

In Camps and Garrisons, Drummers are to beat *Tappoo* at night, and in the morning *Revallie*. This word *Zapen* or *Tappoo* is High and Low Dutch, and signifies, no more drink to be tapp'd or sold; and is not, as some fancy, to advertize the Guards to place their Night Sentinels, but to acquaint Suters to sell no more drink, and Souldiers to go home to their Lodgings; and who is found out of their quarters after it, ought to be punish'd. It should be beat constantly at one hour Summer and Winter, and ten a clock at night is a proper time for it: But By-Guards (as they are call'd) and Night Sentinels are to be put to their Posts when day-light is well near spent, and this in Winter will be about four, and in Summer about ten a Clock at night; neither ought the last Night Sentinels to leave their Posts till the *Dian* or *Revallie* beat, which cannot be done at one constant hour (as the *Tappoo*) for in Winter it may be eight, and in Summer three or four in the morning; and beat it should not, till the Captain of the Watch gives order for it, and he is not to take up his measures by day-light, but by the clearness, darkness, or mistiness of the morning, the Night Sentinels being to continue on their duty, till they can discover all the Fields about them: When by order of the Colonel or Captain of the Watch, the *Dian* is beaten at the Head Watch, all the Drummers of the rest of the Guards ought immediately to beat, and then the Night Watches and Sentinels come to their several Guards. It is then also, that the Souldiers (who have been in their quarters or huts all night) and either Town-men or Countrey people who are ordered to work at the Fortification either of Town or Camp, are to go to their work; and therefore this beating of the Drum in the morning, I think, is more properly call'd *Travaille* than *Revallie*.

Night Sen-  
tinals and By-  
guards.

Dian, Tra-  
vaille or Re-  
vallie.

## CHAP. XXII.

Of things previous to a Battel, of a Battel itself, and of things after a Battel.

OF all Martial Acts, to fight a Battel well, and gain the Victory, is of the highest importance, and makes the Prince or his General most renowned: It is this, (and neither Retreats nor taking Towns, though both these shew the qualifications of an excellent Captain) that crowns them with Laurel: By the winning of Battels, sometimes one, sometimes more Kingdoms are gain'd by one party, and lost by another. Let us then take a view of those things that should be adverted to, before so great a hazard be made. Most men are of opinion, that he who hath the conduct of an Army should never suffer himself to be forc'd to fight: I say too too, if he can help it, and what is the meaning of this, but that his Intelligence should be so good, that if he intend not to fight, he should either quickly get himself out of the way, or strongly entrench his Army in a place where he cannot want provisions. But when he hath done either of the two, he may be forc'd to fight, for who can save his Army without fighting, if his Enemy storms his Retrenchment, or in his Retreat pursues him fiercely and powerfully? To force an Enemy to fight, hath a doubtful event, for many times it succeeds well, as it did with *Alexander* at *Arbela* against *Darius*, with *Scipio* against *Hannibal* at *Zama*, with his Brother against *Antiochus* in *Asia*, with *Charles* the Fifth against the King of *France* at *Pavia*, and *Gustavus* his Army against *Wallenstein* at *Lutzen*. Yet peruse History, you will find that many more have lost, than ever gain'd by it, take a few instances: *Edward*, the Black Prince, was forc'd to fight at *Poitiers*, so was *Henry* the Fifth of *England*, at *Agincourt*, yet both gain'd glorious Victories: *Harold*, when he might have protracted the War, being Master of all *England*, forc'd *William* of *Normandy* to fight, and thereby lost both his Crown and his life: *Edward* the Second, of *England*, forc'd *Robert Bruce*, King of *Scotland*, to fight at *Bannockburn*, but lost the honour of the day, and most of his numerous Army: *Julius Caesar* made himself constantly master of his own dyet, either by Entrenching or Retiring, so that he was never forc'd to fight, but when he pleas'd: But when he forc'd *Pompey*, he try'd both Fortunes. At *Dirrachium* he was beaten off with loss, and was glad to retire, which indeed he did with admirable Prudence and Courage: At *Pharsalia* he brav'd the same *Pompey* to Battel, which so soon as he accepted, *Cesar* got the Victory. Yet it seems most agreeable to reason, that men should fight well, when they are forc'd to fight, Despair whetting their Courage; and for this reason many Captains take away all means of escape from their own Armies, to make them sensible their safety is in their hands, and not in their feet, and withal, they leave an open way for their Enemy to run away; and hence is the common Maxim in War, That a Bridge of Gold should be made for a Flying Enemy.

General's  
should not be  
forc'd to  
fight, if they  
can chuse.

To force an  
Enemy to  
Battel suc-  
ceeds some-  
times well.

Sometimes  
very ill.

A Golden  
Bridge.

Before a Battel it is fit to view an Enemies countenance, and try his Courage, by frequent Skirmishes, and these very oft (each Army sending help to their own parties) draw on a Battel infensibly. Good Intelligence (if possible) should be had of his numbers of Horse, Foot, and Artillery, and in which of these his greatest strength lyes; but I will repeat nothing in this place of what I have said in my Discourse of Intelligence. In the next place our General should view (if he have time and opportunity for it) the situation of the Field where both his own, and his Enemies Army are to fight, that accordingly he may either lay ambushes, or shun them: This was one of *Hannibal's* Masterpieces: he should take notice how the Wind blows, that accordingly by

Intelligence.

Situation of  
the Field.

The Wind  
ordering

ordering his Battalions, he may take the advantage of it. He should cast up his account, how the Sun will shine (if it be a fair day) at such hours, when he conceives the fight will begin, that thereby he may order his affairs. If his Intelligence be good within his Enemies Army, he should endeavour to stir up jealousies, divisions, and dissensions in it, and in the time of these, if his Friends give him the sign, fall upon him. After his Army is marshall'd, if he have time, he should ride along the Front of all his Brigades, and by short Speeches, Courageous looks and gestures, and with Promises of noble Rewards he should enflame the Spirits of his Souldiers with a desire to fight, and wishal, he should assure them, that the honour of their Prince, and their own safety, depends only on their courage and gallant behaviour, all hopes of Retreat being taken away. But this commendable custome of haranguing Armies by Generals is much worn out in our late Wars; and I shrewdly suspect most of those Orations we read are the fine fictions of Historians, who are better at that, than the describing the manner how Generals marshall'd their Armies. If a General be strong in Cavalry, he should thin fighting in a frair or close Countrey; if his Infantry be numerous, he should thin Heaths and Champaigns; yet it is but seldom in his power (though sometimes it be) to chuse either the one or the other. He should advise well with the Master of the Ordnance, how to plant his Artillery, whether on the Flanks, in the great Intervals, or upon some height and ascent, whether that be before or behind the Army, or if his train be great in all these places; this should be done before the beginning of the fight, that accordingly Batteries and Beds may be readily made, and the Gunners ready to fire when they are commanded. Our Army being marshall'd either in one, two, or three Bodies, as our General's own reason and experience will direct him, or the ground permit; of which I have spoken in the seventeenth Chapter. All these things being done, the Word and the Sign should be given, and these are quickly carried through the Army by the Major Generals and the Adjutants. At such a time the Word is ordinarily a Sentence, (for Souldiers are no Grammarians) as, God with us, For God and the King, Our trust is in God, and *Viva* such a Prince, and the like. The Sign may be a Handkerchief on the Hat, or a piece of Linnea on the right or left arm, atwigg of a Birch, an Elme, an Oak, or a Sycamore, or it may be a Fur, or what else the Prince or his General please. The Word and Sign are given both to Officers, Common Troopers and Souldiers; and sometimes they are alter'd in the time of Battel, if there be any ground or suspicion that the Enemy hath got them, or any of them. I remember, when the *Imperialists* had lost the Battel at *Oldendorpe* in *Germany*, in the year 1633, the Prisoners (who were all *Roman Catholics*) pretended they had been beaten by the just Judgement and Revenge of the Blessed Virgin, in regard, before the Battel began, the Word was *Sancta Maria*, and in the time of the Fight, it was changed (for the reason I spoke of) to *Viva Ferdinand*.

Being ready to advance to the Charge, the General takes his place, having assign'd before, a Station to all his General Officers of the Field. Many have reason enough to think that the General himself should stand in the middle of the Infantry of the Battel, where he useth to march, but that is not constantly practis'd, yea, and but seldom in our late Wars; for many times he, who commands in chief takes his station in the right Wing of the Cavalry; so did the Great King of *Sweden* at the first Battel of *Leipsick*, and so he did at *Lutzen* likewise: So did Count *Tilly* at that same Battel at *Leipsick*, and so did *Banier* at *Woodstock*. I told you formerly in my discourse of marshalling Armies, That *Charles* the Fifth intending to fight *Sultan Solymán* at *Vienna*, drew up all his Cavalry in the two great Intervals which his three great Battalions of Foot made, fifteen thousand Horse were in each of the two Bodies, and in that on the right hand stood the Emperor himself, and with that on the left, his Brother, King *Ferdinand*. Nor was, nor is, this custome of a Generals standing in the right Wing of the Horse, or between it and the Infantry, a new thing, the *Roman Consuls* using it frequently, when two of them joyn'd together. Sometimes in our late Wars, when the Army was marshall'd in Battel and Reserve, five General persons have commanded in five several places, as thus: In the Right Wing the Commander in chief; in the Body of the Infantry,

Should be where he please.

try, which makes the Battel, he who hath the command next to the General; in the Left Wing stood the third person in dignity; in the Right of the Reserve, the fourth; and in the Left hand of it, the fifth. So the *Swedish* Generals order'd their business at *Woodstock*, where two of their Armies were joyn'd against an *Imperial* and a *Saxish* Army. *Banier* the first Felt-Marshall, commanded the Right Wing of the Cavalry; *Leslie* the second Felt-Marshall, commanded the Battel of the Avant-guard; Lieutenant General *King* the Left Wing of the Horse, Lieutenant General *Vissdrum* the Right hand of the Reserve, and Major General *Ruthven* the Left. But in ancient times a General of an Army chose to stand where he pleas'd, and where he thought his presence could be most iteadeable: so *Pompey* made his station in the Right Wing of his Army at *Pharsalia*; which *Cesar* observing, chose to stand on the Left Wing of his, that he might be opposite to his Grand Competitor. And I know nothing can tie a General in our times to take a station, or no station to himself, but as he please. For my own part, I think, he should tie himself to no particular place, but should ride where he sees or hears the greatest danger to be. Indeed, he ought to appoint particular stations to all his general Field-Officers, from which they should not budge upon any pretence whatsoever, without expresse command from the Commander in chief, and these places should be given them, according to the honour and precedency they enjoy by their several charges. As let us suppose he hath under him a Lieutenant General of the whole Army, a General and Major General of the Horse, and a General and Major General of the Foot; he may place his Lieutenant General on the Right Wing of the Avant-guard, the General of the Cavalry on the Left, and the General of the Foot in the Battel, the Major General of the Horse on the Right Wing of the Reserve, and the Major General of the Foot on the Left: And keep himself free from any one station, to ride with his Adjutants and Guards, where he thinks his presence is most necessary, and shortly to be an Ubiquitary, that being restricted to no place, he may be every where. If he have more General Field Officers than these just now mention'd, he may place three more, one on the left hand of the Right Wing, the second on the Left hand of the Left Wing, and the third on the left hand of the Battel.

Stations of the general Field-Officers.

A General an Ubiquitary.

Forlorn Hopes.

Before the Battel begin, there use to be fore-parties of both Horse and Foot sent out to skirmish, these are called Forlorn Hopes, and *Enfans Perdus*: Those of the Foot should advance one hundred paces before the Body; those of the Horse further. But I find, at the Battels fought both at *Dreux* and *St. Dennis*, between the Protestants and *Roman Catholics* of *France*, none of these Forlorn Hopes were made use of at all, and as few were used at *Lutzen*, where *Gustavus Adolphus* lost his life.

When an Enemy is marshalling his Army, your Artillery should incessantly play upon him, to hinder him all you may to order his affairs; and if your Battel be already marshall'd, under the shelter of your Ordnance, you should advance, and take your advantage of him, before his Battalions or Squadrons be drawn up; but in good order, that the Scene be not changed, that by your precipitation you give not him an opportunity to take advantage of you. Your advance on an Enemy, in what posture soever he be, should be with a constant, firm, and steady pace; the Musketeers (whether they be on the Flanks, or interlin'd with either the Horse or the Pikes) firing all the while; but when you come within Pistol-shot, you should double your pace, till your Pikes closely scerr'd together, charge these, whether Horse or Foot, whom they find before them. It is true, the business very oft comes not to push of Pike, but it hath, and may come off to it, and then Pike-men are very serviceable.

To advance on an Enemy.

If a misfortune fall out, that a Brigade, Regiment, or other part of an Army be beat, or begin to run and quit the Field, this should be conceal'd from the rest of the Army; and the Souldiers told that the Enemy in other places is beaten, and if they fight but a little, the Victory will be instantly theirs. I shall not speak here of what advantage a large Front is, having done it so often before; but if a General perceive that the business may be quickly decided, I think he should double the Front of his Foot, and make but three Ranks, where formerly they were six, and so being able to out-wing his Enemy, he may

To marshal the Foot in three Ranks.

may fall on his Flank; for at no extraordinary march an Army may be brought to push of Pike, before three Ranks of Musketeers have fired successively, if they do not begin to fire till they be within distance less than Musket-shot, and after they have given their three Volleys, then they may give the fourth (which will signify as much, if not more, than all the three) by kneeling, stooping, and standing; whereof I have spoke in the eleventh and twelfth Chapters.

When any Regiment or Brigade runs, or offers to quit the Field, the Reserve behind should be order'd immediately to advance, and encounter the Victorious Enemy, who will hardly be able to withstand that fresh charge, for it may be almost received as a Maxime, That a Troop, Regiment or Brigade, how strong soever it be, which hath fought with and beaten that Body of equal number that stood against it, may be easily routed by a Troop, Regiment, or Brigade that hath not fought, though far inferior in number. If any part of an Army get the Victory of those who stand against it, he who commands that part, ought to send some Troops in pursuit of the routed Enemy, and with the rest fall on the Flank of that Battalion which stands next him, and yet keeps ground. The neglect of this duty lost the famous General, Count *Tili*, the Battel of *Leipsick*, for himself being on the Right hand of the Imperial Army, beat the Duke of *Saxe*, and his Army out of the Field, whom *Tili* hotly pursuing, did not fall on the Left Flank of the *Swedish* Army, left naked by the flight of the *Saxons*: But at that same time the King of *Sweden* (who was on the Right hand of his own Army) had routed Count *Pappenheim*, who commanded the Left Wing of the *Imperialists*; upon which that martial King did not fail to charge the Flank of the Imperial Battel, which was left naked by *Pappenheim's* Flight; and this help'd to procure the Victory to the *Swedes*. As I told you in another place, *Banier's* Right Wing was well near beaten at *Woodstock*, nor did the Reserve come so soon to his succours. About that same time, Lieutenant General *King* had routed the Right Wing of the Imperial Army, and with it bore down the Right hand of their Reserve, and fell on the Right Flank of their Battel (which yet disputed their ground with Felt-Marshal *Lestie*) who thereupon cast down their Arms, and yielded the Victory to the *Swedes*. And the mentioning this Victory puts me in mind to advertize all Officers of Foot not to teach their Musketeers to neglect the use of their Rammers, a lesson too often taught and practis'd; for at this Battel I speak of, the Imperial Foot were on a Hill, up which *Lestie* advanced with his Infantry, but neither his, nor the Imperial Musketeers made use of Rammers, only (as the common custome is) when they charg'd with Ball, they knock'd the Butts of their Muskets at their Right foot, by which means most of the Bullets of the *Imperial* and *Saxish* Fire-men fell out at the mouths of their Musket, when they presented them down the Hill upon the *Swedes*; whose Bullets could not run that fortune being presented upward: And for this reason it was observ'd that few of the *Swedish* Foot fell.

When a Reserve, or a part of it, advanceth, those who fled have a fair opportunity to rally, and in a short time to second the Reserve; and though rallying at so near a distance is not frequently seen, yet it is not banish'd out of the Modern Wars, or Armies. At *Drenx* both Armies rallied twice or thrice with various success, the Generals of both Armies being both made Prisoners. And at *Lutzen* both Armies rallied often (for they fought from morning till night) most of the Imperial Cannon being twice taken, was as oft retaken. Some Great Captains have thought it fit in time of Battel, to make a show of their Waggon-men, Carters and Baggage-men at a distance, as if they were succours newly arrived; and certainly nothing terrifies an Army more in time of equal fight, than an unexpected Enemy; as *Robert Duke of Normandy's* fortunate arrival in the time of Battel between *Godfrey of Bouillon*, and the *Saracens*, in the Holy Land, deliver'd the Victory to the Christians. But these feigned Musters of Baggage-men and Carriage-horses, produce not always the wished effects. *Sulpitius*, a Roman Dictator, being to fight with the *Gauls*, order'd all that attended the Baggage of his Army to mount upon Mules and Sumpter-Horses, and hide themselves in some near Hills and Woods, and in the time of fight to make a show as if they would cut off the *Gauls*, pass to their Camp, which the Muleteers doing upon a sign from the Dictator,

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the *Gauls* immediately fled. Such a Stratagem did King *Robert Bruce* happily use against *Edward the Second*, of *England*, in the Battel near *Stirling*: But the like being practis'd by the *French* at *Agincourt*, against *Henry the Fifth*, King of *England*, had an issue contrary to the thing intended.

It hath been always, and ever will be a rule of War, That no man offer to plunder, or look for booty: till the Enemy be totally routed, and chac'd out of the Field; but for most part it is ill observ'd. When *Parmeno*, at *Arbela*, sent word to his Master *Alexander*, that the *Perfians* were fallen on the Baggage, which was but slenderly guarded; it was well answer'd of that great Prince, *Let, falth he, the Enemy be master of all the goods that belong to my Army, so I over master him, for then I shall recover my own, and get his to boot*. The not observing this rule lost the Christians the Victory against the *Turk* at *Agria*. At the Battel of *Jankou* in *Bohemia*, in the year 1644. (if I mistake not) the *Imperialists* were well near masters of the Field; in so far that several Brigades of the *Swedes* had run away, and very many of their Officers were taken Prisoners; but they fell too soon to the plunder of the *Swedish* Waggon, which *Torstenjone*, *Christina's* Felt-Marshal did not offer to rescue (though his own Lady was taken with them) but took the advantage of the Enemies disorder, and with fresh and courageous Troops pluck'd the Victory out of his hand, beat them out of the Field, recover'd his Lady, all his Prisoners and Baggage, and made himself master of all the Imperial Coaches and Waggon, took numbers of Prisoners, and among them him who commanded in chief, the Count of *Hatsfeld*.

I know not how the proposition of some will relish with our great Captains, that some lusty strong men should be arm'd with Head-pieces and Corslet, and long and large Targets, all Musket-proof; and a Rank of these ferd'd together, order'd to march before every Battalion of Pikes, and so protect them from shot, till they be within two Pikes length of the Enemy, that they can make use of their own Weapons. But whether this be approv'd or not, I think it would be of no great charge to the Prince or State, who manageth the War, to order every Pike man to have at his girdle a Pistol, with a Barrel two foot long, whereof the three first Ranks may make use before they present their Pikes, and the other three fire over the heads of those who are before them, in the time they are charging.

Now the Battel is done, and if it fall out, that it hath been so well fought, that none of the Armies can boast of Victory; but that both have left the place of Combat, as it were by mutual consent, or that they are parted by night, then either both prepare to fight next day, or the one finding those wants, of which the other hath no knowledge, takes the advantage of darkness, and retires to some place of security, where he may provide for his hurt men, be furnish'd with what he wants, recruit his Forces, and so give a stop to his Enemies further progress; and this, no doubt, is a tacite acknowledgement that he yields the honour of the day to him who keeps the Field. But this was never laid in balance by any prudent Captain with the preservation of his Army, the loss whereof may lose the Prince his Master more than such a Punctilio of Honour, which at a more fortunate Rencontre, may quickly be recover'd. But if both resolve to try their fortunes next day, then both prepare for it, the wounded are sent away, Ammunition is given out, and those who are found, are refresh'd and encourag'd. This falls out but seldom, though sometimes it hath happen'd. The Victory is pronounce'd to be his, who remains master of the ground where both fought; and in ancient times he acknowledg'd himself to be vanquish'd, who desired liberty to bury his dead. *Bernard Duke of Saxon Weymar* having belieg'd *Reinfeld*, and two Imperial Armies coming to raise the Siege, he fought both till night parted the fray, but with this difference, that the *Imperialists* got between him and the besieg'd Town, and so succour'd it; upon which the Duke retired, and left his Enemy the badges of Victory; but with a resolution to return, and throw the Dye of War once more, as he did, as you shall hear anon.

When an entire Victory is obtain'd, he who hath lost the day should not lose his Courage too, but ought to gather up his Shipwrack, rally his dispers'd and broken Troops, get new recruits, dissemble his losses, encourage his party,

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No plunder till an Enemy be totally routed.

Influences.

Things to be done after the Battel.

Badge of Victory.

What a Vanquish'd General should do.

A good Rule, but not Infallible.

Not to fall on the Flank of an Enemy a great neglect.

Influenced.

The doing it contributes to the Victory.

Influenced.

To rally.

Fresh succours in time of Battel discourage an Enemy.

False shews sometimes happy.



and draw to a head again; these are things practis'd by all intelligent Generals; withal he should with all convenient diligence send a Trumpeter to the Victorious General, to demand a list of his Prisoners, which when he hath got, he should make all the haste he can to get them ransom'd or exchang'd: and this is a duty he owes to Prudence, Honour and Confidence.

On the other hand, he who hath gain'd the Victory may lose himself if he be secure, for a resolute enemy may soon take him napping. As that same Duke of Weymar did the Imperial Army that had beaten him, for having got together the rest of his Forces that were not with him at his late overthrow, he return'd and gave Battel to the *Imperialists*, who dream'd of no such thing, and obtain'd so compleat a Victory over them, that he made all the general persons his Prisoners, who were led into *Paris* in triumph: *Duc de Savelli*, an *Italian*, was one of them, who escap'd afterward out of Prison; but the deep contemplation of the sudden change of fortune in his Military employments, mov'd him to make an exchange of his Helmet with a Cardinals Cap. It is for that, that he who commands a Victorious Army should not in sloth pass away his time, but improve his Victory to the greatest advantage of his Master; and not be guilty of that whereof one of the greatest Captains among the Ancients, *Hannibal*, was taxed, that he knew not how to use Victory; whereof two others, one before him and another after him, could never be accus'd, and those were the Great *Alexander*, and the Great *Julius Caesar*.

What a Victorious General should do.

## CHAP. XXIII.

### Of Retreats.

TO Retire after a Battel, or a brisk Rencontre, leads me to speak of Retreats. Next the fighting well, and winning of a Battel, the three great Master-pieces of a Captain are to make a Retreat, to take a fortified place, and to defend one: Of the first I shall speak in this, of the other two, in the two following Chapters. Here I am not to speak of those petty Retreats which parties of Horse and Foot make purposely, dissimbling fear, to make an unwary Enemy follow too eagerly, till he be brought to that Ambush prepar'd to intrap him, as is frequently practis'd in skirmish, when two Armies face each other, or in Battel when they fight, or when either an Army or a strong party faceth a Town, whether it be block'd up or not. But this discourse is of the Retreat of an Army, from the Post it once undertook to maintain from the Countrey, through which it once intended to march, or from the Town, Castle or Fort, which it once intended to besiege, or block up.

The occasions of Retreats may be these, Pestilence, Flux, or other contagious Diseases in the Army, want of Provisions and Munitions, the approach of an unexpected or a strong Enemy, some Disorders, Discontents or Mutinies, or just apprehensions of them; the couragious, or sometimes obstinate holding out of a fortified place, contrary to expectation; the sudden diminution of the Army by some accident of War not foreseen, or to joyn with those Forces who are coming to strengthen the Army, which conjunction, without such a Retreat, might be hinder'd by an active Enemy. Or though none of those be, yet he who commands an Army often retires, for reasons known only to himself, or when he thinks it not conducive for his Masters service to hazard Battel with an Enemy, though no stronger, perhaps not so strong as himself.

To make a Retreat from an advancing Enemy, or from Armies whose conjunction cannot be hinder'd, is not at all difficult, if he who is to make it, have fo good Intelligence as he may begin it in time; but if he be bad or uncertain, or that his Scouts and Parties disappoint him, nothing is more difficult;

Four Master-pieces of a Great Captain.

Occasions and Reasons of Retreats.

Retreats should be made in time.

cult; and in this place I refer you to my Discourse of Intelligence; when an Enemy is near, orders are given and obeyed with fo great haste and confusion, that the March looks rather like a flight than a retreat: and this hath ruin'd many Armies, and loaded their Generals with dishonour and disgrace.

If for want of good intelligence, an enemy comes unlook'd for, or that a General have fought with loss; in both these cases, the retreat should begin in the night. It is true, all Retreats inspire fear in an Army, which is augmented by the darkness and horror of the night, and therefore the common Souldiers should be encouraged, and told by their several Officers, that the Retreat will be but of a short continuance, and that if an Enemy follow, they will face about and fight him; but withal very strict and severe Discipline should be kept that none straggle, for in such occasions, they are very apt to run away, and indeed at some times, and in some places, it is better to hazard a Battle than to offer to retire; for if an Army must be lost, it is done with more honour by the first than by the last. But if an Enemy be near and a Retreat is resolv'd on, it should I say begin in the night, because in the day time it will be seen, and then it is not to be supposed, that an Enemy will be so supinely negligent, as not to follow the Rear immediately; but though one Enemy know of anothers dislodging, yet he will be very cautious to pursue him in the night time, having just reasons to fear Ambushes and other stratagems; and if a retiring Army get the advantage of one nights march, he who commands it may next day possess himself of some fortified place or Pass, and thereby be able to force him who follows to stand, and then he may advise whether it will be more convenient for his affairs, to continue his retreat or to fight, and many times this last succeeds well, but sometimes it succeeds ill; but I say still, better fight than still retire, when the retreat cannot probably be made without the loss of all or most of the Army. A Champagne or a long Heath, a numerous Cavalry of a pursuing Enemy, the weariness of both Men and Horses of the retiring Army, hunger and want of sleep very often render the fighting a Battle more feasible than a Retreat. *Cornelius Arvins* a *Roman* Dictator, perceiving the *Sabines* would storm his Camp, not yet well fortified, left his fires all burning, and retired in the dead time of the night, with all imaginable silence and diligence; but being overtaken next morning, and seeing he could not make his Retreat good without a visible loss, faced about and fought with success. *Cneius Scipio* sped not so well, because he fought not in time. This Consul perceiving three Armies against him in *Spain*, retired in the night time; next day the Enemies Cavalry was in his Rear, with whom he only skirmish'd, but that retarded his March so much, that the *Carthaginian* Infantry reached him at night, before he could entrench himself; he fought them, but was beaten and killed: but if he had faced about in the day time, with his whole Army, and fought the Enemies Cavalry, he knew not what effects it might have produced. *Philip of Macedon*, being worsted by the *Romans*, retired in the night time to the Mountains, and thereafter presented them Battle. Let us briefly sum up some of *Hannibals* Retreats from the *Romans*, and theirs from him, for they will very aptly shew the benefit and safety of Night-Retreats.

After this great *Carthaginian* had fought *Marcellus* at *Numistro* with equal fortune, knowing his own wants, he dislodged in the Night and retired: *Marcellus* knew it, but durst not follow him for fear of his Ambushes. Next Year *Marcellus* fought out his redoubted Enemy, found him at *Cannusum*, fought with him and was beaten, but fought the next day and did beat *Hannibal* into his Camp, out of which he retired that same night, *Marcellus* not daring to follow him. In the *Brutian* Countrey, the Consul *Sempronius* is worsted by *Hannibal*, and gets him to his Camp, and in the Night with great silence retires, and joins with the *Proconful Lelinius*, returns, fights the *Carthaginian* and defeats him, and he in the Night retired with safety to *Croton*.

*Julius Caesar* intending to march away from *Pompey* to *Appellania*, sent away his sick men and Baggage in the beginning of the Night well guarded with a Legion; at the fourth Watch he sent away the rest of his Army, except two Legions

To begin a Retreat in the Night.

In some cases better Fight than Retreat.

Influenc'd.

*Hannibals* Retreats from the *Romans*, and theirs from him.

*Caesars* Retreat from *Pompey*. Legions

Legions and the Cavalry, so soon as they were gone, to save a punctilio of honour, he caused a March to be sounded, and got him away with all possible speed; and made his retreat good, notwithstanding Pompey's pursuit at the River *Genus*, with his Horse mixt with Foot. But I find, that for the space of four days he retired still, sending his Baggage constantly before, and following with his Army in the night, and what stands he made to face the Enemy behind him, were all in the day time.

Charles the fifth from the Duke of Saxe.

Nor have Princes and great Captains in our Modern Wars thought it dishonourable to follow the example of that famous *Carthaginian*, and those illustrious *Romans*, in making their Retreats in the Night-time, whereof I shall not weary you with more instances than three. The victorious Emperor *Charles* the fifth, finding himself not in a capacity to fight *Maurice* Duke of *Saxe*, (who was got very near him, before he had any knowledge of his march) retired with great silence in the Night time from *Inspruck*, for hast leaving some of his Household-stuff behind him. *Francis* the first of *France*, having Vindicated the besieged Town of *Landreey* in view of both the *Imperial* and *English* Armies, marched twelve Leagues back to *Guisse*, where he stayed till the Emperor came in person, who marched with a puissant Army to give the King Battle. But *Francis* being sensible of the danger of an engagement, left some Tents and Baggage, and many fires, and in the Night without Drum or Trumpet retired to places of safety: This was looked upon as one of the bravest actions that ever was done by that Martial King; yet some blame him, perhaps with reason, for staying the Emperors coming, after he had relieved the Town, which was his only errand. *Wallenstein* Duke of *Friedlands*, fought the *Swedish* Army at *Lutzen*, till night parted them, and though he knew the King was killed, and that his own Forces were more numerous than the Duke of *Weymar's*, yet knowing his own wants, he resolved to retire, and did it that same night without noise of Trumpet or Drum, and left some Cannon behind him, and though he staid next day at *Leipsick*, yet the night after, he got him away, and made but short stay at any place, till he came to *Prague*, where he put himself in a posture to meet and fight that Enemy, from whom he thought it then fit to retire.

Wallenstein from the Duke of Weymar.

But many who have preferred a vain punctilio of honour to the safety of their Armies, have lost both their Armies and their honours. Whereof take only two instances. After *Lauree* Captain General of the *French* Army had obstinately continued the Siege of *Naples*, notwithstanding that a pestilentious Disease had consumed the best part of his Army, and made the rest unserviceable, whereof he dyed himself. The Marquess of *Salusse* who succeeded him in the command, with the advice of the other prime Officers, resolved to quit the Siege, and retire to *Aversa*, where a *French* Garrison lay, three Leagues from the Camp; in pursuance whereof, knowing their danger (since the *Imperialists* were very strong within the City, commanded by two great Captains, the Prince of *Orange*, and *Davala* Marquess of *Guaft*) they divide their infirm and sickly Army, equally, into three parts; Foot and Horse, mixing the one with the other, and with every Battalion appointed three Falconets, leaving all the rest of their Artillery and Baggage in their Leaguer as a prey to the Enemy. At break of day they march without Drum or Trumpet, and a tempestuous Rain falling in the mean time, hindered the *Imperial* Sentinels and Guards for a great while to take notice of the *French* Retreat; yet for all that they are overtaken by 300. Horse and some Harquebussiers on foot, and though the last Battalion of the *French* fired, and fought right well, yet did the *Imperial* Horse, increasing in numbers, fiercely charge them and rout them, and immediately after, the second Battalion likewise, killing and taking all. Those of the first Battalion by a speedy march got to *Aversa*, and saved themselves till the Prince of *Orange* came, and made them render on discretion. Now it is very clear, that if the Marquess had begun his Retreat in the beginning of the night, or at midnight (for it was in Autumn) he had undoubtedly brought his Army safe to *Aversa*; for his Rear would have been sooner by that account at that place, than his Van was, which came safely, though it began not to march till break of day, and by the bargain he had saved his own life, for there he got his mortal wounds, whereof he dyed.

Error in the French retreat from Naples.

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The second instance is of *Peter Strozzi*, a *Florentine*, who commanded in chief over an Army of *French* under *Henry* the second, near to *Sienna*, within which *Marshall Monluc* was Governor; An Army of *Spaniards* under the command of *James of Medici*, stronger by far than *Strozzi's*, lay close by him. *Strozzi* resolves to retire to *Luffignan*, but would needs do it in the day time, and consulted the matter by Letters with *Monluc*, who dissuaded him from it, with many reasons, and particularly by the fresh example of the late King of *France* his retreat in the night-time from *Guisse*, and so prevailed with him to retire in the Night-time. And so soon as day was spent, he sent away two Pieces of Ordnance to *Luffignan*, intending to follow with the Army. But the haughty *Florentine* looking upon it as a dishonourable thing for him to show his back in the night-time to *Medici*, to whose Family he carried an inveterate hatred, would needs make his Retreat in spite of him in the day time; and the issue was, his Army was routed, and himself hardly escaped. But that which *Monluc* writes of this, is very observable, That he no sooner understood that *Strozzi* had resolved to retire in the day-time, but foreseeing the event of so frantick a resolution, he instantly convened the Podesta, the Magistrates and principal Citizens of *Sienna*, and assured them the Army in which they trusted, at that very time and hour in which he was speaking to them, was defeated, and therefore advised them without delay to prepare for a Siege; and the event shewed he spoke truly, if not Prophetically, for that day was the *French* Army beaten, and next day the City was invested by the victorious Army.

Error in Strozzi's retreat from Sienna.

It is true, two of King *Ferdinand's* Generals, *Caxxianer* and *Rocandolf*, (each whereof lost an Army to their Master of 24000, or 30000. brave *Germans*) retired, the first from *Efecchia*, the last from *Buda*, both in the night-time, but they did it not soon enough, and lost their Armies deservedly, because they obstinately continued at these places against all reason, and the advice of their principal Officers, when they had certain intelligence of the daily march and approach of the Turks. I never said, nor thought that a Retreat in the Night would infallibly save an Army; I have been an eye-witness of the contrary, but I ever said, and still think, that when an Enemy is near, a Retreat is much more proper to be begun in the Night than in the day. The timely and orderly breaking up and retiring of Armies from the Sieges of Towns, hath saved many of them, whereof it will be more proper to speak in the next Chapter, when I discourse of the Sieges of Towns and Fortified places.

The manner of Retreats, whether they be made by day or by night, useth to be this. 1. The whole Train of Artillery (except some Field-pieces, which should stay in the Rear) with the Generals Coaches, Chancery, and principal Secretary, are sent away with a strong Convoy of Foot and some Horse, then all the sick and wounded men, next to them the Baggage of the whole Army, next to it a party of Horse, behind whom comes the whole Brigades of Foot, and after them the Cavalry, and in the Rear of it all the Dragoons, with as many commanded Musketeers out of the several Foot-Regiments as the Commander in chief thinks fitting, and as many of them mounted on Horses as can be, and behind them a select party of Horse and Foot for present service, which are to be relieved by turns, by those who are before them, one Party still facing the Enemy till the Party that was behind them be past. This is to be observed if the whole Army march one way; but if it can divide and go several ways, the expedition will be the greater, the time and place being named (the last whereof should be a Pass or fortified place) by the General where all shall meet, so that he who is first shall stay for the rest, unless some command be given afterward to the contrary. The same order in retiring is to be kept by several great Divisions or Wings of the Army, as if it marched in one Body.

But the truth is, the Baggage of an Army makes so long a train, that it retards the Retreat exceedingly, especially where there are enclosures and hedges; and therefore I wonder that in all Retreats, order is not given to leave all the Waggon and Carts behind, (for in a close Country that will be a great deal more advantageous than to burn them) and every man should take his best

The manner of a Retreat. Waggon and Carts rather to be left behind in the highways than to be burnt in a close Country.

and most precious things out of them, leaving all trash and luggage of small value in them (which will likewise retard the pursuing Enemy) and these goods the officers should cast upon one Horse, or two at the most, and upon the rest of the Baggage-Horses either sick men should be mounted, or Musketeers for service, and this should be seen done by the Colonels themselves under pain of Infamy; and no less do they deserve who will prefer a little poultry stuff to either the welfare of the whole Army, or the safety and preservation of any one sick or wounded member of it; yet this is not done so oft as occasion requires it should be, which gross oversight can be imputed to none so much, and indeed, I think, to none else but to the General.

In all Retreats great care should be taken that none get leave to fall behind, to prevent which not only all the Superior and Inferiour Officers of Regiments should do their duties, but the General Marshals should severely execute their power against Delinquents; and here, if at any time, it is lawful to shoot those who will not keep Rank and File. I told you that some light Field-pieces should be left in the Rear, for there they may be serviceable; and the lofs is not great; if they be taken, for if he who commands the Army see he cannot with any probability face about and fight, nor can retire in that order that I have spoke of, being hardly pursued by a powerful and prevalent Enemy, he should rather bury, or if he cannot do that, break and spring his great Ordnance, than lose his Army by a hopeless hazarding it to preserve his Artillery, and rather leave his Foot to fight for good quarters, than lose both it and his Cavalry; for the rule never fails, That it is better to save some than lose all; yet all means should be try'd before either Infantry or Artillery be deserted. I have heard that the staying two or three hours for a Mortar which was a great one, and bemired in deep and dirty way, occasion'd the loss of Prince Palatine and Lieutenant General King's little Armies in their Retreat from *Langaw* to *Plotsch*. When a party of either Horse or Foot, or of both, perceives they are neither able to fight, nor retire in a Body, it hath been, and may be practis'd to disband the party; he who leads it, bidding every man that belongs to it to go what way he please, or shall find most safe or convenient for him, and to meet at such a place as he then names, so soon as possibly they can.

That famous Retreat which the two Felt-Marshals, *Banier* and *Leslie*, made in the year 1637. from *Turgaw* in *Saxony*, made a great noise in the World. It was indeed a noble action, and the matter was shortly this: *Banier* had besieged *Leipsick*, which kept out gallantly against him; he makes some breaches, and prepares to storm it; in that very time come Letters from *Leslie*, shewing that he was forc'd to retire from the River *Saale*, and march towards him, Count *Gott* with an Imperial Army being much too strong for him: *Banier* immediately gave over the storm and the Siege too, sends away his Artillery, Baggage and Foot, and follows with his Cavalry, and joins *Leslie* at *Turgaw*, this Town they fortifie, and bring in a world of provisions both for Man and Horse, and resolve to make it the seat of War, against all the Imperial and *Saxish* Armies join'd together at that time, to the number of fourscore thousand fighting men, under the command of Count *Gallas*, for the destruction of the *Swede*; whereof the two *Swedish* Felt-Marshals had good enough Intelligence, yet persisted in their resolution, till the Imperialists were come very near them, and then they began to cast up another account, and found they had lost by their stay there a third of their Forces; and therefore, though a little too late, they resolve to march to *Pomerania*; and so broke up, and got over the River of *Oder* at *Landsberg*, in spite of all opposition, and mangle all the Enemies they had about them, join'd with Felt-Marshall *Wrangle*, without loss of either Infantry or Cavalry. A very gallant and memorable action, yet it cannot be denied but they should have begun their Retreat sooner, and so have sav'd that third part of their Army which they lost. Next year *Banier* made *Gallas* retire with a quicker pace than he had made when *Gallas* pursued him. But that same *Banier* was not so fortunate four or five years after, in his Retreat from Arch-duke *Leopold*; for in it he lost well near the whole Left Wing of his Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant General *Wittenberg*.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XXIV.

Of several ways to take fortified places, particularly of Sieges, Trenches, Approaches, Redouts, Batteries, Zaps, Galleries, Mines, Storms, and Assaults.

THE Art to take fortified Towns and Castles, hath been always, and still is accounted one of the necessary endowments of a Great Captain. The manner us'd by the Ancients, and those of later times is still the same; for Breaches made by the Ram, and by the Cannon are still Breaches; and Approaches made by the help of the Vines, Tortoises and Mules, and without them, are still Approaches. Fortified places may be taken three several ways, by Intelligence, by Surprizal, and by Siege. Of these three, that which loses least time, and costs least Blood, is to be chosen; and therefore that of Intelligence with a party within the Fort is the easiest and the safest, and this, without doing it wrong, you may in plain English call Treachery: It proceeds principally from the villany of some within; and though this be one of the most hateful vices that corrupt our depraved nature, yet Princes and their Generals look upon themselves to be obliged not only to cherish it in an Enemy, but to hire men to commit it at excessive rates: For the price a Traytor will seek for the delivery of a Town, Citadel or Castle, will seldom exceed that which the maintenance of an Army will amount to in two or three days: This is *Arm proditiorem*. Whether it be lawful for men to solicit, encourage, yea, to hire men to sin, I leave to the Divines; but I can assure them, Military men think it very convenient to practise it. This way of taking Towns, Philip, Father of *Alexander* called his Golden Key. This treachery is committed either by the Governour, and then the whole Town or Fort is betrayed, and the hazzard which he without runs is little or none at all; or it is committed by one man, or one party within the Town, by betraying a Port, or Post, or part of the Wall, whereby he who commands without, may quickly make himself master of the whole Fort; but here he runs the hazzard of opposition from those who are not in the Conspiracy: But he to whom the place should be betray'd, ought to take good heed that he be not cheated, for it is a ticklish piece. All Intelligences should not, nay, few Intelligences are to be trusted. I have told you in my discourse of Intelligence, how wary a General should be to trust those who offer to betray Forts, and gave you some Instances of those who have been abused by it; let me add one more out of the Duke of *Rohan's* Memoires: A Roman Catholick Gentleman, one *Mezlay*, who had married a Protestant Wife, pretended some discontent with his own party, and having a Foot Company within *Montpellier*, watched every fourth night in the Citadel; this, upon a stipulation of very advantageous conditions, he offers to deliver to a Cousin of his own, one *Bretigni*, a Protestant Gentleman, who serv'd in the Duke of *Rohan's* Army: After some demurr, the Duke approv'd of the matter, and march'd with six thousand men very near *Montpellier*, sent fifteen hundred men with *Bretigni* the Architect of the design, but advis'd him not to hazzard within the Citadel, till *Mezlay* came out and put himself in his hands; but credulous *Bretigni* neglected this so important a part of the business, and enter'd with thirty seven well arm'd men; the Traytor not daring to let more come in: *Bretigni* and his Brother and sixteen more were kill'd, and nineteen taken Prisoners. *Rohan* who was not far off with the gross of his Army, retir'd in good order, more sorry for the loss of two brave Gentlemen, than the missing the Citadel, as having mistrusted the design all along.

The second way of taking fortified places is Surprizal, whereof there are so many kinds that they cannot all be reckon'd: Sometimes Forts are surpriz'd

Ordnance to be broke or sprung in sudden Retreats.

*Banier* and *Leslie's* Retreat from *Turgaw*.

Three ways to take fortified places.

By Treachery.

A ticklish piece.

A Traytor not to be trusted.

By surprizal.

prised by Souldiers disguised like Country people, both as men and Women with short Carabines, Pistols, or Daggers under their Cloths, wherewith they dispatch a Guard, and so are masters of a Port, and immediately give the sign to them to advance, who are ordained to second them. Sometimes it is done by Armed men hidden in Waggon and Carts under a little Hay, or Straw, whereof the first stops on the draw-bridge to hinder the drawing it up, then all leap out of their Waggon, and whilst some are killing the Watch, others are underpropping the Portcullises with Forks, made purposely for hindring it to fall; in the meantime they give the sign to their Friends, who are not far off. Sometimes a Town is surprized by an Enemies entering man by man at a Postern or hole made for evacuation, or at some ruinous place of the Wall; sometimes by a sudden and unforeseen escalado; sometimes by petarding the Ports or Draw-bridges. If any of these ways of surprisal succeed, it is the next easy way to intelligence. In the next Chapter you may read how Forts are defended against all these ways of surprisal.

By a Block-  
ade.

The third way to take Fortified places, is by Siege, and it is twofold, either by not making approaches, which is called a Blockade, or by approaching, and this is more properly called a Siege. A Blockade is made by a General when he hath hopes to starve a Garrison, as knowing that they within have either consumed their Victuals themselves, or lent them to their Friends; and this was *Brissac's* condition when the Duke of *Weimar* blocked it up. The way to block a place, is, to lay Regiments and Companies of Foot and Horse at all Passes, Advantages, or other convenient places, to hinder all persons, all Provisions, and all things to enter the Blockaded Fort. This way to take Forts saves blood, and is of least danger, provided he who blocks up the Fort be absolute Master of the Field during the whole time of the Blockade, but it ordinarily costs very much time to the Besieger, for I have known a Town blocked a whole year, and not taken then without a petty Battle.

By a Siege.

A Siege properly so called, is, when an Army invests the place, entrencheth it self, makes Approaches, Redoubts, Batteries, Zaps, Galleries and Mines, and after all that, either leaves it or takes it by surrender or assault. The forming and carrying on a Siege is no small Master-piece of a General, to whose own spirit, conduct and prudence, many circumstances must be left; as to the consideration of the nature, strength or weakness of the place he is to besiege, the season of the Year, the stout or weak resistance he may expect from the Garrison within; of which and of the abilities of the Governour he should have good Intelligence: He should also have a serious consideration of his own Provisions, Money, Meat and Munitions; and many more particulars, of which, and concerning which, no definite or certain rules can be given. And before he form or lay down his Siege, he ought to weigh and consider well all the advantages and disadvantages that may accrue to him: As whether the gaining the Town or Castle he Besiegeth will counterpoize the loss of men, and that vast expence of money, meat and munitions, that must be hazarded and bestowed in reducing it; how long time his own Provisions will be able to hold out, whether he be able with probability of success, to withstand or fight any Enemy that dare adventure the relief of the Besieged place. And that which concerns most both his Masters service and his own honour, is to cast up his account so well, that if any unexpected accident or adventure fall out, such as are the change of Weather, inundations of Waters, a mighty and unlooked for Succour, a Pestilence or other heavy disease in his Army, he may notwithstanding these, and in spite of an Enemy, raise his Siege, and march away to places of safety, and consequently make an honourable Retreat with little or no loss of Men; for it is not to be thought that an Army marcheth away from a Besieged place with dishonour, because *ratio Belli* depending on emergencies, and accidents, changeth as oft as *ratio Status*; and as in this nothing is thought dishonourable that can save the State, so in that, nothing can be dishonourable that can save the Army.

How to begin  
the Siege.

I have not the vanity to prescribe or give rules for what should be done at Sieges, but I presume, I may be permitted to tell Novices, (for to them only I write) what is done and ordinarily practised at Sieges. After a resolution

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is taken to Besiege a place, diligence and expedition should be used, that all Passes, High-ways and Avenues be possessed by the Cavalry, that no entrance to the Fort be permitted; and that all Citizens or Souldiers belonging to it, be seized on and made Prisoners, that intelligence may be got of all affairs within. Many Generals at Sieges entrench their Armies, and many do not. Those who do not, have no apprehension of an Enemy, and therefore upon intelligence of the approach of one, they must be ready to march, either to meet and fight that Enemy, or leave both him and the Besieged place for good and all; both which I have known practised. Those who Entrench their Armies, take the far surer way; though the doing it costs a great deal of time and labour. The Entrenchment must be made both against those within the Town, and against any without, who will hazard to relieve it. The Fortifications of the Camp are properly called the *Trenches*, (though the word is frequently taken for approaches) and in that word are comprehended the lines of Communication, which Lines are divided into several parts, Field-fences, whole and half Bulwarks, Star-works and Redouts. None of these should have a Curtain between them above six or seven hundred foot long, for the distance of them one from another should be less than a Musket shot. They should be built of black Earth, if it can be had; but if the ground be sandy, it must be knit together with Withs, fascines, Straw, or growing Corn, and without with a Ditch and Pallisado. Of the same matter should the Redouts and Batteries in the approaches be built. The Star-fences having their sides 40 or 50 foot long, and their points far distant, are ordinarily made in half, when time will not permit better to be made.

At some  
Sieges Ar-  
mies are not  
entrenched.  
Armies En-  
trenched at  
Sieges.

If an Army be numerous enough, or that there be store of Pioneers with it, a General may fortify his Camp, and begin his approaches both together, and this will save him much time, which in such occasions is very precious. But if he cannot do both at once, he should Entrench himself, and then begin those works, which are called Approaches, running Trenches, and by the *Dutch Laufgraben*. In making these to break Ground without the range of a piece of Ordnance, will be too far, and within Musket shot perhaps too near, yet many think 8 or 900. foot from the besieged Fort is passable. At this place where the approach begins, a Sconce should be made, and in it a Court of Guard, neither were it amiss here to make a Battery, and in it to plant some Calverines and twelve pounders, to beat down the nearest Parapets of the Fort, from whence those who are to work in the approaches may be invested. But before I approach any nearer the Fort, I must tell you, that I admire how Captain *Rude* the late Kings Engineer hath left it upon Record, That the Romans were the first that used the Spade at Sieges, and that *Julius Caesar* was the first that besieged Towns by circumvallation. Against the first assertion, though we should not speak of prophane Authors, yet we find it written in the 15. verse of the 20. Chapter of the second book of *Samuel*, That *Jacob cast up a Bank*, (saith our Translation) against *Abel*, where the *Rebel Shebaw*. Deodati in his *Italian* translation calls it *Bastione*, a Bulwark: Now these could not be done without the help of a Spade or something like it; and this action of *Joab* was done some ages before *Romulus*. Against the second assertion, I object the ten years Siege of *Pem*, which was by circumvallation, and that was some Centuries of years before *Caesar* besieged *Alexia*. And we read in holy Writ, that Trenches were cast and Towers built against besieged Towns, and that was nothing else but circumvallations; and those who made them, did so little know *Caesar*, that they did not foresee, that ever such a man would be in the world as *Caesar*.

To approach  
to a Fort.

Captain  
*Rude's* opini-  
on disputed.

But to return to our first Sconce or Battery, from it a line, or if you please a running Trench (which upon the matter is nothing else but a Ditch) must be digged, and run either to the right or left hand, 3, 4, or 500. foot long, a little crooked and oblique, for doing which, Souldiers are appointed with Pickaxes, Spades and Shovels, one behind another at the distance of 4, or 5. foot, the foremost digging 3, or 4. foot deep, casting the Earth up either to the right or left hand between him and the Fort, and so by him who is first, and them that come after him; the running Trench is made 6, or 8. foot deep, and at first 6. Foot broad, and thereafter 10, or 12. broad; sometimes more,

A running  
Trench.

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if it be necessary to make use of Waggon in the approaches, which falls out sometimes. At the end of this first Line a Redout is to be made; this is a work of four sides and four Angles, for most part equilateral, each side 40, 50, or 60. foot long: And sometimes, but very seldom, Redouts are built of an oblong figure, and then the longest side may be of 120, 100. and the shortest 40, 50, or 60. foot. From that Redout another approach runs 5, 6, or 700. foot long to the other hand in the same manner, and at the end thereof another Redout or Battery should be made, from whence begins the third running Line to that hand, that the first Trench did run, and so alternately till Batteries be made, and the Zap begin. Observe, that the ground without, on which the approaches are to be made, is divided by the Generals appointment into several Posts. The approaches whereof to the Besieged Fort, go equally on; and therefore all the Redouts and Batteries of them should defend, flank, and secure one another against the outfalls and Sallics of the Besieged.

The nearer the approach come to the Ditch of the Fort, the deeper and broader it should be, the better to defend the Souldiers; and the deeper any work be, that requires a Brest-work, the higher will the top of that Brest-work be: for that reason, many times three steps of a foot bank will be necessary for Souldiers to ascend to the defence of their Brest-works, either in case of Sallics, or yet to give fire upon the Parapets of the Towns Fortifications.

In such convenient places of these approaches, as either the General of the Artillery or Quartermaster General (for to their charges and inspection belong the Approaches) shall think fit, some of these Sconces should be made, which commonly are called Batteries; for properly a Battery is nothing else but the Platform on which the Ordnance stand, which is also called the Bed of the Cannon; and on these Batteries such Pieces are planted as are thought necessary, ordinarily whole and Demi-Cannon, and whole and Demi-Culverine. In making these Redouts & Trenches, consideration should be had of the nature of the Earth that is digged; if it be good black Earth, it will serve without help for Brest-works; but if not, then must Baskets be made, and filled with Earth or Sand compactly. But whether the Brest-work be of Earth, or made of Gabions, it is necessary it be ten or twelve foot thick. If the ground be marshy, no doubt, it will exceedingly retard the Approaches; for Wooden palls must be struck in the Earth, and Withs, Straw and Rubbish laid upon them for a foundation to a Battery; and upon the Battery, Gabions and Baskets filled with Earth, as was done by Prince Henry of Orange at the Siege of the *Buseh*, and there he was well helped in that marshy Ground by a dry Summer. Where a running Trench is made, if the ground be tolerably good, and yet marshy on both sides, it must be made in a straight and direct Line, and not an oblique one, as the other whereof I spoke; and for the defence of the Souldiers, there must be blinds, and the Trench it self should be two foot deeper than an approach which is either crooked or serpentine.

When the Approaches are brought near the Ditch of the Besieged place, the Counter-scarp (which is the field of the Fortrefs) is in danger, and then the Zappe begins. This Sappe or Zappe is nothing else but a digging, as all the rest of the Approaches are; but men have appropriated it to that digging which is near to, or in the Counter-scarp. We have borrowed it from the *Italian*, in which Language *Zappa* signifies a Mattock, *Zapara* to dig or delve, and *Zappamento* a digging or delving. The Sappe then begins at both sides or faces of the Bulwark, towards which the approaches have been made, sometimes but on one side the Souldiers Zappe under favour of the Canon, which should play lustily from the several Batteries, and of the Musketeers, who should incessantly fire upon the Flanks and Parapets of the Bastion, from both Batteries and Redouts; the manner of Sapping is this: Against that part of the Bulwark which the Besiegers intend to undermine, (which ordinarily is the capital point, or that angle that completh the two faces of the Bastion) one man kneeling or bowing, digs three foot deep and three foot broad, throwing the Earth both before and on both sides of him, and still advanceth; another follows him close, and makes it three foot broader and deeper, if the

Ground

Ground permit it; to him succeeds the third, who adds three foot more to the depth and breadth, so that a man may walk covered. In this manner (the Zappers being often reliev'd by turns) the Zap is continued, till they have digg'd through the Counter-scarp, which must be done, though it be lin'd with Stone and Mortar, otherwise all their labour is lost. When this is finish'd, the Besiegers are to fight with the two merciless Enemies and Elements of Fire and Water, the first from the Walls of the Fort, the second from the Ditch, over which they must be, before they come to the Wall, for doing whereof all the Earth and rubbish that hath been cast out in Zapping, must be cast in the Foss; and with it, a world of Falcines, which are bundles or knitchels of the twigs and smaller branches of Trees, in every one whereof should be Stones to make them sink, they should be six or seven foot long; for this reason, at Sieges, Souldiers, when they are not on other duty, are order'd to make many thousands of them. There must likewise use be made of great logs of Timber, great Stones, and sacks full of Sand, or any thing else that may be thought fitting to fill the Ditch; and this is continued without intermission (your Ordnance and Musket firing incessantly on the Flanks and Parapets of the besieged) till a dam be made to the place you would be at, suppose it be that angle of a Bulwark I just now spoke of, because it hath no other defence but from that part of the Curtain which is called the second Flank, which, for that reason, the Besiegers should make as useless as may be with Cannon and Culverine. Observe in passing (since you are passing over the Ditch) that if there be any Cafemates (as now they are not much used) they must be destroy'd before the dam be begun. Upon this dam (which must run more to one side of the angle than the other, that so it may be subject but to one Flank) a Gallery must be made, the one side whereof, which is in greatest danger, must according to the damage it is to expect from the Artillery, be seven, eight, nine or ten foot thick of strong Balke, coupled together in manner of a gallows, covered above with Boards, above which is to be laid Earth three foot thick: If the other side of the Gallery be made up with strong boards, it will be sufficient. These Galleries may be more or fewer, according to the number of the Bastions of the besieged place, or the strength and number of the Besiegers Army. Prince Maurice of Nassau had seven of them at *Juliers* when he besieg'd it, about sixty years ago.

Galleries being made over the Moat, the Besiegers either make a breach with their Ordnance, or they Mine before they come to the Assault, or they do their Ordnance, or they Mine before they come to the Assault, or they do both. If a breach or *Breche* be resolv'd on, it is the most expeditious way; for, as I told you in my Discourse of Artillery, some require to make a *breche*, eighteen pieces of Ordnance, eight whole Cannons, six Culverines, and four Demi-Culverines; and for these some Gunners require three Batteries, one for the Cannon to shoot in a direct line, and two for the Culverines to shoot crosswise or obliquely, to cut away those parts of the Wall which the Cannon hath shaken. I shall not trouble you with a discourse of Batteries, which are those platforms of Boards on which the Pieces stand, how even and plain they should be made, that they should be higher behind than before, according to the greatness of the Piece is to be planted on them, both to hinder her to recoil too far, and bring her the more easily forward to her Loop hole; nor of the length of a platform to fit a piece for her carriage and recoil; nor of the several sorts of Batteries, as those of Earth, of Timber, and of Woollen Sacks; nor of sunk Batteries, nor of the *Appareils*, which is nothing but the ascent to the Battery, for the more ease bringing up the Cannon to it: All these things, and many more concerning Batteries, belonging properly to the Gunners Art, and but accidentally to this Discourse. I shall only tell you, that when a *Breche* is to be made, Gunners differ about the distance that should be between the Battery, and the Wall to be batter'd. Some are of opinion that one hundred and fifty paces are far enough, and that no Battery should be made further from the mark; and those say likewise that the nearest Battery should be four hundred foot from the mark: Others say two hundred foot makes a convenient distance, and a third sort (it may be with greatest reason) aver, that a Battery at the Counter-scarp, where only the breadth of the Moat is between the Battery and the Wall hath the greatest force, and the Ordnance prove most

How to fill the Moat.

Cafemates.

A Gallery.

To make a Breche.

Distance of Batteries from the place to be battered.

efficacious. But the nearer the Battery be, the greater care should be taken that their Parapets be so strongly and well contriv'd, that neither the Ordinance may be in danger of dismounting, nor the Gunners and Matrosses in hazard of their lives, but neither these, nor many things else can be secur'd by the wit of man. These old Stone Towers that stand on Walls, fortified *a l'antique*, ought to be batter'd down, at least their Parapets; for I have seen more hurt done from those to Approaches, than from either Curtain or Bulwark of any Modern Fortification.

I have said, that to make a breach some require three Batteries, one for the 8 Cannon, the second for the 6 Culverines, and the third for the 4 Demi-Culverines. The first to play on direct angles, which terribly shakes the Wall; the second to play traversely and cross, to cut out what the Cannon hath shaken, and the third to beat down the Parapets, or render them useless. By this means it is conceived, that in less than twelve hours time a sufficient breach may be made, which the Defendants must not be permitted to repair, for an Assault should immediately follow. Nor will I in this place trouble my Reader with the different opinions of Gunners, yea of Captains, whether it be more conducive for gaining the Fort, to make a breach in a Bulwark or a Curtain. Some say, as I told you formerly, the faces of a Bulwark near the Capital having least defence, are with least danger attack'd and assaulted, and therefore should be first batter'd; others think, that Bastions having most *terreplein* (for we must suppose them full of Earth) render Breaches for a long time ineffectual, because having so much Earth so near at hand, they may quickly be repaired, and other Retrenchments may be made successively behind one, two, or more breaches; whereas there is a far greater difficulty to do so in a Curtain, where there is no more earth or *terreplein* than the thickness of the Rampart; and to that, that the danger of assaulting a Curtain comes from two Flanks of the two nearest Bastions, they say, they may be made useless before the Assault both by the direct and traversed Cannon, adding of Demi-Culverines, Quarter Cannons, and Field-pieces.

But having overcome the difficulties of the Moat, it is many times thought fit to lodge at the foot of either Bulwark or Curtain, and there to undermine. What use the Ancients made of Mines, I have shewn you in its proper place; nor are Mines other things now than they were in the days of yore, except that they differ in their contrivances; for of old, the principal end of Mining was to underdrop the Wall with Timber, till the underminer was order'd to fire that Timber, and therefore the Mine might be greater and wider than now, when Gun-powder is to be put into it. Norton in his practice of Artillery says, that *Pietro di Navarra* was the first who made use of Gun-powder in Mines, and made Furns or Ovens, or as we call them, Powder Chambers. If this be true, (as I know nothing to the contrary) it seems strange to me, that the composition of Powder being found out by the German Monk about the year of our Lord 1301. it should not have been used in Mines two hundred and thirty years after its invention, for it is not yet one hundred and thirty years since *Pietro di Navarra* dyed. He was a very ingenious man, and a subtle and vigilant Captain, for his great and good services *Charles* the Fifth gave him great rewards, and made him an Earl: But *Pietro* having deserted him twice, and gone over to the French King, he was taken at the Siege of *Naples*, and kept Prisoner in the *Casfel del Ovo* (which by his dexterity himself had formerly taken from the French for that same *Charles*) and old, crazy, and sickly as he was, his Head, by order from the Emperour, was appointed to be taken off; but the morning before his execution, it was prevented either by himself, or his favourable Guardian *Hickard*, and he was found dead in his Bed, as *Giovio* relates the story.

To demolish a Wall by a Mine is to be preferr'd to a Battery, for two reasons; first, it is of far less expence; secondly, Batteries being soon perceiv'd, may be made useless, by Countermures and Retrenchments; but Mines are more imperceptible, yet they are dangerous works for them that are in them, because of Countermures, which when the Mine-master finds, he is to divert his course to the Right or Left hand, or sink his Mine deeper; and if the Countermures be under him, he had need make haste and take his advantage, by piercing holes

Three several Batteries to make a breach.

Whether to batter a Curtain or a Bulwark.

Mines.

*Pietro di Navarra*.

Countermines.

holes, and chasing them away with scalding Water. But take a few general Rules for Mines. The entrance should be seven foot high and five foot broad, say some; four foot and a half high and four broad, say others: This last, and indeed perhaps no Mine is for a fat corpulent man: The Mine all along must be lin'd on both sides, and cover'd above with boards, and underpropt for keeping up the Earth. The mouth of the Mine should be carefully conceal'd from the besieged. *Philip King of Macedon*, who was afterwards beaten by the Roman Consul *Flaminius*, did not ill to cause a great heap of Earth to be laid on the other side of a besieged Town, where his real Mines were, and so deluded the besieged. The height and breadth of the Mine should decrease, and grow less by little and little, from the entry till it arrive at the place which should be undermined, so that the mouth of the Furn should be no wider than to receive the Vessels wherein the Powder is, whether these be Barrels or Troughs. Some will have this Powder Chamber to be six or seven foot high; four or five broad, and five or six long; others say, only four foot and a half high, the breadth four, or three foot and a half: But I think assuredly it should be proportion'd to the quantity of the Powder, and the number of the Vessels that are ordain'd to be put into it. These Furns should be closely and strongly stopp'd, that the Powder get no vent, but that which naturally it seeks, upwards. The train whereby the Powder in the Furn is to be fired, should be so well order'd that it be not too long a firing, for that disappoints them who are to storm, making them apprehensive of danger of they know not what: And this occasion'd the death of two French Marshals within these forty years, who admiring why the Mine did not spring, after they had order'd the train to be fired, went into the Mine to know the cause, where they both dyed; the Mine at their being there, working its effect: Nor must it fire too soon, lest he who fires the train, be buried in the ruins of the Mine. Besides Countermures, several things hinder the effectual operation of a Mine; such are, the ill stopping the Powder-Chamber, the weakness of the sides, occasion'd by the Countermures, Caves, Caverns, and hollow grounds, as also the failing of the train in its duty, by reason of its wetness, moisture, or some bad contrivance, and the placing the Powder too low in the Furn. When a Mine hath sprung, if it call the Wall outwards towards the Besiegers it makes the entrance very difficult for the assailants; if the Defendants act their part with Courage; and it is just so with a breach after a Battery, which *Charles* the Fifth, and his General the Duke of *Alva*, experimented at the memorable Siege of *Metz*.

When large Breaches are made by furious Batteries, and that Mines have operated happily, then an universal Assault should be given by the whole besieged Army, each part of it being to storm at its assigned Post. These Assaults being given resolutely, and continued obstinately, though the first or second may perhaps be beat off, will probably reduce the place: And then it will be a noble part of the Victorious General to order fair quarter to be given; or if the besieged have with too much obstinacy, and upon weak grounds, by holding out too long, and by making him spend too much of his time, provok'd him to wrath and revenge, to make examples of them to others, he should order no hurt to be done to women, old men, and children; and in one word, to kill none but those who are found in Arms: But a promiscuous putting all to the Sword, sparing neither sex nor age, is too often practis'd; for the Pillage, the Ancients used after the expugnation of Towns, to bring it all to the Treasurers Lodging, who sold it, and distributed the money, as he was appointed by the General, sometimes all of it to the Army, sometimes a part of it, and sometimes none of it. The like hath been often practis'd in the Modern Wars, but the custom is almost worn out, the Plunder belonging to those who can take it, which is *Capia qui capere potest*; and this is truly a very unequal partition, for those who stay in Arms upon the Wall, or perhaps in the Market-place, to make them good against any opposition may arise from hidden Reserves of the Enemy, share not so well as those who so soon as they enter, run presently to the Plunder. Some Princes and Generals give the Pillage of Towns, taken by storm, to their Armies for so many hours, sometimes for a day, for two days, or three days. It is commonly thought, the Prisoners and

General Rules for Mining.

The Train.

What hinders Mines to spring.

Assault.

Fair quarter to be given.

Plunder.

and their ransomes belong to those who took them, and so it is commonly practis'd, unless they be great Officers, and those should be deliver'd to the General, yet that General should be so generous as to bestow some handsome Present or gift on those who took them, which some do, but many do not. The Ordnance, and all that belong to it, all publick Magazines of Provisions, Munitions, and Arms belong to the Prince or State who manageth the War.

Reasons to  
leave a Siege,  
and retire.

Obstinacy in  
continuing  
them loſeth  
Armies.

Influences.

But if all Assaults be beat off, and all the Besiegers have done hath prov'd successful, or that the besieging Army is wasted, as no doubt, it will diminish every day, or that a numerous and fresh succour be expected, or other unhappy accidents fall out; then a wise General will raise his Siege in time, and rather march away, than be chac'd away, and he should go where he may refresh and recruit; and be wise by the examples of those otherwise renown'd Princes and Generals, who have obstinately continued Sieges, to their irreparable loss and danger: So did *Laurece*, a great Captain, continue the Siege of *Naples*, fighting against a redoubted and courageous Enemy within the City, and a contagious disease which rag'd within the bowels of his own Army, which occasion'd first the loss of his own life; secondly, the ignominious rout and destruction of all his Forces; and thirdly, the utter undoing of the *French* Interest in that Kingdom to this very hour. So *Charles* the Fifth, a fortunate and valiant Emperor, and his General the Duke of *Alva*, a renowned Captain, continued the Siege of *Meux* (which was gallantly defended by the Duke of *Guise*) till the Imperial Army moulder'd away, and was made despicable, by the sword, sickness, and grievous winter weather, and at length was forc'd to make a pitiful Retreat from it, after which that great Prince retir'd to a Cloister, and from it to another world. So did that Emperours Great Grandfather, *Charles* of *Burgundy*, with a great deal of vanity, but with a greater deal of loss, continue his Siege of *Niuse* as it were in despite of the *Roman* Emperour, and all the Princes of *Germany*, till he was forc'd to sneak away from it, with damage and dishonour enough. So did *Rocandolf* continue the Siege of *Buda*, notwithstanding all the prayers and persuasions of all his great Officers to the contrary, to the utter undoing of a rich and agallant Army, as hath been told you in another place.

To raise a  
Siege without  
taking the  
place no dis-  
honour.

Influences.

But as in ancient times, so in our late *European* Wars, it hath been an ordinary thing for brave Generals to raise their Sieges, either upon the intelligence of the advance of a strong succour, or some other weighty consideration. So did the great *Gustavus* raise his Siege from *Ingershade* in *Bavaria*: The *Swedish* Felt-Marshal *Banier* from *Leipsick* in *Saxony*: His Successor *Torstenſon* from *Birt* in *Silesia*, and *Wrangle*, who succeeded him, from *Egger* in *Bahernia*: So did *Wallenstein* from the Sieges of both *Magdeburg* and *Stralsund*: So did *Marques* *Spinola* raise his Siege from *Bergen* of *Zoom*, upon Count *Mansfeld's* conjunction with *Maurice* Prince of *Orange*, and was not ashamed to bury some of his Cannon, that he might make his Retreat with more expedition: So did that same Prince *Maurice* raise the Siege he had form'd at *Groll*, upon *Spinola's* advance towards him. And so did his Brother *Henry* Prince of *Orange* rise from *Venlo*, upon the approach of the Cardinal *Inſtan*. But if a General be well provided, and there is no sickness in his Army, and if he have strong hopes to carry the place, he ought not to leave it, unless it be to fight the succour that is coming to it. This hath been often practis'd, sometimes unfortunately, and sometimes successfully. Take a few instances of both. Count *Tili* left the Siege of *Leipsick*, march'd toward the King of *Sweden*, who came to relieve the Town, and fought him, but to his great loss: So did the Duke of *Weymar*, and the *Swedish* Felt-Marshal *Gustavus* *Horne* leave the Siege of *Nordling*, and march'd to fight the *Hungarian* King, but with the loss of the day, and their Army too. But that same Duke of *Weimar* had afterwards better fortune when he besieg'd *Briſac*, from the Siege whereof he rose twice, and fought the Armies that were sent to relieve the Town, and return'd both times to the Siege, crown'd with *Laurel*. So did the *Swedish* Army leave the Siege of *Hamelin*, (that Town out of which they say a Piper plaid first all the Rats, and next all the Children, and of the last none returned) and met the Imperial Army which advanc'd to relieve it, and fought with Victory. So did the *French* and *English* leave the Siege of *Dunkirk* not many years ago, and fight *Don Juan d'Aufirin*, and beat him.

But

But if the Besieging Army be well, and strongly entrench'd against an Enemy both within and without the Town, and want for no provisions, he should make no such hazzard, but: lye still, and when a succour comes, it must either look on, and leave the attempt, or storm the Besiegers fortified Camp. If the succour be forc'd to march back without doing his errand, then the Besieger is master of the Town or Fort. So did the Duke of *Alva* when he besieg'd *Mons* in *Hennault*, keep himself within his fortified Camp, and endur'd all the bravadoes of *William* Prince of *Orange*, who came with an Army out of *Germany* to relieve the Town, the Duke knowing well that the Prince for want of Money would in a short time be forc'd to disband his Army. If he who comes with the succour, resolves to storm the Besiegers fortified Camp, he doth it with as much disadvantage as an Army without shelter can fight with one that is entrench'd, and seldom such attempts are successful. *Hannibal* try'd it at the Siege of *Capua*, and though he did it both skillfully, cunningly, and courageously, yet after he had storm'd the *Roman* Camp, and was beat off, he was forc'd to leave that rich and great City to be a prey to its exasperated Enemy, Count *Pappenheim*, though a brave Captain, yet gave cause to question his discretion very much, when he was so lavish of his Matter, the Emperours Souldiers (at a time when he had so much need of them against the Victorious King of *Sweden*) as to storm the fortified Camp of *Henry* Prince of *Orange* at *Mastricht*, where he left not so few as 1500 dead men on the place, besides as many more who were wounded. The Prince followed a precedent was given him by *Spinola*, when he besieg'd *Breda*, who kept himself within his Trenches constantly, when first *Maurice*, and then *Henry* Prince of *Orange* and Count *Mansfeld* offered him Battel, and beat off likewise some assaults more made on some places of his Camp, by that same Prince *Henry*, and Sir *Horatio Vere*.

To lye still  
entrench'd  
notwithstanding  
ing of any  
succour.

To storm a  
entrench'd  
Camp often  
unsuccessful.

When an Army that hath attempted the relief of a Town hath retir'd, and is either baffled or beaten, the Governour of the besieged place may with reputation yield on honourable conditions, which will not be so good as they would have been before; but be what they will, they ought to be punctually and inviolably kept; but of this I shall speak in another place. If a Besieger obtain a Victory over the Army that comes to relieve the besieged place, some think he may drive all his Prisoners to the Ports of the Town, and if the Governour will not take them in, he may suffer them to starve. But I can find no reason why the Governour should admit them, and far less why the Victorious General should have respited their lives from the Sword, to put them to a more mercilefs Death; yet I saw some part of this practis'd at that Town of *Hammeln*, whereof I spoke but just now; for, after the defeat of the Imperial Army, the *Swedish* General sent all the Prisoners (who were no fewer than three thousand) to the Ports of the Town, but the Governour gave entrance to none of them. But, I conceive, this was done only to frighten the Garrison out of the thoughts of further resistance, and to give them within assurance that their Friends were defeated, and not to starve those poor Creatures. But the matter came not to the tryal, for next day the Governour fought a Parley, and got it, and then made an accord, got Articles fair enough, and gave over the Town.

Of rendition.

To drive Pri-  
soners to the  
Port of a be-  
sieged Town.

The several works that are without the Ditch of a Royal Fortification must be taken notice of so much, that it will be necessary for a Besieger to make himself master of them, before he make his approaches to that side of the Fortrefs, on which any of these outer works are. Engineers ordinarily make five kinds of them; these are, Half-Moons, Ravelines, Horn-works, Crown-works, and Tenailles; some add a sixth kind, Traverſes. The manner to take them is the same I have already describ'd, only I add, that it will be fitting (if possible) to take away the Water out of those Moats that are not dry, for the ground of Water-Ditches often proves muddy, yet the mud is sooner made passable with Falcines, than water is. It is true, if the Ditch be any thing deep, after the Water is away, you must have Ladders to descend at the Counterſcarp, but these may help you to ascend the Scarp, or the *Fausse Bray*, if the Fort have one. The taking away Water from a Ditch is very ordinary, and practicable by any Engineer, if there be a defending ground from any part of the Moat.

The several  
kinds of Out-  
works.

To draw Wa-  
ter from a  
Ditch.

T t

But



But notwithstanding all hath been said, he who leads an Army, if he find none of these works without the Counterfarp to retard him, and the place itself either is not well fortified, or scarce of Men and Munition, or those within are timorous, or do not well agree among themselves, or that by his Intelligence he hath learned that the Governour is either not experienced, not vigilant, or is a man of little Authority or Courage, after his first summons (by the answer whereof he may guess at the Governours resolution) he may, to save his Master much expence, and himself and his Army much time and labour, so soon as he arrives make Batteries, and after a furious Cannonading, fill up the Moat as well as he can, especially if it be a dry one; clap Ladders to the Wall, and his Souldiers being well refresh'd and encourag'd, hazzard a storm with probability enough of success: But on the other part, if the place be well mann'd, (though the Fortification be none of the best) and commanded by an active and experienced Governour, who hath good Officers under him, and wants for neither Meat, Artillery, Arms, or Munition, it is but high presumption, or rather madness, to give an Assault without these previous Approaches, Breaches and Zaps, whereof I have spoke. The late King of Sweden, a very martial Prince, blamish'd his reputation in Military affairs by his inconsiderate storming *Copenhagen*, in which was the *Danish* King with all his Family, many of the Nobles of *Denmark*, a good Souldiery, three thousand Students well arm'd, and some thousands of Burgesses, who were to fight manfully for all that could be dear to men on Earth. The event of this Assault was correspondent to the attempt, for *Charles Gustavus* was beat off with a great loss of both his Army and Honour. Nor was his Uncle *Gustavus Adolphus* excusable (though he was the *Mars* of his time) for storming the Imperial General *Wallenstein's* Camp at *Nuremberg*, strongly fortified on a Hill, and who with his own and the *Bavarian* Forces, had as many men within his Leaguer as the King had without, yet was the Assault obstinately continued almost a whole day, and as resolutely was the Camp defended by the *Imperialists*; inasmuch that the Hill seem'd to be nothing but fire and smoke. The conclusion was, the King was beaten off, and forc'd to leave some thousands of dead men on the place, and fill all the *Lazaretto's* of *Nuremberg* with those who were hurt and wounded. This action of his proceeded from the great confidence he had in his fortune, and former successes; but here she turn'd her back and frown'd upon him, nor did he ever smile on him afterward, for about three months after that he lost his life at the Battel of *Laufen*.

There is a Book of Military matters, dedicated by an *Italian* Earl to the late *French* King, this Kings Father; it is call'd, *Il Guerriero prudente & politica del Conde Galeazzo Gualdo priorato*: After he hath discours'd of the attacks of Forts, he concludes thus, *Il lavoro delle quali Batterie, Traverse, Gallerie, Approci, & altre simili azioni, essendo opere insegnate Diligentissima mente da molti buoni Autori, sparmiero il tedio, che potesse ricevere il Lettore da queste mie imperfette fatiche*. The labour or travel of these Batteries, Traverfes, Galleries, Approaches, and such other Actions, being works which have been most diligently taught by many good Authors, I shall be sparing to give my Reader the trouble he may receive from these imperfect fatigues of mine. These words I desire my Reader to look upon as my language or at least as my sense, by which I excuse my self from running out more copiously on those particulars.

To storm without Approaches.

Inconsiderate assaults seldom successful.

*Charles Gustavus*.

*Gustavus Adolphus*.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. XXV.

Of the Defence of fortified places against all the ways of expugnation. Of all things necessary for Forts; of Governours; of their duties and qualifications.

There be as many several ways and means to preserve and defend Towns, Forts, Castles and Cittadels, as there be to take them: But the most difficult part of all is to guard against Treachery; it is a close and hidden Engine, against which open defences are seldom proof. Nor do I know any better way than for a Governour still to imagine he may be betray'd, and therefore to be constantly on his Guard, to trust but few, and yet seem to trust all: He should have a wary eye (without seeming to be jealous) on all the Inhabitants of the place, upon the Officers and Souldiers of his Garrison, especially on such as are known to be of revengeful, discontented, or avaritious Inclinations; and if he learn that there is any tampering between any one of them and an Enemy, he should do well to proceed against them with just severity, for that will prove to be *pauca ad paucos, terror ad omnes*. If the Governour have any Intelligence at the Court of the Prince or State who are Enemies to his Master, or with the Secretaries of their Generals, it will be easie for him to learn what Traytors he hath in his Garrison, and to proceed accordingly against them. A good antidote also against the poison of Treachery, is neither to trust the several Ports nor Posts of a Garrison'd place constantly to one Officer, nor to one Company or Band of Souldiers, whereof I spoke in my Discourse of Watches and Guards. It hath been of bad consequence in all ages, and will be ever a temptation to all base and treacherous Souls to hatch treasonable designs: The doing it ruin'd the late gallant Duke of *Guisse*, and all his great actions, whereby he went fair to have disburthen'd the King of *Spain's* head of the Crown of *Naples*, immediately after the unexemplified Rebellion of *Masaniello*; but the Duke's entrusting the several Posts of that great City of *Naples*, constantly to the same Officers, encourag'd one of them to treat with the Count d' *Ognati*, and sell him that which was entrusted to him, when the Duke was reducing an inconsiderable Isle without the City: this blasted all his fair hopes, and shortly after lost him his liberty.

How to guard against Treachery.

The late Duke of *Guisse*.

I told you in the last Chapter, that Surprizal was the second, and next to Treachery, the easiest way to take fortified places. I spoke of several kinds of Surprizals; of any of which, if a Governour gets Intelligence, it is easie for him to render it ineffectual, with the great hazzard, if not the inevitable loss of many of the intended Surprizers; but without Intelligence, a Scalado is prevented by Guards duly order'd and set, strictly and severely kept, and by the diligent going of Rounds either the circuit of the whole Fort, or from Post to Post: for a Scalado is soon perceiv'd by vigilant Sentinels and careful Rounds, and as soon are the Ladders thrown down, with those who are upon them. So were the Duke of *Savoy's* people used at *Geneva* twenty years ago, where the Inhabitants expecting no such thing in time of Peace, kept but a very careless Watch. And when *Spinola* besieg'd *Breda* in the year 1625, Prince *Maurice of Orange* his design to scale the Cittadel of *Amwerp* was utterly defeated by a more than half sleeping Sentinel. In the next place, there will be no danger, for a Fort to be surpriz'd by Souldiers disguis'd like Countrey people, if a vigilant Guard examine and search narrowly all who enter the Ports, especially in the mornings and evenings, which should be done in all Frontier Garrisons; and the proper place for doing this is eight or ten paces without the Draw-bridge, where there should be a great balk, laid traverse the Streets,

Against a Scalado.

Against a disguis'd Enemy.

A Spanish Reuter.

Against Waggon & Carts.

Against Petards.

A great piece of Ordnance within a Fort.

Two defences against all Surprizals.

Six things requisite for a Fort against Sieges and Blockades.

Fortification.

Men.

Horfe-men how serviceable in a Siege.

tyed at each end by an Iron Chain to a Post made firm in the ground, and through that balk are great holes bored, through which are pales of Wood made fast, and these sharp at both ends, this denies access to any, either Horle or Foot, till it be open'd. And here likewise should all Waggon and Carts be searched, especially if they seem to be laden with Hay, Straw or Corn, through and in which Halberds should be thrust, for many times under such covers, arm'd men are carry'd in at Ports of fortified places. Neither should any Cart or Waggon be suffer'd to stop on a Draw-bridge, for that is often doner to hinder the drawing it up, till an Enemy lurking not far off, runs to the Port and surprizes it; and in such a case, if the Portcullis (at which, for that purpose there should constantly stand a Sentinel) be not very soon let down, an Enemy may underprop it with strong Forks, shorter or longer, made purposely for that use.

If the Ports of a Town, Castle or Fort, be in the midst of the Curtain, as they should be, and ordinarily are, the Flanks of the nearest Bastions seem sufficient to defend those Ports from Petards, or any other manner of Surprizal; yet some think that long and great pricks of Iron of five or six foot length, fixt in the lower part of the Draw-bridge would do well, that when the Draw-bridge is drawn up, those pricks standing out may hinder Petards to be affix'd, as also that in the upper parts of the Gates and Ports loop-holes be made, pretty wide, out of which may be thrown Stones, Logs of Timber, and Granadoes against the Petardeers, or Water pour'd to quench the Petard, if it be already hung on. There are several other ways to be used against Petards, concerning which I refer you to Engineers and Gunners. But it were good to have within every Port a piece of Ordnance of a large Caliber, constantly charg'd with Cartridges, wherewith to welcome those who first offer to enter, for one of those unexpected Volleys doth often make an Enemy (who in all Surprizals hath the half, if not more, of the fear) retire faster than he advanced. I knew an Enemy who had got over the Walls of a little Town in Germany, without opposition, and had advanced to the Market-place, where receiving not above fifteen or sixteen Musquetades, run over the Walls faster than he enter'd. There be two general ways good against all manner of Surprizals. The one for the defence of Ports, that is, a Raveline before every Port defends it from all manner of Attacks and Enterprizes. The second to defend Curtains and Bulwarks, if the Ditch be dry, a row of Pallisadoes planted in the middle of it, secures the Wall, for these cannot be cut down so soon, but the Guards (unless they be all asleep or drunk) will be sufficiently alarm'd to receive an Enemy: If there be two Moats, and Water in both, a row of Pallisadoes between them secures the place; if there be but one, and Water in it, it should not be full to the brink, for so Boats may easily transport men, but they cannot defend with them, without being heard, and then they may be assured of a shrewd reception. But all this depends on the carefulness and watchfulness of the Guards, on which indeed doth principally depend the security and safety of the place.

To defend Forts against Blockades, or formed Sieges made by Approaches, there be six things requisite; first, the fortification of the place, whether that be by Nature, or by Art, or both; secondly, Men; thirdly, Money; fourthly, Victuals; fifthly, Ammunitions; sixthly, all kind of Arms, Defensive and Offensive, therein comprehending Artillery. The first of these belongs to the Engineer, wherein I have no more skill than to tell my Reader, that he, or any who will study Fortification, will profit more by one lesson taught by word of mouth from an Engineer, than by twenty writ in a Book, and illustrated every one of them by Figures. I shall speak a word or two of every one of the other five necessities for a Fort.

The second requisite is Men, of whom there should be no more nor fewer than are able to maintain it. Horfe-men, if the Siege continue long, prove burthenfome, yet in three cases they may be made useful, first to make Salles, both before and after the Besieger makes his Approaches, till those come so near, that Horfe dare not hazard out; secondly, if there be a void street or interval between the Houses and the Rampart of the Fort, so broad that Horfe-men can ride five or six in breadth, they may be very serviceable to beat an

En-

Enemy out, after he hath come over the Wall confusedly. This Interval all ancient Towns had, and they call'd it *Pomarium*, for they had two of them, one before, or without, and another within the Wall. Thirdly, if the Horfes be called to the Shambles (which in Sieges is no extraordinary case) the Horfe-men may either have a Post given them to defend, or they may be divided among the Foot. When Count *Nauso* (about one hundred and thirty years ago, an Imperial General, born'd *Peronne*, after a great breach made in the Walls of it, he was beat off by the *French Gens d'arms* belonging to the Lord *Florence*, who left their Horfes, and in full Harnets, with Pikes, Partizans and Halberds, maintain'd the breach two hours till they were relieved. And I have seen my self, Horfe-men alight from their Horfes to storm with the Foot. The estimate of the number of the Foot for maintaining a fortified place against a Siege must be taken from the circuit of it: Some will have for every Bulwark of the greater Royal Fortification one thousand Souldiers, and for the lesser Royal eight hundred, meaning still besides the Inhabitants, others four or five hundred Souldiers enough with the Citizens. But since we know not what the number of the Inhabitants will be, such, I mean, as are able to bear Arms, or whether they may be trusted or not, we must cast up our account without them. Some therefore will have for every ten foot of the circumference of the whole Fort six Souldiers, but others think one Souldier enough for two foot, and so five Souldiers for ten foot of ground. If this calculation hold for all the out-works, Counterscarp, and *Fausse bray*, as well as for the Fort it self, then it can hardly be deny'd me, that the whole Infantry of an Army Royal, will be few enough to maintain a lesser Royal Fortification of ten Bastions, commonly call'd a *Dragon*. But let us speak only of the Fort it self, and suppose it to be an *Ohagon*, that is, a Town fortified with eight Bastions, a greater number than which our late Engineers require not in regular Fortifications, though there be some to be seen of ten, some twelve, and some more Bulwarks. We are first to see of how many foot of circumference our *Ohagon* will be. We shall appoint every Curtain of this Fort to be five hundred foot long (an Engineer may make it shorter or longer as he pleaseth) by this account eight Curtains take four thousand foot; every Flank shall have the allowance of one hundred foot, and there being sixteen Flanks in our Fort, they require sixteen hundred foot, for the face of every Bulwark shall be allowed three hundred foot, and there being sixteen faces in the Fort, they must have four thousand eight hundred foot. Add these three numbers 4000, 1600, and 4800, the aggregate will be 10400 foot. Allow then one Souldier to maintain two foot of ground of this Town, you shall need 5200 men. But if you will allow six Souldiers to every ten foot of ground, then you must have 6120 Foot Souldiers to maintain this *Ohagon*, without mentioning any of its Out-works; and how necessary these be, I shall not offer to dispute, since it is certain that the longer an Enemy can be kept from the principal Fort, he is at the greater loss of time, men, munition, and expence, and consequently the longer time is gain'd to the Prince or State, to whom the besieged place belongs, to provide for its relief. But on the other hand, many Out-works require many men to maintain them, many men require much meat, and the shorter time meat lasts, the sooner will the Fort give over: besides, the moulderling away of men in Out-works hugely weakens the defence of the Fort it self. Neither are these Out-works of an old date, if it be true, what Cardinal *Bentivoglio* says, that *Maurice* Prince of *Orange* first added them to Fortification. I dare not believe this, for I suppose it is not above sixty four years since *Maurice* was Captain General of an Army. But if the Inhabitants of this *Ohagon* of ours be the Subjects of the Prince or State for whom the Fort holds out; and more especially, if they be of that same perswasion in matters of Religion with the Garrison Souldiers, then fewer Souldiers will serve, perhaps by half, for those Burgesses within the Walls will fight stoutly for their Wives, Children, Goods and Liberties, which is *pro aris & focis*. But if neither of these be, and that the Citizens are to be mistrusted, the Governour hath to do with a double Enemy, an avow'd and open one without, and a secret, yet a certain one within: And therefore he had need of both more Men, and more strict Watch; neither must he fail to disarm these Inhabitants, and command them, for most part, to keep within doors; but

How many men requisite to maintain ten foot of ground.

How many requisite to defend an *Ohagon*.

Outer-works.

Of the Inhabitants of a Fort.

How Musket-  
teers should  
fire from a  
Parapet.

Money.

Great use for  
Iron Sieges.A Governour  
may borrow  
from the In-  
habitants.

Ammunition.

Arms.

Louis de Mont-  
gomery's his-  
tory.

but in such cases Cittadels are ordinary. These Fortresses, that are by nature strong, as situated on a Hill, or flanked with some inaccessible and steep Rocks, or helped by the nearness of some River or Marsh, besides their artificial Fortification, will need by a great deal, fewer men, and so be defended at a far less expence. The number of these Souldiers I spoke of is to be reckon'd without Officers, neither are you to imagine, that in storm or assault all the Souldiers are to be drawn up in one Rank or row, on the Bulwarks or the Curtains; for at that rate, two foot being allowed to every man, none of them should have room to handle their Arms; neither should their giving fire be successfull as it should be. In time of storm Souldiers appointed for the guard of a Post should be drawn up three deep, or in three Ranks, that when one Rank hath given fire over the Parapet, it may defend, and the second mount the Foot-bank, and after it the third.

The third thing requisite for a besieged place is Money, and so long as there is Money to pay the Garrison, and meat and drink to buy for that Money, the publick Magazines of Proviant should not be touched, and for this reason many Governours cause Brads to be coyned, some Leather, and order it to pass for currant Money, engaging thereafter to give good coyn for it: So did *Tyrus*, Marshal of France, forty years ago, when he was besieged in *Casal*, by the famous Marquis *Spinola*. Yet a Governour should always reserve, if he can, a stock of Money unpent for all accidents, as knowing the difficulties of the Siege will encrease with time: for though loyalty, duty, reputation, good words, and hopes, prevail frequently with Souldiers to stand out against all hardships and difficulties manfully, yet, as the French say, *Argent fait tout*, Money doth all. Intelligence is bought with Money, fellows will be hir'd with Money to go through the strictest, closest, and best guarded approaches, and this is ordinarily done in time of a Sally made for that purpose; and if the Intelligence have agreed with the Governour concerning the precise time of his return, another Sally is made for his reception. At the time of a desperate Sally, at the reparation of a dangerous breach, at the work of Retrenching in time of a furious Cannonade, or when an Assault is assuredly expected, a largess of Money, with large promises of more, hath a wonderful influence upon the hearts of Souldiers. Nor should a Governour spare, in time of want, to borrow from the Inhabitants; for if they be disaffected, he may force them to lend, and if they be friends, it will not be time for them to hoard up their Moneys, when they are in danger to lose all, as the unhappy *Constantinopolitans* did when Sultan *Mahomet* took their City by assault.

The fourth and fifth things requisite for a Garrison are Munitions of War, and Arms. Powder, Match and Ball should be frugally husbanded, or freely spent, according to the quantity and store, wherewith the Fort is provided: It should not be lavished away in the beginning of the Siege, nor should it be spared in the time of Zaps, Batteries, Galleries and Assaults, but no needless waste should be made of it in all or any of these; for this purpose a considerable Magazine of Ammunitions should be put in all Forts, especially in frontier Garrisons, where the attack of an Enemy is soonest expected; for many times to supply this want, great hazzards are run to convoy Horse men into the besieged place, who carry leather bags full of Powder on the croups of their Horses. Our Fort should likewise be provided with all manner of Arms, Defensive and Offensive, Pikes, Half-Pikes, Halberds, Partizans, two-handed Swords, Hang-mens Swords, Morning-Stars, with all manner of Fire-works and Hand-Grana-does, for resisting a storm, against which there should be prepared also huge balks and logs of Timber, tyed to Posts with Ropes or Chains, to let fall over, and pull up again: for these (as likewise a great number of greater and lesser Stones) do good service in time of Assaults, when an Enemy is mounting either the Curtain or Bulwark, and cannot be reach'd by shot unless from the Flanks, which for most part are made useless by the Enemies Cannon before the Assault. We read, even since the invention of Powder, what use our Ancestors made of molten Lead, scalding Water, and boyl'd Oyl in time of Assaults, at which *Louis de Montgomery* in his French Milce makes good sport, and says, the Defendants had as good throw handfuls of Ashes at their Enemies: But I am not thing of his opinion; for though experience were silent, both reason and sense do

do teach us, that Fire doth more hurt than Ashes, and is not burning fire in all these I speak of? Scalding Water no question doth mischief, and may be us'd with no other expence than fire, but Lead and Oyl are chargeable, and may, I think, be employ'd for better and more proper uses.

The sixth and last, but not the least requisite and necessary thing for a besieged place is Munitions for the mouth, without which all the rest signifie nothing. What several provisions of meats and drinks (presupposing there be Water enough in the Fort) are necessary for a Garrison, I have told you in the eighth Chapter, where I have discour'd of Proviant. The question is now, what quantity of them should be stored up in a Garrison that apprehends a Siege. There be some who think that six months provision is enough, and of these *Louis de Montgomery* is one, because, say they, in that time either the Winter season will force the Besieger to remove, or the relief of the place will be attempted by him to whom it belongs. But we have seen in our own times the contrary of both, though we had never heard of the Siege of *Troy*. Others speak of three years provision, and this doth well; but the Governour when he is not besieged, should every year lay in one years fresh provisions, causing the Souldiers to eat and pay for that which is oldest. I believe none will deny but a Garrison should be provided with meat and drink for one whole year at least: And no sooner should a provident Governour foresee or apprehend a Siege (whereof he may have many grounds for a probable conjecture) but he should command all the Inhabitants to provide themselves of a whole years food and maintenance, that his publick stores may be preserv'd for the Souldiery, and all Citizens who are either unable or unwilling to do so, as also all unnecessary people should be commanded to remove out of the Town or Fort.

But after a place is invested, and the Siege formed, if I say, I think, an act of inhumanity to thrust out the Inhabitants, especially if they have not had time to provide themselves, yea, I think, it is more merciful to cut their throats within, than to send them out; for it is not to be thought that an Enemy will suffer them to pass, but will force them back to the Town-Ditches, where they may lamentably languish and starve to death. Such an action as this, in my opinion was an eternal blemish to the reputation of *Monluc*, that famous Marshal of France, who, after *Sienna* (whereof he was Governour) had been strictly besieged, shut out of the City four thousand Inhabitants, Men and Women, young and old: The Marquis of *Martignan*, who commanded the Emperours and *Cesro di Medici's* forces, caused all these miserable wretches to be chased back to the Ditches; *Monluc* would receive none of them within the Town: Some lusty strong fellows broke through *Martignan's* Trenches, and escap'd; many Women and Maids were privately (contrary to the Marquis's command) taken into Tents and Huts, to satiate the lust of the *Spaniards*; but there dyed of them of meer hunger near three thousand. Upon this woful occasion the same *Monluc* in his Commentaries hath this expression: *These are, says he, the mercilefs laws of War, we must be many times cruel to disappoint our Enemies: God be merciful to us for doing so great mischief.* Indeed he had reason to cry for Gods mercy for committing so horrible a wickedness. But in what *Cadex* did he read of such a Law of War? Nay, where did he hear of such a custom of War? Strange it was in him to expel and expose those to a mercilefs death, whom he nor none else had appointed to provide for a Siege, and whom he might have expell'd before the Siege was form'd, that they might have shifted for themselves, or begg'd through Italy for bread. If ever there was a precedent for this, it was not to be imitated by one who professed the name of Christ. And that which made this action of his altogether inexcusable was, that he expected no succours, for after he was forc'd to yield the Town, wherein many of those Citizens whom he permitted to stay, were consum'd with Famine, and the remnant of his Souldiers so hunger-starved that they look'd like Skeletons: He confesseth in the first Tome of his Commentaries, That he could never think of what he did, but with a sad affliction of spirit for his folly, (he should have said, vanity and arrogance) in reducing that noble City, and his own Souldiery, to the last morsel of Bread; and submitting them to the mercy of an incensed Enemy, when he knew well enough that his Master, *Henry the Second of France*, was neither

Munitions for  
the mouth.For how long  
time a Town  
should be  
provided  
with meat  
and drink.Citizens to  
provide a  
years meat.A mercilefs  
act of Marshal  
Monluc.And at once  
another in-  
cuse:

neither able to relieve him at that time, nor desirous he should bring himself and the City to those extremities.

*Brifac.* Reimach, Governour of *Brifac*, in the year 1638, had a great deal more reason to keep out that strong Town to the very last against the Duke of Weimar, since he knew his master the Emperour, would use all means under Heaven to relieve a place that was of so great a concern to the house of *Austria*, yet did he shut no Inhabitants out of it, after it was beleig'd. This *Brifac*, for the famine it suffer'd during that Siege, was an Epitome of the miseries of *Samarina* and *Jerusalem* in the *Holy Land*; and of *Sancerre* and *Rochel* in *France*. *Cesar* in his *Gullick* Wartells us, with a great abhorrency of the fact, That when he had reduced *Vercingetorix* and his *Gauls* to great want within *Alfia*, at a Council held by the beleiged, one of the prime men among them propos'd, that all the old and unserviceable people of the Town should be kill'd, and prefer'd for food to those who were able to work and fight. But the provisions for the belly, be they great or small, should be sparingly measur'd out after the publick store-houses are once broke up. To what I have said of things requisite and necessary for beleiged places, I shall add the care that should be taken for the sick and the wounded, for which Apothecaries Shops and Chyrurgions Chests should be well furnished, for curing both ticknesses and wounds; for the inspection whereof some skilful Physicians should be entertain'd.

Physicians, Apothecaries, and Chyrurgions requisite.

A Governour of a Fortress;

A notional description of him.

The real qualifications he should have.

A Coward a fit Governour.

Our fortified place, be it never so strong, is but a dead body till men be put into it, and then we may say it hath living members, whereof *Victuals* are the nutriment, and *Munitions of War, Arms, and Moneys* shall be the supporters. In this Body, to make it serviceable to the Prince, who is the Creator of it, a Rational Soul must be infused, and that Soul shall be called the Governour: And of him I may say; almost, as I said in another place of a Captain General, that such a Governour, as many in their Discourses, and some in their Writings describe, is to be found in no Countrey unless it be in *Utopia*; or to be read in any Books except *Romances*. He must, say they, have an universal knowledge of Fortification and Gunnery, he must be very wise, of a ready judgement, and a great memory, he should be affable and courteous; yet severe, eloquent, vigilant, sober, temperate, religious, loyal above measure, courageous, and indefatigable. This seems to be enough, but there must be more, he must be an old experienced Captain, and one who hath given good proof that he can both take and defend fortified places. This is a very strange proof, for if a man be not admitted to be a Governour of a frontier Town, or a Royal Fortification, unless he have formerly well defended some Fort or Cattle of lesser importance.

The truth is, much of the safety of the place depends on the Governour, and therefore he should be no Novice in Military affairs; but for all that, he should not be an old man, for age wastes that natural vigour which is requir'd in a man of his charge, and makes him unable for that fatigue which he is oblig'd to undergo. As to his experience, I think it is enough if he have been at two or three Sieges, and within one or two beleiged places, provided he be of a quick apprehension and judgement, for such a one will learn more at one fight than others will do at twenty. He should understand the general rules of Fortification and Gunnery, he should be of a jocund and joyful humour; for when Souldiers who are beleiged look on their Governour, and see him fullen, who perhaps naturally is so, they fancy he is conscious of some defects, weakness, or danger, whereof they know nothing. He should be very courageous, and though he be bound to save himself from all needless dangers, yet in assaults he should not be shy to expose his person to the most eminent perils; for his presence doth exceedingly animate those who are hazarding their lives in that piece of service. If this be true, as I believe it is, then those are mistaken, who think a Coward a fit person to be a Governour, because his constant fear will make him constantly vigilant, but to what purpose his vigilance, when two or three hours Battery of Cannon shall terrifie him to a surrender? An opiniator our Governour should not be, but ready both to seek and follow the advice of his

his Captains, Engineers, and Gunners; and yet of that judgement, that he may of himself conclude the advice that is given him to be rational. It is fitting he have two or three or more Engineers with him, for ordering Retrenchments, and inventing new Defences, Engines and Machines, according to the emergencies of the Siege. Good Gunners and Cannoneers he should have in the Fort, who have skill to make Batteries, Counter-batteries, and sunk Batteries, and to dismount the Enemies Ordnance. And if there be more Regiments than one in the Garrison, it were fit the Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels and Majors, were men of good understanding and experience, that if either the Governour, or any of them chance to dye (which frequently falls out) those who succeed to them by their antiquity or priority of place, may be endued with those qualifications that are lauitable to their trust and charge.

Being satisfisd with the qualifications of the Governour, and those who are to assist him, let us in the next place take a view of those duties he owes, and is bound to perform in the time of a Siege. Before the danger be near, he should destroy all the Suburbs (for those are the Cut-throats of Fortresses) all Mills, Houses of pleasure, Trees, Yards, Gardens, Barns, Enclosures, Hedges, or any thing else, under, or by which he conceives an Enemy may be shelter'd, or make his Approaches more easie. And this he should do betimes, that before an Enemies arrival all within two hundred paces of the Counter-carp, may be an *Esplanad*; for truly when the besieging Army advanceth near the Town, I know not what good it is, or can do, to burn houses, which indeed is quickly done, but the Walls of those Houses standing, gives as good and as easie shelter, though not so good an accommodation, as the Houses did. Next, the Governour is to divide all his men into several Posts, allowing for many to the defence of each, according to the strength or weakness of the place, changing nightly if he can, for fear of Treachery: withal, he should keep a strong Reserve constantly in the Market-place, to make use of as he shall think fit to give direction. At the beginning of the Siege he is to discharge all private Parleys and Discourses with those who are without; some discharge all Songs and Whistlings, the striking of Clocks, and ringing of Bells, that thereby no secret signs or advertizements formerly agreed on, may be given. He is bound to spare his Souldiers from toyl and fatigue as much as possibly he may; and it is well if he can order the matter so that they may watch one day, work the second, and rest the third.

If the Governour have Horse in his Garrison, when the Enemy advanceth towards it, he may send them out, with foot behind to sustain them, to make some light skirmishes, and to bring back with them Prisoners, if they can. But before the Approaches be advanc'd, so long as an Enemy is fresh, and in great Bodies, Sallies do him small or no hurt, and the loss of one man of the beleiged doth the Governour more hurt and prejudice, than the loss of ten can do the Besieger. Sallies are necessary then, when they are undertaken to hinder the making, or the finishing of a Battery; or if made, to ruine it, or to hinder the progress of a Zap, or to nail Ordnance or Mortars. Sallies should be resolutely made, and the Retreat from them orderly: In the time of them, the Ordnance from the Baffions of the Town should play lustily upon the Approaches where the Sallies are not, and over all the Approaches upon the Fields, to hinder succour to come from the leaguer or quarters; and feints made at other Ports of the Town, as if the Besiegers were to Sally out of them likewise.

Those who Sally, will not do well to amuse themselves with taking many Prisoners, one or two may serve their turn, to bring to the Governour to give him intelligence; and those they take should be but common Souldiers, for they will be more apt to tell what they know than others of better quality; nor is it to be imagin'd, that those will be taken in the Approaches, who are upon the Generals Secrets, unless it be very accidentally. What Prisoners you carry into a beleiged place, you must resolve to entertain them (for back you must not send them) and guard them, that they escape not, this will be both burthenfome and troublesome to you, and to allow them no maintenance is inhumanity: And this was the Governour of *Brifac*'s fault, for which he was like to pay dear, as you may hear in the next Chapter. If by a Sally the Besiegers be beat out of a Battery, the Pieces of

Engineers and Gunners.

Duties of a Governour.

To make all plain without the Fort.

To divide it in several Posts.

To discharge private Parleys.

To spare the Souldiers from unnecessary toil.

Sallies.

When necessary.

To take few Prisoners at Sallies.

Ordnance

What is to be done in the time of a Sal-ly.

Ordnance and Mortars that are in it, should be immediately cloy'd and nail'd; or if the Salliers have some time to put Powder under the platform, or a train with a burning match to the Powder Chamber, which is ordinarily beside the *Appareil*, it may much endanger and endamage the Besiegers, when they return to repelless their Battery. But a careful Enemy having Reserves to attend all accidents, many times pursues the Salliers so furiously in their Retreat, that the Besieged are forc'd to shut their Gates against their own people; therefore it were not amiss to have Ladders at the Counterfarp, whereby they may descend to the Ditch, if it be dry, and so get into the *Cafemates*; but these are for most part left out in our latest Fortifications, I know not for what reason; or if there be Water in the Moats, in that case little Boats may receive those Souldiers that cannot enter at the Sally Port. In all, or any of these Sal-lies, the Governour ought not to hazzard his person, or offer to stir out of his Fort, let the pretence be never so specious or plausible. I know many gallant men have done it, to their irrecoverable loss.

A Governour not to fall.

A Retrenchment,

What it is.

Called a Countermure.

Great celerity.

What to be done at a storm.

Private cap- tulation be- tween a Prince and a Governour of a Fort.

When a Governour perceives where an Enemy intends to batter, or to lodge, whether it be in Curtain or Bulwark, he is oblig'd immediately to begin a Retrenchment behind the place aim'd at; but for all that, he is to dispute that Curtain or Bulwark, or any part of them to the uttermost; he must defend it to extremity, by Sallies, Counter-batteries, by sinking Cannon to destroy the Galleries, and by Counter-mines to blow up those who lodge in the breaches; and if he must quit it, he is to do it by inches. But all this while the Governour is busie working at the Retrenchment, that when he is forc'd to part with that for which he hath fought so well, he may retire his men to his Countermure, where the Besiegers shall have a new work to begin. A Retrenchment is a new line, as regularly drawn, and fortified with Flanks, as the conveniency of the place may permit: It is made up of stone, earth, rubbish, boards, balks and planks, feather-beds, woollen or straw sacks, dung, or what can be had, whereof store should be provided before hand. If there be ground enough for it between the Rampart and the Town it is well; if not, as many Houses, owe them who will, must be pull'd down, as may serve the turn. The Ancients used these Retrenchments frequently, and call'd them *Countermures*: The *Germans* call them *Abfuid*, that is, a cutting off; because by it they cut off the rest of the Fort from that part the Enemy hath taken. Many times they are made in a very short time, and so they may in a Town where no serviceable Creature is exempted from work, young nor old, man nor woman; except whom childhood or old age, or sickness excuseth. Yet, I think, that which *Momuc* writes concerning a Retrenchment is very strange: He says, he was in *Henry* the Second of France his time, with the Count of *Brisac*, at the Siege of a Castle in *Piedmont*, called *Courteville*, where by a continued Battery of twelve hundred shot of Cannon in the space of twenty four hours, the Wall was so beat down that the *French* went to storm, which when they did, they saw opposit to them a Countermure as strong as the Wall, made up in the time of the Battery. Yet *Momuc* by his own relation, took longer time himself to make a Retrenchment at *Sienna*, where he had a great deal of more hands to work than can be imagin'd could be got in any Castle of *Piedmont*.

But if after all this care, diligence, and noble behaviour of the Governour and his Garrison, the Besiegers shall give a general storm to the Fort, the Governour and all his Souldiery having made preparation before-hand for a gallant resistance, he and they are to carry themselves so manfully in the Assault that the Enemy may be beat off; but if that cannot be, he and his Garrison may either dye like men, or if they be taken Prisoners, they may out-live their misfortune with honour and reputation.

Next to that of a Captain General, there is not a more ticklish charge in the whole Military employment, or that requires more caution in accepting, than this of a Governour; for on his good and happy, or bad or misfortunate deportment depends the Prince his service, his own reputation, the welfare or ruine of the place, or perhaps the whole Country where the Fortress is situated: and therefore a person of honour should be shy to engage in it; or if the obedience he owes to the absolute command of his Prince, or his General, force him to accept

accept

accept it, he should do it on conditions secretly agreed on, to which few or none but the Prince or his General should be privy. The conditions may be suppos'd to be such as these which follow.

If the place be well fortified, after either the ancient or later way of Fortification, and well provided with men, and all those other necessary things formerly mention'd, the Governour may oblige himself, so long as his Ammunition and Victuals hold out, to maintain it to the last drop of his blood, without any other conditions. But if there be any defect in these or any of these, then the private conditions should be; First, How long he shall be bound to hold out. Secondly, If he shall reject all summons and all proffers, till the Enemy hath fully form'd his Siege, and invested the Fort. Thirdly, If he shall hearken to no agreement, till the Enemy make his Approaches, and begin to make Batteries; for you are to observe, the Governour is to expect worse conditions after the Cannon hath play'd than before. Fourthly, If he shall endure the Battery, Zap and Mine, and all this to give time for the Prince or his General to gather forces for the relief of the Fort. Fifthly, If the Governour shall be obliged to hold out one storm, and then capitulate, or more than one; for you are still to imagine, that the nearer the Enemy draws to him, the worse conditions will be offer'd him. Sixthly, How soon he may expect a succour after the Siege is form'd, that accordingly he may take his measures, and to save Men and Munition, may protract and gain time by counterfeited Parleys (a thing excellently well practis'd by Sir *James Ranfay* at the Siege of *Hanaw*, 1636 and -37.) in seeming to accept some offer'd conditions, but to require others which he knows will not be granted; but he must still be sure not to treat in earnest, till some days after the expiration of the time of the promised relief agreed on in the private capitulation between the Prince or his General, and the Governour. Seventhly, If the promised succour come not at the appointed time, as being hinder'd by those insurmountable difficulties which could not be foreseen; whether then the Governour may not accept of Articles, and by giving over the Fort, save his Masters Artillery, Arms, Ammunitions and Victuals; and if this cannot be granted him, whether he may not by the loss of some of these, or all of these, save the lives of his Garrison, by the best accord he can make? And lastly, The Prince or his General should exactly condescend and agree with the Governour what Dumb Intelligence shall be given by signs by either party, that both may understand how all these foregoing transactions will be, or will not be performed, and what tokens shall be given in the day time and what in the night; as suppose so many shot of great Guns either in the day time or the night, shall signifie such a thing; a great smoke made at such a place in the day time shall intimate such and such a matter; three, four or five shot of Cannon made at such an hour of the night, or a Lantern with many lights let down so many times in the night time from a high Steeple shall denote the wants within the Fort, or perhaps the number of weeks and days the Governour is able to hold out; one, two, or three Fires made at such a distance without, shall let the Governour know such and such things. They should likewise agree concerning Intelligence to be sent in or out by word of mouth or Letters: The last should be writ in Cyphers, a Copy whereof both General and Governour should have: The first should be such language as the Messenger himself should not understand the meaning or sense of it. In the punctual observation of all these the General and Governour should be very wary and attentive.

But in my Discourse of Intelligence, I told you how dangerous it is to trust to any Intelligence, that by word of mouth may be reveal'd to an Enemy either by the Treachery, or the confession (press'd out by torture) of him who carries it. That by Letters may be reveal'd by the carriers fear or falsehood, and the Cyphers opened with a Key, or they may be betray'd by the Secretaries who wrote them. Next, a great persons subscription may be counterfeited, in which art some are very expert; neither is there any hurt in it, so they make not a bad use of their skill, and a Prince or a Generals Seal may be taken from some old Pass, and clapp'd to a new Paper. This was practis'd in the time of *Francis* the First, King of France, at the Siege of *Saint Disier* on the *Marne*, where the Emperour *Charles* the Fifth was in person: Here the Count of *San-*

The supposed conditions of it.

First.

Second-ly.

Third.

Fourth.

Fifth.

Sixth.

Counterfeit Parleys.

Seventh.

Eighth.

Dumb Intelligence.

Letters dangerous.

counterfeited Letters.

A faithful and cunning Messenger may do much good in a Siege.

Influence.

Letters reveal'd to an Enemy.

To yield on Articles.

cerre was cheated to a surrender of the place (which he had defended a long time with much honour and valour) by a Letter feign'd to be sent from *Claud Duke of Guise*, the French Kings Lieutenant General, whose subscription was handsomely counterfeited, and his Seal taken from an old Paper, and put on the Letter; all contriv'd by *Grannell*, President of the Emperours Council, who gain'd, with much Gold, a French-man to carry this Letter in the foal of his shoe, into the Town. This French fellow was as much Fool as Knave, who did not reveal the whole matter to *Sancerre*, from whom he might likewise have receiv'd Gold enough. But a trusty and faithful Messenger may be sent into, or out of a besieged place, and go straight to an Enemy, and seem to reveal all he knows, and give up the Letters he carries, (which should contain no truth) and by that means carry his Letter of importance safely as he is directed, seeming to do the Enemy service; but here cunning should be added to fidelity; and men of that Caliber are rare; yet the *Rochellers* met with one of them who adventur'd to cheat a no less person than Cardinal *Richelieu*, and did it. A Gentleman of *Anjou* offer'd to the Duke of *Soubise*, to enter into *Rochel* (then besieged) and reduc'd to the last extremity) and bring him certain news of the Towns condition. He went straight to the Cardinal (with whom he had gain'd some trust) and told him what he had undertaken: this great States-man permitted him to slip into the Town, provided he should show him his Letters at his return, which he promis'd; having done his business in the City, he came back to the Cardinal, and deliver'd him the Towns Letters, written purposely that this Great Minister might read them, who took some pains to open and seal them again handsomely, and bid the Gentleman carry them to *Soubise*; who went and deliver'd to the Duke a hidden Letter, which told him the true condition of the City, and that was, That it could not hold out above two days without succour, or all must dye for hunger.

If signs by fire, smoke, or shot of Cannon be not agreed on before the place be invested, it will be very dangerous to do it afterwards by Letters, for these may be intercepted, or betrayed. The last whereof befel two illustrious Brothers, both of them great Captains, those were *Maurice* and *Henry*, Princes of *Orange*, both of them egregiously cheated by a Country Clown. *Maurice* entrusts him with Letters to *Justin* of *Nassau*, Governour of *Breda*, when it was besieged round by *Marquis Spinola*; the fellow undertook to deliver the Letter, and bring the Governours answer, and so he did, but not till *Spinola* had read both, the first before he enter'd, and the second after he came out of the Town, who thereby came to the knowledge of all their secrets; the Rogue was well rewarded by both parties. But after *Maurice* his death, this Bore resolves to serve his Brother, Prince *Henry*, in the same fashion, and to that end seem'd to be gain'd with much difficulty, and by much Gold, to carry the Prince his last Letters to the Governour: *Henry* wrote to him, that it was then purely impossible to raise the Siege, and desir'd him at midnight to discharge three pieces of Ordnance, and that thereafter by several fires on the great Steeple, he should let him know how many days his Victuals would hold out. The Intelligencer went straight to *Spinola*, who having read the Letter, and handsomely seal'd it up, dispatch'd the faithful messenger to the Governour, who at the prefixed time made his three shots, and by eleven signs made by fire, let the Prince know he was able to subsist no longer than eleven days; which *Spinola* did as punctually observe as the Prince of *Orange* did. In the time of that same Siege, at a Sally, a German Souldier was taken by the Count of *Isemburg*, who treated his Country-man so well, that the fellow undertook to return to the Town, and come back to the Spanish Camp when the Victuals of the besieged City grew scarce, which he did; and thereby *Spinola* had likewise a fair help given him how to take his measures.

If all endeavours, and all hopes fail, and that inexorable necessity force the Governour to yield, let him do it on the most honourable and advantageous terms he can; and let him be sure to have his Articles sign'd by him who commands in chief; and if he can obtain it, let him get Hostages of quality sent to some neighbour Garrison, to lye there till all conditions agreed on be performed. Of Articles I shall speak in the next Chapter.

But

But if there be small, or no hopes of succours, it will not be fit for a Governour to bring things to the last extremity, or stand out, where he cannot probably hope to resist; for that exposeth his men to Butchery, a thing very unacceptable to God, and prejudicial to his Masters service. It is needless to illustrate this with examples, story is full of them, and we have seen the practice of it in our own days. The Imperial Lieutenant General, Count *Tili*, finding *New Brandenburg* (an inconsiderable Town) obstinately defended by Major General *Kniphausen*, and his Swedish Garrison; did at the storm forbid all quarter (though he was known to be merciful enough) and after he had carried the Town by Assault, he told the Governour who was then Prisoner, That he could not use him worse than send him to his Master, the King of *Sweden*, who, he thought, was oblig'd in Justice to hang him, for losing him so many gallant men, by his vanity and arrogant resistance. And truly, I think, to put a few men in an obscure place, or a Castle of a mean Fortification, and command them to stand out against a well appointed Army, or that which ordinarily passeth under the name of an Army Royal, is to send them directly to the Shambles; for what General will suffer himself to be so affronted, and not revenge it? When the French King, *Francis* the First, march'd into *Italy* with a mighty Army, the Governour of a little ill fortified Castle in *Piedmont*, called *Polane*, made a Sally, and kill'd and plunder'd some French Baggage-men: The Castle is summon'd, and refusing to yield on honest conditions, it is invested, and forc'd to render on mercy, whereof they found but little in that severe Constable *Anne de Montmorency*, who caused the poor Governour, and his Garrison, to be hang'd every mothers son. Another Castle held out against *Charles* the Fifth, when he retir'd to *Italy*, out of *Provence*, but being forc'd to yield, the Garrison receiv'd the like usage, every man of it being forc'd to end his life on a Gallows.

Yet sometimes the condition of the War, and the circumstances of it require, that a Governour and his Garrison should rather fight to death, than accept of any agreement, and this is when time must be given for gathering or joyning of forces; or in a Retreat, to give a stop to an Enemies furious pursuit; and this *Ratio Belli* in such cases, hath *Ratio Physica* in the belly of it, for it is nothing else but Amputation, by cutting one member off to save the whole Body.

On the other hand, to give over a fortified place without a Noble, and Souldier-like resistance, is a crime which comes near to that of Treason; for it is indeed *Tradere urbem in potestatem Hostis*. To betray the Town into the power of the Enemy. And as it was with the Ancients, so it is yet punishable with shameful death. *Montau* tells us in his Commentaries, that *Don Arbre*, a Spanish Colonel, caus'd a Captain to be hang'd at the Bridge of *Asturia*, a Town in *Piedmont*, without Process or hearing him, for giving over a Castle without an Assault; and he says, he knew the like severity us'd to others for crimes of that nature. In the year 1632. *Gustavus Adolphus* took a Town in *Bavaria* called *Reene*, in two days time, and left a Colonel to be Governour there, who was besieged shortly after, and kept out the Town eight days: But because the King his Master thought he had given it over too soon, he caus'd his head to be struck from his Shoulders. In the year 1636. *Jane Druerth*, and some other Imperial and Spanish Generals, destroyed a great deal of *Picardy*, and burnt many Villages; at that time the Governour of *Chasteler* having abundance of all things requisite to hold out a Siege, basely gave it over, and though he sav'd himself by flight, yet was he by the French Kings command, hang'd in effigie. *Corvey*, a very strong place, was also cowardly given over to the Spaniards, who put a Garrison into it, the Governour whereof deliver'd it back to the French sooner than he need'd; for which, so soon as he came to the first Town of *Artois*, where there was a Garrison, he was commanded to alight from his Horse, kneel at the Port, and without other Process, had his Head struck off by the hand of a Hangman. I remember that in the year 1637. the Swedish Felt-Marshall *Banier* garrison'd the strong Castle of *Luneburg*, which Castle they call'd *Kalkberg*, and appointed one Colonel *Stammerto* be Governour of it, who not

Obstinacy in defending Forts hurtful.

Especially those of small importance.

Influences.

Yet sometimes *Ratio Belli* requires it.

To give over with small, or no resistance, punishable with death.

Influences.

long

long after yielded it to the Duke of *Luneburg* without resistance; pretending for his vindication to a Court of War, that his Conscience would not permit him to occasion so much blood to be shed, as he knew would be spilt, if he offer'd to defend the Castle: But the Court made no scruple of Conscience to pass a sentence of Death upon him; which by *Baniar's* command, was executed at *Stein*, by cutting off his Head, as finding the Colonels Conscience dangerously and ridiculously misled by an erroneous Judgement.

A Question  
started.

Having discours'd thus far of the Defence of Towns and Forts, I shall tell my Reader, that some are pleas'd upon this subject to start a question, which is this, Whether all places which Princes and States intend to maintain with Garrisons, should be fortified *a-la-Modern*, that is, according to the Modern Art of Fortification, with Curtains, Gorges, Faces, and Flanks of Bulwarks, Fausse brays, Ditches, Countercarps, and Out-works? Or if a place fortified *a l'antique*, or the ancient manner, may without prejudice be kept and defended, as it is? There be reasons *pro* and *con*. But some judicious persons, who have observ'd the practice of our Modern Wars in *Europe* these sixty years by-past; especially in the long *German* War, where many Forts were taken and re-taken, where many places only fortified in the ancient way, remain'd inexpugnable, notwithstanding obstinate Sieges form'd against them, having in them but small Garrisons of Souldiers, assisted by stout and resolute Inhabitants; whereas other places of great importance, fortified with all the new inventions of Art, have either suddenly been taken by force, or soon brought to surrender on Articles. I say, they doubt not to averr, That a Town which hath a strong Stone Wall, (observe here, that the hardest Stone is soonest breach'd) with Towers at a convenient distance one from another, with dry and deep Ditches; a good and firm Counter-scarp, without any Out-works (wherein men are irrecoverably lost, to the great prejudice of the Fort) this Town, defended by a resolute and indifferently well experienced Governour, seconded by stout and valiant Souldiers and Burgeses, though not very numerous, may make as good and as long, if not a stouter and longer resistance, than a Town fortified *a-la-modern*, *ceteris paribus*, that is, the one being provided as well as the other, with Meat, Money, Munition, Arms and Artillery. It is true, those Round Towers built on the Wall, in the ancient manner, cannot be well Flanked; but to that it is answer'd, that they do much hurt in Approaches, and are not batter'd down, but with a vast expence of Powder and Bullet; as also, that the Faces of the Modern Bulwarks, which take up much more than the third part of the whole Fortification, have no other Defences but from the second Flanks, and those are not very considerable.

Answered.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XXVI.

### Of Prisoners, Parleys, Treaties, and of Articles, in our Modern Wars.

IN those Battels, Retreats, Sieges and Defence of Towns, whereof we have spoken in the four preceding Chapters; there have been, no doubt, many Prisoners, many Parleys and Treaties made, and many Articles sign'd, and therefore it is fit to speak something of them. In the twenty third Chapter of my Discourses of the *Roman* Art of War, I have shewn you the manner of them among the Ancients; between which, and that us'd in the Modern War, we shall not find very essential differences. And first we shall speak of Prisoners.

Imprisonment is one of those seven external afflictions, which learned men say follow the humane nature, and may befall every particular man, how great soever he be. Emperours and Kings, yea, our Blessed Saviour, as he was Man, was not exempted from it. Men are made Prisoners, for crimes, for debts, and by chance of War; and it is of these I nam'd last, whereof I now discourse. How those should demean or comfort themselves, I leave to the directions of the Divine or Moral Philosopher; only I shall say this, and perhaps may averr it to be true, That if Souldiers would accustom themselves to be sometimes alone, and learn to enjoy themselves without other company, and have those meditations they ought to have of their own mortal and uncertain condition, they would endure Imprisonment with greater patience, than those can, who when they are at liberty, cannot live without society and company; for he who can live pleasantly and contentedly alone, will find a Prison easie enough, if no other affliction be added to it.

We may divide all Prisoners of War into two Classes, of those who are taken without any previous Treaty, and those who have Articles. The first Class we may sub-divide into those who have quarter verbally promis'd them, and those who submit to the mercy of the Victor. Of all these, and each of these, I shall say one word in general, that though quarter be promis'd by inferior Officers or Souldiers, or that the vanquish'd hoping for mercy, yield without any such promise, he who commands in chief (provided he be on the place) may put all those Prisoners to the Sword; for quarter given by the Inferiour signifies nothing till it be confirm'd by him who commands on the place, and then the Prisoners have quarter. That chief Commander may order them all to be kill'd, without any imputation of breach of Faith or Justice, as not being tyed by any promise his inferiour hath made; and this he may do by the Law of War, and that is grounded on the law and custome of Nations; and if you will believe *Cyrus*, and the *Athenians*, it is grounded on the Law of Nature, by which Prisoners of War may be us'd as the Victor pleaseth. And *Grotius* says, *In Captivos quicquam impune fieri, et Captivos Jure Belli occidi possunt*. Suppose still, that no quarter hath been promis'd by him who commands in chief on the place. But though, I say, a General may do this by the Law of War, yet he cannot do it without the imputation of horrible cruelty and inhumanity, except in some cases. And though *Jure Belli* they may be kill'd, yet without invincible reasons, to kill men in cold blood is not the part of a man; for they call up their account, that the bitterness of death is past, and therefore they should not be put to death, unless he who inflicts it, can produce as good a warrant for it, as he could who hewed the King of the *Amalekites* in pieces, after *Saul* had given him quarter. The Heathen *Tacitus* could say, *Trucidare deditos sevos*; It is cruelty to kill those who submit. Yet you will see anon that Christian Prisoners of War have been put to death in cold blood by Christian

Imprisonment.

Prisoners of War,  
Divided into  
two Classes.

What a General may do  
with Prisoners of War.

Cruelty to kill  
Prisoners in  
cold blood.



Christian Princes and Generals, without any other Authority for their so doing, than what the Law of War gave them.

But after Quarter is confirmed or granted by the General, the question is, Whether upon the emergency of three several accidents, they may not be put to the Sword? The first is, if an Enemy rally after a Battle is won, and make, or offer to make a fierce onset, the victorious Army not being so strong to oppose the charge and guard the Prisoners, from whom also danger is to be expected; This was *Henry the fifth of England's* case at *Agencourt*, where, for the same reasons, 6000 *French* Prisoners by his order were in an instant put to the Sword.

Whether Prisoners may not be killed after Quarter given them by the General. In three cases.

*Froissard* passionately relates to us the sad fate of about one thousand *French* men, who were taken Prisoners, and had fair quarter given them by *John King of Portugal*, in a battle that he fought with one of his own name, King of *Castile*: the story was briefly this, The King of *Castile* having a just pretence to the Crown of *Portugal*, (to which in hatred of the *Castilians*, the *Portuguese* had advanced a *Baltard*) invades *Portugal* with a great Army, in which were many *French* Auxiliaries: The *Portuguese* King being reinforced with a considerable number of *English* Archers, resolves to fight. The *French* would needs have the point, which was given them with much indignation by the *Castilians*, who lag'd behind them at a very great distance. These *French* valiantly fighting, are routed, and most of the thousand I spoke of, are taken; thereafter the *Castilians* advanced with a resolution to fight; the *Portuguese* seeing he was to fight a new Battle, commanded under pain of Death, every man to kill his Prisoner, which was instantly performed with much pity and compassion, and not without the sad tears of those who massacred them.

The second case is, when an Army is retreating, and a powerful Enemy fiercely pursuing, it will be dangerous to leave your Prisoners behind you, and forward you can hardly bring them. And the third is, When you are reduced to great penury and want of meat, whether you had not better kill your Prisoners than let them starve, for if you maintain them, they insensibly cut your throat by eating your bread. All these three cases *Grotius* comprehends in these words, *Si Captivorum multitudo oneri aut periculo sit*; If, says he, the multitude of your Prisoners be dangerous or burthenfome, in these cases he advieth rather to dismiss them, than kill them. I think he speaks like a good Christian; but I am afraid, that they who lead Armies will think by such mercies they will prove cruel to themselves, and treacherous to their Prince; and when in any of these cases they are put to death, often their numbers occasion their destruction, which in other cases the same *Grotius* would have to be the cause of their safety.

But the Prince or Generals promise of fair quarter admits *la salvo*, for notorious Thieves, Robbers, Murderers, such as have deserted their service and run over to the Enemy, or have broke their Oath of fidelity, ought not to be comprehended in this promise, nor can it save them from the stroke of Justice: Indeed if they get Articles signed for their lives, these Articles should be religiously observed, for faith should be kept to the word of men. Neither can the promise of Quarter secure Rebels from that death Rebellion deserves; for nothing can save them but the mercy of the Sovereign Prince or State, against whom the crime is committed: Yet my humble opinion should be, That when Rebellion is come to that growth, that she is not ashamed to take her mask off, and that the success of Rebels hath clothed them with usurped Authority, Princes and States should rather suffer Quarter (though without Articles) to be kept to those of them who are taken Prisoners, than provoke them to shed the blood of loyal persons on Scaffolds, as hath been done too oft; for it is not to be doubted, but Rebels will both by their Paper and leaden Bullets, vindicate themselves, and maintain their Authority to be lawful, and roar out these distinctions, which yet make our Ears tingle, of the Prince his virtual and personal power, of his legal and personal capacity.

Having told you, who hath power to give Quarter, and having spoken of Prisoners who yield upon promise of Quarter, let us speak next of those who submit to the Victors discretion, and have no promise of Quarter, who certainly may be put to the edge of the Sword, without any imputation of breach

To whom Quarter ought not to be given.

What to be done with Rebels.

Prisoners who yield on discretion.

of Faith or promise, yet not without the imputation of cruel inhumanity. They do not indeed transgress against the Laws of War nor Nations, who shed their blood; but they sin against humane nature, which commiserates frailty, and against the Laws of Christ. The Duke of *Alva*, and his Son *Don Frederick*, broke no faith nor promise to the Garrison and Inhabitants of *Harlem*, and *Narden in Holland*, who had submitted to their mercy, when they beheaded, hanged and butchered to death many thousands of them: but that horrible action of theirs hath left an eternal stain of inhumane cruelty on their names, as it will do on all those who imitate their bloody example. The Duke of *Burgundy*, *Charles the Warlike*, Besieged and Battered *Granfon*, a Town belonging to the *Swissers*, the Garrison consisting of 800 men, yielded to his mercy, which was such, as that he put them all to the Sword: But here vengeance pursued him close, for within a very few days, he was shamefully beaten by the *Swissers*, who were but a handful of men in comparison of his numerous Army. Commonly three reasons are given for putting those to death who yield on discretion: First, Obstinacy in holding out: Secondly, To terrify others: Thirdly, To use *Legem Talionis*, when the Prince or General of the other party hath formerly used the like severity. To the first, to hold out gallantly, and resolutely, so long as there are any hopes of a Relief, is not a crime in it self, but if accidentally a Garrison have provoked the Besieger to revenge, it will be more gallantly done to refuse all Parley, discharge all Quarter, and in the fury put all to the Sword, than to kill them in cold blood; yet it is frequently done. But *Torstenson* the *Swedish* Felt-Marshal did generously, when he resolved to put a *Danish* Garrison of 600 men to the Sword, who were in a Sconce of the *Dutchy of Holstein*, he refused all Parley and Treaty, and in the Storm killed them every man. Yet this action of his smelled too rank of revenge, for it was thought, all this blood was shed, because a *Swedish* Admiral called *Fleming* was killed with a Cannon Bullet out of that Sconce. The second reason to kill men *ad terrorem*, to terrify others, hath no show of reason in it; for why should men be terrified from doing their duty? Shall a Governour yield his Fort for fear, the Besiegers may kill him, if he yield it not? when he deserves, to be hanged by his own Prince, if he should yield it for any such reason. To the third reason, it is answered, That by the Law of Nature in justice and equity, *Talis* can only be used against the person or persons who committed the crime, and therefore it is a transgression against the Law of Nature, and a high injustice to put a Garrison to the Sword, which either doth yield, or would yield to mercy, only because the Prince or General of the other party did so; for none of this Garrison now to be butchered were partakers of that crime. But this *lex talionis* is pretended too often for killing men after they have got Articles, and that is worst of all, whereof I shall speak hereafter: But other reasons may be given for this killing of those who submit to discretion, which the *Germans* call *genad* and *ungenad*, that is, mercy or no mercy, as when the Prisoners are too numerous, a powerful Enemy expected, or the Souldiers are apt to mutiny, if they get not the spoil. To the last I say, lives and the blood of men are no spoil nor booty; to the other two, better have refused (as I said before) all Treaty and Parley: Yet this was the case of *San Joseph* and 700 *Italian* Souldiers at *Smerwick in Ireland*, who yielded themselves to the mercy of the Lord *Grey*, Deputy of that Kingdom; the Officers had their lives spared, all the *Irish* were hanged, and the *Italians* put to the edge of the Sword; and when this was told to Queen *Elizabeth*, that heroic Princess, who detested the killing of those who yielded, she was exceedingly displeased, nor would she accept of any excuses or allegations.

I have told you in another place, how Prisoners of War were used by the Antients, let us take a view, what usage many of them have met with in our Modern Wars: The *Mexicans* or *Tenuchitans* used to sacrifice their Prisoners to their Idols, or to the Sun. The *Cannibals*, to eat them, kill them and eat them. A *Parthian* King took *Valerian* a Roman Emperor, on whose neck that barbarous Prince ordinarily set his foot when he mounted his Horse, and at length did slay him quick. *Tamurlan* used *Bajazet* the great Turk ill enough, yet did he suffer him to be his own Bourreau. *Madame the Great*, took some of *Scanderbeg's* Captains, and slay'd them quick; and in that manner

Inhumanity to kill them.

Duke of *Alva*, and his son, *Charles Duke of Burgundy*.

Reasons given for it.

Answer to the first reason.

To the second.

To the third.

Other reasons alleged and answered.

Horrible cruelties.

he kept them fifteen dayes alive; the like cruelty he used to a poor King of *Cavanannia*: He put also to death all who had any relation to the Imperial families of *Constantinople* and *Trapsund*. But it were well, if these cruelties had been only exercised by Heathens and Infidels, but it is pity so many Christians have taken licence to themselves to deal mercilely with their Prisoners, even those who profess the same faith in Christ, who gave no warrant to his followers to mask cruelty with that Law or Customs of Nations, whereof *Cyrus* spake to his Captains, and the *Albanian* Embassadors to the *Melians*. Heathens killed sometimes those who had got quarter, so have Christians done too often. In the Civil Wars of *France*, it was practised many times by the parties of both persuasions to put Man, Woman and Child to the Sword, or lead them out to some River and drown them. We read of a Protestant Colonel, who for his sport forced all his Prisoners (except one) to leap from the top of a high Steeple; certainly this mirth of his was mixed with much mischief. In these Wars, though Commanders in chief might (though not without cruelty) put Prisoners to death, to whom their inferiors had promised Quarter; yet I wonder, how others below them, and of a mean condition, usurped that same power, and were never either punished, reproved, or reprehended for it. At the Battle of *Dreux*, Saint *Andrew* Marshal of *France*, had Quarter given him by a Gentleman, who mounted him on the croup of his Horse, having no other to give him; but one *Banbigny* pretending the Marshal had once wronged him at Court, shot him through the head, for which barbarous act he was never punished by the Admiral of *France*, who commanded the Protestant Army, the Prince of *Conde* being made Prisoner at the same Battle. More generous was Prince *Porcian*, who though he had received many real injuries from *Monmerancy* Constable of *France*, yet when he saw him Prisoner at that same Battle of *Dreux*, he gave him his hand, and offered him all the service he could do him. The Prince of *Conde* had fair Quarter given him at the Battle of *Jarnac*, but was thereafter inhumanly shot through the head by a private Gentleman, nor was ever the Murderer called in question for it. But these may seem but peccadilloes to the cruelties which are related by Historians, of some of which I shall give you a touch.

Mercilest in-  
humanities.

In a Sea Battle fought about the year 1253. between the *Venetians* and *Genueses*, (with the last whereof some of the Emperors of *Greece* his Ships were joyned) the *Venetian* fleet was routed, all the Prisoners who fell to the *Genovays* there were put to death, every Mothers Son; but the *Greeks* pretended they would deal more mercilely with their Captives, and I will tell you how they exercised it: They put out both their eyes, set them a shore, and so sent them to look for their fortunes; so true is it what Truth it self hath told us, That the mercies of the wicked are cruel. As *Charles* of *Burgundy* Besieged *Nancy* the *Lorrainers* endeavoured to enter the Town, which some performed, but one *Cifron* a prime Gentleman was taken, and had quarter given him, but the Duke against all Law and Equity would have him hanged: the Gentleman desired to speak privately with the Duke before his death, intending to reveal to him the horrid Treason plotted against him by his Favourite the Count *Campobacchio*; but that obstinate Prince would not hear him, and so the poor Gentleman was hanged; upon which followed the loss of the Dukes Army, honour and life: The pretended reason he gave for hanging *Cifron* was, It was (as he said) a capital crime to offer to enter into a Town that was Invested and Besieged by a Prince, and against which he had made use of Ordnance, a thing in those dayes sometimes practised by the *Italians* and *Spaniards*, but now deservedly out of fashion. *Charles* of *Anjou*, Brother to the French King *Louis* the Saint, did worse than all this; for having taken the title of King of *Naples* and *Sicily*, by the donation of Pope *Martin*, it happened that he took *Conradin*, the true proprietary of these Kingdoms, prisoner, and with him *Frederick* Arch-Duke of *Austria*, and beheaded them both publicly on a Scaffold, and with them a considerable number of the Nobility of those Kingdoms, who were all Prisoners of War; an action so much the more execrable, that it was committed by a Christian King, and by the instigation of a Pope, who assumed to himself the title of Head of the Church. This cruel King had a Son, who was called *Charles* the Hasting, a Prince of a sweet disposition, who had like to have

A King and  
an Arch-duke  
Prisoners of  
War, behead-  
ed.

paid dear for his Fathers sin, he was taken at a Sea-fight by *Roger de Lorra*, that famous Admiral of *Armagu*, and in *Sully* condemned to dye in that same manner as the other two Princes had done; but the sentence of death being brought to him on a Friday morning, his answer was, He was well contented to dy on that day on which his Saviour suffered the death of the Crois: which being reported to the Religious Queen *Catharine* (who was then Regent in *Sully* for her Husband *Peter* King of *Armagu*) she said, That for his sake who dyed that day for all Believers, *Charles* should live, and be saved him; But it was not in her power to hinder the revenge of *Sicilians* to sacrifice on a Scaffold the heads of two hundred *French* Gentlemen (all taken with Prince *Charles*) to appease the Ghosts of the murdered *Conradin* and *Frederick*. This they thought was *Lex Talionis*, though indeed it was nothing like it. Take one of a later date, When Count *Ladewick* of *Nassau* (which was a brave and a worthy Gentleman) had defeated and killed the Count of *Aremburgh*, at *Wirscho* in the Province of *Grinnyghen*, he took many *Spaniards* Prisoners, whom he hanged every Mothers Son; a most disavowable act. The Duke of *Alva* (that severe Governour of the *Netherlands*) did not at all challenge him for his cruelty, much less that he had done any thing against the Law of War or Nations; but looking on it as an indignity done to the *Spanish* Nation, since *Ladewick* had used the men of no other Country with so much severity, he revenged it (as most wife men of those times thought) by putting to death shortly after (under the pretext of justice) great numbers of the *Dutch*; In one day he beheaded on the *Sandhil* of *Bruxels* eighteen Lords and Gentlemen of quality, the next day he caused six or seven prime men to be tortured to death, and a few days after that, caused the Earls of *Egmond* and *Horne* to be beheaded; publicly on a Scaffold at *Bruxels*: This had nothing of *Lex Talionis* in it, none of these Lords or Gentlemen having been accessory to that Action of Count *Ladewick*.

How reveng-  
ed.

A detestable  
act of a Count  
of *Nassau*.

But was there ever *Tyr* more mercilest to men, who had Quarter promised them, than an *Italian*, of whom I am now to tell you? When the *Imperialists* Besieged *Florence*, *Florenti* revolted from the *Florentines*, who sent one *Ferrucci* to reduce it to obedience, he entered the Castle (which held out for *Florence*) and by it the City, where he committed extrem cruelties; killed many Souldiers, and took fourteen *Spaniards* to whom Quarter was promised: but when they thought themselves secure, the mercilest *Ferrucci* (allegding, that some of their Country men had once taken him, and given him a very spare Dyet) threw them all into a dark Dungeon, where he furnished the poor wretches to death, and then hanged their Carcasses about the Walls. What do you think of this *Lex Talionis*? May not a man say (without wrong to charity) that this *Italian*, if it had been in his power, would have tortured these poor mens Souls as well as their Bodies; nor did he keep any agreement made to the poor Citizens, but hanged some, and plundred all, and spared neither Church nor Cloyster. The same *Ferrucci* being summoned shortly after to deliver up the Town to *Maramaldo* one of the *Imperial* Generals, against the Law of Arms, he hanged the Trumpeter; this action founded loud for revenge, which quickly overtook him, for being thereafter beaten by the *Imperialists*, he is taken Prisoner, and brought to that same *Maramaldo*, who, after outrageous Language, caused him to be disarmed, and then killed him with his own hand; an ignoble act of *Maramaldo*, but too good a death for *Ferrucci*. But before I go out of *Italy*, hear another barbarous usage of a Prisoner in that same Rencounter, a *Florentine* Gentleman, one *Amico d' Arfols*, was taken Prisoner, fair Quarter was given him, and he had his ransom paid, but by the wrong hand; for one *Martio* *Colonna* bought him from him who had taken him; purposely to kill him, and poor *Amico* was killed, and by *Martio*'s own hand: a very unmartial act, and all because *Amico* had fairly killed a Cousin of *Martio*, one *Stephani* *Colonna*; nor had *Lex Talionis* place here neither. The *Italians* then need not to expiulate with the *Turks* either for cruelty, or inobservance of Quarter given to Prisoners. But let us in the next place see how a *Spaniard* behaved himself, and he was a person of no mean quality, in keeping the Quarter that was given to Prisoners of War.

Unspeakable  
cruelty of an  
Italian to his  
Prisoners.

Revenged by  
the like.

A barbarous  
usage of a  
Prisoner.

When *Philip* the Second, King of *Spain*, had taken Possession of the Kingdom of *Portugal*, his Admiral the Marquis of *Santa Cruz*, at a Sea Battle near

Santa Cruz his  
inhumanity  
to French Pri-  
soners.

the *Tercera*, defeated a *French Fleet*: Here was taken *Philip Strozzi*, a *Florentine*, who was sent as General of the forces ordain'd by *Catherine de Medici*, Queen Mother of France, to assist the *Prin* of *Orange*, with *Strozzi* were three hundred more taken, and had their quarters promis'd them: *Strozzi* was pitifully wounded, and laid down before *Santa Cruz*; but neither the quarter promis'd him, nor the sad condition of a brave Gentleman, nor the consideration of the infatigable of humane affairs, could move *Santa Cruz* to pity him, but gave a barbarous order to throw him immediately ever-board. Nor did his cruelty stop there, for by a formal Sentence he beheaded four score Gentlemen of the Prisoners; all the rest of three hundred, that were above seventeen years of age, he hang'd; those that were under that age he condemn'd to the Gallies. An unparallel'd act of Justice.

A question.

I have said before, that quarter, unless promis'd by Articles, should not be given to Fugitives. But here a question ariseth, If an Officer or a common Souldier be taken, and be not able to maintain himself in Prison, and no care is had by his Superiours either to exchange, ransom, or maintain him, if he be forc'd to take service under the Enemy, and be re-taken, whether he should be used as a Fugitive or not? Here, I suppose, a distinction will be necessary. If he be the natural Subject of the Prince or State that makes the War, he may not serve their Enemy on any pretence; and if he do it, he is liable to punishment as a Traitor; but if he serve him only as a mercenary, it seems disputable: for the *Grecians* and *Romans* punish'd such of their own as serv'd the Enemy, with death; but not their Auxiliaries, unless they had run over from them to the Enemy; but that is not the question, for all Run-aways deserve death; but these I speak of are not such. Yet there was a valiant Knight *Capuz Muden*, who had done *Charles* the Fifth great services, but was none of his Subjects; he was taken by the *French* in *Germany*, and having often, and in vain, solicited for his exchange or ransom, he took service under the *French King*, and after that was taken by the *Imperials* in *Artois*; and notwithstanding all his defenses, had his head cut off by the Emperours command. When that Major General *Knapbush*, whom I mention'd in the last Chapter, was Prisoner with *Count Tili*, he wrote to the King of *Sueden*, (whose Subject he was not) and desir'd to know, (since he could neither maintain nor ransom himself) if he might take employment under the Emperour; the King told all those who were with him, that the Major General ask'd him the question, Whether he might lawfully be a Knave or not? intimating thereby, that he might not for all his imprisonment; break his Military Oath. But for all that, I have known thousands take service in that manner, and never challeng'd for it when they have been re-taken; inexorable necessity disposing of with transgressions of that kind.

Injustice in  
making some  
Prisoners.

To make those Prisoners who have not taken Arms, but live in amity with both parties, only because they are suspected to favour one party more than the other, hath little of the Law of Arms in it, and less of that of Conscience. Herein the famous Count of *Manfred* is inexcusable, for putting Guards on the Earl of *East-Friesland*, when he had quarter'd his Army in his County. So was the *Suedish* Field-Marshal *Baner*, for sending one of the Dukes of *Saxony-Lauenburg* and the Lord *Arminius* Prisoners to *Sueden*: Neither can the late King of *Sueden* be well excus'd for seizing on the persons of the Duke and Dutchess of *Cowland*.

Whether Wo-  
men should  
be Prisoners  
of War, if  
taken.

The securing of the Dutchess as well as her Husband the Duke, minds me of a question, Whether Women should be made Prisoners of War? It is certain, in ancient and later times too, they were taken, and ransom'd, or exchange'd, or made slaves; yet it would seem, since Nature hath generally exempted that Sex from making War, they cannot properly be made Prisoners of War. The *Mahometans* notwithstanding make Slaves of them. And I suppose, in our late Wars, they were not ordinarily made Prisoners, rather, because the custom of it is worn out, than that it is abrogated by any Law. It is not yet 130 years since some *French* Captains under *Francis* the First took some *Spanish* Ladies Prisoners at *Perpignan*, and would have put them to ransom; but that generous King gave a lump of money to those who had taken them, and sent them home to their Husbands, without ransom. Now it is not like he would have

have bought them from his own Officers, if he had not thought they had some right to them by the Law of War. The great *Cyrus* did well in preserving the honour and chastity of the fair *Pamphila*, taken Prisoner in the War; but he had done better to have sent her home to her Husband *Mitradates*. *Alexander* did well to use *Darius* his Mother, Wife and Daughters honourably; but he had done better to have sent them home to the *Persian King*, either for, or without ransom. *Selimus*, the First, as barbarous and cruel a Tyrant as he was known to be, shew'd more generosity in this point than both of them; for the noise of the *Turky Cannon* having rather frighted the *Persian* Horses, than chac'd the *Sophy Isfikel* out of the *Chaldæan* Plains, his Horse-men took a number of noble *Persian* Ladies Prisoners, whom the Great *Turk* sent home to their Husbands without ransom, and without any violence done to their persons or honours.

But Prisoners of War having got fair quarter promis'd them, and honestly kept, What shall be done with them? Assuredly, they must be either enslav'd, exchange'd, or ransom'd. As to the first, we are to know, that after the great *Constantine* suffer'd the Christian Faith to be preach'd without interruption, over most of the then known World, men remitted much of the severity of the Law of War and Nations to Prisoners. And Slavery (which makes men differ but little from beasts) was a piece and piece out of fashion; yet long after Christianity shone over the World, Prisoners of War were made Slaves: for there be some Canons of the Church extant, that forbid men to counsel Slaves to desert their Masters. But by tract of time all Nations, as it had been by an universal consent, left off to make their Prisoners Slaves, or to sell them as such, because they were then better instructed in the Laws of Charity than to abstain from killing miserable Captives, only out of respect of gain to themselves, or at least to seem to be less cruel. But three hundred years after the Great *Constantine's* death, when *Mahometanism* had spread its darkness over the East, slavery was brought back to the World; and yet if you will consider right, you will find this slavery and bondage of Christians is not confin'd to those Countreys only, where *Mahomet* is adored; for there are thousands of Christian Slaves to be found in the Gallies belonging to the most Christian and Catholic Kings, the Great Duke of *Tuscany*, the *Venetians*, the *Genuenses*, the Pope, and the Great Master of *Malta*. And may we not say, That many thousands of his Majesties Subjects, after quarter given, were made perfect Slaves, and upon that account fold and sent to remote Plantations? The Great *Gustavus Adolphus* did, I think, something very like this, when he sent three thousand *Croats*, commonly call'd *Carabats*, (who had quarter given them for life at several places in *Germany*) by Sea to *Sueden*, there to work at his Iron and Copper Mines.

Among Christians then, Prisoners of War being exempted from Slavery, they are to be kept till they be either exchange'd or ransom'd, or set at liberty by the Victor gratis; this sometimes falls out, but seldom. Sometimes they are set at liberty conditionally, as if you do such a thing, enjoy your liberty; if not, return to Prison: and the Prisoner is oblig'd to do either the one or the other. It was the case of some *Scottish* Lords, whom *Henry* the Eighth, of *England*, detain'd Prisoners. He permitted them to return to *Scotland*, and if they could procure the Marriage of his Son, *Prince Edward*, with the Infant Queen of *Scots*, then they were to have their liberty; if not, they were to return: they failing in the first, some of them honestly perform'd the second. He that takes a Prisoner may search him, and all he says hold on his own; but if the Prisoner hath reserv'd something hidden, that his Taker knows not of, he may make use of it to maintain himself, or to help to pay his ransom; for he who took him hath no right to it: for Lawyers say, *Qui nescit, nihil possidet*. The exchange of Prisoners of equal quality is ordinary over all the World; if there be some, but no considerable disparity, some Money balances the matter. The Ransom of a Prisoner belongs to him who took him, unless he be a person of very eminent quality, and then the Prince, the State, or their General seizeth on him, giving some gratuity to those who took him. The price of the Ransom useth to be estimated according to his pleasure who keeps the Prisoner; but because many times they are extravagant in their demands, an agreement is frequently made between the two parties who make the Way of a

Slavery re-  
mitted by  
Christians.

Brought back  
by Mahomet.

Retain'd yet  
by some  
Christians.

Liberty  
granted to  
Prisoners  
conditional-  
ly.

By Exchange.

By Ransom.  
The price  
of the Ran-  
som useth to  
be estimat-  
ed according  
to his plea-  
sure who  
keeps the  
Prisoner.

A general agreement for Ranfomes ordinary.

certain price to be paid by Officers, and Common Soldiers for their Ranfomes according to their quality, and this seldom exceeds one Months pay, for any under the degree of a Colonel: and this is exceeding comfortable to Prisoners, when they know how much themselves or their Friends have to pay for their liberty.

A Question concerning ranfome.

But here is a question, When a Prisoner agrees for his ranfome, and dyes before it be paid, whether the Heir be obliged to pay it? If he dye out of Prison, there is no doubt but the Heir is bound to pay it; but if he dye in Prison, *Grotius* says, his Heir is not obliged to pay it, because the Prisoner had not that for which he contracted; and that was his liberty. But if the bargain be made, that the Prisoner owes the ranfome, immediately after the contract is made, the same *Grotius* says, His Heir ought to pay it, because the Captive was not to be looked on after the finishing of the agreement, as a Prisoner but as a Pledge for his Ranfome. But I can tell *Grotius*, that the Corps of many dead Prisoners are Ranfomed. There is another question, If a Prisoner Parole, and ingage to get such a person of the adverse party set at liberty, and on that condition is set free himself; if the Prisoner agreed on, dye before the other can procure his liberty, whether in that case the Prisoner contracting be obliged to return to Prison? *Grotius* says no, unless it have been particularly so agreed on: yet he saith, he is bound to do something like the equivalent, and that is to pay his own Ranfome.

Answered.

Another.

Answered.

I should now speak of those Prisoners, who have Articles for life, it may be Cloths and Monys, or any thing else they carry about with them, and sometimes as much of their goods as they can carry on their backs: but before I enter on it, it will be fit to know what poor inferior Officers and Commanders have to Parley, Treat, and to Grant, Sign and Seal Articles.

Of the power, inferior Commanders have to grant Articles.

First, it will be granted, that none have power to Treat or Sign Articles but those who command in chief on the place, whether it be in Town or Field. Princes or their Generals cannot be every where, and therefore must recommend the leading of Wings or Parts of their Armies to subordinate Commanders, what ever title they may have, be it Lieutenant or Major General, Colonel or Brigadier Generals, they Treat and Grant Conditions and Articles to Enemies in the Field, or to Enemies within Towns, because the emergency or necessity of dispatch will not suffer them to advise with the Prince or State whom they serve, and therefore Articles granted by them, are to be as inviolably observed as if they had been Signed by the Prince himself. But if either a General or any under him make a transaction with an Enemy against the known Constitutions and publick Laws of the Prince or State whom they serve, then they deserve Punishment, and the Prince and State are not obliged to performance; and if so, they ought not, nor can they in justice retain what they have gained by that Capitulation, whether it be Towns, Forts, Lands, Mony or Prisoners, but are obliged if they disapprove the Agreement, to put all in *statu quo prius*. *Grotius* maintains that a General hath not power to dispose of Lands, Territories, Inheritances, and Offices and dignities (except they be military) without the Prince his express Warrent: and there is no doubt but this assertion is grounded on just reason, and yet that Prince of *Orange*, General for the Emperour, who totally routed the *French* in the Kingdom of *Naples*, disposed of the inheritances of most of those who were of the *French* Faction, to his Captains; and not only so, but distributed the chief Offices of the Crown among them: and though his Master *Charles* the Fifth, did much dislike of the Prince his encroaching on his Prerogative; yet that wise Prince ratified all that *Orange* had done, as knowing how dangerous it is for Sovereigns not to approve of what their Generals transact in their names. For if that be not done, who either dare, can, or will make any Capitulation with a General, whose agreement, be it never so authentick and solema may be called in question and revoked by the Prince he serves.

What a General may do.

What a General may do.

What a Captain General of an Army may do in things of this nature, the like power have those who are subordinate to him, when they command apart, and are upon the head of some Wing or Brigades of the Army at a distance from

from the General, and at such a distance, that his assent and approbation cannot be got so soon as the present necessity or convenience of the affair requires; as suppose a Major General or Colonel is sent three or four miles before the Army (this is no great distance) to force a Pass, which those within it offer to give over, provided they be secur'd by Articles to march away in safety, it is not time to send to the General, (suppose he have an Enemy in his Rear) for his assent, the Major General or Colonel may do it, which the General is bound to ratifie, and so it is in a hundred cases more. Nay further, If that Subordinate or Inferiour Officer grant an agreement to an Enemy, contrary to the private instructions he hath from his Prince or General; yet if he have done nothing which did exceed the limits of his office and function, the Prince and General are obliged to ratifie it: Indeed they may punish him for his transgression, to which the party with whom he capitulated, did contribute nothing, and therefore must not suffer for his Trespals. As suppose a Major General hath a little Town yielded to him by accord, whereby he permits the Garrison to march to a place of greater importance, which the Prince and his General intend to besiege, and have privately forbid the Major General to make any such agreement, they may punish him for his presumption, but are bound either to suffer the Garrison to enjoy their Articles, or at worst to go back to the place where they were. Let us sum up all that hath been said in this particular, in one instance of *Hannibal* and *Maharbal*, and it will quadrate very fitly with the subject we now speak of; the story is this:

Should be ratified by a General.

After the *Romans* were beat at the lake *Thrasimene*, *Hannibal* sent *Maharbal* to pursue the Victory, seven or eight miles from the place of Battel, (at or near which *Hannibal* stay'd;) *Maharbal* finds six thousand *Romans* in a Body, ready to accept of liberty, if granted them to return to *Rome*, otherwise to sell their lives at a dear rate. The *Carthaginian* thought it not fit to hazard the loss of numbers of his own men so strong and so desperate a party, and therefore agrees with them, that they should deliver their Arms, and then have liberty to go home. *Hannibal* will not ratifie the agreement, but makes all the six thousand *Roman* Prisoners, and loads them with Irons; telling them, *Maharbal* had no power, without his content, who commanded in chief, to grant them any immunity. The worst fact ever *Hannibal* did. If *Maharbal* had no power to grant those *Romans* their liberty, he had no power to grant them their lives; and so *Hannibal* with that same Justice might have put them all to the Sword. But first, *Maharbal* commanded in chief in that place where he capitulated; next, he did nothing that exceeded the bounds of his Office, being a great Commander in the *Carthaginian* Army; thirdly, he was at such a distance from *Hannibal*, that he had no time to send for his assent, and do his errand, which was to pursue the flying *Romans*. And therefore the Historian wrongs not *Hannibal*, when he says, *Punica religio servata fides est ab Annibale*: *Hannibal* kept promise with a *Punicall* Faith. Indeed, if *Hannibal* had been on the place he had said right; and this demonstrates what I said before, that any quarter given in the field where a General is, signifies nothing till it be confirm'd by him; and observe, that Articles and Agreements made by word of mouth (as this of *Maharbal's* was) bind as strongly as those made in writing; for Promises and Parolls of Princes and Captains should be sacredly kept.

*Maharbal's* agreement with 6000 *Romans*.

Unworthily broke by *Hannibal*.

*Grotius* acknowledgeth, that *Maharbal's* agreement should not have been infringed by *Hannibal*; and yet in that same Chapter affirms, That *Masaniissa*, King of *Numidia*, a Friend and Ally of the *Romans* had not power to grant the fair *Sophonisbe* her life. I am not at all of *Grotius* his judgement: For first, *Masaniissa* acted by *Scipio's* Commission; secondly, he was far from *Scipio*; thirdly, he commanded in chief where he then was; fourthly, *Sophonisbe* was not by any former publick Law exempted from pardon; fifthly, if *Masaniissa* had private instructions to take her life, *Scipio* might have punish'd him, but *Sophonisbe* should not have suffer'd for his transgression, but should either have enjoy'd her life, or been sent back with all her people, to the Castle where he was taken. And assuredly, *Masaniissa* had power to grant her life, and marry her too, as he did; but he prefer'd the *Roman* friendship to the love of his Beautiful Wife, and so sent her a Cup of Poyson, as the last token of his affection.

So was that of *Masaniissa* to *Sophonisbe*, by *Scipio*.

Duke Hamilton's death, Murder.

This that I have said, may be accommodated and applied to *James Duke of Hamilton's* case, who had Articles granted to him, and all that were with him for life; which, because *Lambert* avouched he had given, the pretended Parliament of *England* did not deny it, but said, with *Hannibal*, that *Lambert* being subalterne had not power to give such conditions; but he had power, for he exceeded not the limits of his Office, and function of a Major General; he commanded in chief on the place where he capitulated; and we never heard that *Cromwell* did charge him with the transgression of any of his private instructions at that time; and *Cromwell* was so far from *Lambert* then, that he could not possibly send to him for his assent; and if *Lambert's* superiours thought it not fit to approve of what he had done, then is Justice (which was a great Stranger in their Courts) they should have set the Duke, and all that were with him at liberty, and then have taken their hazzard of all the mischief could befall them: All which concludes that the death of that unfortunate Lord was plain Murder.

Count de Montgomery's little better.

Of this stamp was that agreement made by those who took *Count Montgomery*, who had kill'd *Henry the Second*, of *France*, at *Tilting*, fore against his will: He had done very signal services to the Protestants, in the time of the Civil Wars, and at length was besieged in the Castle of *Domfron*, which he maintain'd gallantly, resolving to dye with his Sword in his hand; but being at length deserted by most of those that were with him, he accepted of conditions, which were, That his Life should be safe, and he should only be Prisoner a few days, and then have his liberty. But the Queen Mother, *Catherine de Medici*, pretending that those Lords who had besieg'd the Castle, had no power to grant any such conditions, caus'd him to be brought to *Paris*, where his Head was publicly cut off in the *Greve*, not without a previous torture. At that same time, his Son *Lorges* yielded *Carentan* upon Articles, but had been likewise sent to *Paris*, there to partake of his Fathers fate, if he had not been dextrously shifted out of the way, and suffer'd to escape, by a near Kinsman of his own.

Cessations of Arms, and Parleys.

Many Parleys and Treaties are without any Cessation of Arms. That at *Munster*, which produc'd the Peace in the year 1648. lasted six years, and yet the War in *Germany* was as hot and fierce as ever. And so it was in *England* in the time of the Treaty of *Uxbridge*. But if there be a cessation of Arms, which you may call a Truce, during the time of it, acts of hostility cease, yet Armies may retire, Souldiers may be levied, Fortifications may be helped, unless by Articles all or any of these be forbid. If this Truce, or Cessation be broke by one party, the other may lawfully run to Arms, without any new denunciation of the War; or he may not do it, as he pleaseth, or thinks convenient for the present posture of his affairs. Commonly at Sieges, in time of Parley and Cessation, all works above or under ground are forbidden.

Towns and Forts surpriz'd in time of Treaty.

But when Besieged Towns, Castles and Camps are necessitated to come to a Parley, though there be a cessation of Arms, let neither the Besieger nor the Besieged trust to it, but stand on their guard, for many times the Besieged, contrary to agreement, Sally, to destroy the Approaches, to shift away their Horse-men, or some of them for Intelligence; and often do the Besiegers take the advantage of a Parley, and without his order or knowledge who commands in chief, fall on the Besieged place, whose Garrison then over-wearied with former fatigue, is secure, and so soon over-mast'd: For the desire of booty, whereof the Treaty robs the Souldiers, stirs them up to take their advantage of those, who thinking themselves safe by a Cessation, make little or no resistance. And though the Besieger who commands in chief, may pretend it was done without his knowledge, yet he keeps what he hath got as his lawful gain, without any thought of restitution. Thus was *Theueron*, and *Monmorancy*, Marshal of *France*, in it, taken by the Imperialists in time of Parley and Cessation. Thus *Coqueville* at *Saint Valery* was surpriz'd in the time of Treaty, by the Marshal de *Cesse* his Forces. Thus the strong Castle of *Fontenay* kept by the French Protestants in the year 1574. in the time of Treaty was storm'd by the Duke of *Montpensier*, at the breaches of the Wall, and though it was defended at that time, yet it was forc'd to surrender, for fear of a second Assault, on mean conditions. And thus was *Masfricht* storm'd in the year 1579. by the Duke of *Parma's* Army, where most

most of the Souldiers and Inhabitants, in time of Parley, were put to the Sword, after they had defended themselves bravely for the space of four months. Nor can I fancy there can be better ways found out to prevent such mischiefs at such occasions, than to keep strict Guards, to discharge all private Parleys, to suffer neither Officers nor Souldiers of the two parties to speak together, be the pretence of the conference what it will, and to oblige the one party to stay within the Walls, and the other within the Approaches, not only till the Treaty be finished, and the Articles sign'd, but even till the evacuation of the place; for *Homo Homini Lupus*; One Man is a Wolf to another.

Much more generous would it be to give fair conditions to those who are reduced to extremities, than to take such unjustifiable advantages against them. So did *Serriou* to the hunger-starved Inhabitants of *Sancerre* in *France*. And truly, I think, *Marquess Spinola* left a noble testimony to the World of his Heroick Spirit, when he gave very advantageous conditions to the Governour of *Breda* in the year 1628, when he knew well enough (as I observed in another place) that there was no relief to be expected from without, and not above three days Victuals within.

When Articles are sign'd, I suppose, there is not any man of what perfavation soever, but will say they should be religiously observ'd, and inviolably kept, neither is it in the power of any, either Prince or State, to break them without perfidy and violation of Faith, the very Cut-throats of humane society. The *Turks* who were accusom'd to keep no Treaties, but to kill all or most who yielded on Articles, have learn'd of late to keep their Promises, as the defending the breach of them was prejudicial to themselves, because it forc'd the Defendants to stand out to the last drop of their blood. It were to be wist'd that many Christians had not prov'd perfect *Turks* in this. *Cesar Borgia*, Duke of *Valentinus*, after Articles of an accord sign'd, strangled some principal Lords of the noble family of the *Orsines*, and put many others to death. Nor did *Leo* the tenth, Bishop of *Rome* enslave himself to his promise made solemnly to the Dukes of *Urbino* and *Ferrara*: The Bloody Tenet, No Faith to be kept to Heretics, could not excuse this sedifragy, being it was done to *Roman Catholics*. In the year 1632. we shall hear of Faith broke by both Protestants and Papists: The Imperialists forced a Swedish Garrison in the Town of *Sulzbach* to yield the place on conditions sign'd, some whereof were basely broke: Not long after the Swedish King besiegeth it, and makes it render upon Articles; notwithstanding which, when the Governour was march'd a good way out of it, he was shot dead, and with him some other officers; the Souldiers all plunder'd, and forc'd to take service: You may be sure *Lex Talionis* was pretended here, but in vain, for the sedifragy of the first could not excuse the foul breach of the second. The famous *Bernard*, Duke of *Weymar*, had almost done in passion such a disavowable act. The case was this: *Brifac* being reduc'd to the utmost extremity, the Noble Duke (though he knew all their wants) gave Major General *Reinach* honourable conditions: But after the Garrison was march'd out, he came to know that of thirty of his Souldiers who were Prisoners within the City, eight dyed for hunger, which the other twenty two did eat, and then were starv'd to death for want of meat. This so enraged the Duke, that he resolv'd to put that Monster of a Governour, and the four hundred Souldiers, or rather Skeletons, that came out with him, to the edge of the Sword; and here you may be sure unjust Revengè put on the mask of *Lex Talionis*. This disavowable action of the Governour of *Brifac* should be a Caveat to all Governours not to bring many Prisoners into besieged places, for those reasons I mention'd in my Discourse of Sieges. But if the Duke had done as he intend'd, he had been as guilty of perfidy, as *Reinach* was of inhumanity. And therefore the Great Commanders of his Army represented to him the ugly face of sedifragy in its lively colours, which did fully divert him from an action unworthy of so brave and so renown'd a Prince.

Treaties should be made, Promises given, and Capitulations sign'd, without equivocation or mental reservation, they should be clear, sincere, and candid, without ambiguity; for if any of that be made use of, it will be so far from excusing breach of Faith, that it will make it look with the uglier face; as when

Articles oftentimes ill observ'd.

Instances.

Articles should not be ambiguous.

Two unworthy actions.

A pretty story, and yet a true one.

A Soldier no Spy.

Inhumanity.

Fear of bad quarter.

Philopemon.

when something is foisted into an Article, which may carry a double meaning, the Victor makes himself Interpreter of the genuine sense; and if he be wicked, under pretence of the breach of one branch of an Article, he assumes to himself power to break all. I have given some Instances of the practice of this among the Heathen, nor hath the light of the Gospel deterr'd men of later times from actions of so base an alloy. In the year 1633. *Gren Gloggan* in *Silesia*, yields to *Wallenstein*, who sign'd Articles for them to march to the next *Suedish* Army; but without the Town, a quarrel is pick'd for the breach of an Article, the Garrison surrounded, and forc'd to declare for the Emperor. And if you will peruse *Iraus's* Treaty with the Town of *Limerick* in *Ireland*, 1651. you will find it of the same stamp, or worse; after he was master of the place, under pretext of some breach of the Garrison, he broke all agreements, and hang'd the Mayor, and several others to bear him company.

But after such sad stories of the bad observation of Capitulations, let me refresh you with the relation of a merry, but a true Treaty, which was very punctually observ'd. When *Spinola* had retir'd himself from the *Lower Palatinate* to *Brabant*, he left *Don Corduba* to finish the War in that distressed Country: This *Spanish* General march'd to a little Town called *Ogerheim*, out of which all the Inhabitants had fled for fear, except twenty four; these discharged some Falconets upon the *Spanish* Fore-Troops, and thereafter run over the Walls, where they were lowly; only the Town-Shepherd, who was called *Hans Warsch*, (for he deserves to have his name recorded) stay'd. A Trumpeter is sent to summon the place, (the *Spaniards* not knowing its solitary condition) with whom *Hans* capitulated, That himself and his Family should enjoy their Lives, Goods, and free liberty of their Religion; to which the Trumpeter readily consented, and then *Hans* opened one of the Ports: This Agreement was ratified, and faithfully kept by *Don Corduba*.

A Prisoner of War may be examined, and both hired and threaten'd to tell all he knows; but if he will not, he should rather be cherish'd than punish'd: for a Soldier is not to be us'd as a Spy; the last you may put to the Rack, but not the first, with any Justice; yet the contrary hath been practis'd. In the Civil Wars of *France*, I find, that a Soldier, after he had got quarter, was tortur'd, by pouring in Water at his mouth, till his belly grew as great as an Ox head, and yet dyed without revealing any thing he knew. A Captain who had escap'd out of *Sancerre*, and was looking for assistance to that hunger-starv'd Town, was taken, and torment'd with the blows of Cudgels on the Belly, till he told all he knew, or all they would have him to tell, and then they hang'd him for his pains.

The fear of bad quarter, of hard and cruel usage, of the breach of Treaties and Articles, hath made many resolve to take no quarter at all, and to chuse to dye fighting: Whether these be accessory to their own death, whether this be not self desertion, or whether it be diffidence of the Almighty power, shall not be the subject of this Discourse. But I shall say that Self-preservation is a Law imprinted in the hearts of all men by Nature, and when with Honour and Reputation, a Soldier, either of high or low degree, may have fair quarter, he both may, and should accept of it, both to preserve himself for his masters service, and his own future fortune, and that without the least aspersion of Cowardise. That which is commonly reported of the Emperours *Crabats*, and the King of *Sweden's Finlanders*, that none of them would either give or take quarter, is a meer speculation; for I have known them both give and take it very contentedly.

*Philopemon* may stand as a Beacon to all Soldiers, whether they be Pagans, Infidels, or Christians, not to presume, or yet be confident never to be Prisoners: Of a mean Gentleman, he came by his valour and conduct to be Praetor and General of the *Achaens* seven or eight times: Dining one day with some of his Friends, he heard them much commend one of his acquaintance for an excellent good Soldier: How can he (said *Philopemon*) be a good Soldier, who deliver'd once himself Prisoner. But this great Captain (who had now arriv'd with much Honour to the age of seventy years) did not foresee his fate, which the very next day (while he made good the Retreat of some *Achaen* Gentlemen from the *Messenians*) deliver'd him Prisoner to his mortal

mortal Enemies, who having brought him to *Messene*, cast him into a deep Prison, and not long after presented him with a Cup of deadly Poyson, which (after he was assur'd of the safety of his Friend *Licortas*) he cheerfully drank off, and immediately gave up the Ghost.

## CHAP. XXVII.

## Of our Modern Military Punishments, and of Rewards.

THE Law is a Dumb Judge, and a Judge is a Speaking Law. In vain it is to make Laws, unless Judges look to their execution, for that is the life of the Law. I have spoke in another place of the Military Punishments and Rewards of the Ancients, I have likewise spoke of our Modern Military Laws; where observe, that most of them threaten Punishment, few or none promise Reward; the first is due to Transgressors, the second is *ex beneplacito*, because all men are bound to do their duty; yet Princes and States have reward'd Virtue of late times, as well as the Ancients did. I shall speak of Punishments, and then of Rewards.

Though Princes and States have their several Laws of War, yet all agree that Treason against the Prince, in betraying either his Forts, Forces, or Munitions, should be punish'd with an ignominious Death, but the crime should be thoroughly examin'd by the Judge Marthal, and Court of War, whereof I have formerly spoke. Mutiny against Command, or Superiour Officers is punishable by Death: If it cannot be compell'd without force, either all, or most of the Army are to be call'd together, to cut the Mutineers in pieces. But if a Mutiny be quieted without blood (in doing whereof both Courage and Prudence are requisite) then ordinarily the ring-leaders are to dye, and the rest are either all pardon'd, or all to run the *Gallows*, or the tenth man of them is to suffer death; which custom is borrow'd from the Ancient *Romans*. If Officers run away from the Mutineers, and leave them mutinying, the Law of War orders them to dye, unless they can make it appear, that either they had kill'd some of the Mutineers, or had been wounded themselves by them: But it is not to be denied, that too many of them are more ready to give a rise and beginning to a Mutiny, than to put an end to it. The Death of a Mutineer should be ignominious, and therefore it should be hanging, or breaking on a Wheel. All crimes that are Capital by the Civil Law, are so also by Martial Law, as Wilful Murder, Robbery, Theft, Incest, Sodomy, and others, needlessly to be rehears'd. But Martial Law makes many crimes Capital, which the Civil and Municipal Law doth not; Such are, to desert the Colours, to Sleep on Sentinel, to be drunk on a Watch, to draw a Sword or strike at a Superiour; many times these are pardon'd, and very oft they are punish'd with Death, when a General thinks Justice more convenient than Mercy. To be absent from a Watch, by some Military Laws is Capital, but seldom put in execution: Yet I find in the Reign of *Henry* the Second, of *France*, that one *Gransillon*, a German Colonel, in a Court of War condemn'd an Ensign bearer to be hang'd for playing at Dice in his Lodging, when the Company was on Watch; and he put the Sentence in execution. The crime of Cowardise is by the Law of War, Capital; but should be well examin'd by the Auditor, and the matter made clear in a Court of War, before Sentence be pass'd, because it, and Treason, taints the Blood of the parties. To run away in time of service, either in the Field, or from the Assaults of Towns, Forts and Out-works, brings Death upon

Punishment of Capital crimes, Treason,

Mutiny,

Many more:

Severe Justice.

Cowardise:



upon the guilty; or that which to generous Spirits is worse than death, that is, to have their Swords broke over their Heads by the hand of the Hangman, and to turn'd out of the Army; and this I have known more frequently practis'd, than death inflict'd; but the Instances I could give are too fresh, and therefore I shall tell you only of one about a hundred years ago. At the Siege of *Dinan*, *Gaspard Caligni*, that famous Admiral of *France*, commanded some Ensign-bearers to run with their Colours to the Assault of the breach; they did not go, pretending the place was too dangerous for the Kings Colours, for they might chance to be taken by the Enemy; for which the Admiral caus'd all their Swords to be broke over their Heads by a Hang-man, in view of his whole Army. It will be about two or three and thirty years since *Leopold* Arch-Duke of *Austria*, and his Lieutenant General *Piccolomini*, caus'd a Regiment of Horse to be cut in pieces, and all the Officers to be hanged in the place, where-ever they could be apprehended, without any Process or Sentence of a Court of War, because it was well known, that the whole Regiment had run away in a full body, without fighting, at the second Battel of *Leipsick*, where the *Suedish* Felt-marshal *Torstenson* gain'd the Victory over the *Imperialists*. I have spoke in the last Chapter of the punishment due to those Governours who give over Forts sooner than they need, and gave you some instances; but now I shall tell you, that by some Articles of War, the whole Garrison is lyable to punishment, which is, to be Pioneers to the rest of the Army. I dare say nothing against the Justice of this Law, but, I think, if the Garrison disobey the Governour, and do not march out at his command, (he pretending the Prince or Generals order for what he does) all of it may undergo the censure and punishment of Mutiny: But many Laws are made *ad terrorem*, which do but little good.

An ignominious punishment.

An exemplary and deterred punishment.

A severe Law.

Inhumane punishments.

I think, the *Turkish* Punishments not imitable by those who profess the name of Christ; such as are, roasting at slow fires, slaying quick, and gauching; the manner of this last is, to throw the condemned person from the top of a Tower or a high Wall, the place where he is to fall, being all beset with Iron prickles; and the wretch is happy if his Head, Breast, or Belly fall on one of them, for thereby he may be soon dispatched; but if a Leg, Arm or Thigh catch hold, he must hang till extremity of pain, hunger, thirst, and the fowls of the air, put an end to his miserable life. The *Muscovites* for a Military Punishment can whip to death, and that is cruel enough. They and other Christians can impale condemned persons on wooden Stakes and Spits, which in some extraordinary cases is also practis'd in *Germany*; and I have heard, that Hang-men can so artificially do it, that the woful Delinquent will sometimes live three days in unspeakable torture. When *Mahomet* the Great, saw a Valley in *Valachia* beset with these Stakes and Wheels, on which some thousands of Men and Women lay executed, it is said that he much commended the Vayvod or Prince of that Country for a good Justiciary; for he said the one of their tempers, both barbarous and cruel, resembled the other.

The fairest and justest way of Punishment is by Courts of War, if the case do not require a present animadversion: And that Court is to judge, and give Sentence according to the Military Laws of the Prince or State, in whose service the Army is. When the Sentence is pronounced, the General may either pardon the offender, or delay the execution, or alter the manner of his death. The most honourable death for a Delinquent Souldier is accounted Beheading; the next to that is Shooting, (which commonly is called Harquebusing;) if he be a Horse-man, with Pistols; if a Foot Souldier, with Muskets. But the Punishments of several Crimes are left by Martial Law, to the arbitrement of a Court of War; and some of these, aggravated by circumstances, are made Capital, though in themselves they be not such; of which, demurring to give present obedience, if an Enemy be conceiv'd to be near, is one; and this falls frequently out.

Ordinary punishments.

Military Punishments, which reach not to Death, are the Strappado, hanging up by the Thumbs, so that only the Delinquents Toes can touch the ground; laying Muskets on their Shoulders, more or fewer, for a longer or shorter time, according to the quality of the fault; to be kept in Prison for many days or weeks with Irons on them; and sometimes to be fed only with Bread

Bread and Water in Prison. Observe here, that without a Sentence of a Court of War, no Superiour Commander, be who he will, can keep an Inferiour Officer or Common Souldier longer in Prison than the imprisoned party calls for a hearing. There is also riding the Wooden Horse, on which sometimes the Offender hath his hands tyed behind his back, and sometimes Muskets, or other weights tyed to his feet: As likewise to be turned out of the Army by the Hang-man, to have their Ears cut off by the Hang-man, to be whipp'd by the Hang-man, to have their Swords broke by the Hang-man. I have known some who thought, that Souldiers who are whipp'd at *Galoupe*, should be turned out of the Army; which is a gross mistake, for they are appointed to be whipped by their Comrades, that they may be kept in the Army, for after an Officer or Souldier is put in a Hang-mans hand, he should serve no longer in any Army. *Gustavus Adolphus*, King of *Sweden*, first began it, in imitation belike of the custome the *Roman* Centurions had to whip their Souldiers. It is a *German* word, *Gaussen*, and comes from *Gau*, or *Gae*, which signifieth a Street; and *Lauffen*, or *Lauppen*, which is, to run; because he who is to be whipp'd, is to run through a Street, between two rows of Souldiers. The Provost Marshal is to furnish Rods, and to give the Delinquent the first lash; but if there be neither Provost nor Lieutenant, nor Servant of his (who is called *Stokknecht*) then the Drummers give the Rods.

A necessary observation.

The original on of *Galoupe*.

But there are several cases which require present Punishments to be inflicted by Officers and Commanders, without committing the Delinquents to Prison, or calling them before a Court of War; as in point of obtnacy, either in not doing the thing that is commanded, or not doing it in that manner that the Officer would have it done; the giving undutiful language in presence of a Superiour; speaking after silence is commanded; standing still after one is commanded to march or go: In any of these; and many other cases, a Sergeant may make use of his Halbert, and a Commissioned Officer of his Battoon, if the party offending be either an Inferiour Officer, or a Common Souldier. Nay, there be some cases wherein Officers may cut, wound, yea, kill, as in a Mutiny; whereof I have spoke already: In case Souldiers be Plundering, and will not forbear, when commanded; in case two be brawling and fighting together, and will not leave off: But killing should be used by no Officer, but where the service of the Prince, or the Vindication of Just Authority make it necessary. And therefore to kill Souldiers when they straggle on a march, unless they refuse to obey, and return to their Companies, I think is a crime in any Commander or Officer, except in a Marshal or Rumour-monger. And here I must acquaint my Reader with some nice distinctions that some make of Superiours beating their Inferiours.

In what cases Officers may strike, wound, or kill.

As first, that none under a Colonel may kill, nay, nor thrust with the point, or strike with the edge of a Sword, only they may strike with the broad side of it; but in some of these cases, which I have mention'd, especially Mutiny, both Commission'd and Uncommission'd Officers may strike with the edge, thrust with the point, yea, kill with their Swords; and if they do it not, they may be question'd upon their lives. Secondly, say some, A Sergeant should beat with nothing but his Halbert; and so say I too, if he have it by him (which he is not always bound to have;) but if not, he both may and ought to do it with his Sword, when emergencies require it. Thirdly, they will tell you, a Corporal must only beat with a Musket-rest, if he serve to foot, (for Corporals of Horse, they grant, may beat with their Swords,) but Musket-rests are now out of fashion, and when they were used, if a Corporal broke one of them in beating a Souldier, who should pay for it, the Corporal or the Souldier, is a hard question: He may therefore beat with his Sword, for none under an Ensign-bearer should be permitted to carry a Battoon; an abuse too much suffer'd. But fourthly, many Intelligent Commanders have averr'd, that none but a Major may strike with a Battoon, as also that he may beat with it any Officer under a Captain, that is, both Lieutenants and Ensigns, which they say is no affront to them, provided the Major immediately throw away his Battoon, and draw his Sword. Truly, there is no new custome but appears strange and bizarre at first, till it become common, and then it doth not seem strange at all. I find by my Lord *Carlowen's* testimony that this was the ordinary

Some nice Questions. First.

Second.

Third.

Fourth.



nary Military custome in *France*, in the latter end of the Reign of *Henry* the Great, not much more than three score years ago. But that whereat I wonder is, that a Battalion at that time, and yet, was not more odious to any people under the Sun than to the *French* Nation. But mark the reason that is given for this custome, because a Major (says *Louis de Montgomery*) carried always a Staff three foot and a half, or four foot long, to measure the length of the Souldiers huts, and with that he might strike, and with no other. A strange reason, I know no precedent for this custome, except that perhaps Drapers and Taylors may beat their Journey-men and Apprentices with those Ellis or Yards, wherewith they measure their Cloath. But now those whom the *French* call Marshals of Quarters, and we Quarter-masters, measure out to the Souldiers their proportion of ground for their huts, and ought to have a measure for it, may they therefore beat with it? I throw not. And why a Major should be permitted to strike with a Battalion more than a Lieutenant-Colonel, or a Colonel; or in *France*, more than a Captain (who often commands the Major) is more than I can divine. The Custome is a great deal better to strike at Lieutenants and Ensigns, with Swords, if necessity force their Superiours, (as sometimes it may) to strike at them at all. Fifthly, I have heard some very Philosophically discourse, and argue, That if a Superiour Commander draws his Sword against his Inferiour, the Inferiour is obliged to retire seven steps back; but if the Superiour pursue beyond that limit, the Inferiour may draw in his Defence. But this Argument is near in kin to some of those that are used for resistance of the Lawful and Civil Authority, and is an Ulcer of Rebellion: It calls all Order, Discipline and Command in a Chaos of Confusion: At best, it is but the contemplation of some Speculative brain; for who can tell whether the Inferiour hath gone back those seven steps, or not? Who reckon'd them? Witnesses will not agree in the measure. It is true, it is neither fit nor handsome, that the Superiour should pursue his Inferiour, if he pay him that respect as to retire from him; but if that Inferiour will pursue, it is permitted (and if I mistake not, commanded,) that the Inferiour fly, but not at all resist. But this is too ticklish a theme for Military Discourses. Though there may be other punishments, yet, I suppose, I have spoke of most. And now I shall desire all of my profession; of what quality soever they be, to proportionate their punishments to the crime; and to take good heed (as they will answer it one day to the great Judge) they do not revenge their private quarrels and grudges under the cloak of publick Justice. It is true, Military persons may say, That this warning of mine concerns them no more than it doth those who officiate both in Church and State, and neither indeed doth it.

Several kinds of Rewards.

I come now to our Military Rewards, which I may rank in three Classes, those are, Advancement in Military charges, Titles of Honour, and recompences or gratuities of Lands, or Money. The first and the third are, in my opinion, common to both Commanders and common Souldiers; for a Musketeer advanc'd to a Corporals place, and getting ten or twenty Shillings of Benevolence, hath his preferment and his gratuity, as well as that Commander who is advanc'd to be a Lieutenant General, and gets a Donative of 20000*l.* Sterling. But Titles of Honour are only given to deserving Commillion'd Officers, and to none below them. Among those Titles I reckon that to be one, to be made a Gentleman, and this is in opposition of what is commonly said, That all Souldiers are Gentlemen. I knew when the late Emperor, *Ferdinand* the Third, made Major General *Sperreuter* (who had done great services in the Wars) a Gentleman by Patent, because he was none by birth, and gave him a Coat of Arms. Most of all Titles of Honour, as Dukes, Marquesses, Earls, Barons, and Knights, have been given for services in the Wars; notwithstanding which, Princes neither can, nor will be restricted to confer Honours on others of their Subjects, who both have deserv'd or may deserve Honour as well as Sword-men: But herein I will not offer to play the Herald. The time was never, is not, nor can in reason be ever expected to be, that Kings can gratifie all who have serv'd them Loyally. The late Emperour, in our own time, conferr'd both Riches and Honour on many, yet where one who had serv'd him, was rewarded, two hundred were not.

Princes cannot reward all who have served them.

not. Queen *Christina* of *Sweden*, was so profuse in bestowing both Honours and Lands on those who had done her service in the *German* War, that she was thought to have made a prostitution of the first, and to have disposed of the second, even to the sensible diminution of the Revenues of the Crown; and yet not one Officer of a hundred that had serv'd her, tasted of her liberality. His Majesty now reigning, hath honour'd and enrich'd many, but it is not possible for him to reward all; yet those who have not got, should not envy those on whom he hath conferr'd his Princely Favours and Rewards.

The ancient custome of praising and commending those who have done any particular kind of Military service, continues yet; for every General doth something like it, but they have not that power over the Treasury, that the *Roman* Consuls had in the Fields. Our late Politicians can tell us, That their Fore-fathers were so wise, as not to entrust both the Sword and the Purse to one person, and yet Souldiers were never better paid, nor the Prince his service better done, than when he who commanded the Arms, commanded the Purse likewise. But when a General cannot reward of himself, he should not fail to acquaint his Master with the names of the persons who have done him services, with a specification what those were. Marshal *Monluc* had done great things to *Henry* the Second, when he was but Colonel, under the Count of *Briac*, Marshal of *France*: The Noble Earl did represent those services so handsomely to the *French* King, that *Monluc* was made Gentleman of the Bed-chamber, and Governour of *Saint* *Abbe* in *Savoy*. Upon this subject, he hath these expressions in the Second Book of the first Tome of his Commentaries: 'It is an unspeakable grief to a Gentleman, who hath liberally expos'd his life in several actions, when both himself and his services are conceal'd from the Prince, upon whom all the Lives, Honours, and Fortunes of his Servants do depend; there is no theft, says he, nor robbery comparable to that which is made of a mans Honour: And yet many Generals make no Conscience to commit that theft, and that Robbery. Thus far *Monluc*. And since he dyed, Experience hath hath confirm'd the truth of his Observation, Generals loving too well to take both the praise and benefit of all that is done well to themselves, and with a great deal of dexterity, they lay the miscarriage of all their own actions at other mens doors. The *Swedish* Felt-Marshals, *Banier* and *Torsten*, in our own time, were none of those Generals, for they rewarded Officers and Souldiers themselves, as well as they could; and when they could not help them, they generously recommended them to the Administrators of *Sweden*, in the Queens minority, with a grateful remembrance of their services.

Generals should make Gentlemen services known.

*Monluc* his sense of it.

Knighthood, in former times, was a peculiar and honourable reward of Military men, and that which is conferr'd in the Field, in time of action, is assuredly the most honourable. But Sovereign Princes have thought it fit, either when they were infested with War, or other grievous calamities, or after some glorious Victory, to unite and tie some of their Great Captains and Chieftains in a fraternity, and to confer on them, with splendid and magnificent Ceremonies, a peculiar Order of Knighthood, thereby to enslave both them and others, to Vertuous and Valorous actions: The oldest, and most Honourable, is that of the Garter, instituted by *Edward* the Third, of *England*, under the Patrocinny of *Saint George*; as that of the Thistle of *Scotland* was under *Saint Andrew*. *John* of *Valois*, King of *France*, instituted the order of the Star, under the protection of *Saint Owen*, say the *French*; as one of his Successors, *Louis* the Eleventh, instituted that of *Saint Michael*. In the minority of *Henry* the Sixth, of *England*, when the War was hot between that Kingdom and *France*, *Philip* le Bon, Duke of *Burgundy*, instituted the Noble Order of the Golden Fleece, under the protection of *Saint Andrew*. The King of *Denmark* makes Knights of the Elephant, and the Duke of *Savoy* those of the Annunciation. *Christina*, Queen of *Sweden*, instituted a new Order of Knighthood, which she would have called the Order of the *Amaranth*; which, they say, never withers, and accordingly she appointed the Device to be *semper idem*. The Knights of the *Tewonick*, or *Dutch* Order, those of *St. John* of *Jerusalem*, called afterwards Hospitaliers, Knights of the *Rhodes*, and now of *Malta*; as also those of the Sepulchre, or Knights Templars, were, and some

Several orders of it.

Religious Orders of Knighthood.

some yet are very Martial Knights, whose renowned Actions are, and ever will be on the Records of Fame. But there were likewise Religious Orders, for they vowed Chastity, Poverty, and Obedience: And from Religion have come most of the Spanish Orders of Knighthood. *Santiss*, the third of that name, King of *Castile*, for the more vigorous prosecution of the War against the Infidels, instituted the Order of *Calatrava*, in the Kingdom of *Toledo*: The Master of which Order is a person of great Riches and Power. His Son *Alphonse* the Ninth (in the time of his dangerous War with the *Moors*) instituted the Order of *Saint James*, which hath since come to that height of power, that the Master of it is one of the greatest Subjects of *Spain*: But *Ferdinand*, the first Catholick King, made himself and his Successors (with the help of the Pope) Masters of these Orders. One of the Kings of *Portugal*, when he had Wars with both the *Saracens* of *Africk* and *Spain*, instituted the Order of the Knights of *Jesus Christ*. About the year 1570. the Queen of *Navarre* caused 12 great Medals of Gold to be coined, which she distributed among 12 of the most eminent Chieftains of the Reformed Religion, as tokens of their fraternity, to incite them to Constancy, Valour, and Perseverance, in the Cause against the *Roman* Catholicks. Upon one side of the Medal were these words: *Assured Peace, Entire Victory, or Honest Death*. On the Reverse was the Queens own name, with that of her Son, the Prince of *Beaune*, who was afterwards *Henry* the Fourth, the Great, King of *France* and *Navarre*.

Jan & Albert.

Works of Charity.

Pallas.

War drains the Treasures of Princes and States so dry, that for most part they are not able to pay the Wages and Arrears of those who serve them, much less reward them. The *Roman* Oak, Olive, and Laurel Crowns, are out of fashion long ago, nor would they signify any thing, but rather be ridiculous, unless they were given with all the Wages due to the party, who is to be honour'd with one of those Crowns, as the *Romans* were accustomed to do. I have observ'd in another place, how in many parts of Christendome, Officers, above the quality of private Captains, many times are reduced to beggary; to obviate which, since Princes and States cannot forbear War, or will not live in Peace, it would be a great work of Charity in them, and would much redound to their Honour and Fame, to build some Hospitals, and endue them with some small Revenue, in which those Commanders who are lame, old, and poor, might get a morsel of Bread; which would be an exceeding great relief to those distressed Gentlemen, and much encourage younger people to engage in a fresh War; for alais, though written Testimonies, sign'd and seal'd by the Prince or his General, may be of good use to young and lusty Gallants, who have their Health, and some Money in their Purfes, to look for new Fortunes; yet Passes (though never so favourable) to poor old men; are, upon the matter, nothing else but fair Commissions to beg.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. XXVIII.

### The Comparison made by Justus Lipsius of the Ancient and Modern Militia, examined.

IT is one of the Curses that follow'd *Adam's* fall, and I think was inherent in him before his fall, that as he was not, so none of his Posterity can be content with his present condition. The longing desire we have to enjoy that we want, robs us of the content we may have of what we possess. Hence it is, that old men cry up those customs that were used when they were Boys, vilifying the present, and magnifying the by-past times. Neither is this *salsitium*, or loathing of present things, the concomitant of age only, for young men, who are in their strength, are tainted with it. Some are displeased with the Government of the State, others hugely dissatisfied with that of the Church, because none of them are cast in those moulds, which they fancy to be better than the present ones; and though perhaps they cannot pretend to have seen better in their own times, yet they have heard or read of those which they conceive were so absolutely good, that nothing can be added to their perfection. Others like only of those Governments which have their birth, rise, growth, and perfection in their own giddy brains.

But to come nearer our purpose, few Souldiers are satisfied with their own Country Militia; for if they have been abroad in the World, at their return home, they cry up the Arms, the Art, and the Discipline of Foreigners; nor can they find any thing at home can please them. And though their occasions have never invited them to take a view of strange places, yet their Books afford them matter enough, to prefer those Arms, those Exercises, those Guards, those Figures of Battels, that Discipline of War they never saw, to all those they may daily see. Of this disease of Discontent, I think, *Justus Lipsius* hath been irrecoverably sick, and though he did not compile a Military Systeme of his own, as *Machiavelli* did; yet I may compare these two in this, that both of them were Speculative Souldiers. *Lipsius* is so far disgusted with the Militie of his own time, (which truly, being about eighty or ninety years ago, was an excellent one) which he might have seen and observ'd, better than his Writings shew he did; and is so much in love with the old *Roman* Militia, (which he never saw but by contemplation) that in the comparison he makes of the two, in the last Chapter of his Commentary on *Polybius*, he is not assham'd to prefer the Ancient Art of War to the Modern one, in all its dimensions.

As I conceive, he was so Rational as to think no man would deny the Modern Militie to want its imperfections; so, I suppose, none will be so void of it with the Reason, as to grant to him, that the *Roman* one was absolutely perfect. He hath read it sure in the best of Authors, That nothing below the Sun is perfect. And I would have it observ'd, that though the Title of the Comparison be, Of the Ancient and Modern Militia, yet all along in the Comparison it self he mentions only the *Roman*, as if that had been the only Ancient one, whereas he knew the *Grecian* was more Ancient than it, the *Judaick* older than the *Grecian*, and the *Aegyptian* older than all the three. My purpose then being neither to derogate from the excellent worth of the *Roman*, nor to vilipend the Modern Art of War, I hope, without any offence to the alhes of the Learned *Lipsius*, I may take a view of his Comparison, wherein he speaks of all the five essential points of War, and in them all gives the preheinance to the *Roman*; let us hear his Reasons.

The first point is Election or Levy, of which he avers very magisterially that the *Roman* was the best, and which now, saith he, cannot be imitated, except

Discontent follows humane nature.

*Justus Lipsius* an admirer of the *Roman* Militia.

He compares it with the Modern Art of War.

In five points.

First, in Election or Levy.

except perhaps in some Republicks, and among those, he says, the Commonwealth of *Venice* is so far from imitating the *Romans*, that she restrains her Citizens from the Exercise of Arms at Land, permitting them only to serve in her Naval Militia. In answer to this, I think *Lipsius* deals very rudely with Monarchs (himself being a subject of one of them) who, by his assertion, neither have the best way of Levy, nor can imitate the best way; for he plainly says, the *Roman* Levy is the best, and cannot be imitated but by some Republicks, and not by all of them neither. In the next place I say, that though Princes do not bring all their Subjects together in Arms every year, and out of them enrol some to be Souldiers, as the *Romans* did, yet it may satisfy *Lipsius*, if they do the equivalent; and that is, to order the matter so, that their Subjects on a Frontier be ready in an instant to withstand an invasion, till the Prince with a greater force comes to repel it: Or if Princes intend to invade others, then by their several Municipal Laws, they make in a short time such a Levy as serves their turn; witness the Commission of Array in *England*, the raising of all between sixteen and sixty in *Scotland*; out of which an Election is quickly made. But *Lipsius* might have remember'd the seven Legions which were appointed by *Francis* the First to be perpetually maintain'd, and in readiness, in *France*; in imitation of the *Romans*: Of which, notwithstanding Marshal *Montuc* writes, that *France* in its Wars found no advantage. So little did that great Captain care for imitating the *Roman* Levy; and if it be true, that *Credendum Artifici in sua arte*, we should in a matter that belongs to War, sooner trust *Montuc*, perpetually vers'd in Arms, than *Lipsius*, mew'd up most part of his life in a Cell. And if *Lipsius* be offended with the beat of Drum and sound of Trumpet for our Modern Levies, he should have remember'd, that *Rome* had likewise her sudden and tumultuary Levies. And if he mislike that Princes and States should give such trust to so great numbers of Strangers as ordinarily they Levy, and keep in Pay, he should remember that the *Romans* trusted their Allies as much, if not more; and after the name of Allies was obliterated, Auxiliaries of strange Nations had the same trust. In the days of our Fathers, and our own too, the Estates of *Venice*, and the *United Provinces*; the Emperour, the Kings of *France* and *Spain*, of *Denmark* and *Sweden*, have done great feats by the Levies and maintenance of Strangers.

The second part of the Comparison consists in the Order kept in their Armies: Here he cries out, *O, ille bonus in re Romanâ*! O, how good it was in the *Roman* Milice! But that is not enough, he adds, See the Centurions, the Ensign-bearers, and the Options; here, says he, nothing is wanting, nothing redounding. Yes, by your favour, *Lipsius*, I have shewn in my Discourses of the *Roman* Milice, there was much wanting. But here our Author speaks not one word of, or against the Order of the Modern Militia, and therefore I need not speak one word for it, yet he seems to detract from it, by crying up the other so much. When he speaks of Officers, he seems to say the *Romans* had enough of them, and we too many: But if this last be true, as perhaps it is, I affirm the *Romans* had too few; for to speak of their Foot, I know not what to make of their Centurions, Sub-Centurions, or Options; but Caporals, Lance-pelates, and Bringers-up, as I told you in another place. Nor do I find their Cavalry commanded by any Officers in chief under a Consul or a Legate, for the Decurions were not subordinate one to another, nor had any of them a greater command than our Corporals or Brigadiers of Horse. All these I look on as Defects, nor hath *Lipsius* prov'd the contrary. In our Modern Militia there is an order that our Colonels shall be with their Regiments and Brigades, and not stand in an heap together, as *Lipsius* makes his *Roman* Tribunes to be in time of Battel, all at the Eagle of the first Legion; waiting on the Consul, as his Lackies, or at best, as his Adjutants: And this, I conceive, was another defect in the *Roman* Militia, wherof our Modern one cannot be accused.

Thirdly, He compares the Ancient and Modern Arms, and truly I shall easily grant that Defensive Arms were more used in *Lipsius* his time, than they are now, & that they were better in more ancient times, than in either his time, or ours. But that will not satisfy him, for he will have the *Roman* Weapons, or Defensive Arms,

to

to be prefer'd to ours. He acknowledgeth the Pike to be a useful Weapon; The Pike: but not so good as those Arms the *Romans* had; and for this he cites the authority of *Polybius*; of which I can say no more than I have done in my view of that Authors comparison of the *Grecian* Phalanx and the *Roman* Legion, wherof I shall repeat nothing in this place. *Lipsius* says, A Bow is a more useful Engine of War than an Harquebus; I shall not add any thing here to what I have spoke of the neglect of the Bow; but though I think well of it, I dare not for all that, attribute so much to the strength of an Arrow, shot by the strongest Arm, and most experienc'd Archer that ever liv'd, as to a Bullet shot out of a Harquebus; and yet *Lipsius* attributes still as much, and offers to prove it by several instances taken out of Authors: I pray have the patience to hear them. *Plutarch* in the life of *Cassius* says, That the *Parthian* Arrows pierc'd and kill'd through the strongest Armour that was ever forg'd on an Anvil; and *Agathias* tells our Author, That Arrows shot by a certain *Goth*, kill'd men through both a Target and a Corset. I think this was much, but if you think it not so, then hear what follows, If the Arrows shot by that dreadful *Goth* fell on Stones or on Rocks, they split and broke them in pieces. If this be true, I wonder why the *Goths* did not rather batter the Walls of Besieged Towns with Bow and Arrow than with the Ram. But take another story along with you, *Procopius* speaks universally of the Archers of his time, that their Arrows could not be resisted by either Target or Corset, nor by both. To all this I answer, first, If what these Authors say be true, then the Ancients made all their Defensive Arms in vain; for joynt reports of several Authors together, you may make this conclusion, That no Head-piece, no Target, no Back nor Breast, could resist Arrows, Stones, nay, nor Swords. Secondly I say, If Arrows could not be resisted with well temper'd Iron or Steel, then it is purely impossible to make Armour Musket-proof; and yet that this may be done, and was done in his own time, *Lipsius* knew very well, and this, I conceive is *argumentum ad hominem*. Thirdly, I say, our Author should have been ashamed to be so credulous as to believe all he read in Historians, who, no doubt, had these tales told them in their own days at the corner of a Chimney, by some Theoretical Souldiers, who either said, they did these feats themselves, or avouch'd they saw them done by others.

*Lipsius* prefers the Sling (particularly that which is tyed to a Battoon) to our Hand-guns, or Bombards, as he calls them. The Stones or Lead cast by those Battoon-slings, did likewise (as our Author avers) break through Corsets, Targets, and all manner of Armour: And here he cries loud, *Nego, Nego, Bombardis his nostris majorem vim esse posse, fortasse nec tantum*: I deny, I deny, says he, that Hand-guns can have a greater force, perhaps not so great; he adds, *excipio Musquetta qua vocant*: I except, says he, those Guns which they call Muskets. This is all like the rest of the stuff before. But yet he goes a greater length, and tells us gravely, That the Lead Bullets thrown out of these Battoon-slings, were cast with such violent force that they melted by the way; and to let us see he is in good earnest, he offers to prove it by the Authority of both Philosophers and Poets, as well as Historians. To the first, I say, if *Seneca* (for he is the Philosopher cited) had liv'd in *Lipsius* his time he would have alter'd his opinion, when he saw (which *Lipsius* might have seen ten thousand times if he had pleas'd) Bullets shot with an incomparable greater force than can be attributed to the Arm of Man, that is, by force of Fire (the violent Agent that nature hath, which melts any Lead; when he saw, I say, those Bullets batter, break, wound and kill, without being melted. The reason given by *Seneca* and *Lipsius* for the melting, is that the swift motion extenuates the air, that extenuated air becomes fire, and that fire melts the Lead. What foppery is this? Is there any motion swifter than that of a Bullet, shot from a Gun, and yet that motion (whose efficient cause is fire) melts not the Lead. It is strange, that *Lipsius* should have believed that which he read more than that which he saw. His next Authority is from Poets, and he cites four of them, that so he might convince us who are unbelievers, with the testimony of many Witnesses. But our Author knows what is permitted to Poets, and what faith we owe them. Hear one of them.

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Ovid.

*Non secus exarsit, quam cum balærica plumbum  
Fundæ jacit, volat illud, & incandescit unda;  
Et quos non habuit, sub nubibus invenit ignes.*

This is so pretty a story, that I think my self oblig'd to give you it in English,

It burns, as doth a piece of Lead that's cast  
Out of a Sling, it melts, it flies so fast;  
For when it doth below the Welkin soar,  
It finds those Fires which it had not before.

Vegetius his authority

Very questionable in this point.

Lipsum's small esteem of Artillery.

David a good Slinger.

Lipsum laughs and scoffs at an Italian Writer, whom he names not, for saying, That he believ'd the strongest Arm that ever was, could not throw a Stone above forty paces, that could do any hurt. I am not of that Italian's opinion, and yet I do not believe with Lipsum, that a Slinger could hit a mark with a Stone six hundred real foot. He cites for this the Authority of Vegetius, in the twenty third Chapter of his Second Book, where he says, That Sheaves of Corn or Grains were set up for the Bow-men and Slingers at six hundred foot distance, as marks, which they hit often. I believe an Arrow may do it, but that a Battoon-slinger can do so much, I say in our Authors own words, *Nego, Nego*. But I must tell you, in this citation of Vegetius, Lipsum plays fast and loose; he knows the first part of Vegetius his assertion is very questionable, and that is concerning Bow-men, who, he says, were exercis'd by the Ancient Romans; for we find (as in another place I have observ'd) in other Authors, that till the time of the Emperours, none of the Romans handled a Bow, or any of their Allies either; nor can I find they were used by any who serv'd for them or with them, till after the Hæmibulic War! And if Vegetius hath err'd in the first part of his assertion, (as I believe Lipsum knew he did) why would the same Lipsum offer to impose on our Faith, as to make us believe that Battoon-slingers threw lumps of Lead, and did mischief with them at the distance of six hundred foot, especially when the Lead they cast, was of one pound weight, as the same Vegetius says they were? But let us suppose all to be true that Lipsum reports of the six hundred foot, yet it is most certain that Musketeers are able to wound, break, bruise, and kill, before these Battoon-slingers come within distance to cast either Stones or pieces of Lead.

After this, Lipsum tells us very stoutly, That the noise of the Modern Cannon and Muskets terrifies none but Birds. He speaks this like a Philosopher, and one that sate constantly in a Cell, and never either smelt Powder, or heard a Bullet fly. He avers, the Romans would not at all have troubled themselves with Guns; but who will take Lipsum his word for that, when he reads in several Histories that they were appall'd, frighten'd, and chac'd out of the Field with Arms and Weapons not so terrible by half. And lastly, he shows himself so much an Admirer of a Sling, that he doth not at all wonder that David kill'd Goliath with one of them. Nor shall I wonder either, if Lipsum can assure me that the Gyants Helmet did not cover his fore-head; but if it did, (as probably it did) and that his Head-piece was proportionable to the Coat of Mail he had on his Body, (as probably it was) then I shall say, David could not kill him with Pebble-stones cast out of a Sling, without a Miracle; for the Stone that could pierce such a Head-piece, requir'd a greater force than David, and twenty of the strongest Israelites were Masters of; and, no doubt, it was assisted from above.

Upon this whole business of Arms, I think it was well for Lipsum, that he was taken up with more grave Studies, that could allow him no time to read Romances; for if the Authors of those had but declared all the acts of Knight-errantry to have been done by the Ancient Romans, Lipsum had undoubtedly believ'd them all to be true stories. Let us hear what he says more. He finds our Modern Artillery good for nothing but for battering the Walls of Towns and Forts; for in Battel, says he, any rising ground, little Bank, or Breast-work, being quickly cast up, eludes all the hurt Artillery can do. He is so far in

in the right, that these helps (whereof he speaks) are very good, if the General who useth them stand still, and only endeavour to keep his ground; but in day of Battel unless he advances, he shall not win the Field; and if he advances, he must quit those shelters; and the sudden and quicker his march is, the less hurt he shall receive from the Enemies Ordnance. But I think it is very fair, that Lipsum is so modest, that he doth not prefer the Ancient Catapults and Balists to the Modern Artillery, and I wonder much he did it not.

In the fourth place he brings Embattelling or Marshalling Armies on the Stage, and according to his custom, prefers the Roman, yet doth not tell us wherein the Modern is deficient; and this is not so fair dealing as might have been expected from such a man as Lipsum. But I am only to trace him in his own steps, and that which he saith on this subject amounts to this: He first says, he will let us see the *Velles* fight, and retire; in whose room he marshals the *Hæstati*, they being weary, go back; to them succeed the *Principes*, who not prevailing, retire; then the *Triarii*, who are, saith he, the *Veterans* and the *Chieftains*, take the work in hand, and they cannot but prosper: Yet he who wrote this, cannot but know for all this, that both the Roman *Velles*, their *Hæstati*, *Principes* and *Triarii*, have been beat out of the Field often than once. All these things have been already sufficiently spoke of. But I wonder who could tell Lipsum that Modern Generals have not their Reserves, as well as the Romans had; sure in his own time, if he had but enquir'd after it, he might have learn'd that the Duke of *Ava*, and Prince of *Parma*, divided their Armies into Van, Battel, and Rear; and what were the Roman three fold Battalions but the same; and since Lipsum's time, if great Captains, for good reasons, have thought they could do their business better with one Reserve than with two; I suppose, Lipsum, if he were alive, might acquiesce to it, and not examine their reasons why they do not tie themselves to the Roman method. But the Jest is, Lipsum will have a Retreat from one Body to the second, and from that to the third, to be a great secret; *Modum arduum*, he calls it. This might be a secret to him, and those of his profession, but to no Soldiers; and yet he hath the vanity to desire all Generals (*Duces* he calls them) to consider well of his secret; but, I suppose, few of them need thank him for revealing such secrets. In the next place, he cries up the Roman manner of Embattelling, for placing, says he, their Cavalry on the Wings or Horns; that their Foot should not be surrounded, nor their Battel out-wing'd. What folly was this in him, to appropriate that to the Romans, which was an ordinary custom with other Ancients, it may be, before Rome was a City. And it is strange he did not know that it was the customs of all Nations; since the downfall of the Roman Empire. But I must come nearer him, and say, That this was a defect very oft in the Roman Militia, to marshal their Armies so that it could not save them from being surrounded by a numerous Enemy, in regard they drew up so many Bodies one behind another; and those Bodies were marshall'd so deep in File, that their Armies could not (especially Consular Armies) have a large Front; the best means in a Campaign, (where there are no advantages of Hills, Rivers, Ditches, or Marshes to be expected) to save an Army from being out-wing'd. When Lipsum wrote this, it seems he forgot that at Cannæ, the Roman Horie did so little hinder the Foot to be surrounded, that the not adverting to it, lost them the day; for *Asdrubal* having beaten *Scipio* on the Right Wing, fell on the Rear of the Legions, while they fought in Front with *Hannibal* his Foot, and routed them. And if Lipsum distrust *Livy* in this relation, let him look on the first Book of his own *Polybius*, and there he will find, That *Xanthippus* the Lacedæmonian, with an Army of *Carthaginians*, (who had been often beaten and baffled before) and a few Mercenary *Lævians*, routed the Roman Army (where the Consul *Regulus* was taken) only by out-winging it, and falling on the Rear of their Infantry by which (says the Author) *cagebatque facta conversione, cum illi dimicare*. He was forced by facing to the Rear to fight with them, that is, with the *Carthaginians*.

Fifthly, and lastly, he compares the Ancient (I suppose still Roman) and Modern Militia in their Discipline. And this he divides into three parts, Duties, Exercises, and Laws. I shall trace him in all the three. And first, he subdivides Duties into three.

Lipsum his mistake.

Fourthly, Embattelling.

A ridiculous mystery.

Lipsum his inadvertency.

Defects in the Roman manner of Embattelling.

Fifthly, in Discipline, which he divides into three.

First, Duties, subdivided, Private services.

Watches,

Rounds.

A gross mistake of Lippius.

Publick works.

A Souldier is oblig'd to work for his own safety.

Duties into three; these are, Private Services to Officers, Watches, and Publick Works. As to the first, he says, Private Services to Superiors a little cease'd, or are voluntary. He is right, they are voluntary; yet no Souldier now will refuse to do any honest service to his Captain, or any Officer either above or under him; and Lippius knows the Roman Souldiers were no Slaves, and why should Christian Souldiers be Slaves? As to the second part of Duties, which is Watch and Guard, he confesseth, there is some show of them in the Modern Militia not to be contemned; for so I interpret his words, which are, *aliqua, nec improba, apud nos spectis*. But he adds, *Credo tamen aliqua meliora ac tutiora olim fuisse*. But I believe, says he, that of old some things in Watches were better and surer; yet I am not obliged to make his belief the ground of my faith, to believe any such thing. And though he tells us not wherein our Modern Guards are defective, yet he seems to hint at the *Tessera*, or Word, at the stations before Ports, at the Rounds, and at the division of the Vigils. To all which I answer thus: The Modern Words or Signs (when it is great) are given and received with as much secrecy and caution, and with a great deal of less trouble than the Ancient *Tessera* was. Our Rounds in the night, and visiting the Guards in the day time, are as frequent and as orderly; and the neglect of either them or the Guards, as severely punish'd as among either the Romans or the Grecians. But he says, one man standing now at a Port is thought a sufficient Guard for it; truly, I say, he who thinks so is a very insufficient Souldier, nor can I imagine that ever our Author saw in his own Country (which in his time was the Stage of *Mars*) a Port guarded only with a Sentinel. It hath been his gross mistake, for that Sentinel which he took to be the Guard, stood there to challenge Strangers, and upon occasion to call out the Corporal or whole Watch, who were within a House builded and appointed for them, commonly called a Court of Guard. As to the Vigils, we have sometimes Double Sentinels, none whereof sleeps, none whereof sits; and if there is but one Sentinel, yet he being visited not only by the Rounds, but frequently by the Corporal or other Officers, will keep as good, if not better Watch, than four Romans on one Post, whereof only one stood and watch'd, the other three lay and slept; and were visited only by the *Circitores*, and not at all by their own Commanders. I know not what he means by the Division of the Vigils, for certainly a Clock, a Passelunt, or a Sand-glass can divide the hours, and measure the night, as well as a Roman Water-glass.

The third kind of Duties, which Souldiers are bound to pay, are Publick Works; and here you may be sure he will prefer the Roman Souldiers for their wonderful fatigue, to all our Modern Souldiery. And so he may, but I will not suffer him to calumniate us, and charge us with more idleness and sloth than we are guilty of: For first, he avers, That all publick works are altogether omitted; he says, Souldiers will not lay their hands to a Spade or to a Mattock: They cry out, says he, It is a shame for a Souldier to meddle with these, let others be employed for such services. It is true, such words have been heard, but very soon compell'd. And I verily believe, Lippius had such an animosity against the Modern Militia, that he never either convers'd with Modern Armies, or endeavour'd to learn their customs; otherwise he might have seen the contrary of those things he wrote, even at that time when he wrote them. It is a generally receiv'd Maxime, for any thing I know, in all our Modern Armies, That a Souldier is bound to work any thing that can make for his own Defence; and under that notion, he must not refuse to work in Approaches before Towns, to make up Breaches, Retrenchments, and Countermures within Towns, and to make Sconces, Redouts, and Bastions, for the Fortification of Camps and Leaguers. If our Author had gone to *Holland* with the Duke of *Alva*, he had seen his Souldiers work all these at the Sieges of *Harlem* and *Leyden*; or nearer to his own Town of *Lowaine*, he might have seen the Prince of *Parma's* men work laboriously at the Sieges of *Gant*, *Amoyver*, and many other places; or if he had made a step with that Prince over to *France*, in his two marches thither, he would have seen his Souldiers refuse none of those works I have spoke of. Nay, I will tell him that, which will make him inexcusable, either for Ignorance or Malice, when he wrote this. The Spanish Souldiers (and Lippius was the King of Spain's Subject) thought it a

disgrace

disgrace for them to suffer Pioneers to work in the Approaches, they would do it themselves, nor would they take Money for their work, for they said they receiv'd the Kings pay for that, as well as for fighting; their custom was to dig in the Approaches with a Helmet and Back-piece, but nothing on their Breasts and Bellies, because when they bow'd their Bodies to work, only their Heads and Backs were in danger. But if a Prince or a General can ease his Souldiers, by the assistance of Countrey people and Pioneers, will it not be well done? Will they not be the more fit, and the more ready to fight? I suppose they will. Did not *Cesar's* Legate, at the Siege of *Marselles*, make the Countrey Clowns cut down Trees, bring them to his Camp, and help him in many other Drudgeries; let him read *Cesar's* Commentaries, and he will find he did so.

Among those Publick Works he reckons Encamping, and so he may justly do. And here he fiercely chargeth the men of the Modern Militia with the neglect of both the parts of Encamping, those are, Calstrametation and Fortification; and he doth it in a very few words, *Aperie confidemus, & sine certo ordine*; we sit down, says he, in our Camps open, and without any regular order. I should think that he who wrote this, either was never in a Modern Camp, or did not at all take heed to it. The several quarters are as orderly divided as ever they were with his Romans; for proving which I refer you to my Discourse of Modern Calstrametation; neither will you find so many defects in it, as I have observed to be in the Roman, even as it is describ'd by *Polybius*, *Turdus*, *Preillac*, *Stenechius*, and by Lippius himself. As to the Fortification of the Camp, he says, we use none, except it be a *Waggonburg*, or Sconce of Waggon, whereof I spoke formerly, and which he in barbarous *Latin* calls *Carraago*. I shall here repeat something (for clearing this matter) of what I spoke in another place. Our Modern Generals hold it to be exceeding troublesome, and not at all necessary, to fortify their Camps every night, when no Enemy is near them: And when one is near, if they resolve to fight, they stand all night in a fighting posture; if they do not resolve to fight, they either retire, or they fortify. If an Army be to stay for one night or two, Generals chuse some high or close piece of ground for Encamping, after the Grecian custom; and where it is deficient, they help it by some artificial works, or with such a *Carraago* as Lippius speaks of. And I pray you, what necessity for fortifying a Leaguer every night, where there is no danger? what good doth it, nay, how much hurt doth it? To make Souldiers work the half of the night to fortify that Camp (when you are in no danger) which you are to leave the next day betimes. Is this any thing else but to give your Souldiers a needless fatigue? Hath Lippius never read it, That the just man is merciful even to his Beast? But in this Discourse our Author is very injurious to those great Captains who were coetaneous with him, who were very expert in that point of War, and used it more than hath been practis'd since. Let any peruse the Histories of his times, they will find, that at all their Sieges (which were many and frequent) all their Camps were excellently well fortified with a double Circumvallation, one against the Besieged place, and another against those without who would attempt to relieve it. If Lippius had liv'd some years longer than I suppose he did, he would have recanted, when he saw *Spinola's* Siege of *Breda* in the year 1625, for there he might have seen stranger works than ever any he read of; and with which *Cesar's* Circumvallations either when he besieg'd *Allesia*, or when he offer'd to besiege *Pompey's* Army at *Durrachium*, could not compare. For here at *Breda*, the Spanish outward or exterior Entrenchment against the Prince of *Orange* and all his Abettors, was of fifty two miles circumference, and the inner or interior against the Town, of sixteen. In both which were reckon'd (beside the Fortification of some Villages, for securing Convoys) above three hundred and sixty Forts, Batteries, Sconces and Redouts; so that he who writes the particular History of that famous Siege, hath reason to say, That there was such a Labyrinth of Fortifications there, that none but those who saw them will have faith enough to believe it.

Our Author tells us here, what a great benefit it was to the Romans, to have a Camp to which they might retire after a Battel. But he might have learned, that the great Captains of the Modern Militia propose to themselves no advantage by these Retreats, justly fearing their Souldiers may retire before it be

Custom of Spanish Souldiers 80 year ago.

Encamping.

Calstrametation.

Of the Fortification of the Camp.

Both of them ordinary in Lippius his time.

Spinola his wonderful Circumvallations at Breda.

A Retreat to  
a Camp dan-  
gerous.

Instances.

half time, or before they get order for it. And if *Lipſius* had been pleas'd he might have remember'd that his own *Romans* made sometimes very bad use of retiring to their Camp: As when they run to it from their Enemy in their Mutiny against *Appius Claudius*, and at other times too; as I have observ'd in my first Chapter of the *Roman Art of War*. Nay, some of their Consuls, in my first Chapter of the *Roman Art of War*. At *Ciminius*, another *Fabius*, a Dictator being to fight with the *Samnites*, cast down his Entrenchment, burnt his Tents, fought, and gain'd the Victory; as you may see it in *Livy's Ninth Book*. At *Ciminius*, another *Fabius* caused his Drudges in the night-time to cast down his Ramparts, and fill up the Ditch, while he march'd his Army, wherewith he march'd out, and fought next morning with Success. *Cato* the elder being to fight with the *Spaniards*, led his Army in the night-time a great circuit, even behind the Enemies Camp, and next morning did shew his Souldiers where they were; remonstrated to them what they had to do, and that there was an impossibility to get back to their own Camp, but over the Bellies of their Enemies; they fought and got the Victory. These great *Roman* Captains, you see, were not of *Lipſius* his Judgement. But further, the *Roman Senate* imputed the loss of *Cannae* to the Retreat of their Army to the Camp, and accordingly punish'd all that were taken in the Camp, for that Retreat. And besides that, take two other Instances of the hurt their Retreats to their Camps were like to do: The Consul *Antilius*, fighting against the *Samnites*, saw his Foot fly shamefully, he instantly order'd some of his Cavalry to get between them and the Camp, and by meer force drive them back; this was done by the Horse, and the *Roman Foot* desperately turning head, gain'd the day; see *Livy's Ninth Book*. At that great Battel which *Lucius Scipio* fought with *Antiochus*, the Left Wing of the *Roman Foot* being indifferently well secur'd by a River, the Consul made his Left Wing of Horse the weaker; which *Antiochus* perceiving, caus'd a brisk charge to be given on the Horse; and routed them; and immediately fell on the left Flank of the Foot, who not enduring it, fled toward the Camp; but the Tribune who was left for the defence of it, illud with his Cohorts, and forced the flying Legions to face about; which they doing, fought well, and gain'd the day. If this Tribune had let them enter the Camp, as he might, by *Lipſius's* consent, have done; in all probability, the rest of the Legions had left the Field, which, no doubt, had given *Antiochus* the Sovereignty of the greatest part of *Asia*.

Exercises.

*Lipſius* hath kept us long in the comparison of the first part of Discipline, which consists of Duties; now he comes to the second part, which is compos'd (as he will have it) of Trainings and Exercisings; these, he says, in the Modern Discipline are wholly omitted and neglected. In answer to which, I say, I have spoke of great and very great neglects in this point of the Military Art in the later times: But I cannot, I dare not, I will not believe our Author, that they were either neglected or omitted in his days, unless I give the lie to all the Histories of those times, which witness, That *Flanders* and *Holland*, the first for the King of *Spain*, the second for the Estates of the *United Provinces*, were the Military Schools where most of the Youth of *Europe* did learn all their Military Exercises.

Military  
Laws.

Lastly, he makes the third part of the Discipline of War to consist in Military Laws. And truly, if all be true he says, he needs make no comparison in this point between the Ancient and Modern Militia; for he avers we have no Laws at all, or very few; or if any at all, they are made in vain, as being never put in execution. Here he assumes to himself to speak what he pleaseth to the disgrace of Christian Souldiers, and very little to his own reputation. Listen a little to his words: "*Adeſte mei Duces, date vestras Leges: Quid miſſatis? An nulla? An paucæ? Illa ipſa quæ sunt, irrita & pro nullis: Prefecto ita vivitur, libido pro lege est, Jurisque locum sibi vindicat enſis. Furta quis hodie punit? Imo, quis Raptus, & Cædes? Stuprum & Adulteria inter facinora Militaria cenſentur, & qua poſcunt aliquam Coram. Take it in English: "Come hither, says he, you Captains, and give me your Military Laws, that I may examine them, and compare them with those of the *Romans*: Why do you whisper? Have you none? Or have you but a few? Yea, these few are made in vain, and signifie nothing: you live so as*"

Pedantic In-  
folenec.

"if your Lust were your Law, and that your Sword usurps the place of Justice. "Who is it this day that punisheth Thefts? who is it that punisheth Robberies, Rapes, and Murthers? Whoredomes and Adulteries are accounted Military gallantries, and such as deserve the reward of some Crown. Assuredly, if all this be true, it must be granted, *Lipſius* hath reason enough to cry down the Modern Discipline. But before you believe, that Armies either were in his time, or have been since so Lawless and void of Discipline, I shall desire you to examine History, and daily practice; and then I doubt not but you will find this Author of ours was not always guided by exact truth in his assertions. Too many crimes have been, and are committed daily in our Armies, and so it was among the *Romans* too. Too many of them pass unpunish'd by the misunderstanding of great Commanders, and the carelessness and neglect of Inferiour Officers; and so it was among the *Romans* too. Nor dare *Lipſius* say that all crimes were punish'd among them, no, even in their severest times. These faults mention'd by him, as Thefts, Robberies, Murthers, Whoredomes and Adulteries, are punish'd as severely now, as when *Rome* was in her growing condition, and then she was in her purest times. Nor can *Lipſius*, or any for him, produce more severe Laws of War among his Ancient *Romans*, than Military constitutions were in his time, and yet are under most *European* Princes and States, as you may see in my Discourse of the Modern Laws of War; nor were punishments more frequent in their Armies, or more severe than in ours at this day, as you may likewise see in my discourse of Punishments and Rewards. And indeed, those Mutinies which fell out in the *Spanish* Armies, after the Duke of *Parma's* Death, and some before it, were infamous and inexcusable; yet no worse, nor so bad by half, as many were among the *Romans*; some whereof you may remember I have observ'd in another place.

Too many  
crimes unpun-  
ish'd both  
now and of  
old.

Our Author, in the close of his Comparison joyns with *Vegetius*, and crys up the *Roman* custome, in causing the *Roman* Souldiers to deposit at their Colours the half of their Pay, to be a stock to them after they had obtain'd their Dimissions. I think indeed, the custome and institution was good and commendable enough; but it is ridiculous to propose the imitation of it now, when for most part, Princes and States detain (without the consent of the Souldiers) in their own hand, some the half, some the third part, and some two parts of three of both Officers and Souldiers Wages; some Proviant-bread, and now and then a bit of Cheese being deducted.

To deposite  
half pay is  
now ridicu-  
lous.

The reason

To conclude, upon the whole matter of this Comparison, *Justus Lipſius* hath shown himself a good Antiquary, well travell'd abroad, but to be *Peregrinus domi*, a great stranger at home. And so I take my leave of him.

## CHAP. XXIX.

*Whether the profession of a Souldier be lawful.*

WAR being the subject of my Military Discourses, and therein I being necessitated to speak frequently of Soldiers; because without those, who either truly have, or profess to have skill in Military affairs, War cannot be managed, it will be fit to enquire, Whether the profession of a Soldier be lawful; that is, Whether it have any warrant in either Divine or Humane Law, or (which is the same) if it be against any of them. I do not here intend to question the lawfulness of War; for having spoke something of that, shall take it for granted, that War grounded on justifiable causes, is lawful. Nor do I make it a question, Whether Subjects that are able to bear Arms, are bound to serve their Princes in the Wars, as Soldiers. But the Quære shall be, Whether it be lawful to make a trade of Souldiery; that is, to learn no other Art, either Liberal or Mechanical, except to serve in the Wars for Pay, and thereby to gain a livelihood. The affirmative whereof I maintain, my opinion being grounded on the reasons mention'd in this following discourse. But first to shew cavilling, I shall easily grant, that it were much more commendable to learn some other Art, that when a lawful War is at an end, those who have serv'd in it, may work with their hands (as the Apostle says) and so get their livelihood, than to rove from Country to Country to look for employment in foreign Wars. And without all doubt, many of those who do so, cannot but be subject to very uncharitable thoughts, and unlawful desires; for whereas not only Christians, but all men, even as men, should desire and pray for Peace, as the greatest Earthly blessing mortals can enjoy; those who know not how to get a livelihood in time of Peace, long for War, and wish and pray for it; which cannot be done without great sin both against God and Humane Society. But I answer, all this is by accident, it is but the wickedness of the Souldier, not the profession of Souldiery, that makes him pray for War; for pious and morally honest Souldiers in time of Peace may put themselves in Domestick service, of either Gentlemen or Country Farmers, and so earn their bread, till they have a fair call to follow the Wars. But truly their condition for most part is very deplorable, for when they become lame or so old that they can serve no longer in the Wars, they are good for nothing but Hospitals; and because few of them can get into any of these, the rest must be contented to beg, as Troops of them do over all Christendome. In several great Towns of Germany I have seen Captains begging alms, and at *Brussels* and *Antwerp* I have known those who could retribute by their Palles, they had been Lieutenant-Colonels and Majors; much more others of a lower degree begging Charity in the Streets.

But I find nothing that occurs to my memory either in the Old or New Testament, that discharge the profession of Souldiery, that is, to serve for Pay in the Wars, whether these Souldiers have learn'd any other trade or not; yea, on the contrary, there be several passages that confirm me in my opinion. I shall not inforce *Abner, Tobit, Amasai, Benajab*, and others, who were meer Souldiers, and manag'd the Wars of *Saul, Ithobal, David and Solomon*: for it may be told me, these were Gentlemen, who had Estates, and needed learn no other Trade: but I shall say, that *Zeptan* had no Estate, having been banish'd from his patrimony by his Brethren, because he was a Balfard: He, I say, knew no other trade but Souldiery, and thereby maintain'd himself and his followers, and in the Land of *Tob* he learn'd and practis'd his Art of Souldiery, so happily against the Enemies of Gods people (for so *Deodat* interprets it) that his Country-men by a solemn Embasie, invited him to be their Captain General against the *Ammonites*, which he accepted, and wrought their deliverance.

Prov'd to be  
lawful.

rance. Here have you a Souldier, who knew no other Art or profession but that of Souldiery, approved of by the Lord, and elected by him and the people at *Missa*, to fight the Lords Battels against the Enemies of his people; and this very Souldier is reckon'd among the elect and faithful, by the Author of the Epistle to the *Hebrews*, Chap. 2. v. 32. In the Gospel we read that the Souldiers ask'd the *Baptist* what they should do to be sav'd: *Be contented with your wages*, said he, *and do violence to no man*. Here he bids them not learn other trades, and I am bound to believe, that most of those who ask'd him the question, if not all of them, were *Romans*, who knew no other livelihood but to be Souldiers, and were then quarter'd in *Judea*, to keep the *Jews* under the subjection of the *Roman* Emperours; and whether this was a lawful employment or not, shall be spoke to hereafter. The Apostle *Paul* moves the question, *Who goes to War on his own charges?* meaning none is bound to do it. Hence it will follow, that a Souldier may serve for wages; or if any will serve without wages, as some Volunteers do, it is not forbidden them; however in these two places, nothing being spoke against the profession of Souldiery, I may safely conclude, that the profession of a Souldier, without any other trade, is allow'd and authoriz'd by those two great Saints. Our blessed Lord bore witness, that the Centurion who said he was not worthy that our Saviour should come under his roof, had more Faith than he had found in *Israel*; and I make no doubt, but if the profession of Souldiery had been unlawful, he would have bid him learn some other Art wherewith to gain his livelihood: The like may be said of that Centurion, who sent to *Typpa* for St. *Peter* to come to *Cesarea*; for we find not that the Apostle, when he instructed that Captain and his Friends of the means of their Salvation, gave him either advice or command to learn any other trade than that of Souldiery; and it may not only be probably conjectured, but asserted, that these two Centurions had learn'd no other trade but that of Souldiery; as much may be said of a third Centurion, who confess'd our Saviour to be the Son of God, even when he saw him suffer on the Crofs as a Man, who, as Church Histories mention, dyed a Martyr for the Christian Faith.

Those of whom I speak, who know no Art or way of livelihood but by the trade of Souldiery, are ordinarily called, *Souldiers of Fortune*; though most of them might rather be call'd the *Sons of Misfortune*. From what I have said, this argument may be fram'd, that That Profession, Art, or Trade, that is neither directly, indirectly, or confectionally condemned by any Divine Law or Ordinance, mention'd in Holy Scripture, is in it self lawful; but the Profession or Art of Souldiery, without any relation to any other Art, is neither directly, indirectly, nor confectionally discharged in Scripture: *Ergo*, the profession of meer Souldiery is lawful. If it be objected here, That the *Apostle* writing to the *Corinthians*, orders every man that would eat, to work with his hands; I answer first, That the *Corinthians* being a people conquer'd by the *Romans*, were not permitted to be Souldiers; and next, if the command be general for all Nations, and in all Ages, then Souldiers are included, for they work with their hands, and very oft a bloody work. And if no Divine Law be against this profession, as little can it be alledged, That any positive Law of man hath forbid it; and daily experience teaches us, That all Princes and States make use of men who know no other trade but that of Souldiery; which they could not do without sin, if that profession were unlawful in it self. Nay, I have known the time, thirty years ago, when I serv'd in *Germany*, That Princes and States, though they bestow'd Levy-money very plentifully, could not get half so many of that profession as they desired; and at this very time when I write this, those *European* Princes who are hot in War with others, cannot get men enough of that trade; and yet I shall easily grant, they get more than they pay well.

But *Hugh de Grot*, commonly call'd *Grotius*, a very learned and grave Au-  
thor, towards the end of the Twenty fifth Chapter of his Second Book De *Jure  
Bellis ac Pace*, is a heavy Enemy to the trade of Souldiers; for he says,  
*Nullum vite genus est improbius, quam eorum, qui sine caula respectu, mercedem  
dant, militum*: No kind of life (says he) is so godless, as of those, who with-  
out regard to the cause, fight for wages; and he subjoyns, 'Et *quibus his fide  
plurima merces*: And with whom it is a Rule, That War is most lawful, where

**Grafine's option examined.**



greatest Pay is to be got. For answer, What if I grant all this, it will make just nothing against my assertion: The abuse of a thing cannot make the thing unlawful. I shall confess it is so as he says, with very many Souldiers, who have another false Maxime (which *De Gro* mentions not) and that is, it is all one with them whom they serve; so they serve faithfully. These are great faults in too many Souldiers, but all Souldiers not being guilty of them, all should not be charged with them; nor should the profession suffer for the fault of some of its professors. *De Gro* would have taken it unkindly, if I should have argued thus with him. No such a Godless kind of life, as of those, who without any regard to the justice of the cause, embrace the quarrels, though never so unjust, of such Clients who are best able to reward them; for though this be true enough in itself, yet *Grotius* would have thought, that by such an expression, I reflected on all Lawyers and Advocates, and their profession too; for it is certain, that too many Lawyers do so, which *Grotius* (who profess'd Law) knew but too well, and perhaps practis'd it too much. And as *Grotius* must confess, that it is a sin in an Advocate to plead for a Fee in a Clients cause, which he knows to be unjust; so I shall acknowledge all Souldiers to be sinners who fight in a cause which they know to be unjust. But I must tell you, there is a great difference between Souldiers and Lawyers in this case, for there be but few Advocates who cannot discern between the justice and injustice of the cause they undertake to defend; whereas on the other hand, there be but few, and very few Souldiers, who can discern between a just and an unjust cause, for which they are to fight. I knew a person abroad, who left an Honourable employment, in which he had gain'd much reputation, and went to his own Countrey to commence a War against his Prince; for being illiterate, he was not able to discern that he was fighting against Gods Ordinances, when he suffer'd himself to be persuaded by some skilful and learned men, that he was to fight for the cause of God.

That Souldier who serves or fights for any Prince or State, for wages, in a cause he knows to be unjust, sins damnable, and stands in need of both a sudden and serious repentance. But alas, how few of them can discern; and again, alas, how few of them study to discern, and inform themselves of the Justice or Unjustice of a cause! Besides, it is the sad fate of many of them, that being engaged in a foreign Prince's service, even in a just cause; when that War is at an end, the Prince begins a new War, and an unjust one, but will not permit his Souldiers to leave his service, as being tyed to him by their Military Sacrament; yet I think, if foreign Souldiers knew the War to be unjust, in such a case they should desert their employments, and suffer any thing that can be done to them, before they draw their Swords, against their own Consciences and Judgements, in an unjust quarrel.

*Grotius* tells us, that *St. Austin* says, *Militare non est delictum, propter pradam militare est peccatum*: To be a Souldier (says the Father) is no crime, but to serve in the Wars for booty is a sin; and I shall say so too: Yet neither *St. Austin* nor *Grotius* dare aver, but a Souldier, after the Victory, may take a share of the booty: It was a common practice of Gods people, the *Israelites*; and it is no where forbidden in Gods word: *Austins* meaning then must be, to fight merely for Booty, without any other motive, is a sin; and so I say too: But observe that the Father says not, *Militare propter mercedem est peccatum*: To fight for wages is a sin; for indeed it is no sin for a meer Souldier to serve for wages, unless his Conscience tells him, he fights in an unjust cause; but *Grotius* adds, *Imo & propter stipendium militare peccatum est, si id unice & precipue spectetur*: Yea, to fight for wages (says he) is a sin, if wages be chiefly and only look'd to. What if I grant him all this, it will not follow that the profession of pure and only Souldiery, without any other trade, is unlawful. If some Souldiers serve only for wages, without any consideration of the cause, all do not so: But what if the Souldier cannot know whether the cause for which he fights, be just or unjust; say, what if he conceive the cause to be most just, when it is truly in itself most unjust, shall we not presume, that in such a case, invincible Ignorance may plead an excuse with a merciful God; assuredly it should prevail much with the charity Christ hath commanded men to bear one to another. I am of the opinion, if *De Gro* had writ thus when his Masters, the Estates of the seven United Provinces, commenc'd their War against the King of Spain, they

*St. Austin* de-  
fended.

they would have given him but very sorry thanks for such doctrine, for they stood then in great need of men, (as perhaps they do this very day) and whether their quarrel with *Philip* the Second (who undoubtedly was their Sovereign one way or other) was just or unjust, was strongly debated among the wisest States-men, Politicians, Divines, and Lawyers in all Europe, and therefore could not be discerned by every dull and block-headed Souldier; it was enough for them to believe what their Masters said, That the cause was just; and therefore very lawful for them to serve for wages: And if those Estates had not begun the War, till all those who serv'd them, whose only trade was Souldiery, had been satisfied in their Judgements and Consciences concerning the justice of the War, I dare affirm they had never been either Free or Sovereign Estates.

What Judgement shall we make of all the Civil Wars of Germany, France, and Great Britain? certainly the cause of both parties could not be just; and yet, no doubt, all or most of each party thought their own cause the most just, and the only just cause; shall we therefore cast all, whose quarrel was most unjust, into the ever-burning flames of Hell? God forbid! Ignorance was the greatest sin of most of them; though it may be feared, many of the Leaders of the faction sinn'd against Conscience and Judgement. The late King of Sweden, *Charles Gustavus*, invaded Poland in the year 1655, examine the matter rightly, it was a most perfect breach of the twenty six years Truce, concluded and sworn in the year 1635, there being yet six years to run; but the poverty of the Swedish Court, of the Grandees, and General persons, concurring with the unlimited Ambition of that Martial King, trod upon all bonds of Equity, Law, and Justice, and carried on that Invasion; and that Kings Manifesto (though the poorest that ever was published) was so glided over with seeming reasons for the justification of his Arms, that thousands not piercing further than the external pretences, were fool'd into a belief that the cause was just, and were content to serve him for pay. What Court of Justice can condemn those innocents for sin; yet if *De Gro* presided in it, they would be condemn'd to the Gallows, and perhaps worse, as seditious and perjurd, Breakers of the Laws of Nations, Robbers and Thieves.

It is a question, Whether those Souldiers who made their address to *John the Baptist* serv'd in a just and lawful War or not? For my part, I think they did not; yet they serv'd their Master, the Roman Emperour, for pay, and thought the cause just, which I am confident, justified their service in an ill cause; otherwise the *Baptist* was oblig'd to tell them their quarrel was unjust, and if they continued in that service, they sinn'd damnable; but he rather encourag'd them to serve still, and be content with their pay, and wrong no man. *Grotius* would have handled them more roughly. That the cause wherein they serv'd was unjust and unlawful, I demonstrate thus: Whether *Pompey* and *Craesus* made War in the name of the Roman Senate, against the *Jews*, justly and lawfully, shall not be the debate, though I think they did not; but whether that War was just or not, *Julius Cesar* usurping the State, alter'd the cause: for as he had no just right to the Sovereignty of Rome; so he had as little to *Judea*: After his death, the Senate and People of Rome resumes the Sovereignty; but kept it not long, for it was soon taken from them by *Octavius*, *Antony*, and *Lepidus*, and so reduc'd to a Triumvirate: *Antony* and *Octavius* quickly robb'd *Lepidus* of his third, and so divided the Empire into two parts, each of them usurping the Sovereignty of his own share, to which neither of them had either just title or claim. While these two Brothers-in-law remained Friends, *Antony* gave the Kingdom of *Judea* to *Herod the Idumean*, in whose Reign our Blessed Lord was born. *Herod's* Title was very weak, for *Antony* himself had no just title to *Judea*: and *Qui non habet, non potest dare*: He who hath not cannot give. But *Antony* is beaten, and kills himself, and *Augustus* remains the sole Usurper of the whole Roman Empire: He by his usurped power confirms *Herod* in a Kingdom, to which neither the one nor the other had a just title. *Herod* the Great dyes, and his Son *Archelaus*, by *Augustus's* permission, succeeds, who could have no better title than his graceless Father had; upon his misdemeanours, *Augustus* banishes him, and reduces the Kingdom of *Judea* to a Province, giving

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ving a Tyranny to *Hered Antipater*, who beheaded the Baptist. All this power did *Augustus* usurp, the true Sovereignty of all these Countreys belonging not to him, but to the Senate of *Rome*; it being d to the *Romans* at all. *Augustus* dyes, and leaves *Tiberius* his adopted Son, to be Successor to his ill-got Empire: *Tiberius* proves a Tyrant, *avroque modo, sine titulo, & exercitio*; He wanted a just claim, because he who gave it him, wanted one himself: But *Tiberius* was wise enough to know, that *Quomodo aliquid acquiritur, eodem modo tenetur*; By what means a thing is acquir'd, by the same means it is kept: And therefore what his Predecessor had gain'd with his Sword, he resolves to maintain with the same, and therefore kept *Judea* Garrison'd with Souldiers. In the fifteenth year of his Cruel and Tyrannical Reign, about the time that *Jesus Christ* began to Preach, and manifested himself to be the *Messiah*, did the *Roman* Souldiers ask the Baptist, What they should do to be saved? But he neither bid them forsake their trade of Souldiery, or keeping it, to learn another; nor did he say to them, That though their profession of Souldiery was lawful, yet it was not lawful for them to serve in an unjust cause, or under an Usurper and a Tyrant, as *Tiberius* was: And truly this passage is very observable for my purpose, for if it had been told those Souldiers, That they incur'd the hazzard of eternal damnation by serving in an unjust War, they should presently have laid down their Arms, though the Tyrant should have put them all to death for it: So it seems to me, the Baptist thought invincible Ignorance excused them, not knowing the cause to be unjust. But assuredly, if *Tiberius* had ask'd him the question, What he should do? *Ihn* would have bid him resign the Government over to the Senate, and be contented with his own proper goods, and to do no more violence to any man. I believe none will offer to justify the Invasions and bloody Ambition of the Emperor *Maximianus*, and yet the *Thibon* Legion, which was compos'd of Christians, serv'd him faithfully in his Wars, and refus'd none of his Commands, except to Sacrifice to Idols, and for that all of them receiv'd the Crown of Martyrdom; either they thought it did not concern them to examine the cause, or they thought it was just; which was enough to save them from the injustice of it; we may observe here, That neither our Saviour, the Baptist, or any of their Apostles or Disciples ever seem'd to take notice of the Usurpation or Tyranny of either *Augustus*, *Tiberius*, *Caligula*, *Claudius*, *Nero*, or *Damianus*; in whose reign (if I mistake not) the longest liv'd Apostle dyed: Our Saviour, as Man not meddling with Secular Powers, his Kingdome not being of this World, both himself and his Apostles ever inculcating on all his followers and Disciples passive obedience to all Superior Powers, even without exception of Tyrants.

*Tiberius* his title to the *Roman* Empire was no better than that of his Predecessor, who gave him both the Empire and Title; but *Augustus* had no just title to that Sovereignty which he had usurped, which is clear enough by the History, and much more clear by a resolution he once took to restore the Supreme power to the Senate and the People; but wavering in his thoughts, being loth to wrong his Natural Confidence, by keeping that which did not belong to him; and as loth to make himself a Subject, since he had been a Sovereign: He call'd his two great Friends and Favourites, *Agrippa* and *Mecenas* to his Council, protesting he would do in that business as they would advise him: *Agrippa* in a long Speech counsel'd him to do Justice, and resign his power; but *Mecenas* in as long an harangue advis'd him to retain the Sovereignty for the good of the people, preferring Monarchy to both Aristocracy and Democracy; the last Speech fitting the ambition of *Augustus*, by which only he had power to devolve the Succession of his usurpation, by which only he had power to devolve the Succession of his Empire to *Tiberius*. Nor could this *Tiberius* pretend prescription; for That, as Lawyers say, orders possession to be one hundred years old, and all *Augustus* his Reign, even from the first time of his Triumvirate, consisted but of fifty six years. But I believe, Lawyers say also, That in Sovereignties there is no prescription of time, but whenever the just owner can, he may resume his power, which the *Roman* Senate knew very well; when *Nero* fled out of the City, and deserted the Government, they made a Decree, That the Monstrous Tyrant should be put to death *more majestatis*; that was, to be well whipp'd, and then

then have his Head cut off. Now we must be very wary to aver, That the Souldiers who were in *Tiberius* his pay, serv'd in a just War; because their Master was left Successor by *Augustus* his Testament; and had the Empire confirm'd to him, by the Votes of the Senate and People of *Rome*; for if that made him a lawful Prince, and his Wars just, then the Armies which serv'd in *Scotland*, *England* and *Ireland*, under *Richard Cromwell*, the pretended Protector of the three Nations, serv'd in a just and lawful War; and under a just and lawful Prince; for *Richard* had the Protectorship and Sovereignty left him by his Father *Oliver* the Usurper, and had the supreme power confirm'd to him by the greater, the more visible and governing party of the three Kingdomes: But as no honest person will aver this, so the other of *Tiberius* can be granted by no judicious man. The Corollary of this discourse will be, first, That the profession of pure Souldiery, though join'd with no other trade, is lawful; as also that a Souldier may serve in an unjust and unlawful War, and under an unjust Master, provided he think the Cause and the War just and lawful, because his Ignorance may excuse him. On the other hand, I think, if a Souldier know the cause to be unjust, and the War not to be lawful; nay, if he doubt whether it be just and lawful or not, if he continues to serve in it, he sins heinously, for *qui dabitur damnabitur*, may hold true in this case.

But *De Grot* in the same place formerly cited, takes a liberty to himself to render the Profession, the Trade, or the Art of a Souldier not only impious, but most contemptible, detestable and despicable: Let us hear him in his own language. "*Parum, quod suam vendunt necem* (says *Grotius*) *nisi & aliorum laps* " *Innocentium vendant*; *tanto, Carnifices detestabiliores, quanto pejus est, sine causa, quam ex causa occidere. Sicut Amisthenes dicebat, Carnifices Tyrannis estis* " *ores, quod illi Nocentes, hi Innocentes interfecerunt*: It were no matter, said he, if Souldiers sold only their own lives (or rather their own deaths) but they sell also the lives of others, and often of Innocents; as much are they more detestable than a Hangman, as it is worse to kill without a cause, than with a cause. *Amisthenes* said, Hangmen were more religious than Tyrants, because the first puts to death those who are guilty, the last those who are innocent. This language, Monsieur *de Grot*, is indeed severe enough, but multa dicit, pauca probat: Indeed, I think few men would have fancied, that such impertinencies could have dropp'd from the Pen of so learn'd and so wise a man as *Grotius* was esteem'd to be. For first, I shall answer, That it belongs not to the profession of a Souldier, either to sell his own life, or the life of another; much less to sell the life of an Innocent. It is a Souldiers profession, to hazzard his life (not sell it) in the Prince or States service, with whom he has stipulated for wages; and when he is commanded by his Superiors to fight, he is oblig'd to do it, as well as he can, against all that are in Arms against him; and if he kill any of them, it is so far from being his fault, that it is his duty; it is their own fault that are kill'd, who would by fighting, defend an unjust cause: for it must be observed, that both parties think they have Justice on their side, and yet but one of the parties hath it; nor does a Souldier in heat of fight, kill any innocent man, because all his Enemies, and all in Arms against him, are represented to him as guilty, and as such are seeking to take his life; and Nature teacheth all men, That it is better to kill than to be kill'd, because of two evils the least evil is to be chosen. It were to be wish'd, that War might be ended, and an Enemy overcome without killing; for a bloodless Victory is the most honourable: But if that cannot be done, it is folly, nay, madness, to say that Souldiers should not kill their Enemies. I confess, too many Souldiers are cruel in putting to death those whom they might spare, as such who yield themselves Prisoners, and yet this many times in the heat and ardour of Battel cannot be done without danger) or old people, Women, Children, in assaults and storms: this is the Souldiers excess, this is their fault, this is their crime, (unless they be commanded to do it, which seldom falls out;) but this should not reflect on the profession of Souldiery, as *Grotius* makes it to do; since by the Law of Arms, such peoples lives should be spared; the faults of some should

not be imputed to all, as *Grotius* does here, and therein he is most unjust. I ask, If some Lawyers, by collusion with the contrary party, betray the cause of their Clients; if some Physicians poison their Patients; and some Pastors of Churches, by preaching Heresie and Schism, kill their Flocks? Must all Lawyers be called Knaves and Cheats? all Physicians Poisoners? and all Ministers of the Gospel Soul Murderers? God forbid. I confess, when Souldiers kill without cause, they are more detestable than Hangmen, and deserve to be punish'd by the hands of Hangmen; but *Grotius* was bound in reason to have limited his expression, and not have extended it to all Souldiers, as his words bear; and herein he is not only malicious, but ridiculous, in supposing that Souldiers always kill without cause, and never with cause; for if this be true, all War is unlawful, which *Grotius* durst never mutter, far less speak out; for in a lawful War, Souldiers kill with cause, and when they do it without cause, they are liable to punishment and censure. This unlimited and general expression of *Grotius*, renders *Moses*, *Jehonab*, and all those famous *Israelites*, who destroy'd the *Canaanites*; *Saul*, *Samuel*, and others who put the *Amalekites* to the Sword; *David* and his Worthies, who killed thousands and ten thousands of the uncircumcised, and *Joab* who killed so many *Israelites* in *Abshalom's* Rebellion, and all those of the eleven Tribes who had well near destroy'd the Tribe of *Benjamin*: *Grotius*, I say, makes them all more detestable than Hangmen. And what is it to the purpose to tell us, *Antisthenes* said, That Tyrants are not so pious as Hangmen, because the last puts only the guilty, the first the innocent to death. What hath that to do with the profession of a Souldier, of which *De Gro* was speaking: As sure as all Tyrants are not Souldiers, as certain it is that all Souldiers are not Tyrants. Besides, this great man supposeth in his comparison, that which is a manifest untruth, That Hangmen put none to death but those who are guilty; certainly *Grotius* did know that most, if not all those Innocents, against whom Tyrants have pronounced the Sentence of Death, especially in the ten first Persecutions, were executed by the hands of bloody and cruel Hangmen, whom *De Gro* with a strange and odd kind of Charity, prefers before Souldiers. I doubt *Grotius* did not believe, that the Hangman that beheaded *Oldenbernevelt*, at the *Hague*, with whom *Grotius* was *Socius Criminis*, struck off the Head of a guilty man, for assuredly he thought him an Innocent.

I am afraid *De Gro* wrote this (though it came not to light till six years after) when he was Prisoner at *Lovenstein*, beside *Gorcum*; where he had conceiv'd a mortal hatred against Souldiers, perhaps because they guarded him too severely. His comparing Souldiers to Hangmen may have proceeded from the restless agitations of his troubled thoughts, which may have continually represented to his fancy the Idea or Image of one of those Officers of Justice, who had cut off the Head of his Complice *John Oldenbernevelt*, Advocate of *Holland*, and would have done as much to another of his Complices, *Giles Leidenberg*, if he had not usurp'd the Hangmans Office, and cut his own Throat; it being most certain, that *Grotius* himself might have run such a hazzard, if his kind Wife had not got him carried away in a Coffin, pretending it was full of Books, and at that time sure he was oblig'd to Souldiers for neglecting to search the Coffin.

The same great man *Grotius*, in the before-cited place goes further, and says, "*Non est inter Artificia, bellum, imo res est tam horrenda, ut eam, nisi summa necessitas, aut vera charitas honestam officere nequeat*": War, says he, is not to be reckon'd among Artifices; nay, it is so horrible a thing that nothing can make it honest but extreme necessity, or true Charity. Well, I shall be content to take what he grants, and that is, That War sometimes is honest, and if so, I think he must grant, that those who manage that honest War, and those are Souldiers, may be sometimes honest, and therefore not more detestable than Hangmen. Nor do I think any sober man, endued with any reasonable proportion of solid Judgement, though he had never heard of the name of Jesus Christ, but will readily grant, That War being the greatest scourge of mankind, should not be begun till either our own extreme necessity, or the Love and Charity we owe to our Neighbours force us to it;

*Grotius* uncharitable.

it; and herein do all the Moral Philosophers, and the wise Rulers of the Ancient Heathens, fully agree with Christian Doctors. But how shall that War, which either extreme necessity on our own part, or Charity on our Neighbours, makes lawful, be managed but by Souldiers? And how can Souldiers obtain the Victory, but by killing sometimes their Enemies? And with what Credit, nay, with what Conscience, or with what comfort can Souldiers kill their Enemies, if the very killing them, render Souldiers more detestable than Hangmen? If *Grotius* had said, That those Souldiers who kill'd impotent old Men, Women and Children, or Prisoners in cold blood (as too many do) are more detestable than Hangmen, I should never have debated the matter with him, no more than with reason he can contradict me, if I say, That those Advocates (and *Grotius* was an Advocate) who betray the causes of their Clients, who take money and wages from both parties; I add also, Those who undertake the patronage of a cause, which themselves know to be unjust and illegal, are more detestable than the worst of those who hang men on a Gallows.

But what this great and learned man means, when he writes, *Non est inter artificia Bellum*, I do not very well know; if he means there are no artifices in War, he makes a fool of himself, for what shall then become of all those laudable and lawful Stratagems that are used in War, which he himself in his Book *De Jure Belli ac pacis*, both mentions and commends: If he means War is not an Art, he speaks palpably against Sense, Reason, and Experience; for the management of War is an Art, and as a most noble, so a most necessary Art: *Machiavelli*, Recorder of *Florence*, writes seven Books of the Art of War, and yet in one of them denies War to be an Art. All Tactics write of the Art of War, the way to handle Arms, Sword, Dagger, Cannon, Musket, Pistol, Pike, Partizan, or Halberd; or in more ancient times (before the Monk found out Gun-powder) the way to handle the *Roman Pila*, Javelines, Darts, Arrows, Bows, Slings, Stones, and other Missiles; do all prove there is Art in War. The ordering Souldiers in Files, Ranks, Troops, Companies, Squadrons, Battalions, Regiments, and Brigades; the marshalling and conduct of Armies, fighting of Battels, besieging and attacking Towns, Castles, and defending them, do all bear witness, that War is an Art, and more than an ordinary one: It cannot therefore be, that so wise a man as *Grotius* could think that War is not an Art, but positively to tell what he means by those words, is not in my power; and if others can tell no better than I, we must be content to want the true sense of them, till *Grotius* rise from the dead in the day of Judgement; and then, I suppose, it will not be time to inquire after such follies.

*Nicholas Machiavel* in the Fourth Book of his Art of War (if I remember right) is yet more severe to profess'd Souldiers than *Hugo Grotius*; for he says, That no Prince or State should suffer those who profess to live by the Art of War, to dwell under their Jurisdictions, or in their Dominions. This is bad enough, but worse follows, for he adds, that no virtuous nor good man will profess Souldiery to be their livelihood, or use War as an Art or Trade; and those who do it, says he, must of necessity be false, fraudulent, treacherous and violent. I have answered his Raveries in the first Chapter of my Military Essays of the Modern Art of War: Here I shall only say, That it were a disgrace for the Art of Souldiery to be commended by one, whose Political Rules introduce Atheism, Tyranny, and Cruelty; and who sets up *Cesar Borgia*, the Bastard of Pope *Alexander* the Sixth, to be a Pattern for Princes; than whom the Sun never look'd on a person more abandon'd to the contempt of a Deity, guilty of Inhumanity, Treachery, Lechery, and barbarous Cruelty. Let either Christian or all Morally honest men judge, whether this Author, this Atheist, this *Machiavel*, should have been permitted to have liv'd within the Territories of either Christian Prince or State.

Those who condemn the Profession or Art of Souldiery, smell rank of Anabaptism and Quakery, both which Sects condemn all War as unlawful; for I conceive, those who grant War to be sometimes both lawful and necessary, must of necessity grant, that it is lawful for some to study the Art, how to manage

*Grotius* unintelligible.

*Machiavelli* answered.

manage that War with the greatest advantage. Those who are fittest to study it are those who have no other trade or livelihood, for that is the mean to make them study it the more accurately; and when they have attain'd to some perfection in it, why they may not make a Profession of it, and teach it to others for wages, I know not: Do not all professors of Divinity, Medicine, Philosophy, teach others their Arts and Sciences for wages? Yes assuredly; and why should it be denied to a profess'd Souldier to teach his Art to others for wages, *Musamibi causus memora*: What I speak of teaching others, I mean of all Military Officers, who by their command and charges are oblig'd to teach their Art to those under their command; and since Souldiery is a practical Art, Souldiers of all kinds may serve in the Wars (provided the cause seem just to them) as well as Chirurgeons may cure men for wages, that are hurt or wounded in the Wars. Histories tell us, and our experience and sense teach us, That Peace and War are alternative, and there be but few Kingdoms in the World that have not felt the smart of War, as long as they have enjoyed the fruits of Peace. May not I then conclude, That the Art of Souldiery and the Profession of it for wages, is as lawful, and as necessary too, as the profession of any of those Arts or Sciences, which can neither be conveniently taught, or learn'd, but in the time of Peace.

St. Paul's authority.

But to conclude, I avouch that St. Paul's opinion concerning this question was the same with mine; and I have reason to think, That great Apostle's authority will weigh more with men who profess the name of Christ, than either *Grotius* or *Machiavel*: If I mistake not, that great Doctor of the *Geniles* thought the Art of Souldiery, consider'd a part, and distinguish'd from all other Arts, either Liberal or Mechanical, very lawful, and therefore compar'd not the professors of it to infamous people, such as *Grotius* knew Hangmen to be. On the contrary, the Apostle proposes a pure Souldier, who waited only on his own Art of War, as a fit example for his Son *Timothy* to follow: Read the third and fourth verses of the second Chapter of his Second Epistle to *Timothy*, you will find these words, *Thou therefore endure hardness, as a good Souldier of Jesus Christ. No man that warreth, entangleth himself with the things of this life, that he might please him who hath hired him to be a Souldier.* The French Translation hath it, *the affairs of this life*; the Italian, *the doings of this life*; the German hath it, *no Warriour seeks another livelihood.* This is much, and more than I desire; for, I think, it were good for Souldiers to have learned some other Art, or Trade, than that of Souldiery only. *Deodati* expounds these words [*in the doings of this life*]; that is, says he, in such affairs, such Art, or such Trades, as may hinder a Souldier in his duty of Souldiery. Be that as it will, I avouch, That the Apostle in these words, pronounceth the pure Art of a meer Souldier, without any other Art or Trade, to be most lawful, else he had made no apposite comparison between *Timothy* and a Souldier; which, I presume, none who hath read *Paul's* Epistles, and believes them to be endited by the Holy Ghost, will be so impious as to fancy. By this Text, a Christian man may very lawfully apply himself to the profession of pure Souldiery, without learning any other Art or Trade. And I think also, that *Timothy* was exhorted, if not commanded to apply himself only to the Ministry of the Gospel, and to no other Art; yet if he had learn'd any other way of livelihood, before *Paul* circumcis'd him, it would not have been forbid him: *Paul* himself, before his conversion, had learn'd to be a Tent-maker, which he exercis'd for his livelihood, when he preach'd the Gospel: *Luke* the Evangelist, before his Baptism, was a Physician, which, no doubt, he practis'd all the time he accompanied St. Paul in his Voyages. But, I think, by this Text, men are forbid to learn any other Art, after they are actual Ministers of the Gospel. And therefore, I conceive, Church-men are forbid to have plurality of Professions; which perhaps they will be contented to hear with better will, than to have it told them, That plurality of Benefices is forbidden the Clergy.

St. Austine's authority.

But because *Grotius* hath made use of St. Austine's authority against me, in this question which I have cleared, I shall presume to cite that same Father in defence of my cause: It is true, I have read but few of his learned Books, but

but the passage I mind to speak of, I have read, cited by a very worthy and credible Author; and though he cites it for another purpose, yet finding it makes very much for mine, I could not chuse but make use of it: The words are in one of his Books against the *Manichees*, and are these, "*Non est peccatum nisi a Deo, sine jubente, sine suante; Ergo vir justus, si forte sub Rege etiam Sacri lego militat, recte peccat, illo jubente, Bellare; quemadmodum enim Regem sacri regni Iniquitas imperandi, ita Innocentem Militem facit ordo serviendi.*" English me this, Monsieur de *Gros*; but because you either cannot or will not, I both can and will: There is no power, says he, but from God, either commanding or permitting it, therefore if sometimes a Righteous man serves as a Souldier under a Sacrilegious King, he may lawfully fight when he is commanded; for as the sin of commanding makes that King Guilty, so the obedience of serving makes that Souldier Innocent. This is more than I have yet said, this great and pious Divine seems to me to assert, That a Souldiers Art is not only lawful, but that he is bound to fight when commanded, even in a cause, the Justice whereof does not appear to him; yea, though the Injustice of it be made apparent to him. But assuredly St. Austine meant to except those things which are diametrically against the word and Will of God; for the rule holds firm and perpetual, Better obey God than Man: In other matters, the Souldier is not so strictly to examine the quarrel, the sin of commanding to fight in an unjust cause, rendering the Souldiers obedience in fighting, blameless and innocent. Hence it will follow, That a profess'd Souldier, who knows no other Art or Trade, may lawfully make profession of his skill, and practise it in any part of the World for wages, so he fight not for those who are profess'd Enemies of the name of Christ, against those who profess it; for I do not at all doubt, but Christian Souldiers, who make a profession of Souldiery, and have no other way of livelihood but to fight for wages, may very lawfully serve either the *Sophi of Persia*, or the great Mogul of *India*, against the Great Turk, because though they be all three equally blasphemous adorers of the *Alcoran*; yet the Wars of the first two may divert the Grand Signior from the Invasion of Christendome.

Give me leave to take the help of another Doctor, and Father of the Christian Church, and that is *Tertullian*, whom I find cited by many others, to prove taking Arms against Sovereign power unlawful. The passage is in that Apologetick which he wrote in vindication of the Primitive Christians, persecuted by Heathen Emperours: I shall only cite the words that I conceive make for my purpose; "*Cui Bello non prompti fuimus? cui Bello non idonei, etiam impares Copiis, qui nunquam libenter cruciadamur?*" To what War, says he, were we not fit? to what War were we not ready, though fewer in number of forces, who now are content willingly to be slain? In these words observe that profess'd Christians were Souldiers, and fought willingly, and without constraint, (and for pay too you may be sure) under the Banners of Heathen, yea, Persecuting Emperours, without examining the Justice of the War, which ordinarily was very oft wanting with those Princes, who measured the equity of their cause by the length of their Sword. I doubt not, but the War which the Tyrant *Maximianus* made, was neither just nor lawful, yet the *Theban Legion*, consisting of six thousand Christians, serv'd faithfully in that War, and found no opposition in their Consciences to that Military employment: But when that Pagan Emperour commanded them to Sacrifice to his false Deities and Idols, then they flatly refus'd obedience, knowing surely they were not oblig'd to disobey God, by giving obedience to Man; and offer'd their Throats to be cut, and gave their Bodies to be butcher'd to death by the rest of his Heathen Army. *Julian* the Apostate, who with both force and fraud, endeavour'd to root out the Christian Name and Religion, had thousands of Christians who served under him in his Wars, who, I suppose, never examin'd the Justice of them; for if they had, they would have found that even that very War he made against the *Persians*, (wherein he dyed, as is said, blaspheming the name of the Son of God) was grounded only on Ambition to enlarge the limits of the *Roman Empire*; and such a reason even the moral Heathen, much less the Christians, did never acknowledge.

acknowledge to be a just or lawful cause of War. By vertue then of these passages and precedents, Soldiers may make a profession of the Art of War, and may practise it, and serve for Wages, though they neither know, nor examine, whether the cause be just or not. But I shall conclude this discourse, as they say *Bellarmino* did one of his; but in another case, and say, It is most safe to trust to the Justice and Equity of the cause, and to examine it well, before men engage in it.

FINIS.

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